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The career and conversion of Dio Chrysostom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2013

J. L. Moles
J. L. Moles
Affiliation:
The Queen's University of Belfast
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Extract

Dio of Prusa (Dio Chrysostom) is nowadays mostly read only as a historical source for the Graeco-Roman world of the late first and early second centuries A.D. But he is of course one of the relatively few Greek writers of the early Imperial era who are worth reading at all and his career raises important questions of a more general kind: how valid is it to analyse a writer's or philosopher's life in terms of conversion and how firm a line can be drawn between the activities of the philosopher and those of the sophist?

In this paper I shall argue that the theory of Dio's conversion is not borne out by the facts of his career, and that the originator of the theory was not Synesius of Cyrene but Dio himself, who found it a convenient way both of suppressing the memory of his early time-serving attacks on philosophy under Vespasian and of gratifying his personal taste for self-dramatization. The discussion falls into five parts. Part 1 consists of some general remarks on the methodology of conversion-analysis intended to emphasize some of the dangers of me approach. In Part 2 I consider the evidence of Synesius and of the facts, as far as they can be established, of Dio's early career.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 98 , November 1978 , pp. 79 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1978

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References

1 The classic work remains von Arnim, H., Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa (Berlin 1898)Google Scholar. Sympathetic general studies include Martha, C., Les Moralistes sous L'Empire Romain (Paris 1865) 292–312Google Scholar, Dill, S., Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius (London 1905) 367–83Google Scholar, Dudley, D. R., A History of Cynicism (London 1937) 148–58Google Scholar, Phillips, E. D., ‘Three Greek Writers on the Roman Empire’ in C&M xviii (1957) 107–13Google Scholar. Momigliano, A. D., Quarto Contributo (Rome 1969) 257–69Google Scholar, offers a notably uncharitable view. There is much authoritative analysis of Dio's cynicism in Höistad, R., Cynic Hero and Cynic King (Uppsala 1948), esp. 50–63Google Scholar, 87–91, 150–222. No doubt the publication of C. P. Jones' forthcoming book will do much to stimulate wider interest in Dio.

2 For a still more jaundiced view of the contemporary literature see van Groningen, B. A., ‘General literary tendencies in the Second Century A.D.’ in Mnem. xviii (1965) 41–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and for a much more sympathetic approach Reardon, B. P., Courants littéraires grecs des iie et iiie siècles après J.-C. (Paris 1971)Google Scholar. Bowie, E. L., ‘Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic’ in Past and Present xlvi (1970) 3–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar discusses the extreme literary archaism of the period and offers a political explanation for it.

3 For the date see Shackleton Bailey on Cic. Ad Fam. xv 16.3 and 17.3; an important corrective of the dates given by Momigliano, , JRS xxxi (1941) 151Google Scholar, Rostagni, A., Scritti Minori ii. 2 (Turin 1956) 160Google Scholar, and Flacelière, R., Plutarque Vies vii (Paris 1972) 194Google Scholar. Cassius' conversion may have been triggered by the Republican defeat at Pharsalia but that his Epicureanism had little lasting effect upon his behaviour is patent. Naturally the statement in the unreliable life of Lucretius by Girolamo Borgia that Lucretius was a friend of Atticus, Cicero, Brutus and Cassius proves nothing: Cicero and Brutus were not Epicureans.

4 Thus Toynbee, J. M. C., ‘Dictators and Philosophers in the First Century A.D.’ in G&R xiii (1944) 43–58Google Scholar. The position of A. D. Momigliano, review-discussion of Ch. Wirszubski, , Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate, in JRS xli (1951) 148–9Google Scholar = Quinto Contributo ii (Rome 1975) 964–5, is not fundamentally different. See also n. 41 below.

5 Cf. Kennedy, G., The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton/London 1963) 177–8Google Scholar.

6 Müller, K. O., A History of the Literature of Ancient Greece ii (Eng. trans. London 1858) 139 ff.Google Scholar, cf. Adams, C. D., Lysias, Selected Speeches (N.Y. 1905) 21–2Google Scholar. Contra Jebb, R. C., The Attic Orators i (London 1893) 162Google Scholar.

7 Dover, K. J., Lysias and the ‘Corpus Lysiacum’ (Berkeley 1968) 9Google Scholar, 19, 44 (date), 56, 122, 133, 138, 143, 147. For Dover absence of evidence against does not amount to a positive argument in favour of authenticity but I would agree with the more optimistic attitude of Usher, S., review of Dover, JHS xci (1971) 147–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But the abusive use of the term λογογράφος at Plat. Phaedr. 257d (dramatic date perhaps pre-415, Dover 32–3) does not in itself prove logographic activity: the context is much more general.

8 For a sensible though unenthusiastic defence see Bizos, M., Lysias Discours i (Paris 1955) 42–5Google Scholar.

9 For the identification see Dover 36–7. Usher 148 is unnecessarily sceptical, σοφιστής can of course be applied derisively to political orators but here must denote professional status.

10 Thus e.g. Ziegler, K., RE xxi (1951) 716–17Google Scholar, Hamilton, J. R., Plutarch, ‘Alexander’: A Commentary (Oxford 1969) xxiiiGoogle Scholar; Jones, C. P., ‘Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's works’ in JRS lvi (1966) 70Google Scholar and Plutarch and Rome (Oxford 1971) 14–16, 67–71, 135. Contra Russell, D. A., review of Jones, JRS lxii (1972) 226–7Google Scholar, less trenchant in OCD 2 849 and Plutarch (London 1973) 3.

11 The dilemma is spelled out but not fully resolved by Barrow, R. H., Plutarch andhis Times (London 1967) 128Google Scholar. Cf. Russell, review, n. 10 above.

Of course explanations in terms of the conversion from rhetoric to philosophy were also often canvassed in antiquity, sometimes with just as little justification as now. Cf. e.g. Plut. Mor. 791a—b on Carneades (given the lie by Carneades' eminently sophistic behaviour in Rome in 155 B.C.) and Dio xix 3 in the light of the discussion below.

12 For this classification cf. D.H. i 9.1, 11.15, 26.22–27.1, 11.16 f.

13 See e.g. Guthrie, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy iii, Part i (Cambridge 1969)Google Scholar = The Sophists (Cambridge 1971) 40, 44; Bowersock, G. W., Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford 1969)Google Scholar.

14 The weight of the tradition is decisively against the contention of Dodds, E. R., Plato, ‘Gorgias’, a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford 1959) 7Google Scholar, that Gorgias was not a sophist in some accepted sense of the term. Cf. Harrison, E. L., ‘Was Gorgias a Sophist?’ in Phoenix xviii (1964) 183–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Guthrie 36. For attempts to define the term ‘sophist’ see e.g. Guthrie 27–34, Harrison 190–1, Bowersock 12–14 (the imperial period). Dio refers to Gorgias as a sophist at xii 14 and liv 1 (cf. xxxvii 28, Favorinus).

15 For this type of formulation cf. Cassius Dio lxvi 15 σοφισταὶ κύνєιοι.

16 For other examples of this dual role see Bowersock 11–12 and for an excellent discussion of the fusion of philosophy and rhetoric in the Second Sophistic and later Barnes, T. D., Tertullian (Oxford 1971) 211–32Google Scholar.

