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A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: The Kuomintang-Communist Split of 1927

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Tien-Wei Wu
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The Chinese Communist movement stemmed from nationalism and assumed the left wing in the Chinese national revolution. The CCP (Chinese Communist Party) was organized in the wake of the May Fourth Movement which had kindled a great fervor of patriotism, particularly among the intellectual youths. Only as nationalists first and Communists second, were the Communists willing to join the KMT (Kuomintang) as individuals in order to take an active part in the national revolution. In a span of five years, the KMT-CCP alliance had contributed to the consolidation of the revolutionary base in Kwangtung and the spread of revolution to the north. In the course of the national revolution, the CCP enjoyed a spectacular growth from a group of about 70 intellectuals in 1921, when the party was founded, to a mass party of over 50,000 members in 1927, when die Pei-fa (Northern Expedition) swept the whole of South China.

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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , November 1969 , pp. 125 - 143
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Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1969

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References

1 As to whether the Communists were admitted into the KMT as a “bloc within” or simply as individuals, the debate is still going on. Suffice it to say that Sun Yat-sen did not admit the Communists into the KMT as a “bloc within” and that Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of the CCP, issued a statement at the First National Congress of the KMT, asserting that the Communists joined the KMT as individuals and expected to be treated as such. See Tse-ju, Teng, Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang erh-shih nien shih-chi (Historical records of the Kuomintang of the past twenty years) (Shanghai: 1948), pp. 289–91Google Scholar; “Li Ta-chao's Statement on the Communists' Entry into the Kuomintang,” as reprinted in Ko-ming wen-hsien (Revolutionary documents). Lo Chia-lun, ed., (Taipei: 1957), IX, 37–48; Tu-hsiu, Ch'en, Kao ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu (A letter to all comrades of the Party), December 10, 1929, p. 2.Google Scholar

2 See Mif, Pavel, Chin-chi thih-ch'i chung ti Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang (The Chinese Communist Party in critical days) (Moscow: 1928), p. 37Google Scholar; North, Robert C. and Eudin, Xenia J., M. N. Roy's Mission to China: The Communist-Kuomin-tang Split of 1927 (Berkeley: 1963), p. 243.Google Scholar

3 The term “Wuhan debacle” as used in this paper means the collapse of the KMT-CCP alliance or the “united front” and the disaster of the CCP ending the first phase of the Chinese Communist movement. Some aspects of the Wuhan debacle have been ably treated by a few leading scholars, such as Harold Isaacs, Robert North, Conrad Brandt, and Benjamin Schwartz. Among the recent publications, Chiang Yung-ching's Bo-lot'ing yü Wuhan cheng-ch'üan (Borodin and the Wu-Han regime) (Taipei: 1963)Google Scholar and North, Robert's and Eudin, Xenia's M. N. Roy's Mission to ChinaGoogle Scholar (supra, Note 2) merit our special attention, for both have broken some new ground in the study of the KMT-CCP relations during the Wuhan period. With the appearance of Chang Kuo-t'ao's Wo ti hui-i (My memoirs), published consecutively in Ming-pao yüch-k'an (Ming-pao monthly) (Hong Kong), beginning with the third issue (March 1966)Google Scholar, our study of the Wuhan debacle is greatly enriched; not only does his work clarify many of the events for which no explanation had been given previously but it also brings to light a great deal of the controversy which had heretofore remained obscure and undetermined. Perhaps the major contribution of Chiang Yung-ching's book is that the author made extensive use of the minutes of the Political Council and the Standing Committee, both of which were under the CEC (Central Executive Committee) of the KMT. As a result, he has shed considerable light on two issues: the three resolutions adopted by die CEC Standing Committee on July 15, 1927 were not intended to expel the Communists from the KMT, nor did they signal the KMT Left's breaking with Moscow. The significance of Roy's materials published by North and Eudin lies not so much in the account of the Wuhan debacle as in that of the Fifth National Congress of die CCP. The information furnished by Roy is not beyond the date of June 28, 1927, so that the most crucial month of July, when the split between die KMT and the CCP occurred, is not touched upon. However, the publication of Roy's materials at least clarifies one of the controversies, i.e., his role in the Wuhan debacle.

