We present large sample evidence on the performance of domestic and U.S. (foreign) bidder firms acquiring Canadian targets. Domestic bidders earn significantly positive average announcement period abnormal returns, while U.S. bidder returns are indistinguishable from zero. Measures of pre- and post-acquisition abnormal accounting performance are also consistent with a superior domestic bidder performance. Domestic bidder announcement returns are, on average, greatest for offers involving stock payment and for the bidders with the smallest equity size relative to the target. Neither direct foreign investment controls, horizontal product market relationships, nor acquisition propensities explain why domestic bidders outperform their U.S. competitors.

The popular finance literature describes the asset allocation decision as one of the most important factors in determining investment performance. This article reviews the implications of modern portfolio theory for the asset allocation decision and then examinesthe recommendations of some leading financial experts to see if they are consistent with theory.

This paper proposes a two-factor hazard rate model, in closd form, to price risky debt. The likelihood of default is captured by the firm's non-interest sensitive assets and default-free interest rates. The distinguishing features of the model are threefold. First, the impact of capital structure changes on credit spreads can be analyzed. Second, the model allows stochastic interest rates to impact current asset values as well as their evolution. Finally, the proposed model is in closed fom, enabling us to undertake comparative statics analysis, compute parameter deltas of the model, calibrate empirical credit spreads, and determine hedge positions. Credit spreads generated by our model are consistent with empirical observations.

We distinguish between horizontal and vertical joint ventures, and find correspondingly different valuation effects. Horizontal joint ventures create synergistic gains that are shared by the partners. In contrast, vertical joint ventures generate gains only for suppliers. This is similar to the patter we find for simple contracts, which suggests economic similiarities between vertical joint ventures and contracts. Analysing firms' choices between these contracting options, we find that firms choose vertical joint ventures over simple contracts when potential hold-up problems are severe and when suppliers face finance constraints. The results d not support a risk-sharing motive for joint ventures.

The paper examines the determinats of contract terms on bank revolving credit agreements (revolvers) of medium/large publicly traded companies. We model the duration (maturity), secured status, and pricing decisions within a simultaneous decision framework, thereby overcoming the biased and inconsistent estimates in prior single equations studies of debt contract terms. We find strong interrelationaships between contract terms with significant bi-directorinal relationships between duration and secure status and between the all-in-spread and commitment fees and aunidirectional relationship from both duration and secured status to all-in-spread. We also illustrate how several single equation studies of contract terms draw incorrect conclusions because of their (inappropriate) assumption that other contract therms and leverage were exogenous. Finally, our results support the hypothesis that the setting of contract terms plays and important role in alleviating contracting problems.

This paper assesses the importance of the role of prices as aggregators of private information in the S&P 500 future market. We estimate primitive parameters of the Hellwig (1980) noisy rational expectations model, when both prices and terminal values are observable. The variance-covariance parameters governing futuers prices and terminal values can be inverted to obtain estimate of the primitive parmeters, including the precision of private infromation and the variance of liquidity-motivated trades. We also estimate coefficients in the linear price conjecture, weights that agents place on different sources of information, and the informativeness of prices. We find that the variance of the error term in agents' private signals is several orders of magnitude larger than the variance of liquidity-motivated trades. But, in a large market, prices are still so informative that the market as a whole appears to weight them more than prior beliefs.