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Too Many Cooks: British Planning Before Saratoga

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2014

William B. Willcox
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Extract

The climax in the long story of Britain's blunders during the War of Independence is the campaign of 1777, the planning of which, in Whitehall and New York, was the worst that the British perpetrated in the seven years of hostilities. Their strategy in 1781 was even more disastrous in its outcome, but far more defensible in its design; the strategy of 1777 can scarcely be defended at all. It rested upon premises that many observers at the time recognized to be wildly fallacious, and it brought its due reward — the surrender that led directly to French intervention.

The campaign had no unifying concept. An army from Canada advanced by way of Lake Champlain and the Hudson toward Albany, where it was supposed to be joined by a small detachment marching down the Mohawk; far to the south a substantial garrison was immobilized on Manhattan, while the main field army attacked Philadelphia by the most roundabout route it could have chosen. The British thus had three armies (ignoring, as they tended to do, their small garrison on Rhode Island), each isolated from the other two; and the Americans were free to concentrate against whichever one they chose. This was dispersion of force carried to the point of absurdity. Why was the absurdity not apparent to the Commander in Chief? to General Burgoyne? to the King's ministers in London? The question has been endlessly debated, and no final answer is possible. But an examination of the men who were principally responsible for the outcome suggests that two major factors were at work.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of British Studies , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , November 1962 , pp. 56 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 1962

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References

1. Fisher, Sidney G., The Struggle for American Independence (Philadelphia and London, 1908), II, 68–76Google Scholar; Anderson, Troyer S., The Command of the Howe Brothers during the American Revolution (New York and London, 1936), esp. chs. xii and xivGoogle Scholar; DeFonblanque, Edward B., Political and Military Episodes in the Latter Half of the Eighteenth Cenutry Derived from the Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. John Burgoyne, General, Statesman, Dramatist (London, 1876)Google Scholar; Nickerson, Hoffman, The Turning Point of the Revolution, or Burgoyne in America (Boston and New York, 1928)Google Scholar; Clark, Jane, “Responsibility for the Failure of the Burgoyne Campaign,” A.H.R., XXXV (1930), 542–59Google Scholar. Fisher excoriates Howe, and Anderson gives the fullest defense of him; DeFonblanque is the classic apologia for Burgoyne, and thoroughly biased. Nickerson's is the only book-length study of the campaign, and is extremely interesting; it has no documentation, however, and does not really come to grips with the underlying problem. Neither does Miss Clark's article, which was based, as mine is, primarily upon the Germain and Clinton Papers in the Clements Library of the University of Michigan.

2. “Thoughts for Conducting the War on the Side of Canada,” Feb. 28, 1777, Germain Papers, printed with minor errors in Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, pp. 83–89Google Scholar. In quoting documents I have modernized spelling and punctuation throughout.

3. Burgoyne to Clinton, Nov. 7, 1776. Clinton Papers. See also Clark, Jane, “The Command of the Canadian Army for the Campaign of 1777,” Can. Hist. Rev. (hereafter cited as C. H. R.), X (1929), 130–32Google Scholar.

4. The King to Lord North, April 14, 1775, Dec. 13, 1776, and Germain to the King, Dec. 10, 1776, Fortescue, John W. (ed.), The Correspondence of King George the Third from 1760 to December 1783 (London, 1927–1928) III, Nos. 1642, 1938, 1936Google Scholar; H[ans] Stanley [to Lord Huntingdon], Dec. 18, 1776, H. M. C. Report on the Manuscripts of the Late Reginald Hastings, Esq., of the Manor House, Ashby de la Zouche, III, 189Google Scholar. Burgoyne's biographer paints a touching and quite false picture of his hero's sticking by Carleton so tenaciously that he shared his chief's disfavor. DeFonblanque, , Political and Military Episodes, pp. 225–28Google Scholar. Lord Percy was also angling for the Canadian command. Lord Percy to his father, the Duke of Northumberland, Jan. 11, 1777, Alnwick Castle MS [University of Michigan microfilm] LI, fols. 23-23v.

