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Congressional modification of benefit-cost analysis as a vehicle for particularized benefits and a limitation on agency discretion: the case of the federal contract tower program

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 January 2015

Russell W. Mills
Russell W. Mills*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Bowling Green State University, 124 Williams Hall, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA
*
Russell W. Mills, PhD, Department of Political Science, Bowling Green State University, 124 Williams Hall, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA, e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

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The literature on Congressional control of the bureaucracy has examined how members of Congress pursue strategies such as oversight, the limitation of discretion in legislation [Moe, T. (1989). The politics of bureaucratic structure. In J. E. Chubb & P. E. Peterson (Eds.), Can the Government Govern? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution); Huber, J. D., & Shipan, C. R. (2002). Deliberate discretion: The institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press], and the use of tools such as administrative procedures [McCubbins, M., & Schwartz, T. (1984). Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrols vs. fire alarms. American Journal of Political Science, 21(1), 165–179; McCubbins, M., Noll, R., & Weingast, B. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3, 243–277] and limitation riders [MacDonald, J. A. (2010). Limitation riders and congressional influence over bureaucratic policy decisions. American Political Science Review, 104 (November), 766–782] to exert influence over executive agency decision making. One area where Congress has attempted to exert control over agency decision-making is through the legislative modification of one of the most common bureaucratic decision-making tools: benefit-cost analysis (BCA). While scholars have examined political influence in agency regulatory impact analysis BCAs for proposed rules [Shapiro, S., & Morrall III, J. F. (2012). The triumph of regulatory politics. Benefit-cost analysis and political salience. Regulation and Governance, 6(2), 189–206], there has been a lack of examination of Congressional modification of agency BCA processes to justify and protect particularized [Mayhew, D. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press] infrastructure projects in their districts. This paper will examine the effect of Congressional control over agency BCA processes to secure particularized benefits by developing an in-depth case study of the Federal Contact Tower Program (FCTP) operated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that examines the political and public management implications of Congress’s limitation of the FAA’s autonomy to operate the FCTP under current benefit-cost guidance. Building upon the literature on particularized benefits and Congressional delegation, the results of this study indicate that members of Congress use BCA processes to insulate infrastructure projects in their districts by restricting the ability of agencies to optimize program effectiveness.

Keywords

agency discretionparticularized benefitstransportation infrastructureCongress
Type
Article
Information
Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , 01 December 2013 , pp. 301 - 333
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis 2013

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