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Prince Diponegoro: Progenitor of Indonesian Nationalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Justus M. van der Kroef
Justus M. van der Kroef
Affiliation:
Michigan State College
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Extract

Ever since the beginning of the twentieth century, when the native movement in the East Indies got its start, the more extreme elements among Indonesian nationalist groups have looked to the figure of Prince Diponegoro, the early nineteenth-century mystic and leader of the native rebellion against the Dutch known as the Java War (1825–30), as a source of inspiration in their struggle for independence. Members of the nationalist movement still commemorate his death and are hailing him today as “the hero of liberty of the Indonesian people.” Many are also sympathetic to Diponegoro's old program of national purification with its emphasis upon the distinctive Hindu-Mohammedan antecedents of the Indonesian, as opposed to the “contamination” of Western civilization brought in the wake of more than three centuries of Dutch rule over the East Indian Archipelago.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 8 , Issue 4 , August 1949 , pp. 424 - 450
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1949

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References

1 Also spelled Dipanegara or Dipa Negara, since the Javanese letter “a” is pronounced “O.”

2 Charles O. van der Plas, Nationalism in the Netherlands-Indies, Netherlands Indies paper no. 1 (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), 1; in Blumberger, H. Petrus, De nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (The Hague, 1931), 219Google Scholar, there is a picture of an early meeting of the native nationalist organization Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, where a large garlanded portrait of Diponegoro is displayed.

3 Pratomo, Djajeng, “Diponegoro, een nationale vrijheidsheld,” Indonesia, Feb. 9, 1946.Google Scholar In the same issue of this weekly, the official organ of the nationalist organization Perhimpoenan Indonesia, see the article “Geen herhaling van de Java oorlog,” written to commemorate Diponegoro's death. Sapija, M. (“Pattimura, Pahlawan Indonesia,” Waspada, Jan. 27, 1948)Google Scholar con siders Diponegoro in his historical setting and calls him a “hero of Indonesia.” Interesting is also the unsigned article “Pangeran Diponegoro” (The voice of free Indonesia, 2 (1947), 258-72)Google Scholar, where Diponegoro is considered as having “strived after a sovereign kingdom based on the original customs and usage (adat) and adapted to the rules as stipulated by the Islam religion.”

4 This contamination according to Diponegoro caused the immorality and decay of Islamic values in his land, for which he held the high-living Dutch, “who are trying to teach the Javanese their ways,” responsible (Diponegoro's autobiography in Louw, P. F., De Java-Oorlog van 1825 tot 1830 [Batavia, 1894] 1:121)Google Scholar. A major grievance was the fact that many native nobles and officials dressed themselves in Dutch officers' uniforms instead of in traditional Javanese attire (de Stuers, Majoor F., Mémoires sur la guerre de Vile de Java de 1825 à 1830 [The Hague, 1833], 18Google Scholar). Many Indonesian nationalists, however, are by no means so insistent upon the retention of original Hindu-Mohammedan values in their culture and are more inclined to accept Western civilization as their own. The most notable protagonist of this group is Sutan Sjahrir,, thrice prime minister of the Indonesian republic (see his articles in Kritiek en opbouw, May 1 and May 16, 1939, and the excellent criticism of them by Edgar du Perron in “Notifies bij het artikel van Sjahrir” (Indies memorandum [Amsterdam, 1940], 110 ft.).

5 Vlekke, Bernard H. M., Nusantara (Cambridge, 1945), 266.Google Scholar This tradition of a powerful monarch who will liberate the Javanese from foreign oppression and lead them to greatness emanates chiefly from the mythical personality and the prophesies of King Djojobojo (or Jayabhaya), ruler of the Javanese kingdom of Kadiri (1130-60) (Drewes, G. W., Drie Javaansclie goeroe's [Leyden, 1925Google Scholar], passim). For an earlier account of the high veneration the Javanese have for Diponegoro see Brumund, J. F., “Bezoek, in den vervallen dalem van Diponegoro te tegalredjo,” Indiana (Amsterdam, 1853), 181–98.Google Scholar