5. Germain to Knox, William, H. M. C. Report on Manuscripts in Various Collections, VI, 128Google Scholar; see also Clark, , “Command of the Canadian Army,” C. H. R., X, 130, 134Google Scholar.

6. The King to North, Feb. 24, 1777, Fortescue, Correspondence of King George, III, No. 1964; Cabinet minute, Feb. 25, 1777, Barnes, G. R. and Owen, J. H. (eds.), The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1771-1782 [Navy Records Society Publications] (London, 1932–1938), LXIX, LXXI, LXXV, LXXVIIIGoogle Scholar. Cited hereafter as Sandwich Papers, I, 285Google Scholar; Burgoyne [to Capt. Philemon Pownall, R.N.], Mar. 2, 1777, Clinton Papers.

7. Memorandum of Clinton-Howe conversation [July] 13, [1777], Clinton Papers. Clinton later said sometimes that he was offered the command, sometimes that he received only hints. The latter is more probable, because a definite offer would have obviated pushing his claims. In any case Miss Clark is mistaken in saying that he would not have objected to taking the command if he had had the chance. “Command of the Canadian Army,” C. H. R., X, 134–35Google Scholar.

8. Undated Clinton memorandum filed at the end of 1777 and Elizabeth Carter's Diary for Mar. 10, 1777, Clinton Papers; I assume that the discussion and the dinner coincided.

9. Burgoyne to Clinton, Nov. 7, 1776. Clinton Papers.

10. Burgoyne [to Capt. Pownall], Mar. 2, 1777. Clinton Papers.

11. Quoted in Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, pp. 86–87Google Scholar; see also the excellent analysis of Burgoyne's intentions in Anderson, , Command of the Howe Brothers, pp. 246–48Google Scholar.

12. Howe to Germain, Dec. 20, 1776, Force, Peter (ed.), American Archives, fifth series (Washington, 1848–1853), III, 1318Google Scholar. For the size of the British position see Willcox, William B., (ed.), The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782, with an Appendix of Original Documents [Yale Historical Publications] (New Haven, 1954), p. 63Google Scholar. Cited hereafter as Clinton's Narrative.

13. Anderson, Command of the Howe Brothers, pp. 214-19. Miss Clark implies that Burgoyne took more time than necessary. “Failure of the Burgoyne Campaign,” A. H. R., XXXV, 546Google Scholar. But he certainly took less than Howe expected; he actually reached the upper Hudson in late July, and was then delayed for more than a month by the search for supplies.

14. Howe to Germain, Jan. 20, 1777, PRO, CO 5/94/201/03. For some reason Anderson omits this phase of Howe's planning, although it was the last one that made strategic sense.

15. H. M. C. Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville, of Drayton House, Northamptonshire, II, 63–64Google Scholar. Cited hereafter as Sackville MSS; Anderson, , Command of the Howe Brothers, pp. 222–27Google Scholar.

16. He blamed British slowness on the Hessians' incredible amount of baggage. See the letter cited above, note 14.

17. Anderson, , Command of the Howe Brothers, pp. 259–60Google Scholar.

18. The November plan called for a total of 35,000, the December plan for 19,000, and the April plan for 21,000. See “Sir William Howe's Campaign of 1777,” précis, CO, 5/253/299.

19. Howe to Carleton, April 5, 1777, a copy enclosed in Howe to Germain, April 2, 1777, H. M. C. Sackville MSS., II, 65–66Google Scholar. Anderson, , Command of the Howe Brothers, p. 257Google Scholar, mentions this letter but does not analyze the crucial sentence.

20. Burgoyne to Clinton, Nov. 7, 1776. Clinton Papers; Anderson, , Command of the Howe Brothers, p. 204Google Scholar.

21. Memorandum of Clinton-Germain conversation filed under April 7, 1777, Clinton Papers. I assume that the undated memorandum applies to the interview that took place, according to Elizabeth Carter's diary, on that date.

