Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-08T08:36:26.855Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

China: A Challenge or Opportunity for the United States?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Jianwei Wang
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the United States—from the government to the public, from the White House to Congress, from policymakers to pundits, from China specialists to people who know little about China—has engaged itself in the seemingly endless debate on China. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, people debated whether China was still important to the United States and whether the Sino-U.S. special relationship was worth preserving. Since the early 1990s, with China's remarkable economic “soft landing” and the consequent robust and sustained economic growth, Americans seemed to have reached a consensus that China still matters to the United States for better or worse. U.S.-China relations were often referred to as one of the most important bilateral relations to the United States. But important in what way? Much debate ensued with a series of frictions between the two countries that climaxed in the dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carriers to the South China Sea during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, the U.S.-led NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between the two air forces in 2001. The U.S. media tirelessly asked the question: “China: friend or foe?” The pattern for U.S. China policy since the end of the Cold War is that whenever the relationship appeared to be stabilizing and a consensus was shaping, new crises emerged and destroyed the hard-won progress, triggering another round of debate on China as if people never learned anything from the previous debate; the old and familiar discourse started all over again.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , May 2003 , pp. 293 - 334
Copyright
Copyright © East Asia Institute 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1. For example, see Nye, Joseph S. Jr., “Foreword,” in The China Initiative (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 1998), p. 1.Google Scholar

2. Lake, Anthony, “From Containment to Enlargement,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, No. 3 (September 27, 1993).Google Scholar

3. “President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea,” Remarks by the President and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Press Conference, Bush Ranch, Crawford, Texas, October 25, 2002 (available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021025.html).Google Scholar

4. For more discussion of this concept, see Wang, Jianwei, Limited Adversaries: Post–Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). The QDR report by the Department of Defense in 2001 also pointed out “a great deal of uncertainty about the potential sources of military threats.” Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p. 3.Google Scholar

5. Posen, Barry R. and Ross, Andrew L., “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 21, No. 3 (winter 1996/97): 5–53.Google Scholar

6. Ibid., p. 44.Google Scholar

7. Lemann, Nicholas, “The Next World Order, the Bush Administration May Have a Brand-new Doctrine of Power,” The New Yorker, April 1, 2002, pp. 43–44.Google Scholar

8. Rice, Condoleezza, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000): 57.Google Scholar

9. This, of course, has been somewhat modified after the September 11 attacks.Google Scholar

10. Shambaugh, David, “Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors,” Survival 42, No. 1 (spring 2000): 99.Google Scholar

11. Ibid.Google Scholar

12. LatelineNews, “Rumsfeld Questions Two-war Strategy,” June 22, 2001.Google Scholar

13. Ricks, Thomas E. and Pincus, Walter, “Pentagon Plans Major Changes in U.S. Strategy,” Washington Post, May 7, 2001.Google Scholar

14. Soh, Felix, “Win-win Middle Path in US Security Strategy in Asia,” Straits Times, May 26, 2001.Google Scholar

15. As one senior administration official put it, “China is not yet a great power but is clearly going to be.” Barry, John, “A New Pacific Strategy,” Newsweek, May 7, 2001.Google Scholar

16. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p. 4.Google Scholar

17. “Chinese Military Power Independent Task Force Report,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 22, 2003.Google Scholar

18. Soh, Felix, “Win-win.”Google Scholar

19. Organski, A.F.K., World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Organski, A.F.K. and Kugler, Jacek, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).Google Scholar

20. Organski, , World Politics, p. 370.Google Scholar

21. Among other works, see Conable, Barber Jr. and Lampton, David, “China: The Coming Power,” Foreign Affairs (winter 1992/93); Overholt, William H., The Rise of China: How Economic Reform Is Creating a New Superpower (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993); Kristof, Nicholas D., “The Rise of China,” Foreign Affairs (November-December 1993); Kristof, Nicholas D. and Wudunn, Sheryl, China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power (Vancouver: Vintage Book, 1995); Burstein, Daniel and de Keijzer, Arne, Big Dragon: China's Future—What It Means for Business, the Economy, and the Global Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); and Goodman, David S.G. and Segal, Gerald, eds., China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (New York: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999).Google Scholar

22. So much has been said and written repeatedly about China's military that one specialist of China security affairs got so bored that he decided to quit his current job because he “did not want to spend the rest of his life analyzing the Chinese military.” Google Scholar

