Representative agent models are inconsistent with existing empirical evidence for steep demand curves for individual stocks. This paper resolves the puzzle by proposing that stock prices are instead set by two separate classes of investors. While the market portfolio is still priced by individual investors based on their collective risk aversion, those individual investors also delegate part of their wealth to active money managers, who use that capital to price stocks in the cross section. In equilibrium, the fee charged by active managers has to equal the before-fee alpha they earn. This endogenously determines the amount of active capital and the slopes of demand curves. A calibration of the model reveals that demand curves can be steep enough to match the magnitude of many empirical findings, including the price effects for stocks entering or leaving the S&P 500 index.

We develop measures of the management quality of firms and make use of a unique sample of hand-collected data to examine the relationship between the reputation and quality of a firm’s management and its financial and investment policies, a relationship that has so far received little attention in the literature. We hypothesize that better and more reputable managers are able to convey the intrinsic value of their firm more credibly to outsiders, thus reducing the information asymmetry facing their firm in the equity market. Given this, firms with better and more reputable managers will have more access to the equity market, so that we expect lower leverage ratios for these firms. In addition, they will have less need to signal using dividends, so that they will have lower dividend payout ratios. Further, since better managers are likely to select better projects (having a larger net present value (NPV) for any given scale) and to implement them more ably, higher management quality will also be associated with higher levels of investment. We present evidence consistent with the above hypotheses. Our direct tests of the relationship between management quality and asymmetric information also indicate that higher management quality leads to a reduction in the extent of information asymmetry facing a firm in the equity market.

In light of recent improvements in the transparency of the corporate bond market, we examine the relation between high frequency returns on individual stocks and bonds. In contrast to the authors of previous literature, we employ comprehensive transactions data for both classes of securities. We find that hourly stock returns lead bond returns for nonconvertible junk- and BBB-rated bonds, and that stock returns lead bond returns for convertible bonds in all rating classes. Most of the predictable nonconvertible bonds are issued by companies in financial distress, while the predictable convertible bonds are those with conversion options more deeply in-the-money. These results indicate that the corporate bond market is less informationally efficient than the stock market, notwithstanding the recent improvements in bond market transparency and associated reductions in corporate bond transaction costs.

Existing approaches to testing for the efficiency of a given portfolio make strong parametric assumptions about investor preferences and return distributions. Stochastic dominance-based procedures promise a useful nonparametric alternative. However, these procedures have been limited to considering binary choices. In this paper we take a new approach that considers all diversified portfolios and thereby introduce a new concept of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) optimality of a given portfolio relative to all possible portfolios. Using our new test, we show that the U.S. stock market portfolio is significantly FSD nonoptimal relative to benchmark portfolios formed on market capitalization and book-to-market equity ratios. Without appealing to parametric assumptions about the return distribution, we conclude that no nonsatiable investor would hold the market portfolio in the face of the attractive premia of small caps and value stocks.

We examine two hypotheses to explain stock mispricing: i) the money illusion hypothesis (Modigliani and Cohn (1979)) and ii) the resale option hypothesis (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)). We find that the money illusion hypothesis may explain the level, but not the volatility, of mispricing in the U.S. market. In contrast, the stock resale option hypothesis, which stems from heterogeneous beliefs about future dividend growth rates and short-sale constraints, can explain both the level and the volatility of mispricing. The evidence suggests that while the two hypotheses complement each other in explaining the level of mispricing, the resale option hypothesis provides a more coherent explanation for asset price bubbles, in which extraordinarily high price levels are often accompanied by excessive volatility and frenzied trading.

This study explores the phenomena associated with conflicts of interest, particularly as they pertain to the brokerage and proprietary trading divisions of investment banks. This distinguishes it from past studies, which have researched conflicts of interest between underwriting and brokerage divisions. We examine whether or not an investment bank issues buy recommendations to the market and buys (sells) the same recommended stocks through its proprietary trading division before (after) recommendations, and if so, to what extent this goes on. We find that these conflicts of interest do exist and that these investment banks can profit from their recommendations in the short run.

This paper tests alternative theories about the effect of asset liquidity on capital structure. Using data from a broad sample of U.S. public companies, I find that leverage is positively related to asset liquidity. Further analysis reveals that the relation between asset liquidity and secured debt is positive, whereas the relation between asset liquidity and unsecured debt is curvilinear. The results are consistent with the view that the costs of financial distress and inefficient liquidation are economically important and that they affect capital structure decisions. In addition, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the costs of managerial discretion increase with asset liquidity.

In this paper, we propose a nonparametric estimator of the short rate diffusion process using observations of a panel of yields. The proposed estimator can greatly reduce the bias of the nonparametric estimator proposed in Stanton (1997) that uses a single time series of short rate observations. Simulations confirm that the new method significantly attenuates the spurious nonlinearity of the drift function as documented in Chapman and Pearson (2000). We apply the method to estimate the U.S. short rate process using a panel of six Treasury yields. With 42 years’ daily observations of the panel of yields, the proposed drift function estimator achieves the same efficiency as the Stanton (1997) estimator based on 145 years of daily short rate observations. Finally, we show that the proposed estimator also has significant economic implications on the pricing of bonds and interest rate derivatives.

This paper proposes an alternative characterization of the early exercise premium that is valid for any Markovian and diffusion underlying price process as well as for any parameterization of the exercise boundary. This new representation is shown to provide the best pricing alternative available in the literature for medium- and long-term American option contracts, under the constant elasticity of variance model. Moreover, the proposed pricing methodology is also extended easily to the valuation of American options on defaultable equity and possesses appropriate asymptotic properties.