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Hoplites and heresies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2013

A. J. Holladay
A. J. Holladay
Affiliation:
Trinity College, Oxford
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Extract

Fundamental questions have recently been raised about the way hoplites fought and about reason for the survival of this curious form of warfare over a period of some three centuries. The present paper seeks to examine the grounds on which traditional views have been assailed.

The traditional view is that in the fully-developed hoplite line the soldiers were packed closely together, each man relying on his right-hand neighbour for protection because his own shield, on his left arm, could not adequately cover his right side. A famous consequence of this situation was the tendency for the man on the extreme right of the line to edge further to his right in order to outflank the enemy and protect his own vulnerable side. This process is attested in Thucydides and elsewhere.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 102 , November 1982 , pp. 94 - 103
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1982

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References

1 Cawkwell, G. L., Philip of Macedon (London 1978) 150–3Google Scholar; Cartledge, Paul, JHS xcvii (1977) 11–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The latter article is only concerned in part with the issue of the survival of hoplite warfare.

2 Thuc. v 71.1, cf. Xen., Hell, iv 2.18–19Google Scholar.

3 For the figures see Pritchett, W. K., The Greek State at War i (Berkeley 1974) 134–43Google Scholar.

4 The mention of a soldier as promachos in a funerary inscription is surely eulogistic and hardly to be offset against the picture in Thucydides' account of normal hoplite behaviour (cf. n. 2). But it is clear that on occasions brave, or foolhardy, soldiers ran out and broke the line, as in the Anapus battle (cf. n. 11) and he may have been such a one. As for pictures of duels between hoplites on fifth-century vases, these are not clearly related to hoplite fighting of the developed kind and may perhaps be regarded as heroic. I am indebted to Professor J. B. Boardman for this comment.

5 Thuc. v 67. In the Funeral Oration (Thuc. ii 39.1) Pericles is represented as chiding the Spartans for their laborious application to military training. There is no reason to attribute this view to Thucydides himself as his account of the effects of Spartan training at Mantineia is respectful.

6 He suggests that the abnormal Theban depth was to provide reserves (cf. n. 13) but this was clearly not the case with the normal depth of 8 ranks.

7 Thuc. iv 126.

8 Thuc. v 66. 1–2.

9 Thuc. vi 69.1.

10 Xen., Hell, vii 5.22Google Scholar.

11 Thuc. vi 70.3.

12 Thuc. iv 96.2.

13 Cawkwell's suggestion, (n. 1) 15, that the rear ranks in the deep Theban formations must have been intended as reserves in a second stage of the battle, and not for pressure in an early othismos, hardly fits the evidence. If they were reserves why were they not kept out of the fray, as were those at the battle on the Anapus (Thuc. vi 67.1) or at Amphipolis (Thuc. v 9.8)—the cases he cites as parallel? This suggestion also flouts the evidence of the importance of the pressure of the deep ranks and of a breakthrough on a narrow front, Xenophon, (Hell, vi 4–14)Google Scholar describes the Spartans as being pressed back by the mass (of Thebans) at Leuctra and adds the revealing detail that Boeotian merchants and baggage-carriers grouped themselves behind the army, thus adding bulk and mass to it. They were not armed as hoplites, so they had nothing to contribute but weight for the othismos. Buckler, John, The Theban Hegemony 371–362 BC (Cambridge, Mass. 1980) 63–4 and 216–18Google Scholar, endorses the traditional view of the deep Theban ranks.

14 Xen., Hell, vii 5.23Google Scholar mentions this tactic specifically at the battle of Mantineia in 362, and Cawkwell, , CQ xxii (1972) 262Google Scholar, very reasonably argues that it was also true of Leuctra. Xenophon says that the prime Theban aim was to defeat the Spartan right wing and hence the massed Theban force was placed on their own left wing.

15 Cawkwell's view (discussed in n. 13) that the rear ranks of Theban armies were a reserve would mean that the casualties of the single combats could hardly be decisive since a large part of the army would not be involved. Even when hoplite armies were deployed on a broader front, in the normal manner, the casualty figures in all reliable cases are small: Marathon—192; Plataea—91 Spartans, 16 Tegeates, 52 Athenians; Delium—500 Boeotians, nearly 1,000 Athenians; Mantineia (418)—1,100 Argives and allies, 300 Spartans.

