Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 April 2021
We provide evidence regarding mutual funds’ motivation to hold lottery stocks. Funds with higher managerial ownership invest less in lottery stocks, suggesting that managers themselves do not prefer such stocks. The evidence instead supports that managers cater to fund investors’ preference for such stocks. In particular, funds with more lottery holdings attract larger flows after portfolio disclosure compared with their peers, and poorly performing funds tend to engage in risk shifting by increasing their lottery holdings toward year-ends. Funds’ aggregate holdings of lottery stocks contribute to their overpricing.
We thank Hendrik Bessembinder (the editor) and Roger Edelen (the referee) for their insightful and constructive feedback. We thank Rishabh Khurana and Chenglu Zhang for their excellent research assistance. We thank Turan Bali, Justin Birru, Chuck Buker, Sandeep Dahiya, Rui Dai, Kent Daniel, Freda Song Drechsler, Wayne Ferson, Vyacheslav (Slava) Fos, Egemen Genc, Bing Han, Ron Kaniel, Donald Keim, Clark Liu, Pedro Matos, David Mclean, Scott Murray, Sugata Ray, Honglin Ren, Matthew Ringgenberg, Clemens Sialm, and Xuemin Yan for their helpful comments and constructive suggestions. We also benefited from the comments received at presentations at the Baruch College, Baylor University, the Central University of Finance and Economics, Erasmus University, Georgia State University, Georgetown University, Renmin University, the Indian School of Business, the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, the Tsinghua Finance Workshop, the University of California at Riverside, the University of Houston, the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, the University of Virginia (Darden), and the WRDS Advanced Research Scholar Program in the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Jiang gratefully acknowledges financial support from Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program, the National Science Foundation of China (71572091), and Tsinghua National Laboratory for Information Science and Technology. Agarwal would also like to thank the Centre for Financial Research (CFR) in Cologne for its continued support. We thank Linlin Ma and Yuehua Tang for sharing the managerial ownership data.