17 Cf. Kennedy 158–64. It is of interest to note that Synesius (Dion 37d) considers Socrates' speech in the Menexenus purely rhetorical. In Dio iv 79–81 Diogenes' behaviour has a Socratic flavour about it.

18 It can hardly be regarded as the primary source for reasons that will appear below. Cf. also n. 147.

19 Von Arnim 223.

20 His brief discussion in Conversion (Oxford 1933) 173–4 is wholly uncritical.

21 E.g. Hirzel, R., Der Dialog (Leipzig 1895) ii 85Google Scholar n. 3, 88, Valdenberg, V. E., ‘The Political Philosophy of Dio Chrysostom’ in Izvestia Akad. Nauk SSSR (1926) 946Google Scholar, Browning, R., OCD 2345Google Scholar, Russell art. cit., Jones, C. P., ‘The Date of Dio of Prusa's Alexandrian Oration’ in Hist. xxii (1973) 303Google Scholar. There are signs that scepticism about conversion-analysis in the context of the Second Sophistic is spreading—see e.g. J. Bompaire, ‘Le décor sicilien dans le roman et dans la littérature contemporaine’ in Erotica Antiqua, ICAN 1976 ed. B. P. Reardon (Bangor 1977) 87–90 (REG xc [1977] 55–68) and Tatum, J., ‘The Two Lives of the Sophist Apuleius’ in Erotica Antiqua 140–1Google Scholar. Nevertheless, acceptance of Dio's conversion remains common, e.g. Parke, H. W. and Wormell, D. E. W., The Delphic Oracle i 2 (Oxford 1956) 409Google Scholar, Grube, G. M. A., The Greek and Roman Critics (London 1965) 327Google Scholar, Lesky, A., A History of Greek Literature (London 1966) 834Google Scholar, MacMullen, R., Enemies of the Roman Order (Harvard 1967) 65–6Google Scholar.

22 Art. cit. 149–53 = Quinto Contributo 966–74.

23 Cf. Terzaghi, N., Synesii Cyrenensis Opuscula II (Rome 1944) 238Google Scholar.

24 Viz. the Ψιττακοῦ ἔπαινος, Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, Πρὸς Μουσώνιον, his work on the Essenes, Τέμπη, Μέμνων, Κώνωπος ἔπαινος

25 This important point is discussed further below.

26 This would be out of character anyway. For discussion of Synesius' career see Marrou, H. I. in The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, ed. Momigliano, A. D. (Oxford 1963) 126–50Google Scholar.

27 Dio's date of birth can only be conjectured. Von Arnim 147 gives by implication 44/45, but this is based on a probable misdating of the Melancomas Orations (see n. 65 below). The criterion of earliest recorded activity would tend to favour the later dating but would make Dio refer to his old age in 97 (xii 12) when only just over 50. On balance A.D. 40, as argued for by Schmid, W., RE v (1903) 850Google Scholar, seems preferable.

28 He owed his second fortune to his παιδєία (xlvi 3) but it is impossible to infer from this that he was a ῥήτωρ (as tentatively Momigliano, , Quarto Contributo 257Google Scholar) rather than just a highly cultured man.

29 Von Arnim 123. At xlvi 3 τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων might suggest more than one emperor but it is probably just a rhetorical plural: cf. the specific τὴν τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος προθυμίαν immediately below.

30 Von Arnim 124.

31 See further below.

32 See further below.

33 For discussion with some qualification see Lutz, C. E., ‘Musonius Rufus, “The Roman Socrates”’, YCS x (1947) 5Google Scholar n. 8 and 9 n. 22.

34 Attribution and identification are both of course speculative but it would be rash to dismiss them just because Dio takes a positive attitude to rhetoric in the second and expects his friend's oratorical skills to benefit from association with ‘Rufus’: in practice philosophers' attitude to rhetoric was not generally as intolerant as it was in theory. Cf. below.

35 The accepted identification. Another suggested candidate is Apollonius of Tyana, of whom a very similar story is told in Philostratus, VA iv 22, but the phraseology ‘inferior in birth to no Roman’ rules this out completely. In fact the Apollonius passage is probably modelled on the Rhodian: thus Bowie, E. L. in Aufstieg und Niedergang der röm. Welt iv (Berlin 1978)Google Scholar. Cf. VA v 26 for another Dionian doublet.

36 See e.g. Grosso, F., ‘La vita di Apollonio di Tiana come fonte storica’ Acme vii (1954) 333–532Google Scholar, Bowersock, G. W., introduction to the Penguin trans., Philostratus: Life of Apollonius (1970) 16Google Scholar, E. L. Bowie in Aufstieg (n. 35). On the novelistic aspects of the work, which naturally detract from its historical reliability, see also Anderson, G., ‘Apollonius of Tyana as a novel’ in Erotica Antiqua (n. 21) 37Google Scholar.

37 Bowersock, , Penguin, Philostratus 19Google Scholar is, surprisingly, not wholly convinced of this.

38 Apollonius/Dio VA v 27–8Google Scholar, 31–2, 37–8, viii 7.2, Epp. 10, 90. Disagreements: VA v 40, Ep. 9. Apollonius/Euphrates VA i 13Google Scholar, ii 26, v 28, 33, 37, 39, vi 7, 9, 13, 28, vii 9, 36, viii 3, 7.11, 7.12, 7.16, Epp. 1–8, 15–18, 50–2, 60.

39 For a full discussion see von Arnim 142, 224 ff. For example Philostratus' statement that Dio had Plato's Phaedo and Demosthenes' De falsa legatione with him during the exile (VS 488) presumably derives from a lost work of Dio's (so Momigliano, , Quarto Contributo 261Google Scholar) or a reliable oral tradition, and his observation that Dio was exceptionally good at extemporization (VA v 37) can be substantiated from Dio's extant writings—cf. von Arnim 181 ff. and Dio v 24, vii 102, xii 38, 43, xxxiv 53, xlviii 15, lxv 7, 8, 10, 13 for practical examples. On the other hand his characterization of Dio as a man who avoided quarrels is plainly ludicrous (VA v 37). On the question of the reliability of Philostratus' description of Dio digging etc. during the exile sec n. 135.

40 This analysis is a paraphrase and expansion of Momigliano art. cit. 148–9, 152–3 = Quinto Contributo 964–5, 972–4. Expansions are noted below.

41 Cf. (besides Momigliano) Toynbee 51–6, MacMullen 55, Sandbach, F. H., The Stoics (London 1975) 146Google Scholar (a more cautious formulation). Cassius Dio lxvi 12.2 and Philostratus VA v 33 ff., can be argued to be mutually corroborative—but see below. For Republican ideals under the empire cf. Tac. Ann. i 4.2, 33.3, ii 82.3, Gell. NA xiii 13.2, Hor. Sat. i 3.81 with Porphyrio ad loc., Joseph., Ant. xix 162 ff.Google Scholar, Suet., Claud. 10.3 ff.Google Scholar, Cassius Dio lx 15.3, Tac. Ann. xv 52.4 (as late as 65, which surely makes the idea of a thoroughly disillusioned Helvidius turning to Republicanism not difficult). If this unfashionable view of Helvidius Priscus is rejected, Philostratus' account of the discussions between Vespasian and the philosophers could still be considered valuable as reflecting something of the flavour of the debate about the nature of kingship then in progress—but see below.