4 Two of Chiang's divisions were left to Ho Ying-ch'in and Ch'ien Ta-chün in Kwangtung; the other two divisions under Wang Po-ling and Liu Ch'ih, which participated in die Pei-fa, were badly beaten. See Ch'ih, Liu, “A Memoir of An Old Soldier,” Tzu-yu t'an (The Rambler), XIII, 5 (May 1962), p. 34Google Scholar; Kung-chih, Wen, Tsui-chin san-shih nien Chung-kuo ch'n-shih shih (A military history of China in the last thirty years) (Shanghai: 1930), Vol. II, pp. 275–81.Google Scholar

5 According to the “Resolution on the Unification of the Party Leadership,” adopted by the CEC Third Plenum of die KMT, Chiang as Comman-der-in-Chief was subject to the control of the Military Council, the presidium of which consisted of several members, three of them non-military. All orders and resolutions had to be signed by at least four members of the Council. Parallel to the Military Council was a Political Council of six; both the two councils were under the nine-member Standing Committee of die CEC. Of equal importance was the “Resolution on the Unification of Revolutionary Forces,” which inaugurated a two-party joint conference to devise ways and means for close cooperation between the KMT and die CCP. It also resolved dial the CCP should participate in the national government so as to share the responsibility of the government of the KMT. See Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh chieh chung-yang chih-hsing ivsi-yüan htti tsung pao-kao fu-chien (Attached documents of the general report of the Second Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang) (n.p.: March, 1929), pp. 75–79; “An Account of the Third Plenum of the Kuomintang CEC,” Kuo-wen chou-pao (National news weekly), IV, 12 (April 3, 1927), pp. 1–10.Google Scholar

6 See Wilbur, C. Martin and How, Julia L. Y., Documents of Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China 1918–1927 (New York: 1956), Doc. 44, p. 419Google Scholar; Woo, T. C., The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution (London: 1928), pp. 221–23Google Scholar; Ming-shu, Ch'en, “Why We Want to Fight the Communists,” in Ko-ming yü fan-fo-ming (Revolution and counterrevolution). Hsing-shih, Lang, ed., (Shanghai: 1928), p. 365Google Scholar; Nassonov, Fokine, and Albrecht, “Letter from Shanghai,” in Leon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution (New York: 1932), Appendix, p. 409.Google Scholar

7 Wang Ching-wei arrived at Shanghai on April 1. He opposed Chiang and others concerning a plan to expel the Communist but insisted on calling the CEC Fourth Plenum to settle the issue. After issuing a joint manifesto with Ch'en Tu-hsiu on April 4, reassuring the KMT-CCP alliance, and dismissing the rumor that the Communists would overrun the foreign concessions at Shanghai, Wang left for Wuhan which he reached on April 10.

8 Ch'ung-hsi, Pai, Shih-liu nien ch'ing-tang ti hui-ku (Reminiscence on the party purification in 1927) (n.p.: 1932), pp. 8–9Google Scholar; Hsü-ch'u, Huang, “Wu Chih-hui and Wang Ching-wei in the Words of Li Tsung-Jen: A Piece of Secret Talk on the Party Purification of the Kuomintang in 1927,” Ch'un-ch'iu (Spring and Autumn), No. 253 (January 16, 1968), pp. 12–14.Google Scholar

9 Hanyang was conquered by the revolutionary army on September 6, 1926, followed by the surrender of Hankow without a fight, but the siege of Wuchang lasted until October 10, 1926.

10 See Mo-jo, Kuo, Ko-ming ch'un-ch'iu (Revolutionary annals). Shanghai, 1947, Vol. II, p. 382Google Scholar; Chien-min, Wang, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang shih-kao (Draft history of the Chinese Communist party) (Taipei: 1965), I, 404.Google Scholar

11 See Ransome, Arthur, The Chinese Puzzle (London: 1927)Google Scholar; Littell, John S., “The Revolutionary Spirit of the Yangtze,” Asia, XXVII, 9 (June 1927), p. 486Google Scholar. Documents concerning the incident and official negotiations for the restoration of the two concessions are reprinted in Ko-ming wen-hsien, XIV, 2343–78Google Scholar. The official negotiation is well treated by Borg, Dorothy in American Policy and the Chinese Revolution (New York: 1947)Google Scholar, Chap. IX.

