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Communication of Aggregate Preferences through Market Prices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Alan Kraus  and
Gordon A. Sick
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Extract

In a dynamic economy with a sequence of markets over time, there are generally goods or securities that will be traded in the future at currently unknown prices. Individuals require some notion of what these future prices will be since knowledge of future investment opportunity sets is relevant when making current portfolio allocation decisions.

Type
I. Incentive Signaling Models and Rational Expectations
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , November 1979 , pp. 695 - 703
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1979

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References

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