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Was There a Solution to the Ancien Régime's Financial Dilemma?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

Eugene Nelson White
Eugene Nelson White
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903.
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Abstract

The fiscal policy accomplishments of the ancien régime during its last two decades in France have been greatly underappreciated. While the collapse of the monarchy has been attributed to persistent peacetime deficits, these did not appear until the mid-1780s when earlier reforms and successful budget policies were abandoned by reactionary finance ministers. Had the earlier policies been continued, it is unlikely that a severe crisis would have occurred in 1788/89.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , September 1989 , pp. 545 - 568
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1989

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References

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