23. Christensen, Thomas, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up,” International Security 25, No. 4 (spring 2001): 5–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24. Godwin, Paul H.B., “China's Defense Modernization: Aspirations and Capabilities,” CAN, April 2001, p. 1.Google Scholar

25. For a representative sample of work on the China threat, see Timperlake, Edward and Triplett, William C. II, Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised U.S. Security for Chinese Cash (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1998); Gertz, Bill, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999); Timperlake, Edward and Triplett, William II, Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military Threat to America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999); Gertz, Bill, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2000); Kagan, Robert and Kristol, William, eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000).Google Scholar

26. Michael Waller, J., “Blue Team Takes on Red China,” InsightMag.com.Google Scholar

27. Goldstein, Avery, “Great Expectations, Interpreting China's Arrival,” International Security 22, No. 3 (winter 1997/98): 53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28. Godwin, , “China's Defense Modernization,” p. 18.Google Scholar

29. Lampton, David and May, Gregory, A Big Power Agenda for East Asia, America, China, and Japan (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2002).Google Scholar

30. Ehsan Ahrari, M., “U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC: New Frontier of Information-based War,” Asian Survey 37, No. 1: (December 1997): 1179.Google Scholar

31. Lewis, John Wilson and Litai, Xue, “China's Search for a Modern Air Force,” International Security 24, No. 1 (summer 1999): 90.Google Scholar

32. O'Hanlon, Michael, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25, No. 2 (fall 2000): 53, 83. Frank Moore's study concurred with O'Hanlon's observation. He pointed out that the size of China's amphibious assault fleet is so small that it excludes any possibility of China attempting to seize control of Taiwan by means of an amphibious assault. Frank Moore, “China's Military Capabilities,” June 2000, p. 8, Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute (available online at www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/iddschina.html). The former commander in chief of U.S. Pacific Command also pointed out that China does not have the military capability to take and hold Taiwan. This is “military reality.” Charles Snyder, “US Admiral Echoes Bush on Taiwan,” Taipei Times, March 1, 2002.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance: 1990–2000 WMEAT Report (available online at www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rpt/wmeat/99_00).Google Scholar

34. Christensen, , “Posing Problems,” p. 7.Google Scholar

35. Ibid., p. 13.Google Scholar

36. For a more detailed discussion of the internal-external linkage, see Wang, Jianwei, “Democratization and China's Nation Building,” in Friedman, Edward and McCormick, Barrett, eds., What If China Doesn't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 51–56.Google Scholar

37. Hermann, Charles, “Political Opposition as Potential Agents of Foreign Policy Change: Developing a Theory,” paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, 1987, p. 12.Google Scholar

38. Lantos, Tom, “Unwelcomed Bid for Beijing,” Washington Times, June 24, 2001.Google Scholar

39. Waltz, Kenneth, “Realism After the Cold War,” December 1998, p. 8.Google Scholar

40. Bernstein, Richard and Munro, Ross H., The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).Google Scholar

41. Many Chinese wonder why the United States could be an exception but China could not. They cite this cognitive as an example of American exceptionalism. See The China Initiative (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 1998), p. 41.Google Scholar

42. See Rice, , “Promoting the National Interest.”Google Scholar

43. Small, Melvin and Singer, David J., Report to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982).Google Scholar

44. Li, Tieying, “China Marching Toward the Twenty-first Century and the Development of the World Economy,” People's Daily, November 15, 1996.Google Scholar

45. Organski, , World Politics, p. 366.Google Scholar

46. See Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence (Glenview, IL: HarperCollins, 1989).Google Scholar

47. Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

48. The former means a change in the form of control of an international system; the latter means a change in the form of regular interactions or processes among the entities in an ongoing international system. See ibid., pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

49. Waltz, , “Realism After the Cold War,” p. 17.Google Scholar

50. Organski, , World Politics, p. 371.Google Scholar

51. Ibid., p. 374.Google Scholar

52. Ibid., p. 479.Google Scholar

53. Lanxin Xiang's analysis of the competition between Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian England in the early twentieth century illustrates that the interaction between the so-called dominant power and rising power is far more complicated than a simplistic assertion that a rising power challenges a dominant power. See Xiang, Lanxin, “Washington's Misguided China Policy,” Survival 43, No. 3 (autumn 2001): 7–22.Google Scholar

54. Some scholars argue that the United States has already become a true anti–status quo superpower while China has become a leading status quo power. See Xiang, Lanxin, “Washington's Misguided China Policy,” p. 12.Google Scholar

