Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 June 2023
We investigate how men and women fare in the managerial labor market in the plausibly exogenous circumstance of their firms being acquired when most target-firm managers (about 90%) are displaced. These career disruptions result in a larger drop in rank and compensation for female managers, despite similar job search attributes. Gender differences are mitigated when hiring firms have more women in upper-echelon positions. Rich managerial experience and external board service also reduce gender-related differences. Overall, results point to a (implicit) “gender penalty” in terms of managerial job mobility, but also indicate contexts in which penalty is alleviated, and even reversed.
We thank two anonymous referees, Anup Agrawal, Vineet Bhagwat, Mara Faccio (the editor), David King, Lei Kong, Marc Lipson, John List, Johan Maharjan, David Matsa, Shawn Mobbs, Josh Pierce, and Emilia Vähäma, seminar participants at the 2020 Labor and Finance Online Seminar and Nova School of Business and Economics, participants at The Dawgs Virtual Workshop, and John List’s Team meeting, and conference participants at the 2020 Boca Corporate Finance and Governance Conference, 2020 Financial Management Association Doctoral Consortium, 2021 Northern Finance Association conference, and 2020 Southern Finance Association conference for valuable comments.