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Market Structure and Profits: A Further Rejoinder

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

J. E. Inikori
J. E. Inikori
Affiliation:
Professor of History at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Federal Republic of Nigeria.
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Abstract

Seymour Drescher's comments center on whether British traders exporting slaves from Africa directly to non-British territories in the Americas were able to load more slaves per ton after 1788 than the slave-ton ratios imposed by British laws. The bone of contention here arose originally from attempts to estimate the volume of the trade. I argued that the British traders did load considerably more slaves per ton after 1788. Neglecting this factor would lead to a significant underestimate of the volume. Drescher disagreed and offered comments in Econocide; I replied in Forced Migration. In discussing the profits I found the subject still relevant: I argued that loading considerably more slaves than British laws allowed enhanced profits of the larger firms with access to non-British territories. On this Drescher here takes issue.

Type
A Symposium on the Atlantic Slave Trade
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , September 1985 , pp. 708 - 711
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1985

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References

1 Inikori, J. E., “Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: An Assessment of Curtin and Anstey,” Journal of African History, 17, no. 2 (1976), pp. 219–21,Google Scholar and “Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade:A Rejoinder,” Journal of African History, 17, no. 4 (1976), p. 609.Google Scholar

2 Drescher, Seymour, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition (Pittsburgh, 1977), pp.205–13.Google ScholarInikori, J. E., ed., Forced Migration: The Impact of the Export Slave Trade on African Societies (London and New York, 1982), p. 277, n. 20.Google Scholar

3 Inikori, J. F., “Market Structure and the Profits of the British African Trade in the Late Eighteenth Century,” this JOURNAL, 41 (12 1981), pp. 766–67.Google Scholar

4 Liverpool Record Office, 387MD43, Account Book of Ship Enterprize.

5 Inikori, “Market Structure,” p. 766, n. 73.Google Scholar

6 Pitman, Frank W., The Development of the British West Indies, 1700–1763 (New Haven, 1917, 2nd ed., 1945), pp. 206, 220, 221, 276.Google Scholar

7 Inikori, “Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Rejoinder,” p. 609.Google Scholar

8 See their present comments in this issue.Google Scholar

9 Thomas, Robert P. and Bean, Richard N., “The Fishers of Men: The Profits of the Slave Trade,” this JOURNAL, 34 (12 1974), p. 914.Google Scholar

10 Inikori, “Market Structure,” pp. 762–75, especially Tables 4–6 and n. 86.Google Scholar

11 Table 4, p. 771.Google Scholar

12 Inikori, , “Market Structure and the Profits of the British African Trade in the Late Eighteenth Century: A Rejoinder,” this JOURNAL, 43 (09 1983).Google Scholar

13 Inikori, “Market Structure,” Table 4.Google Scholar

14 p. 771–72.Google Scholar

15 Anderson and Richardson's present argument on whether marginal traders were able to remain in the trade during difficult times in the late eighteenth century, as reflected in Table I of my original paper, is misleading. The only logical way of resolving the issue is to group all the firms in the British slave trade in the late eighteenth century into two categories: the Larger and more Efficient Firms (LEF), and the Marginal Firms (MF). We then follow the performance of all the firms in the LEF category and those in the MF category, without transferring firms from one category to another, over time. Using Wallace's criterion, we take all firms landing 1,000 slaves or more per year during peak periods of the trade as belonging to the LEF category and all others as belonging to the MF category. If this method is applied to the information presented in my original Table 1 it will be seen that the collective share of the trade by the firms in the MF category diminishes to almost zero in the difficult year of 1793, meaning that almost all the marginal firms in Liverpool were weeded out of the trade in 1793. Conversely, while all the firms in the LEF category may have reduced their scale of operation in 1793 (some reducing more than others), their collective share of the trade rises to close to 100 percent. This was also true of London and Bristol. In fact, only a handful of the marginal firms came back to the trade in London and Bristol after 1793, making the dominance of the firms in the LEF category very pronounced in the last years of the trade in those two ports. This is the point that I tried to clarify in my earlier rejoinder (p. 724), which Anderson and Richardson seem to have missed altogether in their present comments. It is only in this way that the point becomes relevant to my original argument that it was firms in the LEF category that usually made the huge short-run abnormal profits, because they remained in the trade all the time.Google Scholar

16 See Inikori, J. E., “The Import of Firearms into West Africa' 1750–1807: A Quantitative Analysis,” Journal of African History, 18, no. 3 (1977), pp. 350–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 Public Record Office, T.70/1543, Alexander & Bridges, Robert to the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa, London, 12 09 1781. My italics.Google Scholar

18 P.R.O., T.70/1568, Messrs. Pigow & Andrews to the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa, 19 09 1794. Note that in the thirteen years between 12 09. 1781, and 19 09 1794, the price of gunpowder increased by about 30.4 percent, while the rate of discount on gunpowder increased by 100 percent, from 5 percent to 10 percent cash discount. My italics.Google Scholar

19 P.R.O., C. 107/7 Part I, Will. & Saml. Rawlinson to Messrs. Richd. Fydell & Co., Manchester, 11 June 1787.Google Scholar This was quoted in my original paper on p. 758, n. 37. My italics. The evidence is overwhelming and it covers all the commodities essential for the British slave trade in the late eighteenth century. One more may be added from Bristol: “We have supplied many cargoes of Brass Neptunes, Guiny Pans, Kettles, to our & the Liverpool merchts who are pleased to give us the preference as they say our manufacture gives more content…. The price is here 7:5[£7:5/–1 per cwt. But lately the Old Company have allowed 10/– per cwt discount if paid for within 30 days, 8/– per cwt in 2 [months], 6/– per cwt in 3, 4/– per cwt in 4 /– per cwt in 5 months discount after delivery.” (P.R.O., T.70/1516, Messrs. Wm. Champion & Co. to Company of Merchants Trading to Africa, Bristol, 24 Dec. 1750. My italics.)