42 This would not exclude more normal explanations such as Vespasian's refusal to take action against the delatores or surround himself with boni amici or even the much maligned ‘Rostovsteff hypothesis’ that Helvidius objected to the entire principle of hereditary monarchy. The argument is that failure on all normal fronts drove Helvidius into Republicanism as a last resort.

43 Apollonius/Musonius VA iv 46Google Scholar, v 19, vii 16. Apollonius/Vespasian v 27–38, 41, viii 7.2, 7.3. Apollonius/Titus vi 28–33. Apollonius/Domitian Epp. 20–21. Momigliano does not use this argument.

44 Scharold, J., Dio Chrysostom und Themistius (Burghausen 1912)Google Scholar. Cf. Dio xxviii 5–7/xxix 4–8/Themist. x 139.

45 Lemarchand, L., Dion de Pruse—Les œuvres d'avant l'exil (Paris 1926) 30 ffGoogle Scholar. argued that Melancomas was a purely imaginary character because Themistius' evidence has no independent value (cf. n. 44 above), there is no other reference in ancient literature to the great Melancomas and he is described by Dio in thoroughly idealized terms. Even if this were correct it would not completely destroy the link with Titus (which is of course extremely likely on a priori grounds) but it seems clear that Lemarchand is wrong. Athenodorus, an athlete friend of Melancomas' ἀπὸ παιδός (xxviii 10), can probably be identified with the Athenodorus who appears in the list of winners at Olympia in A.D. 49, 53 and 61 (Eusebius, , Chron. p. 101Google Scholar Karst, cf. Schmid 849). The fact that Dio makes Athenodorus a παγκρατιάστης whereas Eusebius registers him as a winner in the stadion is trivial (pace Momigliano art. cit. 152 and Moretti, L., Olympionikai MAL viii 8a [1956]Google Scholar no. 775 [Mclankomas])—discrepancies of that kind between Eusebius and other sources are very common. And granted that Themistius was working from Dio, the information that Titus was a lover of Melancomas, even if reported as hearsay (φασίν), seems a bit bold to be pure invention. As to the idealization of Melancomas, there was nothing to prevent Dio from using a real-life athlete as a peg upon which to hang his ethical ideals, a technique familiar from many Greek funerary writings. Finally the lack of other attestation is always a dangerous argument for non-existence, especially in the light of the Athenodorus identification.

46 For the friendship see Dio xiii 1, the identification, von Arnim 228–31, and the relationship to Vespasian, Townend, G., JRS li (1961) 54–6Google Scholar.

47 See below.

48 Jones, C. P., Hist. xxii (1973) 302–9Google Scholar makes a good circumstantial case for dating the Alexandrian Oration to the early 70s, which I accept. Arguments against this dating (some not mentioned by Jones) are: (i) the phraseology of xxxii 9, where Dio makes a distinction between Cynic behaviour and the excellence of their philosophical tenets, might be thought appropriate to a man who was embarrassed about his own past Cynic career but unwilling to repudiate it utterly. Yet equally it could have been used by Dio before his exile. (ii) The difference in tone between the Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων of 7 i (below) and the Alexandrian Oration in Dio's attitude to the Cynics (see n. 58 below—not a problem for Jones as he does not recognize that there is a difference),. But such an argument from consistency is always dangerous, especially if the Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων was a work of expediency written at a time of crisis (below). (iii) Would Dio have emphasized that he was an envoy of Vespasian, an unpopular figure in the Alexandria of the 70s? This is a difficult question to assess but after all the point is made attractively and amusingly and the explicit references to the emperor (xxxii 60, 95, 96, cf. perhaps 29) are skilfully prepared for. It is clear that Dio's brief was invidious whichever emperor he was representing. (iv) The parallels with the Trajanic Kingship Orations (e.g. xxxii 26/i 23–4, xxxii 95/i 7, iv 19). But these are simply τόποι. (v) The parallels with Or. xxxiii (e.g. xxxii 88/xxxiii 22, xxxii 35–7/xxxiii 24, xxxii 67/xxxiii 57, xxxii 47/xxxiii 41). The first three of these are just τόποι and the resemblance between xxxii 47 and xxxiii 41 is not striking. In any case the dating of Or. xxxiii is not certain. Cf. n. 73 below. (vi) The parallels with securely dated Trajanic orations (e.g. xxxii 29/xxxix 5, xxxii 29/xxxix 3, xxxii 2/xlviii 7). But these are also τόποι. (vii) The parallels with Or. xxxiv (von Arnim 461–2) hardly amount to much, nor is Or. xxxiv securely dated. Cf. n. 73 below.

49 I owe much to Mr E. L. Bowie for the sceptical discussion that follows. Cf. also n. 35 above.

50 Apollonius/Demetrius, VA iv 25Google Scholar, 42, v 19, vi 31, 33, vii 10, viii 10, 12, 13.

51 The distinction between κατά and πρὸς is made very clear by Treu, K., Synesios von Kyrene. Dion Chrysostomos oder Vom Leben nach seinem Vorbild (Berlin 1959Google Scholar) ad loc. ‘Der Titel der ersten Rede mit κατά⊂. gen. deutet auf eine gerichtliche Anklage, während für die an den geachteten Philosophen Musonius gerichtete Rede eine mildere Art der Polemik anzunehmen ist, die von persönlicher Animosität frei war’. Πρός does not necessarily denote opposition but it is quite clear from Synesius that it does so here.

52 Though xlvii 7 and liv do provide a context for στεφανοῦντι ‥ αὐτοὺς καὶ παράδειγμα τιθεμένῳ γενναίου βίου καὶ σώφρονος.

53 Treu takes Σωκράτη καὶ Ζήνωνα as imprecise, suggesting that it is just Synesius' way of saying ‘philosophers in general’, with which he compares Διογένας τє καὶ Σωκράτας (39a). But there the plural makes a difference (= ‘people like Diogenes and Socrates’) though even so the names are chosen because these two philosophers loom so large in Dio's writings—Synesius makes this quite plain.

54 For Diogenes represented in Socratic terms cf. his ‘conversion’ to philosophy after visiting the Delphic Oracle (discussed below) and in Dio e.g. viii 12 (Socratic personal mannerism) and iv 79–81 (see n. 17 above).

55 Von Arnim 150–1.

56 The conventional dating, consistent with Cassius Dio lxvi 13. For the purposes of the attempted reconstruction of the chronology of Dio's early career which follows it is of considerable importance that it should be right. Bowie's conjecture (n. 59 below) adds useful support.

