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Does Economic Integration Across the Taiwan Strait Make Military Conflict Less Likely?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Scott L. Kastner
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Abstract

Deepening economic ties across the Taiwan Strait are widely believed by analysts and scholars to be a stabilizing force in cross-Strait political relations. Yet within the broader international relations literature, the relationship between economic interdependence and military conflict continues to be controversial. This article examines the impact of growing cross-Strait economic links on the likelihood of cross-Strait military conflict within the context of this broader literature. A description of three separate causal mechanisms—identified in the existing literature—through which economic ties could promote peace is followed by a discussion of how broadly these processes are operating in the Taiwan Strait case. Although the article does not rule out the possibility that economic integration across the Strait makes a military confrontation less likely, it shows that the evidence in support of such a proposition is ambiguous.

Keywords

ChinaTaiwaneconomic interdependencetradeconflict
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , December 2006 , pp. 319 - 346
Copyright
Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

For helpful comments, I wish to thank Thomas Christensen, Stephen Haggard, Chad Rector, Xu Xin, and the anonymous reviewers.Google Scholar

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