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Individual versus Group Play in the Repeated Coordinated Resistance Game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2015

Timothy N. Cason  and
Vai-Lam Mui
Timothy N. Cason
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 W. State St., West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056, USA; e-mail: [email protected]
Vai-Lam Mui
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Monash Business School, Monash University, P.O. Box 11E, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia; email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper reports an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of repeated interactions in deterring leaders from using divide-and-conquer strategies to extract surplus from their subordinates, when every decision-maker involved is a group instead of an individual. We find that both the resistance rate by subordinates and the divide-and-conquer transgression rate by leaders are the same in the group and individual repeated coordinated resistance games. Similar to the individual game, adding communication to the group game can help deter opportunistic behavior by the leaders even in the presence of repetition.

Keywords

Communicationcoordinated resistancedivide-and-conquerlaboratory experimentrepeated gamesgroup decision-making
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , Spring 2015 , pp. 94 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2015 

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Supplementary material: File

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Appendix A

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Appendix B

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Appendix C

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Appendix D

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