12 Yung-ching, Chiang, pp. 228–29Google Scholar; Kung-po, Ch'en, “The Crisis of the National Revolution and Our Errors,” in Ch'en Kung-po hsicn-sheng wen-chi (Collected works of Ch'en Kung-po) (n.p.: Ta-jen Bookstore, 1929), pp. 277–78.Google Scholar

13 Kung-po, Ch'en, p. 278.Google Scholar

14 Ibid., p. 284.

15 “Conditions of All-China Peasant Movement,” Kuangchou min-kuo jih-pao (Canton republic daily), October 21, 1926.Google Scholar

16 Mao, , “Report on An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” Hsiang-tao chou-pao. No. 191 (March 12, 1927), pp. 2061–66Google Scholar. The report was written after his 32-day inspection tour of five hsiens (counties) of Hunan from January 4 to February 5, 1927. His report is only representative because there were 77 counties and 2 municipalities in Hunan at the time. (In this paper, “county” is used for hsien and “district” for ch'ü, a subdivision.)

17 A report by Karachev, a Soviet adviser from Canton to the Soviet Military Attaché Longva at Peking, dated November 15, 1926, said that “the peasant associations had acquired considerable force and become the most thorny question in the province.… As a result, fights broke out not only between the peasantry and gentry but also between the peasantry and the men of the 20th Division of the First Army.” See Mitarevsky, , World-wide Soviet Plots, as Disclosed by hitherto Unpublished Documents Seized at the USSR Embassy in PekingGoogle Scholar (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, n.d., but probably published in the latter part of 1927), pp. 140–41.

18 See Wilbur, and How, , Doc. 47, p. 428.Google Scholar

19 The Kremlin sent a telegram to the CCP in October 1926, ordering the CCP to restrain the peasant movement until Shanghai was taken in order not to antagonize the KMT generals in the course of the Pei-fa. A month later this order was cancelled by the Comintern. See Stalin, J. V., Works (Moscow: 1953), X, p. 18.Google Scholar

20 See Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan hui tsung pao-kao fu-chien, loc. cit.

21 The Seventh Plenum of the ECCI adopted eleven measures of agrarian program to be followed by the CCP and KMT: “(a) Maximum reduction of rents; (b) Abolition of the various forms of taxes weighing on the peasantry and their replace ment by a single progressive agricultural tax; (c) Regulate and reduce as far as possible the burden of taxation now being borne by the principal masses of the peasantry; (d) Confiscation of church and monastery lands, and of land belonging to reactionary militarists and compradores, and those landlords and gentry who are waging civil war against the Kuomintang National Government; (e) Securing to tenants the right to perpetual lease on the plots of land they cultivate, and the fixing of maximum rent jointly by the peasant unions and representatives of the revolutionary authorities; (f) All-round support by the Canton Government of peasant interests; in particular, protection of the peasants against oppression and persecution by landlords, gentry, and usurers; (g) Disarming the min-t'uan (local militia) and all other landlord forces; (h) Arming the poor and middle peasants and subordinating all armed forces in the village to the local agencies of the revolutionary Government; (i) Maximum support by the Government for all peasant organizations, including the Peasant Unions; (j) Provision of cheap government credits, fight against the usurers, support of peasant mutual-aid associations; (k) Government help for co-operatives and mutual-aid association.” These eleven items in full are taken from North and Eudin, op. cit., p. 360; Degras, Jane, Communist International (London: 1956), II, 344Google Scholar. Both works have omissions, but diey supplement each other to make the text complete. For the program of the Fifth Congress of die CCP, see infra, Note 25.

22 The Commission was established on April 2; it held three meetings and five enlarged sessions. See Yung-ching, Chiang, pp. 278 ff.Google Scholar

23 There are several accounts of the Fifth Congress of the CCP given by the participants of the Congress, including M. N. Roy, Pavel Mif, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Ts'ai Ho-shen, and Chang Kuo-t'ao. Roy has treated the ideological issues at the Congress in great detail and with extreme accuracy (see North and Eudin, Doc. 10–19, pp. 188–282). As for the environment of the Congress, Mif should be credited with having given the best account in his Chin-chi shih-ch'i chung ti Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang as cited. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai also treated the Congress in great detail in Chung-kuo ko-ming yü Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang (Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party) (Moscow: 1928)Google Scholar. (This was a report to the Six National Congress of the CCP held at Moscow in July 1928.) Ts'ai Ho-shen's comment on the Congress is given in his “History of Party Opportunism,” in Ch'ih-se tang-an (The red documents), ed. Li Min-hun. Peking, 1928, p. 70Google Scholar. A recent review of the Congress is gievn by Kuo-t'ao, Chang, op, cit., No. 22 (October 1967), p. 90.Google Scholar

