We investigate the claim that hedge funds offer investors a superior risk-return tradeoff. We do so using a continuous-time version of Dybvig's (1988a), (1988b) payoff distribution pricing model. The evaluation model, which does not require any assumptions with regard to the return distribution of the funds to be evaluated, is applied to the monthly returns of 77 hedge funds and 13 hedge fund indices from May 1990–April 2000. The results show that, as a stand-alone investment, hedge funds do not offer a superior risk-return profile. We find 12 indices and 72 individual funds to be inefficient, with the average efficiency loss amounting to 2.76% per annum for indices and 6.42% for individual funds. Part of the inefficiency cost of individual funds can be diversified away. Funds of funds, however, are not the preferred vehicle for this as their performance appears to suffer badly from their double fee structure. Looking at hedge funds in a portfolio context results in a marked improvement in the evaluation outcomes. Seven of the 12 hedge fund indices and 58 of the 72 individual funds classified as inefficient on a stand-alone basis are capable of producing an efficient payoff profile when mixed with the S&P 500. The best results are obtained when 10%–20% of the portfolio value is invested in hedge funds.

Conservative financial policies are often criticized as serving the interests of managers rather than the interests of stockholders. We test this argument by examining the operating performance and other characteristics of firms that for a five-year period held more than one-fourth of their assets in cash and cash equivalents. Following the five-year period, operating performance of high cash firms is comparable to or greater than the performance of firms matched by size and industry or by a measure of proclivity to hold substantial cash. In addition, proxies for managerial incentive problems, such as ownership and board characteristics, are not unusual and do not explain differences in operating performance among high cash firms. We find that high cash holdings are accompanied by greater investment, particularly R&D expenditures, and by greater growth in assets. For firms that persistently hold large cash reserves, we conclude that such policies support investment without hindering corporate performance.

We investigate whether intertemporal variation in stock and bond risk premia can be explained by time-varying covariances with priced risk factors. We estimate and test a conditional two-factor variant of Merton's ICAPM in which excess returns on an equity index and a long-term government bond portfolio proxy for risk factors. Conditional second moments follow the asymmetric dynamic covariance (ADC) model of Kroner and Ng (1998). We find that conditional bond variance responds symmetrically to bond return shocks but is virtually unaffected by stock return shocks, while conditional stock variance responds asymmetrically to both stock and bond return shocks. Models that impose a constant correlation restriction on the covariance matrix between stock and bond returns are strongly rejected. We conclude that the conditional two-factor model fails to adequately explain intertemporal variation in stock and bond risk premia.

We investigate the impact of Focus Listing by the Council of Institutional Investors on targeting poorly performing firms. Post-listing stock returns for the targeted firms differ insignificantly from those of a suitable benchmark group. Institutional investors increase their holdings of targeted firms, but not by more than those of the benchmark firms. Similarly, though analysts revise earnings forecasts up for Focus Listed firms, they do so well after the listing event and positive revisions are no greater than the benchmark group. Moreover, there appears to be little difference between Focus List and benchmark firms in the incidence of post-listing events such as mergers and stock repurchases. Overall, we find very little evidence of the efficacy of shareholder activism.

This paper uses an HJM model to price TIPS and related derivative securities. First, using the market prices of TIPS and ordinary U.S. Treasury securities, both the real and nominal zero-coupon bond price curves are obtained using standard coupon bond price stripping procedures. Next, a three-factor arbitrage-free term structure model is fit to the time-series evolutions of the CPI-U and the real and nominal zero-coupon bond price curves. Then, using these estimated term structure parameters, the validity of the HJM model for pricing TIPS is confirmed via its hedging performance. Lastly, the usefulness of the pricing model is illustrated by valuing call options on the inflation index.

Credit derivatives are among the fastest growing contracts in the derivatives market. We present a simple, easily implementable model to study the pricing and hedging of two widely traded default-triggered claims: default swaps and default baskets. In particular, we demonstrate how default correlation (the correlation between two default processes) impacts the prices of these claims. When we extend our model to continuous time, we find that, once default correlation has been taken into consideration, the spread dynamics have very little explanatory power.

To explain post-earnings announcement drift, we construct a risk factor related to unexpected earnings surprise, and propose a four-factor model by adding this risk factor to Fama and French's (1993), (1995) three-factor model. This earnings surprise risk factor provides a remarkable improvement in explaining post-earnings announcement drift when included in addition to the three factors of Fama and French. After adjusting raw returns for the four risk factors, the cumulative abnormal returns over the 60 trading days subsequent to quarterly earnings announcements are economically and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, except for the first two days after the earnings announcement, the cumulative abnormal returns and the arbitrage returns from our four-factor model are relatively stable over the testing period and never significant on any day of the testing period. On the other hand, the arbitrage returns from the other models increase over the 60-day testing period. We argue that most of the post-earnings announcement drift observed in prior studies may be a result of using misspecified models and failing to appropriately adjust raw returns for risk.

Does more leverage always worsen the debt agency problem? This paper presents a unified analysis that accounts for both risk-shifting and under-investment debt agency problems. For firms with positive marginal volatility of investment (defined as the change in cash flow volatility corresponding to a change of investment scale), equity holders' risk-shifting incentive will mitigate the under-investment problem. This implies that, contrary to conventional views, the total agency cost of debt does not uniformly increase with leverage. This model further predicts that, for high growth firms in which the under-investment problem is severe, the optimal debt ratio is positively related to the marginal volatility of investment. Empirical results support this prediction.

This paper examines the performance of momentum trading strategies in foreign exchange markets. We find the well-documented profitability of momentum strategies during the 1970s and the 1980s has continued throughout the 1990s. Our approach and findings are insensitive to the specification of the trading rule and the base currency for analysis. Finally, we show that the performance is not due to a time-varying risk premium but rather depends on the underlying autocorrelation structure of the currency returns. In sum, the results lend further support to prior momentum studies on equities. The profitability to momentum-based strategies holds for currencies as well.

This paper aims to develop and compare bounds on the pricing formulas for European type discrete Asian options. The lower bound is found by conditioning the maturity payment of the Asian option by the geometric average and the bound derived can be expressed as a portfolio of delayed payment European call options. Several exercise price-dependent upper bounds are derived. Like the lower bound, one of the upper bounds is expressed as a portfolio of delayed payment European call options. Through a numerical analysis, we conclude that more information is gained from the readily calculated bounds than from the usually applied pricing approximations. From the closed-form solutions of the bounds, hedging positions are finally derived.