22. Undated Clinton memorandum and journal of events, Jan.-Oct., 1777, both filed at the end of 1777, Clinton Papers.

23. Germain Papers, supplement IV (letterbook). A dispatch of April 19, 1777 told Howe that some chasseurs in St. Leger's detachment would move down the Mohawk “and join your army,” which Miss Clark interprets to mean “join the southern army at Albany.” [italics mine]. Clark, , “Failure of the Burgoyne Campaign,” A. H. R., XXXV, 549Google Scholar. I see no evidence that Germain had any such clear-cut expectation. While he complained of Howe's vagueness and delay in submitting his ideas (H. M. C. Various Collections, VI, 130, 136Google Scholar), his own ideas of the campaign were much more vague. His one concrete and timely contribution to it, his letter to Carleton, was far from adequate. See Anderson, , Command of the Howe Brothers, pp. 249–50Google Scholar.

24. Anderson, , Command of the Howe Brothers, pp. 256–57Google Scholar.

25. Ibid., pp. 238-44, 274-77, where even Anderson is hard put to it to con-done Howe's dawdling. The idea persists among historians that Sir William expected to be back in time for joint operations with Burgoyne. Thayer, Theodore, Nathanael Greene, Strategist of the American Revolution (New York, 1960), p. 172Google Scholar; Watson, J. Steven, The Reign of George III, 1760-1815 (Oxford, 1960), p. 209Google Scholar. I have found no evidence to support this idea.

26. Clinton-Howe conversations of July 6, [1777], July 8, [1777], and [July] 13. [1777]. Clinton papers; when the date of the conversation is clear from the text, direct quotations, unless otherwise indicated, are from Clinton's notes filed under that date. Miss Clark has discussed these interviews briefly in “Failure of the Burgoyne Campaign,” A. H. R., XXXV, 550–53Google Scholar. Their content is clarified in places by Clinton [to Gen. Harvey], July 11, 1777. Clinton Papers, and by the journal cited above, note 22.

27. Ibid.; this journal was patently written later and may be colored by hindsight.

28. Clinton to Lord Percy July 23, 1777, Clinton Papers.

29. Anderson, , Command of the Howe Brothers, pp. 249–54Google Scholar.

30. Clinton [to Harvey], July 11, 1777, Clinton Papers; see also Clinton to Newcastle, July 21, 1777, Aug. 18, 1777, Newcastle Papers (University of Nottingham Library), 2/110, 2/5.

31. For an excellent analysis of what the British could have achieved by this method, see Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, pp. 52–55Google Scholar.

32. Clinton to his “sisters” (i.e., his sisters-in-law), July 15, 1777, copy, Newcastle Papers 2/7.

33. Howe to Germain, July 7, 1777, CO 5/94/524. Nine days later, on the other hand, Sir William told Germain that the main difficulty with the northern army would be with supplies. Fortescue, , Correspondence of King George, III, 462.Google Scholar

34. Conversation [July] 13, [1777]. Clinton Papers; see also Clinton's memorandum of another conversation [July 11, 1777], and his notes of July 10, [1777] Clinton Papers.

35. Howe to Clinton, July 18, 1777, Clinton Papers.

36. Clinton memorandum, July 16, [1777], Clinton Papers.

37. Clinton's recollections, dated Aug. 1793, under B in alphabetized notebook, Clinton Papers. See also the memorandum cited above, note 36; Charles Grey to Lord Percy, Alnwick MS. 50 Pt. 2, fol. 190, where the undated letter is mistakenly assigned to 1776. Maj. Gen. Phillips, commanding Burgoyne's artillery, was an intimate of Cornwallis as well as Erskine, and was Clinton's closest friend.

38. The three quotations are from Clinton's narrative of events of 1776-77, filed at the end of 1777, Clinton Papers. See also Clinton's Narrative, pp. 61-65 and notes.

39. [Sir] G[uy] Johnson to Clinton, July 20, 1777, Clinton Papers.