24 North, and Eudin, , p. 10Google Scholar; Haithcox, John P., “Nationalism and Communism in India: The impact of the 1927 Comintern Failure in China,” Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, 3 (May, 1965), p. 464Google Scholar. Li Li-san commented on the Congress: “Roy, in spite of standing for the Comintern line, paid his attention only to Borodin's rightist-leaning but ignored the opportunism of the Chinese Party. He went so far as saying that ‘the Chinese Party has grown out of struggle, so that it will never become opportunist.’ Soon the whole CCP leadership followed Borodin's line.… The policy of the central was to shelve the opportunist land program adopted by the Fifth Congress.” See Shan, Po (pseud. Li Li-san), “Lessons from the Great Chinese Revolution, 1925–1927,” in Chung-kuo ko-ming—kung-ch'an kuo-chi tui Chung-kuo ko-ming chüeh-i an (Chinese revolution: Resolution of the Communist International on the Chinese revolution) (Shanghai: 1930) (in microfilm), p. 39.Google Scholar

25 The Fifth Congress of the CCP resolved: “(i) Confiscation of all communal, ancestral, temple, and school lands, and lands belonging to the Christian Church, as well as company-owned real estates, and the transfer of such lands to the peasants who till them … (2) … land belonging to small owners shall not be confiscated. Land belonging, as of this date, to officers of the revolutionary army is likewise not subject to confiscation. … See North, and Eudin, , pp. 262–63Google Scholar; Conrad Brandt and others, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, Mass.: 1952), p. 96Google Scholar. On April 26, the Special Land Commission adopted a “Draft Resolution on Land Question,” article I of which reads, “In the course of the national revolution, land question must be solved. That is to distribute land of the big landlords and public and reclaimed lands to those peasants who do not have land or sufficient land to guarantee a living; land of the small landlords, and military men who have contributed to revolution will be protected by the government.” See Yung-ching, Chiang, p. 301.Google Scholar

26 Ting, Sia, “The Peasant Movement in China,” International Press Correspondence, VII, 36 (June 23, 1927), pp. 760–Google ScholarKung-po, Ch'en, p. 282Google Scholar; Ch'iu-pai, Ch'ü, p. 60Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, p. 23.Google Scholar

27 The China Press (Shanghai), June 11, 1927Google Scholar. See Shou, Li, “Account of the May 21st Coup in Hunan,” Hsien-tai shih-liao (Materials of modern history). Hai-t'ien Publishing Co., ed., (Shanghai: 1934–1935), vol. II, Pt. II, pp. 397–401Google Scholar; “Ho Chien's Telegram of May 23,” Kuo-tven chou-pao IV, 23 (June 19, 1927), pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

28 Kuo-t'ao, Chang, pp. 92–3Google Scholar; Yen, Yen, “The Faded Wuhan,” Kuo-wen chou-pao, IV, 22 (June 12, 1927), pp. 4–5Google Scholar; Kao Yü-han's Report as reprinted in Yung-ching, Chiang, pp. 320–21Google Scholar; Chien-min, Wang, pp. 441, 444Google Scholar; Hsi-sheng, T'ao, “Tempest of Wuhan (1),” Tzu-yu-t'an (The Rambler), XIII. 9 (September 1962)Google Scholar. An incorrect account of die event based upon Roy's source is given in North, and Eudin, , pp. 98–99.Google Scholar

29 Kuo-t'ao, Chang, p. 93Google Scholar; Yung-ching, Chiang, pp. 313, 321Google Scholar; Chien-min, Wang, p. 442.Google Scholar

