Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 November 2014
Following Waterloo, managing French public finances represented a daunting task as the country had lost a substantial part of its population and territory and had to pay huge amounts as reparations to the victors. Despite this, in just ten years, France managed to issue substantial amounts of debt with a spread, compared to the British consol, falling from more than 400 to 100 basis points. We argue that the Duke of Wellington was key in creating an environment in which Baring had an incentive to lend to France and all actors had an incentive to see French debts reimbursed.
The authors wish to thank the editor, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, three anonymous referees as well as Patrice Baubeau, Stéphanie Collet, Nicholas Dimsdale, Benoit D'Udekem D'Acoz, Marc Flandreau, Georges Gallais-Hamonno, Oscar Gelderblom, Jane Humphries, David Le Bris, Larry Neal, Kris Mitchener, Patrick O'Brien, Kevin O'Rourke, Catherine Pouget, SébastienPouget, Erwan Quéinnec, Angela Redish, Christian Rietsch, Albrecht Ritschl, Angelo Riva, Hugh Rockoff, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Dick Sylla, Ariane Szafarz, Eugene N. White for comments and suggestions. We also thank participants in seminars at ESCP-Europe, Kedge Business School, Oxford University, Toulouse School of Economics and the Université d'Orléans, and at conferences held by the CEPR and the Economic History Association.