57 Cassius Dio lxvi 13.

58 Thus Momigliano art. cit. 152 = Quinto Contributo 973. Jones, , Hist. xxii (1973) 305Google Scholar links the Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων with the Alexandrian Oration. In that case Dio's behaviour in 71 could be seen as responsible and statesmanlike rather than panicky and opportunist. It is true that both speeches show him acting in the interests of Vespasian but there are considerable differences both in tone—the Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων extremely shrill and overstated (contrast xxxii 9)—and content: the Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων attacked Stoics, Cynics and philosophers in general, the Alexandrian only certain Cynics and philosophers who did not do their job properly. Hence Momigliano's analysis is right. It would of course be methodologically unsound to argue back from Dio's celebrated παρρησία under Domitian (Lucian Peregr. xviii, cf. Dio iii 13, xlv 1 ff., l 8), which is in any case largely unverifiable (the veiled attacks in the Diogenes exile discourses or at lxvi 6 need not have been very perilous), or from his ἐλєυθєρία (iii 12, cf. vi 34, 58, vii 66, xiii 13), and reject the possibility that Dio could have sold out in 71.

That Dio had already in 71 contracted philosophical friendships was naturally denied by von Arnim, who thought that the Κ. τ. φ. proved complete ignorance of philosophy, but this view, apart from being naïve and schema-based, cannot be reconciled with the chronological evidence for Dio's association with Musonius and the Flavians. See below.

59 I owe this suggestion to E. L. Bowie. Dio's acquisition of citizenship is usually dated to Nerva's principate, von Arnim 125. If Nerva, like Petronius, was a member of Nero's literary coterie it might be conjectured that he was peculiarly well qualified to secure the services of a young Greek from Bithynia.

60 See n. 51 above.

61 This seems to be clearly implied by Synesius' remarks (Dion 36b—c): ‘For no matter what treatise of theirs [i.e. of Carneades and Eudoxus] you may take, it is philosophic in nature, though handled in sophistic fashion, that is, phrased brilliantly and cleverly and provided with charm in abundance. In this way, too, they were deemed worthy of the title sophist by the persons whom they beguiled in their speeches by the beauty of their language. And yet they themselves would have rejected that title, methinks, and would not have accepted it when offered, philosophy having lately made it a term of reproach, since Plato had rebelled against the name. Dio, on the contrary, not only championed in brilliant fashion each of the two types of career separately, but he is also at variance with his own principles, having published treatises based upon the opposite foundations.’ The point is important since it was perfectly possible to engage (in effect) in sophistic activity while at the same time denying that you were doing so, and Synesius here seems to be aware of the fact. See below.

62 For biographical details see Lutz 14–24.

63 It is natural to assume that Dio would have got his philosophical education in Rome even though he clearly travelled around a lot even at this stage of his career and even though Musonius did run a sort of school on Gyaros (MacMullen 65 and 310 n. 22). Dio could also presumably have met Musonius in Asia Minor.

64 Philostratus' words at VA v 31 (Apollonius to Vespasian) Εὐφράτης καὶ Δίων πάλαι σοι γνώριμοι ὄντες are suggestive of superior knowledge but they naturally would be, whether based on it or not.

65 Schmid 849. Von Arnim's dating of Orr. xxviii and xxix to 74 (von Arnim 145), when Titus was involved in the Ludi Augustales in Naples, is therefore probably too late. Cf. n. 45—for the purposes of chronology it is the identification of Athenodorus, not the historicity of Melancomas, that is important.

66 Cf. Momigliano, , Quarto Contributo 258Google Scholar: ‘The philosopher Musonius Rufus was his master, evidently before being exiled by Nero’. For possible ages for a philosophical education see Rohde, E., Kleine Schriften ii (Leipzig 1901) 51Google Scholar, paraphrased by Butler, H. E. and Owen, A. S., Apulei Apologia (Oxford 1914) ix n. 5Google Scholar.

67 Art. cit. 150–1 = Quinto Contributo 971–3. xxxi 110 gives further support.

68 Lemarchand, op. cit. 103–4, 107, Jones, , Hist. xxii (1973) 304Google Scholar. Most important is xxxii 52/xxxi 162–3.

69 The parallel between xxxii 52 and xxxi 162–3 certainly suggests close proximity of date, with the Rhodian almost certainly composed first.

70 This sequence differs from Momigliano, art. cit. 153 = Quinto Contributo 973–4, who offers two possibilities:

(i) If the Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων was written some years after 71 or made an emphatic exception of Musonius, the Rhodian Oration with its complimentary reference to Musonius would fit satisfactorily into the period 70–5.

(ii) If the Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων was written in 71 and if its sentiments were irreconcilable with those of the Rhodian Oration, the latter has to be dated to the early years of Domitian.

Momigliano himself prefers a version of (i), giving the sequence: Rhodian Oration (c. 70), Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, Πρὸς Μουσώνιον, composed after Musonius had lost Vespasian's favour.

Both are difficult. (i) can be rejected in the light of the practically secure dating of the Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων to 71 and the extreme unlikelihood that it made an exception of Musonius: Synesius' evidence does not remotely suggest this, and he would surely have been surprised by, and have mentioned, the fact if it had been so. Momigliano's version of it is also open to the objection that his proposed dating for the Rhodian Oration does not sit happily with a closely-related Alexandrian Oration composed post-72. (ii) does not follow and is also hard to square with the probable dating of the Alexandrian.

It is not known when Musonius was exiled under Vespasian—exempted from the purge of 71 he must have fallen out of favour later for he was recalled under Titus (Hieron, . Chron. p. 189 Helm)Google Scholar. Under the scheme argued for in the text therefore the Rhodian Oration might (but there is no way of checking) have been delivered before Musonius was exiled. But it would not have been impossible for it to have been delivered after his exile—the reference to him was very allusive and in context praise of a Roman philosopher was compliment enough to the Roman authorities. Besides, on any view the Alexandrian Oration, where Dio poses as a philosopher (see n. 74 below), and the Rhodian, where he commends a philosopher, are not strictly reconcilable with the Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων or (probably) the Πρὸς Μουσώνιον (if it had political application).

The argument is not substantially affected by Lemarchand's theory that the extant Rhodian Oration is a conflation of two speeches, delivered at an interval of nearly ten years. In any case this theory rests partly upon a misinterpretation of sections 45–6, which do not necessarily imply that Rhodes was not a civitas libera, partly upon a mistaken acceptance of von Arnim's contention that Rhodes recovered her freedom under Titus, but perhaps mostly upon a mistaken desire to impose artistic respectability upon a speech which is diffuse, rambling and self-contradictory —characteristics which regrettably are not always alien to Dio's style

71 Cf. pp. 80–1.

72 Note that Synesius (Dion 41c) classes the Rhodian with the Trojan and the Κώνωπος ἔπαινος i.e. as a sophistic work.

73 On grounds of style and general approach there would be a case for dating the two Tarsic Orations (Orr. xxxiii, xxxiv)—or at any rate the first—and the Celaenae Oration (Or. xxxv) to the same general period (a possibility hinted at by Jones, , Hist. xxii (1973) 304Google Scholar ‘a humour that is absent from the demonstrably late speeches’?). Von Arnim's dating of all three speeches (op. cit. 460 ff.) is essentially schema-based and the attempt of Kienast, D., ‘Ein vernachlässigtes zeugnis für die reichspolitik Trajans: die zweite Tarsische Rede des Dion von Prusa’, Hist. xx (1971) 62–80Google Scholar, building on von Arnim's Trajanic dating, to connect the second Tarsic Oration with Trajan's Parthian war is highly speculative, though in other respects the speech can be made to fit a Trajanic context.

