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Why Was British Growth So Slow During the Industrial Revolution?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

Jeffrey G. Williamson
Jeffrey G. Williamson
Affiliation:
The author is Professor of Economics at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.
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Abstract

Although it has been labeled the “First Industrial Revolution,” British growth and industrialization was slow between the 1760s and the 1820s. The explanation seems to lie with low capital formation shares in national income, low rates of accumulation, and thus little change in the capital-labor ratio. What accounts for the modest investment rates? Lack of thrift? Weak investment demand? This paper argues that the answer is to be found in the enormous debt issues used, to finance the French Wars.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , September 1984 , pp. 687 - 712
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1984

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References

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52 Hueckel's “War and the British Economy” was the pioneering application of such methods to the problem, but his approach differs from what follows. For example, there are only two sectors in Hueckel's model—agriculture and manufacturing, no raw material inputs to manufacturing, and no nontradables. The most important difference is that Hueckel did not offer a quantitative assessment of the impact of capital formation.Google Scholar

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