Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2009
The record of British and French finance during the Napoleonic wars presents the striking picture of a financially strong nation abandoning the gold standard, borrowing heavily, and generating inflation, while a financially weaker country followed more “orthodox” policies. This paradoxical behavior is explained by Britain's strong credibility that allowed more flexible policies, while France's poor reputation forced reliance on taxation.
For helpful comments and suggestions we thank Levis Kochin, Hugh Rockoff, Mark Rush, Forrest Capie, Stanley Engerman, Angela Redish, Anna J. Schwartz, and Warren Weber, and seminar participants at Northwestern University, the University of Illinois, and Brown University. Howard Bodenhorn provided valuable research assistance.Google Scholar
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