40. Clinton to Howe July 21, 1777, Clinton Papers; see also Clinton's Narrative, p. 64, note 13.

41. Clinton's copies of the two letters, filed in the Clinton Papers under July 20, 1777. The one to Burgoyne is printed, with minor additions and variations, in Worthington Ford, C. (ed.), The Writings of George Washington (New York and London, 1889–1893) V, 514nGoogle Scholar; for details of the letter's reaching Washington (who recognized it at once for a fake) see Fitzpatrick, John C. (ed.), The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799 (Washington, 1931–1944), VIII, 468 note 12Google Scholar. These references do not mention that the letter was marked as intended for enemy consumption, by a code signal suggested in Burgoyne to Howe May 14, 1777 (filed under July 18, 1777), Clinton Papers.

42. Clinton's Narrative, p. 64, note 12; see also Com. Hotham to Sandwich, July 26, 1777, Sandwich Papers, I, 290–91Google Scholar.

43. He did promise that, if Washington moved north and Burgoyne could hold him at bay, “I shall soon be after him to relieve you.” But these were large if's that made a small promise—which Howe, in any case, to judge by his conversations with Clinton, had no intention of honoring. Howe to Burgoyne, July 17, 1777, DeFonblanque, , Political and Military Episodes, pp. 280–81Google Scholar; the original (now in the Howe Papers in the Clements Library) got through to Burgoyne. He later said that he had construed it as implying “an intention to cooperate” (Sack-ville MSS., II, 114); if he actually put that construction upon it at the time, his need was clouding his common sense.

44. For his understanding of his orders see his letter to Germain, July 11, 1777, DeFonblanque, , Political and Military Episodes, p. 256Google Scholar; Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, pp. 190, 267Google Scholar. Instructions without latitude would have been extraordinary, and the government almost surely did not so intend them. Germain was alarmed to learn that Burgoyne felt constrained to push on, and later protested that the wording of the orders gave no ground for the General's construction of them. Germain to Knox, Oct. 31, 1777, H. M. C. Various Collections, VI, 140Google Scholar; to the King, Dec. 15, 1777, Fortescue, , Correspondence of King George, III, No. 2108Google Scholar.

45. Clinton to Newcastle, July 27, 1777, Clinton Papers.

46. Howe claimed that he did not receive the letter until Aug. 16, 1777. See Clinton's Narrative, pp. 66-67 and note 19; undated Clinton memorandum filed at the end of 1777, Clinton Papers.

47. Clinton to Harvey, Aug. 18, 1777, Clinton Papers.

48. For Burgoyne's letter see Clinton's Narrative, p. 70. Sir Henry's message did not get through; it is reproduced and discussed in Partridge, Bellamy, Sir Billy Howe (London and New York, 1932), pp. 193–95Google Scholar. These pages are almost the only ones of value in the book.

49. Quoted by Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, p. 341Google Scholar; Clinton's comment is in copies of his correspondence with Burgoyne filed under Sept. 10, 1777, Clinton Papers.

50. The message, like that in Clinton's letter of Aug. 10, appeared only when a mask was laid over the page. A garbled version is printed in SirTrevelyan, George O., The American Revolution (London and New York, 1905–1912), IV, 170 note 1Google Scholar, and an extract in Ward, Christopher, The War of the Revolution, ed. Alden, J. R. (New York, 1952), II, 514Google Scholar; see also Clinton's Narrative, p. 70.

51. Burgoyne to Germain, Aug. 20, 1777, DeFonblanque, , Political and Military Episodes, p. 275Google Scholar; see also Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, pp. 292–96Google Scholar.

52. Fisher, , Struggle for American Independence, II, 94;Google ScholarWard, , War of the Revolution, II, 504–12Google Scholar; 521-22. If Burgoyne, says Fisher, “had had any thought of being justified in retreating back to Canada, this letter [from Clinton] compelled him to dismiss it.” Nonsense: Clinton offered at most a diversion, of problematical effect; what kept Burgoyne from retreating was his peculiar interpretation of his orders and his groundless hope of rescue.