6 The study of Kemp, P. H. van der, “Dipanegara, eene geschiedkundige hamlettype” (Bijdragen lot de taal-land-cn volkenkunde van Nedcrlandsch-Indie uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Instituut [hereafter BKI], 36 [1896], 306 ff.Google Scholar), is a psychological interpretation rather than a historical study. The Javanese epic (babad) of Tjakranegara, translated by Roorda, T. as “Verhaal van de oorsprong en het begin van de opstand van Dipa-Negara” (BKI [hereafter Tjakranegara], 3 [1859], 137 ffGoogle Scholar), covers only the early years and is factually not entirely correct, while Kielstra, E. B. in “Een en ander omtrent Dipo Negoro” (De gids, June 1855Google Scholar), though enlightening in some details, similarly fails to present a complete picture.

7 Louw, op cit., 1:89, affirms 1785 as the year of Diponegoro's birth. Diponegoro himself, however, said he was three years old when his great-grandfather Swarga died in 1792 (Dipone--goro's autobiography in P. van der Kemp, 300).

8 See Jonge, J. K. J. de, De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag over Java (The Hague, 1876; 10Google Scholar, 156 ff. and 298 ff.) and Stapel, F. W., Corpus diplomaticum Ncerlando-Indicum (BKI, 96 [1938], 494–500)Google Scholar for the circumstances of the partition. Louw, Also P., “De derde Javaansclie successie oorlog (1746-1755)” (BKI, 85 [1889]Google Scholar, passim).

9 C. F. Walraven Van Nes, “Verhandeling over de Waarschijnlijke oorzaken die aanleiding tot de onlusten van 1825 en de volgende jaren in de vorstenlanden gegeven hebben,” Tijd-schrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie (hereafter TNI), 4 (1804), 121.

10 Daendels had devised the new etiquette in order to bolster the sagging prestige of Dutch officials at native courts (Daendels, H. W., Staat der Nederlandsche Oost-Indische bezittingen onder het bestuur van den Gouverneur-Generaal H. W. Daendels [The Hague, 1814], 13–25).Google Scholar

11 Aantekeningen van de Majoor de Stuers van de gesprekken die Dipanegara voerde en van enige uitlatingen die hij zich Het ontvallen in Sevenhoven, J. I. Van, “De oorzaken van de oorlog op Java van 1825 tot 1830,” TNI, 2 (1838), 119.Google Scholar Herein Van Sevenhoven has recorded the conversations Diponegoro had with the Dutch Major de Stuers to whom he surrendered himself at the end of the Java War in 1830. Also Louw (De Java-Oorlog, 1:149) seems convinced of the validity of Raffles' promise to Diponegoro, but Parve, D. C. Steyn (“Landverhuur in de vorstenlanden en Javasche Oorlog,” TNI, 1 [1850], 48Google Scholar) is not. Diponegoro's claim, however, also seems substantiated by Tjakranegara's epic which records that Diponegoro's stepmother, who had reason to fear her son because of her immoral behavior and was wondering “what will become of me when Prince Diponegoro becomes ruler,” obtained through deceit the document written by Raffles assuring Diponegoro's succession to the throne and that she promptly burned it (Tjakranegara, 154, and H. Van Lawick Van Pabst, Nota betrefjende de aan den pangeren Dipanegara geopende vooruitzichten op den troon van Djokjakarta, reprinted in F. Louw, De Java-Oorlog, 110).

12 In his conversation with Major de Stuers (Van Sevenhoven, 119).

13 Kiclstra. 410.

14 Louw, , De Java-Oorlog. 1:111.Google Scholar

15 According lo Tjakraiiegnra. 147 and 160. See also Diponcgoro's autobiography in Louw, P.. De Jnva-Oorlog, 1:92.Google Scholar

16 Sec the Javanese epic of Aria Djajadiningrat quoted in Louw, , De Java-Oorlog, 1:84–87.Google Scholar

17 Memorandum of F. G. Engelhard, a government official attached to the court at Djokjakarta, to Governor-General G. van ilcr Cnpcllcn, quoted in van der Kemp, 308.

