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Sakdalism and Philippine Radicalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

David R. Sturtevant
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On the night of May 2–3, 1935, 65,000 partially-armed peasants shattered the tranquility of the countryside surrounding Manila. Between sunset and sunrise dissident bands seized three communities and threatened ten others in Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna, and Cavite. Throughout the night confusion mounted. Hard-pressed Constabulary units from the provinces and Manila fought three engagements with Sakdalistas, picked up persistent reports of an impending attack on Manila, and heard recurrent and highly disturbing rumors that Japanese aircraft, equipped with arms and ammunition for the rebels, would fly over the trouble zone at dawn.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , February 1962 , pp. 199 - 213
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Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1962

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References

1 Estimates of Sakdal membership ranged as high as 300,000 at the time of the uprising. No more than 65,000, if that many, however, participated in the insurrection. Acting Governor-General Hayden, J. R., Preliminary Report on the Sakdalista Disturbances, Manila, May 7, 1935, p. 4Google Scholar. Hayden Papers. Cited hereafter as Hayden, Preliminary Report. Documents from the Hayden Papers will be labeled HP.

2 See Dunham, G. C., Van Schaik, L. J., Manley, F. W., and Chapman, E. G., Report of the Committee Appointed by Acting Governor-General J.R. Hayden to Investigate the Uprising of May 2 and 3, 1935, Manila, May 21, 1935Google Scholar. HP. Cited hereafter as Sakdal Uprising Report.

3 Hayden, J. R., The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York, 1942), p. 391Google Scholar. Cited hereafter as Hayden, The Philippines.

4 Manila Herald, May 3, 1935.

5 Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix III, “Action of Municipal Authorities,” pp. 1–14.

6 The influx of well-to-do rural refugees placed a severe strain on Manila's hotel facilities. Manila Daily Bulletin, May 4, 1935.

7 Richard Ely, the ranking official at Malacañan during the disturbance, filed a memorandum immediately after the uprising explaining the alert: “.… early yesterday morning there was a possibility that the Constabulary would not be able to control the situation and I thought it might ultimately be necessary to call on the Army.” Ely to Hayden, May 4, 1935. HP.

8 Hayden, Preliminary Report, p. 4.

9 All available Constabulary reserves except 114 men at Manila headquarters were committed to action. If the insurrection had lasted a few more hours or spread to neighboring provinces the reserve would have been exhausted. Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix II, “Action by the Constabulary,” pp. 1–3.

10 Three of the wounded died within twenty-four hours. Sakdal Uprising Report, p. 8.

11 Typical of the treatment accorded the Sakdals by Filipino historians is that of Gregorio F. Zaide. Volume II of his standard history contains only three sentences pertaining to Sakdalism. Zaide, G. F., The Philippines Since the British Invasion (Manila, 1949), p. 289Google Scholar. An excellent popular survey of Philippine affairs dismisses the Sakdalistas as “part crackpot, part idealistic, part socialist and part fascist ….” Bernstein, David, The Philippine Story (New York, 1947), p. 120.Google Scholar

12 A recent monograph on agrarian unrest in the Philippines continues standard misinterpretations by lumping the Colorums and Tangulan into one movement and by glossing over the armed revolt of the Sakdals in “1934.” Scaff, A. H., The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, California, 1955), pp. 147–148.Google Scholar

13 Zaide, The Philippines since the British Invasion, p. 289.

14 Taruc, Luis, Born of the People (New York, 1953), p. 29.Google Scholar

15 See Sturtevant, D. R., “Philippine Social Structure, and Its Relation to Agrarian Unrest” (unpublished doctral dissertation, Stanford Univ., 1958), pp. 105–153.Google Scholar

16 Biographical information on Ramos' early career can be found in Stubbs, R. M., “Philippine Radicalism: The Central Luzon Uprisings, 1925–35” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1951). pp. 130–35.Google Scholar

17 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 382.

18 For an analysis of the Tangulan Movement and Ramos' connection with Dionisio, see Stubbs, “Philippine Radicalism,” pp. 94–125.

