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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 August 2023
We examine the association between margin requirements and the market’s efficiency in incorporating firm-specific and market-level public news. Combining the Fed’s 22 changes in margin requirements with a hand-collected sample of earnings announcements between 1934 and 1975, we show that higher margin requirements induce greater delay in incorporating earnings information into prices. We draw similar conclusions when we analyze the Hou and Moskowitz (2005) price delay measure, as well as indirect measures of leverage constraints over recent years. Further tests suggest that, despite the Fed’s expressed intent to curtail excess speculation, higher margin requirements restrict trading by arbitrageurs more than noise traders.
We thank Alexander Barinov, Gib Bassett, Andriy Bodnaruk, Oleg Bondarenko, Ginka Borisova, James Brown, Brad Cannon, Hsiu-Lang Chen, Robert Chirinko, Jennifer Conrad (the editor), Arnold Cowan, Yuliya Demyanyk, Egemen Genc, Tyler Jensen, Chao Jiang, Ted Juhl, Petri Jylhä (the referee), Jenny Kim, Mike Kirschenheiter, Tingting Liu, Stanislava Nikolova, Andrew Stephan, Xiaolu Wang, Jide Wintoki, and seminar participants at Iowa State University, the University of Illinois–Chicago, the 2020 Southern Finance Association Conference, the 2021 Eastern Finance Association Conference, and the 2021 American Accounting Association. We gratefully acknowledge the data support of Rajendra Srivastava (SeekEdgar LLC), regarding the daily earnings reports from the Wall Street Journal archives. We also thank Zhongjin Lu and Zhongling Qin for sharing data on the shadow cost of leverage.