18 Tjakranegara, 14G-147.

19 Ibid., 144.

20 Walraven Van Nes, 145; Lawick, H. vanPabst's, vanNota in Louw, De Java-Oorlog 1:118;Google Scholar and Hageman, J., Geschiedenis van den oorlog op Java van 1825-1830 (Batavia, 1856), 29–30.Google Scholar The possibility that Diponegoro was responsible for his brother's death is considered by Van Scvenhoven, 118, and Wilkens, J. A., “Overzicht der geschiedenis van Java, grootendeels nit oorpronkclijkc inlandsche bronnen geput” (TNI, 2 (1849), 225)Google Scholar.

21 Tjakranegara, 152. According to J. P. Schoemaker in “De onderwerping van Dipanegara, Hoofd der opstandelingen in den Java-Oorlog 1825-1830” (Indisch militair tijdschrijt, nos. 5-C [1893], 407 ff. and 475 (I.), Diponegoro's behavior at his brother's bier was exceptionally shocking to the court since he expressed, in no uncertain terms, his joy at his brother's death.

22 The appointment of Diponegoro as successor to his brother Djarot would not have been contrary to the Javanese customary laws according to P. van der Kemp, 303. Diponegoro's path was clear since he had stepped aside to let Djarot become sultan. Menol was only four years old and could not, according to Mohammedan tradition, be considered as monarch until he had become of age. The decision of the Dutch government becomes even more inexplicable when the fact is considered that in neighboring Soerakarta a prince who like Diponegoro had a mother of low birth was raised to the throne in 1823. According to Stapel, F. W. (Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie [Amsterdam, 1940], 4:216)Google Scholar, Djarot had given Diponegoro a written promise that in the event he, Djarot, should die before there was a male heir of age to succeed him, Diponegoro would become sultan. Stapel's statement is unsupported by documentary proof, and no other source offers confirmation.

23 Tjakranegara, 154. A pandita is a student of theological problems; a santri is a person who seeks to qualify himself for religious leadership. There are no priests in the Islamic world.

24 Ibid., 167.

25 According to J. H. Knoerle in “Extract nit de gehoudcne aantckcningcn gcdurcnde mijne reis naar Mcnado” (De Oosterling, 2 [1836], 152)Google Scholar. Danoeredjo originally obtained bis high position chiefly through Diponegoro's influence. The two seem to hav^ been on good terms until one day, Diponegoro, in a fit of anger, hit Danoeredjo in the face with his slipper during a public court gathering. As relations between the two men steadily deteriorated, Diponegoro openly began to refer to the vizier as “that dirty dog Danoeredjo,” and on one occasion, again in a fit of rage, he threw the vizier from his chair and kicked and reviled him in the grossest of terms (Tjakranegarn, 163, and J. Hageman, 50-60). However, according to the Dutch official Chevallier, de Salis' assistant, Danoeredjo was “a man of ability and of good character.” The source of friction between the vizier and Diponegoro, according to Chevallier, was the “fidelity with which Danoeredjo served the Dutch Government” (see P. F. Chevallier, Confirfenticele npta, August 25, 1825, a memorandum handed to General de Kock, in Louw, De Java-Oortog, 1: appendix, p. 599).

26 Tjaltranegara, 156.

27 According to a note of Roorda, T., 159. According to Stapel, F. W. (Cescliiedenis, 5:217Google Scholar), Diponegoro did not resign as guardian until some time after the sudden coronation, upon the occasion of a festival during which the vizier insulted him.