53. Clinton to Howe, Sept. 27, 1777, “Correspondence with Sir William Howe,” Clinton letterbook, pp. 38-39, Clinton Papers; partially quoted by Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, p. 342Google Scholar.

54. Burgoyne to Clinton, Sept. 21, 1777, in copies of Clinton-Burgoyne correspondence filed under Sept. 10, 1777, Clinton Papers.

55. From Clinton's undated memorandum of his answer to a later message from Burgoyne, filed under (and patently written on or about) Oct. 6, 1777, Clinton Papers. See also Clinton's Narrative, p. 72. Nickerson quotes from a letter of Burgoyne to Clinton, Sept. 23, 1777, Turning Point of the Revolution, p. 343, of which I have found no record; even if it is not spurious, it adds little. The description of Sir Henry's communications from Burgoyne in Ward (War of the Revolution, II, 514Google Scholar), is thoroughly erroneous.

56. News of this blow reached Burgoyne on the 27th and accounted, Sir Henry believed, for the change in tone between the cheerful letter of the 21st and Campbell's message of the 28th. Clinton's note in his letterbook, “Correspondence with Howe,” p. 42, Clinton Papers.

57. Clinton's Narrative, pp. 73-74; Clinton-Burgoyne correspondence filed under Sept. 10, 1777, Clinton Papers. See also DeFonblanque, , Political and Military Episodes, pp. 287–89Google Scholar; Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, pp. 344–45Google Scholar; Hudleston, Francis J., Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne, Misadventures of an English General in the Revolution (New York, 1927), pp. 190–94Google Scholar. Hudleston's breezy and opinionated biography is as innocent of documentation as Nickerson and, like Partridge's Howe, repeats as fact most of the myths about the campaign.

58. Burgoyne's expectation amazed Howe, who thought that he had made clear that there would be no troops at Albany; Howe to Germain, Oct. 22, 1777, Sackville MSS., II, 80Google Scholar.

59. [Clinton to Burgoyne, Oct. 6, 1777], Clinton's Narrative, pp. 379-80; to his “sisters,” Oct. 14, 1777, Clinton Papers. “Recollect my … handsome offer to B[urgoyne], my fulfilling it and then much more, and the return he made me of endeavoring in his distress to catch at [such] a poor miserable weak twig as I am, to rend me only to break his fall!” Clinton to unknown correspondent, filed at end of 1777, Clinton Papers.

60. Extracts from Clinton's correspondence with Howe and Burgoyne filed under July 9, 1777, Clinton Papers; Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, p. 352Google Scholar, prints one of the letters with slight verbal differences. See also “Correspondence with Howe,” Clinton letterbook, pp. 45-46, 58, Clinton Papers; precis of Clinton-Burgoyne correspondence and messages, CO 5/94/707-10, 713, 717-19, 725-26.

61. Clinton memorandum, Oct. 26, [1777], Clinton Papers.

62. Memorandum of Joseph Bettys, Burgoyne's messenger [Oct. 26, 1777], and Tryon to Clinton, same date, Clinton Papers; see also Fisher, , Struggle for American Independence, II, 102Google Scholar.

63. Clinton implies in his memoirs (p. 74) that he considered Burgoyne's position hopeless because the time for retreat had passed. He actually believed, for the next week and more, that the army had made good its retreat; see Clinton to unknown correspondent, Oct. 26, 1777, Clinton Papers.

64. Clinton to Howe, Oct. 9, 1777, “Correspondence with Howe,” Clinton letterbook, pp. 56-58, Clinton Papers.

65. Clinton's Narrative, p. 80 note 45; Tryon to Clinton, Oct. 8, 1777, Clinton Papers.

66. The quotation at the beginning of the paragraph is from Clinton [to Rawdon, Oct. 14, 1777], Clinton Papers. See also Clinton's Narrative, pp. 77-79 and notes; memorandum by him of Oct. 26, [1777], Clinton Papers.