30 The Wuhan government set up a special commission of investigation composed of five members to go to Changsha for an investigation on the spot. They reached as far as Yaoyang and turned back, upon learning that their lives would be in danger if they ventured to come down to Changsha. Now the Wuhan government decided to leave the whole affair to T'ang Sheng-chih. See “Incident of Conflict between Military and Peasantry and Labor in Hunan,” Kuo-wen chou-pao, IV, 23 (June 19, 1927)Google Scholar: Hsun, Chih, “Reminiscence of the Hunan Peasant Revolution,” Pu-erh-sai-wei-k'o (Bolshevik), No. 12 (January 2, 1928)Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, pp. 23–27Google Scholar; K'o-hsiang, Hsü, “May 21st Coup d'Etat,” Chin-jih ta-lu (Mainland today), No. 146 (October 1961), pp. 7–8Google Scholar; “An Account of the Changsha Coup, I, II,” Hsiang-tao chou-pao (Guide weekly), No. 199 (June 22, 1927), pp. 2184–87; 2187–90.Google Scholar

31 Kuo-wen chou-pao, IX, 22 (June 12, 1927), pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

32 The exact figure of those killed in the Changsha coup is not available. Sources vary from one hundred to several thousands as killed. See Chi, Su, “A True Sketch of the Revolutionary Renegades,” Pu-erh-sai-wei-k'o, No. 1 (October 24, 1927)Google Scholar; Chu Ch'i-hua. l-chiu-erh-ch'i nien ti hui-i (Reminiscences of the year 1927) (Shanghai: 1932), pp. 132–33Google Scholar; “A General Review of the White Terror in Various Provinces,” Chung-kuo pai-huo hui-wen (Collected news on the Chinese white calamity), No. 1 (October 1928)Google Scholar; Chang Kuo-t'ao, No. 23 (November 1967), p. 88. For Hupeh, see The China Press (Shanghai), June 17, 1927Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, p. 36Google Scholar; Mif, Pavel, p. 49.Google Scholar

33 North, and Eudin, , pp. 293–96.Google Scholar

34 North, and Eudin, , pp. 310–17Google Scholar; Roy, M. N., Revolution and Counterrevolution (Calcutta: 1946), pp. 520–52Google Scholar. North and Eudin believe that Roy Himself must have been deceived by T'ang Sheng-chih who may have been willing to crush the counterrevolutionaries (p. 108). This is wrong, for Roy himself wrote on June 9: “His [T'ang Sheng-chih] wavering and indecisive position with respect to the coup in Changsha is also well known. His efforts to legalize the Hunan counterrevolution was a secret to no one.” North, and Eudin, , pp. 321–22.Google Scholar

35 Concerning the special committee, Ts'ai Ho-shen wrote: “A Hunan Special Committee was organized for the sole purpose of directing uprisings in Hunan. Several sessions of the Committee were held. The Russians revised their plans of uprising again and again. … Finally completely reversed their decision and refused to forward the promised funds. Thus comrade Chou En-lai had a violent quarrel with Roy over the matter, and the Committee was abolished.” (pp. 38–39.) An incorrect translation of this passage based upon a Russian version is given in North and Eudin, p. 118n.

36 All Chinese sources agree that the immediate cause of the KMT-CCP split originated with Stalin's June 1 telegram. See Wang Ching-wei's report at the 20th Enlarged Conference of the CEC Standing Committee on July 15, 1927, in Yung-ching, Chiang, p. 403Google Scholar; Yün-han, LiTs'ung yung-kung tao ch'ing-tang (From the admission of the Communists to the party purification) (Taipei: 1966), II, 736Google Scholar; Ching-wei, Wang, “On Separating the Communists from the Kuomintang at Wuhan,” November 5, 1927Google Scholar, in Ko-ming yü fan-ko-ming, p. 606Google Scholar; Ch'ung-hsi, Pai, p. 14Google Scholar; Kuo-t'ao, Chang, No. 23 (November 1967), p. 90Google Scholar. Ku Meng-yü, in his reply to this writer's inquiry dated April 28, 1963, wrote: “Roy's report to Wang created a great sensation. The parting of the ways between the KMT and the CCP had long been in the making, but the final action was precipitated by Stalin's telegram.”

37 Upon their arrival at Wuhan in the middle of December 1926, Borodin and others immediately established a Joint Council of the Members of the National Government and the Kuomintang CEC, to which Chiang Kai-shek was strongly opposed. The CEC Plenum of the KMT held in March 1927 changed much of the KMT structure under the CCP influence.