55. Yizhou, Wang, “Some Contentious Points in Our Country's Current Study of International Politics,” Reference Material of Social Science Studies, no. 12 (June 20, 1998): 19.Google Scholar

56. Shambaugh, David, “Facing Reality in China Policy,” Foreign Affairs 80, No. 1 (January/February 2001): 55–56.Google Scholar

57. Ibid., p. 58.Google Scholar

58. Ibid., p. 59.Google Scholar

59. As the U.S. under secretary for global affairs, Dobriansky, put it, the Chinese government's lack of resolution on the issue of Tibet “will be a stumbling block to fuller political and economic engagement with the United States and others.” See “State's Dobriansky Says U.S. Seeks Beijing–Dalai Lama Talks,” Statement of Under Secretary Paula J. Dobriansky, Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, House International Relations Committee, March 7, 2002.Google Scholar

60. See Mann, James, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knoff, 1999), pp. 128–130, 132, 144.Google Scholar

61. He asserted that the Bush administration is “less ambiguous around the world.” Agence France-Presse, “Cheney Reiterates US Serious About Defending Taiwan,” April 30, 2001.Google Scholar

62. Reuters, , “Taiwan Naval Chief in US for Talks,” April 12, 2001.Google Scholar

63. Central News Agency, “ROC Military Officers Attending US Workshop,” June 12, 2001.Google Scholar

64. As some analysts observed, the size of missile defense Bush called for (the deployment of several hundred antimissile missiles) was enough to take care of all the rogues of the world plus China. Taylor, Jay, “Traditionalists and Soft Hegemonists, Tactics, and Strategy on China,” Los Angeles Times, April 28, 2001.Google Scholar

65. Tyler, Patrick, “Behind the Shield, a 3-sided Rivalry,” New York Times, May 6, 2001.Google Scholar

66. Rice, , “Promoting the National Interest,” p. 54.Google Scholar

67. Associated Press, “Australian Warships Rebuff Chinese,” April 29, 2001.Google Scholar

68. Barber, Ben, “U.S., India Restore Cooperation by Militaries,” Washington Times, May 30, 2001.Google Scholar

69. “Spokesperson on President Bush's Remarks on US Arms Sale to Taiwan, 26/04/2001” (available online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/10024.html).Google Scholar

70. Shanbaugh, David, “China or America: Which Is the Revisionist Power?” Survival 43, No. 3 (autumn 2001): 28.Google Scholar

71. Cossa, Ralph and Glaser, Bonnie, “Sino-U.S. Strategic Dialogue: Some Suggested Topics,” PacNet 6A (February 8, 2002).Google Scholar

72. Pomfret, John, “China Sees Interests Tied to U.S.,” Washington Post, February 2, 2002.Google Scholar

73. “President Jiang Zemin Expressed Condolences to President Bush, 11/09/2001” (available online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/17828.html).Google Scholar

74. See also U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Inter-Agency Partnership to Fight Terrorism,” U.S. ambassador Francis X. Taylor's remarks to the press, Beijing, China, December 6, 2001 (available online at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2001/6689.htm).Google Scholar

75. Reilly, James, “The U.S. ‘War on Terror’ and East Asia,” FPIF Policy Report, February 2002.Google Scholar

76. People's Daily, September 14, 2002.Google Scholar

77. Testimony of William Kristol before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in “What's Next in the War on Terrorism?” A compilation of statements before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February 14, 2002.Google Scholar

78. Testimony of Samuel Berger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in “What's Next in the War on Terrorism?” A compilation of statements before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February 14, 2002.Google Scholar

79. Scowcroft, Brent, “Don't Attack Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002.Google Scholar

80. John Ikenberry, G., “America's Imperial Ambition,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2002): 44–60.Google Scholar

81. CNN, “Bush Outlines Asia Trip in Radio Address,” February 16, 2002.Google Scholar

82. Reuters, , “Bush Sees U.S.-China Harmony, Plays Down Taiwan,” February 16, 2002; Xinhua, , “Bush: It Is in the Interest of the United States to Maintain Close Dialogue with China,” February 21, 2002.Google Scholar

83. As the only dissenter on the commission put it, “The commission majority has bent over backwards to avoid describing the Chinese as a ‘threat’; yet the belief that they are permeates every chapter.” Kessler, Glenn, “Panel: Toughen China Policy,” Washington Post, July 12, 2002.Google Scholar

