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A forgotten factor of Greek naval strategy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2013

A. W. Gomme
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Extract

It is a common-place of most scholars, followed enthusiastically by writers of text-books, that Greek sailors did not like the sea; they went from island to island, or crept along the coast. Rarely did they leave the sight of land, and then only the most venturesome; and they did not sail by night. I don't know that I have seen it stated in so many words, but it is implied that the close relations between Miletus and Sybaris were maintained by voyages across the Aegean to Corinth (e.g.: ‘Corinth becomes the centre of exchange with Italy: it pays better to break cargo at the isthmus than to sail round the stormy coasts of the Peloponnese’), thence (but in Milesian or foreign ships?) through the gulf, up the north-west coast to Corcyra, hurriedly and anxiously across to Otranto, then, following every curve of the coast, past Tarentum and Metapontum, to their goal. If goods must go further, as so many did to Etruria, they took another isthmus-route overland to Laus or Scidrus, thence along the coast again, even as far as Massalia and Emporiae.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 53 , Issue 1 , 1933 , pp. 16 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1933

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References

1 Rostovtzeff, , History of the Ancient World, I. p. 201Google Scholar. Thucydides regarded the isthmus as a land-bridge between North Greece and the Peloponnese, as we do, not between two seas: (I. 13. 5).

2 Dem. LVI., XXXII.

3 Dem. LVI. 9.

4 Dem. XXXII. 5–8. The agreement cited in XXXV. 10–12 is for a voyage from Piraeus to Mende or Scione and the Bosporus, thence by the west coast to Borysthenes, and a return direct to Piraeus.

5 IV. 86.

6 Thuc. II. 97 also shows that night voyaging was common. But it is unnecessary to multiply instances; the fact that some knowledge of the stars was necessary for the skilled seaman is sufficient proof. It is only necessary to stress the fact. And that trading by sea in winter was avoided if possible was due, not so much to the fear of bad weather, as to the difficulty of sailing on cloudy nights, and even cloudy days, with no stars or sun as guide, and no compass.

7 All of these ‘passengers’ and the crew could, in case of shipwreck, take to the ship's one λέμβος (Dem. XXXII). Ordinary passengers, however, sometimes had little chance of safety: Dem. XXXIV. 10, when thirty were drowned, the master and the crew saved.

8 Three days' supply just before a battle was taken in by the Corinthians: Thuc. I. 48. 1.

9 See in particular Xen., Hell. VI. 2Google Scholar. 27–30, Iphicrates' expedition round the Peloponnese; keeping in mind that Xenophon was a landsman.

For the importance of the water-supply for all ships, see Stadiasmus Maris Graeci (Geogr. Gr. Min. I. 427 ff.), which gives directions where water was to be found; Plut., Quaest. Gr. 54Google Scholar; and Athen. V. 208A: all quoted by Cary and Warmington, , Ancient Explorers, 6–8Google Scholar.

10 Dem. L (c. Polyclem). 22.

11 Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments, 1930, p. 124.

12 Op. cit., and ‘The Greek Warship,’ JHS. 1905, pp. 137, 204.

13 Das Antike Seewesen, Berlin, 1923, and in Kromayer, u. Veith, , Heerwesen u. Kriegführung, Munich, 1928Google Scholar (in Müller's Handbuch). Indeed both Köster and Tarn somewhat exaggerate the unseaworthiness of the trireme, its helplessness in bad weather, for example. We seldom hear of Athenian fleets destroyed by storm; after Arginusae the undamaged vessels survived well enough.

14 Seewesen, pp. 186–7. He also (p. 143) has much of interest about Greek sailing, pointing out, as is unfortunately still necessary, that it is not true that they could only sail with a following wind. See also p. 81, on the Homeric sailor.

15 The Greek fleet might, as a matter of fact, have been stationed at Artemisium with the army in Thessaly, if it could have been sure of holding the enemy fleet; for the latter could do nothing between Tempe and the Gulf of Pagasae to hamper the Greek army. But in the event of defeat, the army would have been lost.

16 Although all good writers since Grote have recognised the technical superiority of the Persian ships, it is too often forgotten, and needs emphasising once more. The position at Artemisium, and still more at Salamis, was the same as in the concluding battles of the Syracusan expedition: the better ships and seamen were at a disadvantage in narrow waters.

17 Köster, , Seewesen, p. 211Google Scholar, and in Kromayer-Veith, p. 167, rightly calls the Greek position unhaltbar after the fall of Thermopylae, but without explaining why. Kromayer (ibid., p. 149) followed the usual view in calling it gegendstandlos, as did Grote (iv. p. 170). Köster, , Seewesen, p. 140Google Scholar, touches on strategy as affected by the build of the trireme, but misses the main point.

18 ‘Topography of Pelion, etc.,’ JHS. 1906, p. 146.

19 A great deal of folly has been written by historians, from Herodotus to Beloch, about the action of Leonidas. Here at least there should be no difficulty. He found his position was turned, and it was his duty to extricate his army by a quick retreat. He at once sent back his troops; but a retreat, with the enemy in pursuit, does not consist only in a quick march with your back to the enemy. Leonidas had to keep some troops, and those the most reliable, to cover the retreat, to face the enemy. He chose that duty for himself, and his Spartans, Thebans and Thespians, running the risk, an unavoidable risk, of being cut off. That was the action of a good soldier and a brave man, which Leonidas was.

Kromayer also suggests that the Greeks would have defended the Cithaeron-Parnes line, either north or south of the mountain-range, if they had had sufficient troops at their disposal, as they had next year, but not in 480, when so many men were on board ship. But practically the whole of the Peloponnesian army, and probably the Boeotian as well, was available. It was not the Greek habit to defend mountain passes.

20 Herodotus had heard something of this: VIII. 68. 7.

21 Cf. Xen., Hell. VI. 2Google Scholar. 27–30, cited above, n. 9.

22 Köster (in Kromayer-Veith, pp. 196–7) notes the necessity of a near-by base in foreign expeditions, and quotes the case of Demetrius Poliorcetes before Rhodes, and then the similar considerations which induced the Duke of Parma to advise the King of Spain to secure Flushing before sending the Armada. But he does not note the special difficulty of the trireme. In the late war the allies had to have a base at Lemnos and Imbros for the attack on Gallipoli; but that does not mean that modern and ancient conditions of naval attack are the same, and it is the difference that needs emphasis. In fact, compare the strategical factors in the campaigns of Pylos and Navarino.

23 There was not much difference in the average speed of trireme and merchantman—each from five to six knots. See Köster, , Seewesen, pp. 125Google Scholar, 177 ff.

24 Conversely, Alexander the Great defeated the Persian fleet on land, when finally by the capture of Tyre he had taken all but their island bases.

25 Seewesen, pp. 80–3.