74 Thus von Arnim 435–6, rightly; cf. also xxxii 18–19, where Dio is clearly contrasting himself with philosophers who funk their duty. Jones', remarks on this (Hist. xxii [1973] 303 and n. 9)Google Scholar are extremely weak, though of course it is not difficult to pick holes in von Arnim's rigid chronological schema. No reliance can be placed on Dio's statement (xiii 11) that he only began to be known as a philosopher during his exile (cf. further below). Momigliano, , Quarto Contributo 259Google Scholar, maintains that Dio at this stage of his career took care not to be regarded as a philosopher in the strict sense but after all this was a claim that could be made lightly enough and—the evidence of the Alexandrian Oration apart—it is a priori unlikely that Dio, a man not noted for his modesty and a pupil of the great Musonius, would have missed the opportunity to make it. This need not have been dangerous for a philosopher who had sold out. Cf. also xxxiii 8, 14–16, xxxiv 2–3, 11, xxxv 2, 4 in the light of n. 73 above.

75 E.g. xii 1–13 (owl v. peacock-like sophists, xii 9 particularly), xii 85, xxxiii 14, 15, xxxiv 2, xlvii 25, lxvi 25, lxx 8, lxxii, cf. i 50, vii 8, 117, viii 30–1, ix 9, xii 2, xiii 10. Naturally the τόπος can be treated satirically: xxxiv 3, xxxv 3, 11–12, xlix 11–12, lxvi 2, lxxii 15–16. Photius, followed by the Suda, reports that Dio reputedly wore a lion-skin in public, perhaps a mistaken inference from the figurative use of a lion-skin to denote political activity (as e.g. in Plut, . An sen. 785f)Google Scholar.

76 E.g. xi 6, 14, xii 13, xlvii 16. Reardon 80 n. 63 cites xviii 12 as evidence that Dio moved freely in the world of the sophists. That he did so is clear (see below) but xviii 12 is not evidence for it since the men under discussion flourished before Dio's time and cannot in any case automatically be classified as σοφισταί.

77 E.g. vi 21, viii 33, xii 2–3, 5, 14 (of Hippias, Polus and Gorgias), lv 7, lxxvii/lxxviii 27.

78 E.g. iv 132, vi 21, viii 33, xii 11, xxxv 1, 8; cf. xxxii 10 (attack on philosophers motivated by δόξα), 11 (rarity of man not so motivated).

79 E.g. viii 9, xi 6, 14.

80 E.g. iv 33–8, viii 36.

81 E.g. iv 28, 33–8, x 32, xxxii 10, xxxv 9, liv, lv 7.

82 E.g. iv 14, 33–8, viii 9, xi 14, xii 5, 10, 13, xxxv 8–10, lxvi 12, lxxvii/lxxviii 27, cf. xii 15 (Dio has no pupils), xxxiii 14 (the philosopher walks alone), xxxv 10 (pupils to be rejected at all costs). Rejection of pupils whether categorical or partial (to avoid crowds of hangers—on), was a position that could be taken by philosophers of any school anxious to make a clear distinction between themselves and meretricious sophists. Cf. e.g. D. L. vi 21 (Antisthenes), 69 (Diogenes), vii 182 (Chrysippus), x 120 (Epicurus). Dio's statements about himself in this regard are not trustworthy. He himself had been a ‘pupil’ and he had pupils during his exile and later.

83 E.g. iii 27, iv 32, xxxiii 14, xxxviii 10, cf. lviii 2.

84 E.g. iv 33–8, vi 21, x 32, xxxiii 4, xxxv 9.

85 E.g. iv 132 (sophists linked with demagogues as mercenary leaders, cf. lxvi 12, lxxvii/lxxviii 27), xii 10 ff., 13, liv, lxvi 12, lxxvii/lxxviii 27, cf. iii 15, xii 13, xxxii 11, xxxv 1, xliii 6, where Dio emphasizes that he does not take money, cf. liv 3 (Socrates though poor never accepted anything). Cf. also vii 123 (corrupting effects of μισθός on lawyers and advocates), xxii 1 and 5 (attack on ῥήτορєς who work only for money), xxxii 10 (attack on philosophers motivated by κέρδος), 11 (rarity of man not motivated by ἀργύριον).

86 E.g. xii 13, xxxiii 2 ff., xxxv 8 ff., cf. xxxviii 1 (flattery of the masses, apparently with reference to sophists).

87 E.g. xii 43, xxxii 10, 39, xxxiii 1–5, 23, xxxiv 29, liv 1 and passim. Cf. iv 78 (inadequacy of sophists' rhetorical powers in comparison with man truly δєινὸς λέγєιν), vii 124 (Dio's contempt for mere γλωσσοτέχναι in general).

Other attacks on the sophists include vii 98 (apparent dig at sophists' misuse of citations from the poets), xii 17 (scorn for congratulatory embassies) and xxxii 68 (attack on the affectation of the ‘ode’).

Of general relevance to Dio's views on sophists are his attitudes to δόξα (wholly conventional: δόξα per se is of no value and pursuit of it for its own sake is to be avoided)— because sophists are so concerned with acquiring it—and to the opinions of οἱ πολλοί (again wholly conventional: οἱ πολλοί are nearly always mistaken about everything)— because it is from them that sophists get their δόξα. Cf. also xii 13: Dio has nothing to gain from attracting the interests of οἱ πολλοί; contra xii 84: his speech as suitable τῷ πλήθєι as for philosophers (the point being that Dio can beat the sophists at their own game [securing the attention of the masses] without descending to their level).

88 iii 27, cf. [xxxvii] 28, lviii 2. σοφός can also be used in the same contemptuous way, e.g. vii 123, xii 10, 36, 37, xviii 7, xxi 11, xxvii 6, xxxi 10, xxxiii 5, xxxv 2. For the pejorative use of the term σοφίσμα cf. i 57, 61, iv 38.

89 E.g. iv 38 = viii 9 = xi 6, cf. i. 61.

90 Post-exile e.g. iii 27, iv 14, 28, 32, 35, 36, 132, xii 2 ff, 5, 10 f., 13, 14, 15, xlvii 16. Exile e.g. vi 21, viii 9, 33, 36, x 32, lv 7. I accept von Arnim's arguments for dating the Diogenes discourses to the exile period, despite the reservations of Momigliano, , Quarto Contributo 261–2Google Scholar. The arguments are circumstantial but persuasive and it is precisely in relation to these discourses that Momigliano's remark (262) ‘The tension and the bitterness we should expect in a persecuted man appear only too rarely in Dio's extant compositions’ appears most inappropriate. Even if the evidence of the Alexandrian Oration is excluded it must be regarded as a priori extremely likely that when posing as a philosopher (cf. n. 74 above) the pre-exile Dio indulged in attacks on sophists despite his pro-sophistic stance in 71. Cf. further below.