84. “Text: Bush Touts Free Society to Chinese,” New York Times, February 23, 2002.Google Scholar

85. Alcorn, Gay, “Bugged but Not Bothered: Beijing Ignores American Spying Indiscretion,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 26, 2002 (available online at www.old.smh.com.au/news/0201/26/world/world10.html).Google Scholar

86. One observer even concluded that China's official response was more conciliatory than Moscow's; Gill, Bates, “Can China's Tolerance Last?” Arms Control Today (January/February 2002).Google Scholar

87. Brown, David, “Triangular Cross-currents,” Comparative Connections 1Q (2002); Chu, Henry, “China Warns U.S. over Taiwan Ties,” Los Angeles Times, February 6, 2002.Google Scholar

88. Lam, Willy Wo-Lap, “Jiang's Tough Tactics on U.S. Policy,” CNN.com, April 9, 2002.Google Scholar

89. Reuters, , “Taiwan President Backs Independence Referendum,” August 3, 2002.Google Scholar

90. “Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy,” June 1, 2002, p. 4 (available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2202/06/print/20020601–3.html).Google Scholar

91. “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” September 20, 2002, nytimes.com, pp. 22–23.Google Scholar

92. Ibid., p. 1.Google Scholar

93. “Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy,” p. 4.Google Scholar

94. “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” p. 18.Google Scholar

95. Ibid., p. 20.Google Scholar

96. Xinhuanet, , “Armitage: US Does Not Support Taiwan Independence,” August 27, 2002.Google Scholar

97. “Remarks by the President and Chinese President Jiang Zemin.” It was also reported that in his private conversation with the Chinese president, President Bush used stronger words by saying that the United States “opposed” Taiwan independence.Google Scholar

98. Kessler, Glenn, “U.S. Opts Not to Censure China, Russia on Human Rights,” Washington Post, April 12, 2003.Google Scholar

99. BBC, “China Seeks Dialogue with NATO,” November 15, 2002; Gill, Bates and Oresman, Matthew, “NATO's Border with China,” PacNet 50 (November 25, 2002).Google Scholar

100. Pomfret, John, “China Suggests Missile Buildup Linked to Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Washington Post, December 9, 2002.Google Scholar

101. Kahn, Joseph, “Hands Across Pacific: U.S.-China Ties Grow,” New York Times, November 15, 2002.Google Scholar

102. “Jiang, Bush Talk over Phone on DPRK Nuclear Issue,” People's Daily, January, 12, 2003.Google Scholar

103. Stout, David, “Bush Emphasizes Commitment to Diplomatic Solution with North Korea,” New York Times, February 7, 2003.Google Scholar

104. Stout, David, “Bush Emphasizes Commitment to Diplomatic Solution with North Korea,” New York Times, February 7, 2003; Dao, James, “Bush Urges Chinese President to Press North Korea on Arms,” New York Times, February 8, 2003; DeYoung, Karen and Struck, Doug, “Beijing's Help Led to Talks,” Washington Post, April 17, 2003; Kahn, Joseph, “China Offers Its Help in U.S.–North Korea Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, April 24, 2003.Google Scholar

105. For this concept, see Chace, James, “Imperial America and the Common Interest,” World Policy Journal (spring 2002): 1–9.Google Scholar

106. Some die-hard China bashers, however, still insist that Beijing is “a maturing fascist regime.” See Ledeen, Michael, “From Communism to Fascism,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2002.Google Scholar

107. Indeed, some may consider China part of the “axis of evil.” For them, September 11 only postponed rather than eliminated the long-term competition with China. Lobe, Jim and Barry, Tom, “The Yellow Peril Revisited,” Foreign Policy in Focus, July 12, 2002 (available online at www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/commentary/2002/0207china_body.html).Google Scholar

108. Even some renowned China specialists seem to be satisfied with both countries to take “being pragmatic” as “the highest policy priority.” See Lampton, David, “Pragmatic Is Glorious,” Time, November 4, 2002.Google Scholar

109. Pomfret, John and Kessler, Glenn, “China's Reluctance on N. Korea Irks U.S.,” Washington Post, February 4, 2003.Google Scholar

110. For example, see Restall, Hugo, “Tough Love for China,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2002.Google Scholar

111. CNN, “Kissinger Warning on U.S.-China Ties,” April 6, 2002.Google Scholar