28 Tjakranegnra, 160.

29 Ibid., 1655.

30 Al-Mawardi, Kitab-ul Ahkam as-Sultaniyah (Cario, 1298 A.H.), 3-4. This principle emanating from the historical position of the caliph in the Islamic world Has been supported by most scholars. See for example Arnold, T. W., The caliphate (Oxford, 1924), 47–49;Google ScholarKhadduri, Majid, The law of war and peace in Islam (London, 1940), 6–7;Google ScholarHamiddulah, Muhammad, Documents sur la diplomatie Musulmane a I'epoque du Prophete et de khalifes orthodoxes (Paris, 1935)Google Scholar, passim; Goldziher, Ignaz, Muhammedanische studien (Halle A. S., 1888), 1:61.Google Scholar However, two Dutch scholars have shown that this concept of unity in Islamic religion and politics ceased to exist in practice as early as the tenth century (Hurgronje, C. Snouck, Nederland en de Islam (Leyden, 1915), 67–68Google Scholar, and Juynboll, T. W., Handleiding tot de Mo-hamedaansche wet [Leyden, 1925], 322Google Scholar). Diponegoro's position and the dilemma confronting him are ably indicated by Klerck, W. de, History of the Netherlands East Indies (Rotterdam, 1938), 2:158–59.Google Scholar The restoration of Mohammedanism in Java was uppermost in Diponegoro's mind, it seems. He insisted that the Dutch government recognize him as head of his country's religion until the bitter end (Capellen, G. van der, “Aantekeningen van den Gouverneur-General Baron van der Capellen over den opstand van Diponegoro,” TNI, 2 [1860], 376).Google Scholar

31 Van Sevenhoven, 129-30, and Kiclstra, 416, are in agreement that the rebellion could have been prevented if the Dutch government in general and Smissaert in particular had treated Diponegoro with more tact.

32 “The cause of the insurrection, has been nothing else than that the Dutch Government in the Indies during these ten years, has made itself, in the expression of Engelhard [see footnote 17], ‘stinking in the highest degree’ to the native” (Hogendorp, H. Graaf Van, Willcin van Hogendorp in Nederlnndsch-lndic 1S25-183O [The Hague, 1913], 142).Google Scholar

33 Nahuys, M. W., Verzamcling van officieele repporlen betreffende den oorlog op Java in de jnren 1825-1830 (The Hague, 1853), 1:18.Google Scholar

34 Prior to his appointment at Djokjakarta, Smissaert had made objections to the governor-general that lie was not competent enough to undertake such a position (see Rapport van den Commissarie-Gcneral Du Bus, July 6, 1827 in van der Kemp, 379-80). Diponegoro characterized Smissaert as “a good but weak man” (Diponegoro's autobiography in Louw, P., De Java-Oorlog van 1825 tot 1830, 1:115).Google Scholar The accusation made by Weitzel, A. W. P. (De oorlog op Java van 1825 tot 1830 [Breda, 1854], 1:8)Google Scholar that Smissaert had forced one of Diponegoro's wives to submit to him, thus incurring Diponegoro's deadly hatred does not seem supported by any evidence whatsoever (see Kielstra, 410).

35 Tjakranegara, 188-89; Steyn Parvé, 45, and the letter of Lieutenant-Governor-Gcneral de Kock to van der Capellen, May 20, 1820 (MSS Landsarchief, Batavia. Java Oorlog, folio 23, unedited).

36 H. Van Lawick Van Pabst, Memorie, Rembang, August 21, 1826, and Louw, , De Java-Oorlog, 1:11.Google Scholar See also Smissaert's letter to the Governor-General Van der Capellen, July 19, 1825, in Eene portejeuille met stukken, betrckhelijk de oorzaken der onlusten op Java in 1825, gevoegd bij de particuliere missive van den commisaris-generaal van Nederlandsch-Indie aan zijne excellentie den minister van kolonien en marine dd. 5 November 1827 met bijgevoegde nota. A part of this letter is reprinted in van der Kemp, 383-84.