91 E.g. xix 4, xxxii 39, xxxiii 1–3, xxxv 1–2, xlii, xlvii 1, 8. Contra e.g. xxxvi 8, xlvi 7, cf. Ep. 5 (attributed to Dio).

92 E.g. i 10 (Πєιθώ), ii 18–24, 124, xviii (underpinned by this whole theme), xxiv 3–4, lvii passim esp. 8.

93 For the distinction between rhetoric and ‘true rhetoric’ cf. Dio's concept of the διττὴ παιδєία (iv 29). Most of his references to ῥήτορєς and rhetoric are naturally pejorative, the reality falling so far short of the ideal: e.g. vii 49, xiii 22–3, xviii 14, xxii, xxxii 19, 39, 68, xxxiv 31, xxxv 15, xliii 6, liv 3, lxix 3, 5, lxxvi 4. Contra e.g. xii 5, 15 (ῥητορική one of the nobler arts) xix 4, (indulgent), xxxii 10 (harmless if without pretensions), xliii 6, lxv 12, 3, lxxx 1. Cf. further below.

94 In some cases this is immediately verifiable: e.g. the honorific tone of the first and third speeches on Kingship, delivered before Trajan, contrasts sharply with the pessimism and disillusionment of the fourth, perhaps delivered before a Greek audience (so Momigliano, , Quarto Contributo 265 persuasively)Google Scholar; the characterization of the demos in his speech to the boule at Apameia (xli 12) is markedly different from that of his speech to the ekklesia at Rhodes (xxxi 6); the sentiments of Orr. lxxv and lxxvi, sophistic tours de force, are flatly contradictory.

95 Sometimes he contents himself with a modest implication of his philosophical character as in the Alexandrian Oration (n. 74 above) or in Or. xlix, in which after a lengthy discussion about the duty of the philosopher to take part in public affairs it finally becomes clear (xlix 14) that all along he has in fact been talking about himself. Sometimes he is more direct: e.g. xii 9, 38, 48, xiii 12, xxiii 9, xxxiii 8, 14, 16, xxxiv 2–3, xlviii 14,l 8,lx 9, etc. Contra Or. xlii (a pleasant piece of humorous self-deprecation, denying all philosophical or rhetorical competence). Naturally the assumption of a philosophical character does not preclude attacks on ‘bad’ philosophers, e.g. xxxii 8, 9 (Cynics), 20, xxxiv 3, xlv 12, xlix 11–13, lxx 8–10.

96 One exception is xxxv 10. The circumstances are slightly special—the whole tone of the speech is humorous and good-natured and it was directed at an audience which was extremely devoted to rhetoric (xxxv 1). Cf. also n. 16 above.

97 E.g. i 2, 7, 16, ii 20, 26, 40 etc.

98 E.g. v 27, vii 16, viii 21.

99 E.g. vi 36, viii 7.3.

100 There are obvious parallels in many of the arts today, e.g. the refusal of many Black American jazz musicians to admit that they in fact play jazz at all or the reluctance of many science fiction writers to accept that title.

101 Cf. above.

102 For a detailed stylistic comparison see Dover 59–69.

103 Examples of such literary posturing could easily be multiplied, e.g. Apuleius and Themistius, both clearly products of the rhetorical climate of their times, like to be known as ‘philosophers’ and normally refer to sophists abusively (e.g. Themist. 245d, 260c, 336c, 345c; Apul., Florid. 18.18Google Scholar, De Plat. ii 9.14, Asclep. 14.1). From the Classical period Xenophon's Cynegeticus, which opens in the most sophistic of styles and ends with a savage attack upon the sophists, would be another good example were the arguments for disunity in this case not rather more securely based than usual (see Lesky 621–2).

104 So Mensching, E., Mnem. xviii (1965) 62Google Scholar n. 3, Behr, C. A., Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales (1968) 106Google Scholar n. 39. Bowersock 13 n. 3, points to Aristid. 50.100 Keil, an example of a neutral usage which Behr unwisely emends. The fact that Aristides uses the word neutrally here does not invalidate the general principle—cf. Dio.

105 E.g. Dem. 9.1, Brut. 33.5, De prof. virt. 80a, Quaest. Conv. 613a, 613c, 615b, 621b, 659f, Max. cum princ. diss. 776c, 778b, but the term can be neutral, e.g. Quaest. Conv. 618e, 667d, An seni 785a, 790f, 791e, though the pejorative use is more common.

106 Von Arnim 168–9 maintains that the words μάλιστα δὲ οἶμαι τοὺς κακοδαίμονας σοφιστάς (xi 6) are an interpolation but the phraseology is Dionian (cf. n. 89) and the ‘unparenthetical’ use of οἶμαι unobjectionable (cf. xi 7), while the gratuitous attack on sophists is typical. He also argues that the point of xi 14 is that Dio has no school; but, I think, Dio is attacking sophists, who (it is assumed) will have pupils, not the particular category of sophists who have pupils.

107 Thus e.g. Palm, J., Rom. Römertum und Imperium in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit (Lund 1959) 22–3Google Scholar.

108 ‘A pretence to make his auditors forget that he is a sophist himself, though he is at that very time performing one of the sophists' most characteristic acts’, Cohoon, J. W., Loeb edn., Dio i (1932) 445Google Scholar.

109 E.g. Hdt. i 29, Isocr. Antid. 251, Arist. fr. 5 Rose etc.

110 Cf. the much quoted passage from Plutarch's, Themistocles (2.4)Google Scholar: ‘Mnesiphilus…was neither a rhetorician nor one of the so-called physical philosophers, but a cultivator of what was then called wisdom although it was really nothing more than cleverness in politics and practical sagacity. Mnesiphilus received this wisdom and handed it down as though it were the doctrine of a sect, in unbroken tradition from Solon. His successors blended it with forensic arts and shifted its application from public affairs to language and were dubbed sophists’.

111 Cf. n. 91 above.

112 Cf. Palm 23 n. 1 for references.

113 This view is of course often a corollary of the idea that the speech is ‘serious’ but need not necessarily be so. A case could be made for an exile dating in the light of the rather Cynic-like posturing of xi 37 and 150 and the close parallel between xi 22–3 and x 23.

114 Von Arnim 289–90; 254, 288, 299; 290; 299–300. Orr. lxxv and lxxvi, which are wholly sophistic, are simply undatable.

115 For discussion of the problems posed by the speech see von Arnim 154–5. Its sophistic character is self-evident and on the face of it the close parallel between its opening sentence and the proem of Or. lii, arguably a post-exile discourse (Lamar Crosby, H., Loeb edn., Dio iv [1946] 337Google Scholar, contra von Arnim 162), taken in conjunction with the reference to Dio's ill-health, points to a post-exile date.