19 Stubbs, “Philippine Radicalism,” p. 135.

20 Constabulary records indicated that the abortive “Tangulan uprising … was precipitated by the influence of the ‘Sakdal’ publications.….” G. B. Francisco, Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary, The Salkdal Party, Manila, May 7, 1935, p. 1. HP.

21 Of the thirteen men elected to subordinate positions in the party, four were lawyers, three former government employees, two merchants, one a school teacher, one an ex-judge, and one a dentist. Stubbs, p. 155.

22 A summary of the Sakdal Party Platform can be found in Francisco, Sakdal Party, p. 1.

23 Ramos spent more time in Japan and California building political fences than he did in Washington. For an account of his trip see Stubbs, pp. 157–159.

24 “They appealed to people whom the local leaders of the dominant parties often disdained, ignored, or patronized.” Hayden, The Philippines, p. 384.

25 Campaign techniques are described by Francisco, Sakdal Party, p. 2.

26 Bernstein, The Philippine Story, p. 121.

27 Election results are summarized in Francisco, Sakdal Party, p. 3.

28 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 388.

29 Following the rapprochement, an editorial succinctly summarized the history of the Nacionalistas as “a record of mergers, consolidations, coalitions, and reconciliations.” Manila Daily Bulletin, April 30, 1935.

30 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 388.

31 Stubbs, p. 173.

32 Valdes, Basilio, “Peace and Order in the Philippines,” The Philippines Herald Year Book 1935, III (November, 1935) p. 141Google Scholar. Conrado Benitez suggested that the independence issue be set aside in favor of the more worthy social and economic objectives. Benitez, Conrado, “Sakdal,” Philippine Magazine, XXXII (1935). p. 240.Google Scholar

33 Ramos' contacts with Japanese extremists were established by Matsumoto Kumpei, a member of the Seiyukai Party and an erstwhile representative in the Diet. Matsumoto, who had imbibed the doctrines of Kitta Ikki and other Japanese expansionists, introduced Ramos to personal friends and acquaintances, including Toyama Mitsuru, and urged them to grant aid to the Sakdal leader, New York. Times, May 5, 1935.

34 Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Eulogio Rodriguez informed the Acting Governor-General of the situation in a confidential memorandum and suggested that “irresponsible speakers” guilty of “defamatory and seditious denunciations” be arrested on the grounds that such a course would “stop this campaign of exaggerated misrepresentation.” Rodriguez to Hayden, April 2, 1935. HP.

35 Conrado Benitez considered the order a violation of the new Constitution and warned that a policy of suppression would result in “explosion and violence.” Benitez, “Sakdal,” p. 253.

36 Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Office of the Secretary, General Circular #11, April 12, 1935. HP.

37 “News Summary,” Philippine Magazine, XXXII (1935), p. 270.Google Scholar

38 See Malcolm, George A., The Commonwealth of The Philippines (New York, 1936), p. 282Google Scholar; and the Manila Daily Bulletin, May 1, 1935.

39 The existence of the letters, signed by Major Hiroshi Tamaru, came to the attention of the Governor- General's office shortly after the uprising. Inquiries despatched to the American Embassy in Tokyo revealed nothing other than the fact that Major Hiroshi was attached to the Headquarters Staff of the Imperial Army on Formosa. Hayden to Grew, May 8, 1935; and Grew to Hayden, May 9, 1935. HP.

40 A rare copy of Free Filipinos is included in the Hayden Papers. The following quotations are from this source.

41 The exact role of Japanese nationals in the uprising is difficult to evaluate. Sakdalistas captured during the encounters of May 2–3, believed that arms and air support would be supplied by Japan. Such a development, of course, did not take place. In fact, there is no evidence of any ties between Ramos and Japanese government circles. Interviews conducted in Tokyo immediately after the uprising with eight responsible Imperial officials revealed that only one had ever heard of Ramos. Grew to Hayden, May 13, 1935. HP. Moreover, Japanese diplomatic personnel vigorously denied any connection between their government and the rebels. New York. Times, May 5, 1935. Students of the Sakdal movement agree that the Imperial Government was in no way responsible for the upheaval. See Hayden, The Philippines, p. 392; and Stubbs, “Philippine Radicalism,” p. 183. Matsumoto Kumpei, however, admitted that he introduced Ramos to members of patriotic societies. Later he intervened to prevent the Sakdal leader's extradition to the Philippines. Matsumoto's activities, together with Major Hiroshi's letter, and the issues of Free Filipinos which circulated among “Pan-Asia” elements in Japan, indicate that private individuals and groups definitely associated themselves with the movement. The only conclusion which can be safely drawn is that the connection between the Japanese and Sakdalism resulted from covert activity by a few extremists who hoped to embarrass the United States and thus contribute to the growth of antagonism toward the West among the colonial peoples of Southwest Asia.

