To price assets with a parsimonious set of factor-mimicking portfolios, one typically identifies and weights well-diversified basis portfolios. Traditional weightings lead to factor-mimicking portfolios that are unlikely to price even the basis portfolios from which they are formed. We offer a method to combine basis portfolios into a single factor-mimicking portfolio that is closely linked to the optimal portfolio. In practice, this method improves the pricing accuracy of parsimonious factor models, even for anomaly portfolios formed from characteristics that are distinct from those underlying the basis portfolios.

We test the hypothesis that low-visibility shocks to text-based network industry peers can explain industry momentum. We consider industry peer firms identified through 10-K product text and focus on economic peer links that do not share common Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Shocks to less visible peers generate economically large momentum profits and are stronger than own-firm momentum variables. More visible traditional SIC-based peers generate only small, short-lived momentum profits. Our findings are consistent with momentum profits arising partially from inattention to economic links of less visible industry peers.

We investigate the effects of target initiation in M&As. We find target-initiated deals are common and that important motives for these deals are target economic weakness, financial constraints, and negative economy-wide shocks. We determine that average takeover premia, target abnormal returns around merger announcements, and deal value to EBITDA multiples are significantly lower in target-initiated deals. This gap is not explained by weak target financial conditions. Adjusting for self-selection, we conclude that target managers’ private information is a major driver of lower premia in target-initiated deals. This gap widens as information asymmetry between merger partners rises.

Using novel earnings calendar data, we show that firms’ advanced scheduling of earnings announcement dates foreshadows their earnings news. Firms that schedule later-than-expected announcement dates subsequently announce worse news than those scheduling earlier-than-expected announcement dates. Despite scheduling disclosures being observable weeks ahead of earnings announcements, we show that equity markets fail to reflect the information in these disclosures until the announcement itself. By also showing that option markets respond efficiently to volatility-timing information embedded in the same scheduling disclosures, we provide novel evidence that markets fail to react to information about future earnings despite investors immediately trading on the underlying signal.

Myopic investors focus on short-run price changes rather than long-term fundamental value, resulting in an overweighting of public information and a slow diffusion of fundamental news. Such processing of information can produce price drifts similar to those seen in behavioral models of momentum. We explore the impact of myopia over an international sample, finding that momentum is stronger in more myopic countries, and this relationship is magnified where the proportion of funds under delegated management is high. We therefore argue that investor myopia, which arises due to agency issues in delegated funds management, is an important determinant of momentum.

Mutual fund managers with degrees from elite universities tend to outperform their counterparts from less elite universities. We show that the better performance of elite graduates is generated from their better connections with underwriters that facilitate allocations to underpriced initial public offerings (IPOs). Indeed, we find that the funds outperform only in months when they are connected to underwriters issuing IPOs. A strategy of buying mutual funds in months when they are connected to underwriters scheduled to issue IPOs generates significant abnormal returns, as high as 4.08% per annum in hot markets.

We reconsider whether hedge funds’ time-varying risk factor exposures are predictive of superior performance. We construct an overall measure (BA) of fund managers and present evidence that top beta active managers deliver superior long-term out-of-sample performance compared to top alpha active managers. BA captures the time-varying nature of beta exposures and can be interpreted as a common factor of both systematic risk (SR) and (1 - R2) measures. BA also compares favorably to extant measures of market timing, capturing the explanatory power of such measures of hedge fund performance.

A major issue with predicting inflation rates using predictive regressions is that estimation errors can overwhelm the information content. This article proposes a new approach that uses a monetary-policy rule as a bridge between inflation rates and short-term interest rates and relies on the forward-interest-rate curve to predict future interest-rate movements. The 2-step procedure estimates the predictive relation not through a predictive regression but far more accurately through the contemporaneous monetary-policy linkage. Historical analysis shows that the approach outperforms random walk out of sample by 30%–50% over horizons from 1 to 5 years.

Straddles on individual stocks generally earn negative and significant returns. However, average at-the-money straddles from 3 days before an earnings announcement to the announcement date yield a highly significant 3.34% return. The positive returns on straddles indicate that investors underestimate the magnitude of uncertainty around earnings announcements. We find that positive straddle returns are more pronounced for smaller firms and firms with higher volatility, higher kurtosis, more volatile past earnings surprises, and less trading volume/higher transaction costs. This suggests that when firm signals are noisy, and/or when it is costlier to trade, investors underestimate the uncertainty associated with earnings announcements.

There is widespread agreement that corporate debts’ recovery rates are time varying, but empirical work in this area is limited. We show that the joint information from the term structure of senior and subordinate credit default swaps can identify the level and the dynamics of recovery rates. We estimate a reduced-form no-arbitrage model on 46 firms across different industries. We find that the term structure of expected recovery rates is, on average, downward sloping. However, an inversion occurs during the 2008 crisis, suggesting the market expects higher recoveries conditional on short-term survival. The inversion is more pronounced for firms in distressed industries.

Betting quotes provide valuable information on market-implied probabilities for outcomes of events such as elections or referendums, which may have an impact on exchange rates. We generate exchange-rate forecasts around such events based on a model that combines risk-neutral event probabilities implied from betting quotes with risk-neutral exchange-rate densities extracted from currency option prices. Its application to predict exchange rates around the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential elections shows that these forecasts, conditional on the respective outcomes, were accurate, and markets were able to separate their views on the likelihood and the impact of these events.

Overconfident CEOs/senior executives tend to have excessively positive views of their own skills and their company’s future performance. We hypothesize that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in reckless or intentional actions/disclosures that give rise to securities class actions (SCAs). Empirical evidence is supportive: Overconfident CEOs/senior executives increase SCA likelihood, though litigation risk is ameliorated through improved governance, such as following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Post-SCA, companies are less likely to hire an overconfident CEO. Following an SCA, overconfident CEOs appear to moderate behavior and to reduce their litigation risk.