116 For Favorinus as sophist cf. Philostratus, VS 491, 576, both in contradiction with Philostratus' editorial position.

117 For a typical view see MacMullen 66.

118 This may be inferred from three facts: (i) Dio was often accused by his enemies of vices which can be regarded as typical of sophists, such as ἀδολєσχία (cf. i 56, vii 81, xlvii 8: for ἀδολєσχία as a typically sophistic vice see e.g. Ar. fr. 418, Plat, . Polit. 299b)Google Scholar, δοξοκοπία (xxxii 24—cf. n. 78 above), pretensions to superior oratorical ability and knowledge above the average (xlii 2), ἀλαζονєία (xliii 2—cf. iv 33 and lv 7), and γλωσσαργία (xlvii 16, though the accuser is himself a sophist!). (ii) he is constantly on the defensive about his own μακρολογία. (vii 127–32, xxxi 161, xxxii 33) and ἀδολєσχία (xii 16, 38, 43), which he often represents as the proverbial ἀδολєσχία of old age (vii 1), wanderers (vii 1, xii 16) or victims of misfortune in general (cf. also lii 9). (iii) the note of special pleading in the De Exilio (cf. especially xiii 11–12, 14–15) suggests that Dio's claim to being a φιλόσοφος had evoked a sceptical response in certain quarters. Cf. further below.

119 See the suggestive comments of Russell, , Plutarch 7 and OCD 8492Google Scholar (less persuasively dependent on the rhetoric/juvenilia equation).

120 Von Arnim 205–7 dates this speech only shortly before the exile but two factors favour an earlier dating: (i) if Dio's son became an ἄρχων in c. 102, as he almost certainly did (xlviii 17, l 5–6, 10), the statement καὶ τὸ παιδίον λαβόντα (xlvi 13) fits a dating of c. 75 or earlier better than one of c. 80. (ii) if Dio did engage in important political activity in the 70s or earlier, as is virtually proven, his failure to claim respect because of his own merits suggests a dating a good bit earlier than von Arnim's.

121 On the identification see n. 46 above. That Dio acted as philosophical σύμβουλος to Flavius Sabinus cannot be proved but is extremely likely. The wording ὡς δὴ τἀνδρὶ φίλον ὄντα καὶ σύμβουλον (xiii 1) reproduces the terms of the charge brought against him and σύμβουλος is of course a key word for such a role. Dio's friendship with Musonius, his association with Vespasian and Musonius' friendship with Titus are also relevant. Cf. also n. 122 below.

122 The identity and nationality of the recipient and the question whether he is a real or imaginary character have been much discussed, but von Arnim 139–40 is right to point to xviii 16 ff. as being strongly suggestive that Dio has in mind a local Greek official occupying a high rank in some large Greek city of Asia Minor. Palm's objections to this view (op. cit. 21–2) are pedestrian.

The dating of the speech is necessarily imprecise. The fact that Dio does not recommend the reading of any philosophical works to this would-be orator proves nothing about what stage of his career he himself was at—the reading of philosophy would hardly be relevant to Dio's purpose here. On the other hand the enthusiastic praise of λόγος at xviii 2–3 might be held to be inappropriate to Dio's role as a φιλόσοφος but need not necessarily be so (cf. the casual approval of φιλοσοφία at xviii 7). The fact that Dio seems to represent himself as considerably younger than his addressee, who is at the height of his powers, is, however, a fairly strong argument for a pre-exile date. Dio's role in Or. xviii cannot be dismissed as purely literary—it is literary with a political purpose (xviii 2 etc.).

123 Demetrius was mentioned in Favorinus' writings (VA iv 25) and was the friend of Thrasea Paetus (Ann. xvi 34).

124 See n. 73 above.

125 Von Arnim 267. In what follows I accept von Arnim's datings for the Orations mentioned so that they can at least be used as an argumentum ad hominem. But they are all plausible enough—cf. n. 90 above.

126 E.g. iii 10, lxii 3 and 7.

127 So rightly Cohoon, Loeb edn. ii (1939) 323.

128 Toynbee 56 n. 9, denies this but quite wrongly. Dudley 154–6 is still adequate. Cf. Höistad 150 ff.

129 xxxi 15, 37, 58, 75.

130 Von Arnim 476 ff., Brunt, P. A., ‘Aspects of the Social Thought of Dio Chrysostom and the Stoics’, PCPS cxcix (1973) 9–33Google Scholar (largely restricted to the Euboicus). Stoic doctrine is prominent in e.g. the Euboicus, the Olympic and Kingship Orations, the Borysthenitic Oration and Or. xl 35–41.

131 Von Arnim 260 ff.

132 E.g. xx 2, xxii passim, xxvi 8, xxxii 8, 20, xxxiv 34, xl 12, xlvii 2–3, xlix 3 and passim.

133 E.g. Or. x argues that not only is it better to be without a slave or any kind of property if you do not know how to use it, but it is better still to have no property at all. Not surprisingly, when Dio returned from exile he clearly felt exactly the same way about the loss of his slaves as Diogenes' unfortunate victim in Or. x (xlv 10).

134 The authenticity of this dialogue has been disputed by Nilsson, M. P., Gesch. d. gr. Rel. ii 2 (Munich 1961) 401Google Scholar n. 2, but its general structural resemblance to the Phaedo, Dio's favourite book of philosophy (Philostr. VS 488), the precise correspondences between Charidemus' speech and other of Dio's discourses (Wilhelm, F., Philol. lxxv [1918] 364–5)Google Scholar, and its links in style and conception with the Melancomas Orations still argue strongly in its favour. The question whether Charidemus is a real or imaginary person is irrelevant in this context.

For the interpretation of the dialogue accepted in the text see the useful brief discussion by Cohoon, , Loeb edn., Dio, ii 395–8Google Scholar. If it is right, then even if the dialogue is not by Dio it is still of some importance as preserving a view of Dio's development substantially in agreement with the evidence of Dio himself.

135 Brunt 10 regards it as independent but suspect. Suspect it probably is, but a man who could describe himself as a ‘mere wanderer and self-taught philosopher, who find what happiness I can in toil and labour’ (i 9) might surely have provided such details of his way of life in his exile. Those of a suspicious turn of mind may recall that Cleanthes is said to have made his living by watering gardens and digging earth (D. L. vii 168, 169, 171). Another Dionian persona? Cf. below. For Dio's knowledge of Cleanthes' personal life as preserved in the tradition cf. xxxiii 53–4.

136 xxxvi 17, cf. xii 1, which presumably can be backdated to the exile period, xiii 12.

137 Cf. Von Arnim 303–4. For the decision to make the actual journey Delphic influence may have been responsible.

138 E.g. i 9, 50, 55, 56, vii 1, 3, 9, 81, xii 16, xiii 10–11, xix 1 (self-deprecatory irony), xl 2, 12, cf. viii 29, xxx 20 and perhaps liii 9.

139 E.g. xii 15, xxxiii 14, xxxv 2, xxxvi 17, xlvii 25, lxxii 2, lxxvii/lxxviii 37, Κόμης ἐγκώμιον passim; contra ii 12, vii 4 (peculiarity of Euboean hair-style in Homer). Cf. his enthusiasm for beards (vii 4) and long hair (xxxvi 17) and his dislike of elaborate hairdoes (vii 117). Naturally long hair is not an instant guarantee of philosophical probity (xxxv 2–3, lxxii 15–16).

