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The Balance of Power, Globalization, and Democracy: International Relations Theory in Northeast Asia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Stephan Haggard
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Extract

The end of the Cold War has given rise to a wide-ranging debate about the future of international relations in the Asia-Pacific. This debate has been difficult to assess in part because of the elusive quality of the outcomes being explored, such as whether the region is characterized by “stability” or “rivalry.” What exactly do we want to explain?

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Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , April 2004 , pp. 1 - 38
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Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

My thanks to Kristian Gleditsch, Iain Johnston, Anthony Jones, David Kang, Andrew MacIntyre, Barry Naughton, and Byung-Kook Kim for their comments and assistance.Google Scholar

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