67. Clinton to his “sisters,” Oct. 14, 1777, Clinton Papers. See also Com. Hotham to Lord Howe, Oct. 15, 1777, CO 95/ 127/573-74; Nickerson, , Turning Point of the Revolution, pp. 390-92, 405Google Scholar. Ward, , War of the Revolution, II, 520,Google Scholar completely misinterprets the purpose of Vaughan's expedition, and Fisher, , Struggle for American Independence, II, 101–02Google Scholar, implies that it was stopped by its leader's laziness.

68. Clinton to Vaughan, Oct. 18 [1777]. Howe's requisition, it was soon being said in New York, had been made to paralyze Clinton; Sir Henry professed to reject this slander, but officers of the troops sent to Philadelphia made no bones about his dissatisfaction. Clinton [to Duncan Drummond], Dec. 23, [1777], Clinton Papers; Tatum, E. H. Jr. (ed.), The American Journals of Ambrose Serle, Secretary to Lord Howe, 1776-1778 (San Marino, 1940), p. 263Google Scholar.

69. The story, pieced together from a variety of sources, speaks for itself. On Sept. 29 Clinton wrote Howe a letter no longer extant, and forwarded him Burgoyne's message of the 21st; both went by the Thames in convoy to the Delaware. On Oct. 1, he sent, by a ship ordered to catch the same convoy, the messenger and a letter describing his move. On the 4th the Thames reached the Delaware; on the 8th Howe acknowledged receipt of the letter sent by her (but not of Burgoyne's message), and ordered the reinforcements; on the 9th he emphasized that the order was to be obeyed even if Clinton had already moved. This evidence establishes the strongest possible presumption that Sir William had the facts before him. See Com. Hotham to Lord Howe and to Clinton, Oct. 1, [1777], Clinton Papers; Clinton to Howe, same date, “Correspondence with Howe,” Clinton letter-book, pp. 41-42, Clinton Papers; Tatum, , American Journals of Ambrose Serle, pp. 253–54Google Scholar; Laughton, John K. (ed.), “Journals of Henry Duncan, Captain, Royal Navy, 1776-1782,” The Naval Miscellany [Navy Record Society Publications, XX] (London, 1902), 151Google Scholar; Howe to Clinton, Oct. 8, 1777, Oct. 9, 1777, “Correspondence with Howe,” Howe letterbook, pp. 25-26, Clinton Papers.

70. Undated memorandum “for Capt. Russell” filed under Clinton to Peter Russell, Clinton Papers; see also Clinton's Narrative, p. 74. Burgoyne remarked in a letter to Sir Henry of Oct. 25, 1777 (Clinton Papers), that a junction would have been effected at Albany if the forts had fallen a month or even a fortnight before they did.

71. I am here paraphrasing my own argument (Clinton's Narrative, p. xxvii), which seemed reasonable when I wrote it. But re-examination of the old evidence, and of new material in the hitherto uncatalogued papers, has convinced me that the argument is untenable.

72. Fisher, , Struggle for American Independence, II, 101–02Google Scholar; Wallace, Willard M., Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution (New York, 1951), p. 164Google Scholar.

73. Undated Clinton memorandum filed at the end of 1777; internal evidence suggests that it was written in 1783 or later.

The most recent study of the campaign has appeared while this article was in press. Alan Valentine devotes almost a third of his Lord George Germain (New York and Oxford, 1962) to the causes and results of Saratoga, and lays the entire responsibility on Lord George. The strategic design could never have succeeded, he contends; and the inflexibility of Burgoyne's orders converted a bad plan into a disastrous one. I disagree with both points. The design of controlling the Hudson was a serious threat to the Americans, or they would not subsequently have fortified West Point. Burgoyne's orders to advance to Albany were much less of a factor than his determination to do so. He hid behind them after he had surrendered, as Cornwallis hid behind his orders to hold Yorktown; but before surrendering each man weakened his defense by trying to retreat. They were birds of a feather, as self-confident as they were short-sighted.