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The Changing Shape of Islamic Politics in Malaysia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Meredith L. Weiss
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Malaysia has long been viewed as a model of a “moderate” Islamic polity. Muslims and non-Muslims have enjoyed the same civil and political rights, and Islamic parties have competed alongside secular ones in periodic elections, in spite of the distinctly Islamic timbre of Malaysia's state and society. Growing domestic political volatility, however, has led many to question the viability of political moderation. Mounting Islamism among the public, reflected both in the rise of Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and in the greater priority placed on public displays and enforcement of piety, has spurred and been reinforced by increasingly Islamist political parties. Discussions of political change have come to revolve largely around the place of Islam in party platforms and state institutions. The relative position of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in the polity has altered with the incremental Islamization of state and society, and observing religious rituals has become a matter as much of state law as of personal choice for Muslims. Internationally, too, Malaysia has come to emphasize more its ties with non-Western and especially Muslim-majority states. Islam has thus become increasingly central to Malaysian politics—even though only slightly more than half the population (all ethnic Malays, and a small proportion of Indians, Chinese, and others) is Muslim.

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Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , April 2004 , pp. 139 - 173
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Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Association for Asian Studies annual meeting in New York, March 27–30, 2003. Thanks to Elizabeth Collins for organizing that panel and to Zakaria Haji Ahmad and several attendees for their useful comments. Thanks also to Byung-Kook Kim and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful criticisms and suggestions. What weaknesses remain are entirely my own fault.Google Scholar

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53. Quoted in Malaysiakini , September 17, 2002.Google Scholar

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55. Quoted in Malaysiakini , July 2, 2002.Google Scholar

56. For some specifics, see Harakah Daily , May 31, 2003, and August 30, 2003.Google Scholar

57. Malaysiakini , December 4, 2001.Google Scholar

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61. “The Greening of Malaysia,” Economist , April 5–12, 2003.Google Scholar

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63. Ahmad, Syed, “Muslim Politics,” p. 85. See also Noor, Farish A., “Remembering PAS' Red Islamist Past,” Malaysiakini, February 11, 2003. For more on the tension among ideologies of Malay rights, indigenous rights, and a noncommunal religious premise to the state, see Chandra, , Islamic Resurgence. Google Scholar

64. Alias, Mohamed, PAS' Platform , p. 182.Google Scholar

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68. For that election, PAS did pick a relatively moderate theme: Membangun bersama Islam (“Develop with Islam”). The party advocated governance based on Islamic values but with full protection for the civil, political, cultural, and religious rights of non-Muslims. By 1995, however, PAS had reverted to a more clearly Islamist stance, alienating most of what non-Muslim support it had managed to achieve. See Gomez, Edmund Terence, The 1995 Malaysian General Elections: A Report and Commentary (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), p. 21.Google Scholar

69. Alternatif, Barisan, Ke Arah Malaysia Yang Adil (Pamphlet, 1999).Google Scholar

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72. Quoted in Farish, “Remembering.” Burhanuddin's perspective echoes that of Indonesian president Soekarno; see, for instance, his 1926 proclamation, “Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism,” in Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism. Trans. Warouw, Karel and Weldon, Peter (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970 [1926]), pp. 35–62.Google Scholar

73. For instance, PAS president Fadzil Noor was reported to have said the party would defer its plans for an Islamic state and instead focus on issues highlighted in the BA manifesto. He then refuted the first part of that report, saying articulation of a clear stance on the Islamic state issue awaited BA-level negotiations (Malaysiakini, July 12, 2001) and asserting, “an Islamic State is our objective” (quoted in New Straits Times, April 11, 1999). Prior to the elections, though, one PAS leader went so far as to insist that the idea that the party seeks to establish an Islamic state is mere “Western propaganda,” designed to discredit PAS in the eyes of more moderate Malay Muslims and non-Malays. Interview with Husam Musa, political secretary to Nik Aziz and Kelantan PAS youth chief, February 23, 1999, Bharu, Kota.Google Scholar

74. By mid-1999, Harakah Daily had become one of Malaysia's most widely read papers, with a circulation of around 250,000, leading the government to restrict its frequency and crack down on distribution. Legally, only PAS members may purchase Harakah. Google Scholar

75. Zainah also notes this disparity: despite PAS's supposed commitment “to reform and democratic principles … the language it speaks at the village level in its traditional constituencies, and even in the Malay pages of Harakah, is one of an intolerant and extremist Islam” (Zainah, , “Facing the Fundamentalist Challenge”).Google Scholar

76. Women's groups were especially incensed by provisions that would charge a woman who reported rape with qazaf (slanderous accusation) unless she could find four Muslim, male eyewitnesses to the crime. PAS was forced to amend that part of the bill, although the burden of proof still rests on the woman. The state government delayed enforcement of hudud law while it sent a team to study the implementation of Islamic laws in other countries.Google Scholar

77. Ahmad, Salbiah, “Hudud, Here We Go Again!” Malaysiakini , June 25, 2002.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

78. Proselytization among Muslims is already prohibited and hence rare.Google Scholar

79. Quoted in Mageswary, R., “Talk of ‘Islamic State’ Causes Malaysian Jitters,” Asia Times Online , November 17, 1999.Google Scholar

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82. Malaysiakini , September 25, 2001.Google Scholar

83. PRM, for instance, has reiterated its opposition to the concept of an Islamic state or the imposition of beliefs by political elites, but with virtually no apparent effect on PAS's position (Malaysiakini, July 7, 2002). By contrast, Keadilan president Wan Azizah Wan Ismail stated that PAS had the right to enact hudud law in Kelantan and Terengganu, given that the party was democratically elected and no Muslim can reject sharia laws, including hudud ( Malaysiakini , August 26, 2002).Google Scholar

84. See Straits Times , September 25, 2001; Agence-France Presse, October 1, 2001.Google Scholar

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86. His deputy, Mustafa Ali, however, denies any major difference between the two men's leadership styles. Interview, August 25, 2003, Kuala Terengganu.Google Scholar

87. Quoted in Kabilan, K. and Rahman, Nash, “PAS Alone Cannot Come to Power,” Malaysiakini , September 18, 2001.Google Scholar

88. Economist , “The Greening of Malaysia.” Google Scholar

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