42 The Tayug uprising took the lives of five constabularymen. Five Colorums, including two women, died during the engagement; twenty suffered serious wounds. See Stubbs, “Philippine Radicalism,” pp. 60–87.

43 Hayden, Preliminary Report, p. i.

44 partial explanation of the peaceful celebration appears in a memorandum from Secretary of Labor Ramon Torres: “There was no red demonstration on account of the refusal of the city mayor to grant the necessary permit to the radicals. But even if they were granted the permit they would not have been able to muster many followers in Manila and would have had to bring them from the provinces.” Torres to Hayden, May 2, 1935. HP.

45 Other important figures away from the capital at that time included Governor-General Murphy, who was convalescing from an operation at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia; Manuel Quezon, who was on official business in the United States; and Major General Parker, the Commander of American forces in the Islands, who was on leave in China. New York Times, May 3, 1935. This absence of senior government personnel further indicated the lack of anticipation of any major difficulties. The departure of General Valdes, however, appears to spring from somewhat different motives. On the morning before the uprising, Valdes notified Colonel Manley, the Superintendent of the Constabulary, that trouble was brewing. In part, the confidential memorandum reads as follows: “X reported to me this morning that the Sakdalistas last night were preparing an uprising against the government to be held tonight … One thing queer on this supposed … movement is that no Sakdalista leaders could be located in their houses the whole day and night yesterday. X could not tell me the definite plans of attack … but he insisted in telling me that this is a very serious situation.” Valdes to Manley, May 2, 1935. HP. That the General left Manila the evening of May 2 aboard a vessel lacking a radio, indicates that Filipinos, like old-line sheriffs in the American South, recognize the political advantages of “going fishing” at critical junctures.

46 Insurgents eagerly scanned the skies as they marched on the presidencias in a futile search for Japanese aircraft. Hayden, The Philippines, p. 391.

47 Taruc, Born of the People, p. 29.

48 At Santa Rosa, Laguna, eleven Sakdalistas yielded two paltiks (homemade shotguns), one pistol and “several daggers and bolos” to Constabulary captors. Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix II, p. 2. Since Filipinos were forbidden to bear arms, the manufacture of paltiks constituted a never-ending problem for the authorities. The Constabulary made periodic efforts to restrict their production. Hayden, The Philippines, pp. 916–917.

49 Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix I, “Field Reports on Individual Participants in the Sakdalista Uprising,” p. 7. These revealing interviews, together with others not incorporated into the final report, can be found in Sturtevant, “Philippine Social Structure,” pp. 219–228.

50 New York Times, May 5, 1935.

51 While Sakdalism continued to exist throughout the period leading up to and including the Pacific War, it ceased to function as the leading organization in the area of agrarian dissent. During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Sakdal remnants under the guidance of Ramos engaged in flagrant collaboration with the conquerors. The history of Sakdalism after the uprising deserves careful study.

52 Practically every Sakdal arrested after the uprising was sentenced to prison. Maximum terms ranged from two to seventeen years. While these sentences may not seem mild they compared favorably with the maximum terms of seventeen to forty years meted out to survivors of die Tayug affair. Furthermore, pardons were quickly granted to many Sakdal prisoners. On November 15, 1935, in his last official act, Governor-General Murphy pardoned the vast majority of the Sakdalistas remaining behind bars stating that he wanted “to set an example of tolerance where differences of opinion are concerned.” “News Summary,” Philippine Magazine, XXXII (1935), p. 597.Google Scholar

53 New York Times, May 5, 1935.

54 Torres to Hayden, May 7, 1935. HP. Shortly after this report, the Buenavista Estate, consisting of 27,408 hectares, was among church lands purchased by Governor-General Murphy for redistribution to tenants. San Ildefonso, the scene of a bitter encounter on the night of May 2–3, was the largest community on the estate.

