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Communication and Collective Actions: A Survey Experiment on Motivating Energy Conservation in the U.S.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 August 2014

Toby Bolsen ,
James N. Druckman  and
Fay Lomax Cook
Toby Bolsen
Affiliation:
Georgia State University, 38 Peachtree Center Avenue, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA, e-mail: [email protected]
James N. Druckman
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Scott Hall 601 University Place, Evanston, IL 60208, USA, e-mail: [email protected]
Fay Lomax Cook
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, 2040 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208, USA, e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

When do citizens take action to benefit the public good, even when individual benefits are scant or non-existent? We address this question with a focus on an area of critical importance when it comes to environmental sustainability—specifically, we examine citizens' actions in the domain of energy conservation. We do so by using a survey experiment to evaluate the impact of exposure to communications posited to shape collective action behavior. We find that communications shape behavior depending on two primary factors not previously studied in concert: to whom responsibility is attributed for collective outcomes; and, what effects, or consequences, are associated with one's actions. We find that communications emphasizing individual responsibility and collective environmental benefits can stimulate collective action.

Keywords

Energyframingbehaviorsattributionssurvey experimentconservation
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , Spring 2014 , pp. 24 - 38
Copyright
Copyright © The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2014 

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