140 See n. 75 above.

141 E.g. vii 8, xii 12, 15, 19, 85, xix 1, xxxix 7, xl 2, xlv 1–2, xlvii 23, xlviii 8, cf. lii 1, 3, the Κόμης ἐγκώμιον, and perhaps lii 6.

142 Equally Dio could hardly have produced such a work as Or. x if he himself had not manifestly been without property when he wrote it. Of course the credibility gap between philosophical theory and practice is depressingly familiar (for an exhaustive treatment of the problem see Griffin, M. T., Seneca, A Philosopher in Politics [Oxford 1976]Google Scholar) but in this case the argument for consistency is a strong one in the light both of the Diogenes/Dio allegory and of Dio's verifiable physical state.

143 Von Arnim 223 ff. Cf. xliv 6. Of course Dio would have incurred some financial loss, e.g. of revenue from his estates.

144 I owe this parallel to Phillips 109 n. 24.

145 i 55 (in an obviously fictitious context), xii 5–8, xxxii 12–13, 21, xxxiv 4–5, xlv 1, cf. xxxvi 25, xxxvii 27 (Favorinus), xxxviii 51, xlv 1.

146 See further below.

147 One might reasonably infer from the facts that Or. xlvi has the title Πρὸ τοῦ φιλοσοφєῖν and that Synesius (Dion 38a) found that the speeches in which the exile was referred to had already by this time been entitled μєτὰ τὴν φυγήν by ‘certain persons’ that research on the chronology of Dio's speeches (cf. also 39a) and perhaps therefore investigation of the whole question of the development of Dio's career predates the fourth century. But Synesius is the first to articulate the conversion theory (so far as we know) and clearly has thought the matter out for himself, whether influenced by previous research or not.

148 Another possible persona is that of Cleanthes (see n. 135 above). And the loaded description of Heracles (viii 29–35) clearly has some application to Dio (von Arnim 265). Dio's manipulation of personae, which often involves a certain duplicity, should be carefully distinguished from his skill at creating fictitious situations for his acquisition of knowledge. Examples include his meeting with the Arcadian prophetess (i 52 ff., πλασάμενός τι μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων says Arethas, cf. Loeb Dio v 410); his adventures in Euboea (Or. vii), based on themes drawn from New Comedy (Highet, G., ‘The Huntsman and the Castaway’ in GRBS xiv [1973] 35–40Google Scholar) or the novel (Jouan, F., ‘Les thèmes romanesques dans l'Euboicos de Dion Chrysostome’ in Erotica Antiqua 38–9Google Scholar, in full in REG xc [1977] 38–46); his interview with the aged Egyptian priest (xi 37 ff.); the alleged dying words of Charidemus (xxx 8 ff.)—clearly modelled on the last words of Socrates in the Phaedo; the alleged authority of the Phrygian kinsman of Aesop for the story of Orpheus, in the Alexandrian Oration (xxxii 63–6)Google Scholar; the allged authority of the Magi for the myth of the Borysthenitic Oration (xxxvi 39–40). No educated Greek or Roman reader would have taken any of these very seriously, nor would Dio have intended them to do so. Nevertheless, skill at creating fictitious dramatic settings is an analogous skill to the adroit manipulation of dramatic personae and requires the same sort of imagination.

149 For details see von Arnim 223–308.

150 Noted by Cohoon, , Loeb edn., Dio ii 236Google Scholar n. 1.

151 Cf. also iv 1–3: there is a similarity of situation between Dio in relation to his audience (a Greek one? See n. 94 above) and Diogenes in relation to his (i.e. Alexander).

152 Plut., Cat. Min. 67–70Google Scholar.

153 Tac. Ann. xvi 34–5, Wirszubski 142, Questa, C., Studi sulle fonti degli Annales di Tacito 2 (Rome 1963) 248–9Google Scholar.

154 Tac. Ann. xv 62–4, Questa 248–9, Griffin 369–72.

155 MacMullen 312 n. 29.

156 Ibid.

157 Lutz 3.

158 See Tatum, ‘The two lives of the sophist Apuleius’, n. 21 above.

159 References in n. 91 above.

160 References in n. 145 above.

161 This seems to have been appreciated by Crosby, Loeb edn. iii 182, n. 2. It is also perhaps relevant that Diogenes too seems to have had a δαιμόνιον according to Julian vii 212d. This need not be dismissed as a late tradition since the process of Socratizing Diogenes was evidently well established by the first century. Cf. n. 54 above.

162 Cf. Arethas' shrewd observations on this point (most accessible in the Loeb edn., Dio v 410–15).

163 Cf. his attitude to sophists and rhetoric, discussed above.

164 That Dio was aware of this is also clear from xliii 3, l 2, cf. xviii 12.

165 Cohoon, Loeb edn., ii 96, n. 1, seems to hint at this. The point has certainly not escaped C. P. Jones (private letter to me, Feb. 1976) but had occurred to me independently. Von Arnim 227–8 notes the Socratic colouring but makes nothing of it.The comments of Hirzel 88 are still very perceptive.

166 Parke and Wormell, i 409, stress the unusualness of the step of consulting the oracle and accept Dio's own explanation that he was influenced by the ancient custom of the Greeks when men had consulted Apollo about childlessness or famine. Dio himself also suggests a precise Croesus parallel (xiii 6–8). Momigliano, , Quarto Contributo 261Google Scholar hints at the influence of Xenophon's example. In the light of Dio's previous philosophical career and the strong association between the Delphic oracle and great philosophers of the past philosophical influence seems most likely.

167 Prima facie a further argument for scepticism over the reliability of Dio's evidence in the De Exilio might be that the theme, though clearly of great relevance in a period of philosophical persecution, had already become something of a literary genre by Dio's day. But while the De Exilio does employ some standard τόποι (e.g. xiii 2, 3, 5, 8) it clearly does not conform to the general pattern and the real arguments for scepticism are sui generis.

168 D. L. vi 20–21, 49 esp., Julian vi 188a—b, cf. 7.208d, 21 1b—d, 238b—d, Parke and Wormell, i 406–7, ii no. 180. Dio's familiarity with this tradition, likely on a priori grounds, is supported by xxxi 24.

169 D. L. vii 2, Parke and Wormell, i 406–7, ii no. 421.

170 Parke and Wormell, i 400 ff. Cf. Galen's ‘conversion’ to medicine, Parke and Wormell, i 409, ii no. 463.

171 E.g. xi 6 and 14 (abuse of sophists in a sophistic speech), 145 (use of a Thucydidean motif followed by a reference to Thucydides in 146), xii 5, 9, 15 (use of a Socratic claim with a casual reference to the fact that Socrates did the same thing in xii 14).

172 It is true, however, that Synesius has gone a little further than Dio, by suggesting that the ‘conversion’ was sudden (Dion 37c, rather at odds with 36a). This is perhaps to be explained by the fact that Synesius naturally regards Dio as a Stoic (37d) and Stoics necessarily (in theory) viewed conversion as an instantaneous process.

173 This paper was originally delivered at a meeting of the Hibernian Hellenists, 27 February 1976. I am grateful to all those who made helpful comments on that occasion. Mr E. L. Bowie and Professor G. L. Huxley kindly read a later draft and made many constructive criticisms.