55 Ibid.

56 Senate President Quezon at first attempted to dismiss the uprising as unimportant. In a press conference at his hotel suite in New York City, Quezon called Ramos an “irresponsible demagogue,” and maintained that the Sakdal movement was “operated on a purely racketeering basis.” Manila Daily Bulletin, May 4, 1935. Within twenty-four hours, however, Quezon, who apparently was able to judge infinitesimal shifts in the political winds from a distance of 10,000 miles, adopted a new tack and traced the uprising to the depression and the threat of American import quotas. New York. Times, May 5, 1935.

57 “Generally speaking the actions of the individual [Sakdal] were governed by political and purely patriotic considerations which led him to believe that immediate independence was, for a number of intangible reasons, highly desirable.” Sakdal Uprising Report, p. 3.

58 ibid., p. 13.

59 Under a photograph of two dead Sakdals appeared the following warning: “The government must be respected and those who would destroy it will share the lot of these two.” Manila Herald, May 3, 1935.

60 New Philippine Republic I (1935), 4.Google Scholar

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Manila Herald, June 15, 1935.

64 Ibid.

65 Hartendorp, A. V. H., “The Sakdal Protest,” Philippine Magazine, XXXII (1935), p. 233.Google Scholar

66 Ibid.

67 Quoted in Bernstein, The Philippine Story, p. 148.

68 Quezon carried forward the program of estate purchase and land redistribution begun by Governor- General Murphy. At his urging the National Assembly established resettlement projects in the Koronadel Valley of Mindanao for the depressed and crowded population of Central Luzon. In addition, the assemblymen created the National Rice and Corn Corporation to provide badly needed storage facilities for small farmers. The legislators provided for public defenders to protect peasant interests in provincial court proceedings, and gave unions the right to organize and bargain collectively. They also established the Court of Industrial Relations to mediate labor disputes.

69 The first effective organization of this type was the Batung Maputi or “White Stone” which flourished in Pampanga during the late twenties. Openly dedicated to resisting tenant “encroachments,” its by-laws included a declaration that “members … should not accept as tenants those who have deserted another member of the association without reasonable cause.” Macaraig, Serafin E., Social Problems, (Manila, 1929), p. 257.Google Scholar

70 Manila Tribune, August 10, 1937.

71 Ibid. Governor Samonte had reason to respect “delicate situations.” Captured by a Sakdal band during the uprising he avoided danger by joining the rebels declaring, “I am with you heart and soul”; later that night he signed a deposition stating that the Sakdals who seized him had gathered in the town of Tanza to hold a meeting and not to create a disturbance. After this capitulation his captors set him free. Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix Ill, p. 8.

72 Manila Daily Bulletin, July 30, 1939.

73 The Manila Tribune, doubting that the Cawal was dedicated to peace, maintained that the association's existence was “predicated on its ability and intention to use force.” The organization offered free legal services as an inducement for enrollment; thereby convincing many observers that the Cawal was designed to operate as a '“private army.” Manila Tribune, March 10, 1938.

74 Crippen, Harlan, “Philippine Agrarian Unrest: Historical Backgrounds,” Science and Society, X (1946), 355.Google Scholar

75 The “Tambuli Ordinances,” passed in 1938 by the Pampanga Legislature over Quezon's objections, typified provincial restrictions; the tambuli, or meeting horn, laws forbade the “gathering of two or more people after dusk.” Manila Daily Bulletin, October 3, 1938.

76 Mounting activity on the part of Socialists and Communists in Central Luzon brought forth again the spectre of a peasant uprising. In 1938 land-owners and businessmen in San Fernando, Pampanga, purchased a truck for the municipal police to “facilitate the transportation … of patrols during emergencies.” Manila Daily Bulletin, April 16, 1938. The governor of Bulacan, in the same year, advocated that municipal police forces in his province be increased by six hundred men. Manila Tribune, January 22, 1938.

77 Manila Tribune, February 6, 1938.

78 Ibid.