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Bilateralism, Multilateralism, or Regionalism? Japan's Trade Forum Choices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Abstract

The Japanese government today is actively and strategically choosing among various institutional forums to deal with its trade partners, namely bilateral venues, multilateral settings, and even preferential regional arrangements. This ongoing high-profile institutional selection is somewhat unprecedented for Japan, and demands a review of the historical and analytical reasons that drive decisionmakers to select one forum over another. Overall, the Japanese case suggests that the aggregate trade forum choices are influenced both by the desire to institutionalize mechanisms for stabilizing a range of expectations and by the necessity of guaranteeing market access and protection of investment in the fastest time possible.

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Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

I wish to thank numerous officials in the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially Junichi Ihara, Shinichi Kitajima, Setsuo Ohmori, Tadaatsu Mouri, Naoko Munakata, Kuni Sato, Yuichi Suzuki, Tanaka Shigehiro, and Masakazu Toyoda, for sharing their views with me. I also thank Edward Lincoln and Ellis Krauss for their very thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this article presented at the Brookings Institution in 2002. Finally, at the Journal of East Asian Studies, I thank the editor Stephen Haggard, the former editor Byung-Kook Kim, and the anonymous reviewers for their very constructive criticisms.Google Scholar

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