16 Op. cit. (n. 1).

17 Hdt. vii 9 β and reference by Cartledge (n. 1) 18. Cf. also W. K. Pritchett (n. 3) ii (1979) 180 ff. Adventurous generals like Brasidas and Demosthenes did go in for ambushes.

18 Op. cit. (n. 1) n. 83. The emphasis is mine.

19 Recent writers who have discussed this idea are: Gomme, A. W., HCT i (1945) 10–15Google Scholar, Anderson, J. K., Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley 1970) 5Google Scholar, and de Ste Croix, G. E. M., Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London 1972) 190–6Google Scholar.

20 Hdt. i 82–3, Thuc. v 41. Note also Mardonius' challenge to the Spartans before the battle of Plataea Hdt. ix 48).

21 Op. cit. (n. 4) 12–13. All allusions to Gomme's discussion of passes come from these pages.

22 Thuc. iv 94.1.

23 Xen., Hell, iv 6.10–11Google Scholar. He was allowed to pass freely through Aetolia but he had to fight through a narrow pass in Akarnania.

24 Cf. de Ste Croix (n. 19) 193–4.

25 Xen., Hell, v 4.14Google Scholar.

26 Ibid. v 4.36.

27 Ibid. v 4.47. In this year Agesilaus made moves within Boeotia as if he were going to approach Thebes by way of Thespiae. The Thebans guarded the pass from Thespiae and Agesilaus then went by the direct road. It was not difficult to find a way if there was a will.

28 Ibid. v 4.49.

29 Ibid. v 4.63.

30 Ibid. vi 1.1.

31 Ibid. vi 4.4.

32 Ibid. v 4.16.

33 Ibid. vi 4.5.

34 Thuc. i 105.3.

35 Cawkwell (n. 1) 142.

36 Cartledge (n. 1) 25.

37 Cf. Parke, H. W., Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford 1933) 3–6Google Scholar. It is noteworthy that the Eastern dynasts were not content with the mere purchase, or manufacture, of hoplite equipment.

38 Hdt. ix 49.2–3.

39 Diod. Sic. xv 38.

40 Arrian Anab. ii 10.4–6Google Scholar.

41 Cartledge (n. 1) 24. The emphasis is mine.

42 Contempt for light-armed troops appears clearly Thuc. vi 69, but in a matter of this kind we cannot regard his judgment as final since he could well have been the victim of a general upper-class prejudice.

43 It is true that Epaminondas seems to have made use of cavalry in the main battles at Leuctra and Mantineia and this was an innovatory supplement, but the depth of the hoplite ranks seems to have been the crucial factor.

44 On occasions other Greek lines are drawn up 12 or 16 deep, but not more.

45 Cf. Cartledge (n. 1) 17. He fails to comment on the willingness of Athenian commanders to undertake sieges.

46 They must have relied on the force of social discipline, as have many authoritarian regimes which have dared to allow weapons to the deprived. Cf. Holladay, , CQ xxvii (1977) 124Google Scholar for references to the ancient evidence.

47 Snodgrass, A. M., JHS lxxxvii (1967) 19Google Scholar and other references in Cartledge (n. 1) 25.

48 Thuc. vii 27.1.

49 Thuc. iv 127–8.

50 Hdt. ix 29, Thuc. v 67–75.

51 Thuc. iv 93.3.

52 Xen., Hell, iv 5.11–17Google Scholar.

53 Cf. Holladay, , G&R xxiv (1977) 44–5 and n. 34Google Scholar.

54 The choruses in both Acharnians and Wasps and Demos in Knights are all so described. It is possible that attempts were made to heighten hoplite claims to distinctive credit for Salamis. Cf. Fornara, C. W., JHS lxxxvi (1966) 51–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55 [Xen., ] Ath. Pol. i 2, ii 1Google Scholar.

56 Cartledge (n. 1) n. 97, cites a work on the thought of Mao (with which I cannot claim familiarity) as evidence for Mao's very just view that ‘the acceptance of technological progress rapidly undermines both the ideas on which their rule is based and the ideas serving as its justification’. This was apparently a judgement on the Mandarins of China, but it might be thought to throw some light on the Cultural Revolution, which was apparently designed to devalue and obstruct the acquisition of technical and cultural skills. But threats and challenges from without seem to have achieved their usual effect. Technological progress, with all its dangers, is now to be resumed. Mao's apparent successor, Den Xiao Ping, is reported to have said recently: ‘Of course some decadent capitalist influences will be brought into China. We are aware of this but … we are not afraid of it.’ Mutatis mutandis, so said they all.