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Dealing by a Truculent Ally: A Comparative Perspective on China's Handling of North Korea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Michael R. Chambers
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Abstract

Fearing war on the Korean peninsula as a result of the current nuclear crisis, China has attempted to restrain its risk-taking ally in North Korea and push it toward a negotiated solution. In the process, Beijing has reneged on security commitments made in its bilateral alliance with Pyongyang. We should not be surprised by this behavior because China has acted similarly in other alliances with Asian neighbors. In particular, the PRC has demonstrated a wariness of being dragged into unwanted conflicts, has (since the economic reforms began in 1978) placed its own strategic economic development interests over fulfilling security pledges to allies, and has taught unruly allies a lesson for defying Chinese interests and advice by allowing them to be bloodied in combat. China's refusal to honor its security commitments in order to restrain North Korea and avoid entrapment in an undesired war raises the issue of the future of this alliance.

Keywords

ChinaNorth Koreaalliancesinformal alliancesunequal alliancesententesentrapmentrestraint of allyCambodiaPakistan
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , April 2005 , pp. 35 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

I would like to thank Robert S. Ross and Andrew Scobell as well as anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.Google Scholar

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94. On this point, see Scobell, , “China and North Korea,” pp. 275–276; and Lam, Willy Wo-Lap, “China Diplomacy Hinging on ‘Korea Option.’” Google Scholar

95. For two important statements by PRC officials on China's rise, see Premier Wen Jiabao's remarks at Harvard University, December 10, 2003, available at http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html; and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing's press conference following the March 2004 National People's Congress: “Full Text of Chinese FM's National People's Congress News Conference,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 6, 2004. Beijing's decision not to devalue its currency during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis is often pointed to as the first example of this new responsible neighborliness.Google Scholar

96. Certainly, China's expansion into the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as well as its threats against Taiwan can be viewed as Chinese efforts to alter the regional status quo. However, the Chinese see these moves as defensive rather than expansive. Andrew Scobell characterizes this tendency of the PRC as their “cult of defense.” See his book China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), especially chap. 2.Google Scholar