38 Stalin's telegram of the ist of June, 1927 can be conveniently found in Eudin, Xenia J. and North, Robert C., Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–7927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford; 1957), pp. 303–304Google Scholar: Kai-shek, Chiang, Soviet Russia in China (New York: 1957), pp. 50–51.Google Scholar

39 Since early July 1927, a movement for a rapprochement between Nanking and Wuhan initiated by Feng Yü-hsiang and Wu Chih-hui had been under way. Hsu Ch'ien and Ku Meng-yü were among the first to respond to the call for unity on July 14. Wang's first response was made on July 24, followed by a circular telegram on August 3. See Yün-han, Li, pp. 760–62Google Scholar; Tang-kuo ming-jen chung-yao shu-tu (Important correspondence of national and party leaders) (Shanghai: 1929 [on microfilm]), Pt. I, pp. 93–96; 222–26.Google Scholar

40 The full text of the telegram is given in North, and Eudin, , pp. 338–40.Google Scholar

41 Anna Louise Strong was one of the two Americans who went to the conference, and made a report of the trip in China's Million (New York: 1935), pp. 62ffGoogle Scholar. For a recent investigation on the conference, see Sheridan, James S., Chinese War lord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang (Stanford; 1966), pp. 225–27Google Scholar. A revealing account of the Communist maneuver at the conference is given in Kuo-t'ao, Chang, loc. cit., pp. 91–92.Google Scholar

42 Ch'iu-pai, Ch'ü, p. 62Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, p. 35Google Scholar; North, and Eudin, , pp. 321–37.Google Scholar

43 North, and Eudin, , pp. 333–35.Google Scholar

44 See Mif, Pavel, p. 64Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, p. 54.Google Scholar

45 Leang-li, T'ang, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution (London: 1930), p. 283Google Scholar; Ken, Sawada, Ō Seiei den (Biography of Wang Ching-wei) (Tokyo: 1941), p. 152Google Scholar; Ch'ung-hsi, Pai, loc. cit.Google Scholar; Kuo-t'ao, Chang, loc. cit., pp. 92–92.Google Scholar

46 Ho-shen, Ts'ai, p. 49Google Scholar; Kuo-t'ao, Chang, No. 24 (December 1967), p. 96.Google Scholar

47 North, and Eudin, , pp. 261–65, 366n.Google Scholar

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49 For the Chinese text, see Ch'iu-pai, Ch'ü, pp. 115–16Google Scholar; Kang, Hua, Chung-kuo ta ko-ming shih, 1925–1927 (History of the Great Chinese Revolution 1925–1927) (Shanghai: 1932), p. 465Google Scholar. Articles 4 to 9 are translated in Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, 2d ed. revised (Stanford: 1961), pp. 262–63.Google Scholar

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51 Isaacs, Harold, p. 264Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, pp. 59, 72Google Scholar; Hsiao-ch'en, Lei, San-shih nien tung-lan Chung-kuo (Thirty years of chaotic China) (Hong Kong: 1954), p. 76.Google Scholar

52 The Pan-Pacific Labor Congress was held on June 20–26 and the Fourth Congress of the All-China Federation of Labor on June 19–28. See Strong, Anna L., p. 274Google Scholar; Isaacs, Harold, p. 263Google Scholar; Chien-min, Wang. pp. 411–20.Google Scholar

53 Kuo-wen chou-pao, IV, 29 (July 31, 1927).Google Scholar

54 Ho-shen, Ts'ai, p. 79Google Scholar; Ch'iü-pai, Ch'u, p. 62.Google Scholar

55 Ho-shen, Ts'ai, pp, 62–63Google Scholar; Ch'iu-pai, Ch'u, pp. 79–81Google Scholar; Mif, Pavel, pp. 64–65.Google Scholar

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58 Sun K'o spelled out this view at the Standing Committee of the CEC: “The Communists talked loudly about the rise of 2,000,000 peasants in Hunan. Rise up as they did, they were easily suppressed by the army. Not only did they cause great trouble but also they destroyed the united front.” See Yung-ching, Chiang, p. 344Google Scholar; Chien-min, Wang, p. 446.Google Scholar

59 Ch'iu-pai, Ch'ü, p. 63Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, p. 79Google Scholar; Kuo-t'ao, Chang, No. 24 (December 1967), p. 90.Google Scholar

60 Ch'iu-pai, Ch'ü, p. 65Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, pp. 82–85.Google Scholar

61 Kuo-t'ao, Chang, loc. cit., p. 90.Google Scholar

62 Ch'iu-pai, Ch'ü, p. 65Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, p. 82Google Scholar; Chang Kuo-t'ao, ibid.

63 Wei-lien, Wang, pp. 53–54Google Scholar; Nien, Kuei, “Chou En-lai During the Wuhan Period,” Hsien-tai shih-liao, IV, Pt. II, 276Google Scholar; Ho-shen, Ts'ai, p. 84Google Scholar; Wilbur, C. Martin, “The Ashes of Defeat,” The China Quarterly, No. 18 (April–June 1964), p. 46.Google Scholar

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65 Mif, Pavel, pp. 65–66.Google Scholar

66 Kuo-wen chou-pao, IV, 29 (July 31, 1927).Google Scholar

67 Yung-ching, Chiang, p. 402Google Scholar. The first two resolutions can be gathered from Kuo-wen chou-pao, IV, 29 (July 31, 1927)Google Scholar and 31 (August 14, 1927). The third resolution had never been mentioned in any publications until revealed by Chiang. According to him (p. 409), Teng Yen-ta was actually sent to Moscow for the mission (also see Kuo-t'ao, Chang, loc. cit., p. 96).Google Scholar

68 Ibid.

69 Kuo-wen chou-pao, IV, 29 (July 31, 1927)Google Scholar; Ko-ming wen-hsien, XVI, 2829.Google Scholar

70 Yung-ching, Chiang, pp. 408–409.Google Scholar

71 Ibid., pp. 417–18.

72 Kuo-wen chou-pao, IV, 31 (August 14, 1927)Google Scholar: Ko-ming wen-hsien, XVI, 2832–34.Google Scholar

73 See Kai-shek, Chiang, p. 52Google Scholar; Brandt, Conrad, Stalin's Failure in China (Cambridge, Mass.: 1958), pp. 117, 210.Google Scholar

74 Anna Louise Strong had accompanied Borodin on the trip from Wuhan to Moscow through Feng Yü-hsiang's territory and the Gobi desert (see China Million as cited).

76 Many original documents concerning the Nanchang uprising were translated by C. Martin Wilbur in “The Ashes of Defeat,” loc. cit. Other important sources may include: Ch'en Yü-hsin, “Report on the Nanchang Uprising,” Ko-ming wen-hsien, IX, 1323–26Google Scholar; Mo-jo, Kuo, Mo-jo wen-chi (Selected works of Kuo Mo-jo) (Peking: 1958), VIIII, 196–245Google Scholar; Kuo-t'ao, Chang, loc. cit., p. 92.Google Scholar

76 Wang Ching-wei's report to the Standing Committee of the CEC on August 5, 1927, as reprinted in Yung-ching, Chiang, pp. 420–423.Google Scholar

77 Some original documents concerning the “autumn harvest uprising” including “Resolution on the Plan for the Liang-Hu Uprising.” Correspondence between the Hunan Provincial Committee and the CCP, and “Resolution on Political Discipline” adopted by the Enlarged Conference of the Provisional Central Political Bureau are reprinted in Wang Chien-min, pp. 553–60. Other important sources may include: Tse-tung, Mao, Mao Tse-tung tzu-ch'uan (Autobiography of Mao Tse-tung). Rec. Edgar Snow, (n.p.: 1938 [on microfilm]), pp. 50–54Google Scholar; Ts'ung Wu-Han tao Ching-kang-shan (From Wuhan to the Chingkang mountain) (n.p.: n.d.), in hand-written copy (microfilm in the Hoover Institution).

78 Political departments of Chang Fa-k'uei's army were still mainly run by the Communists: e.g., Liao Shang-kuo, a well-known Communist, was still the chief of the Political Department of the 4th Army; Chiang Tung-chin listed among those Communists wanted by the Nanking government still headed the political department of a division. Many regimental commanders were of Communist leaning. See Kuangchou shih-pien yü-Shang-hai hui-i (The Canton incident and the Shanghai conference) (Canton: 1928), pp. 39–40, 120Google Scholar; “Declaration of December 13th Concerning the Canton Coup d'Etat,” in Liu-Ou t'ung-hsin she (Wang Ching-wei's correspondence from Paris) (Paris: 1928), p. 28.Google Scholar