37 Walraven van Nes, 158, and Hageman, 65.

38 Tjakranegara, 170.

39 Diponegoro's autobiography, quoted in van der Kemp, 369.

40 Louw, P., De Java-Oorlog, 1:92.Google Scholar Thus Diponegoro came ultimately to wage the “holy war” (Jihad) against unbelievers, required of all good Moslems (Koran, IX, 5).

41 Saperdan seems to have had a mother of low birth and owed his throne chiefly to the advice given by the vizier to the Dutch government-that Saperdan had been designated as ruler by his dying father (Kemp, P. van der, Brieven van den Gouvemeur-Generaal van der Capellen over Diponegoro's opstand, in BKI, 2, [1893], 547–50).Google Scholar

42 Kemp, P. van der, “De economische oorzaken van den Java-Oorlog van 1825-30” (hereafter “Java-Oorlog”), BKI, 3 (1897), 12–13.Google Scholar

43 Letter of the Lieutenant-Governor-General de Kock, May 20, 1826, to the Governor-General, quoted in van der Kemp, ibid., 9.

44 Elout, P. J., Bijdragen tot de kennis van het koloniaal beheer (The Hague, 1851) 10–18Google Scholar, and Baud's, J. C. ministerial report in TNI, 2 (1864), 34Google Scholar ff. However, according to Van Seven-hoven, 106-07, the poverty-stricken state of the nobility was due mostly to their own reckless expenditures and but little to the reduction in income suffered by the rulers.

45 Many sources regard this as a fundamental cause of the Java War, securing for Dipone-goro the support of overwhelming numbers of ruined Javanese nobles (Kemp, P. van der, “Java-Oorlog,” 18–38;Google ScholarGillavry, C. Mac, Nota omtrent de staat der Javasche vorstenlanden, de thans bestaande onlusten en de middelen welke tot herstel en verzekering der rust kunnen warden aangewend [Djokjakarta, May, 1826];Google Scholar de Klerck, 2:60; Walraven van Nes, 134-45). However, Van Sevenhoven (op. cit., 126) and especially Steyn Parvé op. cit., 52) contend that van der Capellen's decrees of May 6, 1823 had no influence on the causes of the war.

46 For the text of the decree see Staatsblad, 1823, no. 17.

47 J. I. van Sevenhoven, Kort overzicht van den teegenwoordigen toestand der vorstenlanden op Java in het algemeen en van het rijk van Jogjakarta in het bijzonder mitsgaders de over-weging der vraag, mat in dezen toestand van zaken door het gouvernement zoude kunnen warden gedaan ten meeste nutte (Djokjakarta, July, 1826). This report, a commentary on Mac Gillavry's memorandum (see footnote 45) is quoted in part in van der Kemp, “Java-Oorlog,” 17.

48 This report is reprinted in Deventer, S. Van, Bijdragen tot de hennis van het landclijk stehel op Java (Zalt Bommel, 1866), 1:279 ft.Google Scholar

49 The practice of leasing land had begun under the administration of Marshal Daendels and was continued by the British who, even while the Dutch were returning to Java, continued to lease estates to Englishmen, apparently with the intent of diminishing the future profits of the Dutch. See the report of the commissarissen-generaal to the crown, December 23, 1817, in Deventer, M. L. van, Het Nederlandsch gezag over Java sedert 1811 (The Hague, 1891), 232–33.Google Scholar

50 Ottow, S. J., De oorsprong der conservatieve richting, het kolonisatie rapport Van Der Capellen, uitgegeven en toegelicht (Utrecht, 1937), 97–112.Google Scholar The landowners thus wished to return to the concepts prevalent in the days of the Dutch East India Company and of Daendels administration when private ownership of land had carried with it judicial authority and economic control over the native population living on the land (Delden, E. van, De particuliere landerijen op Java [Leyden, 1911], 23 ff.).Google Scholar

51 Ibid., 108.

52 Kemp, P. van der, “Java Oorlog,” 28–29.Google Scholar

53 A fact corroborated by van der Capellan's adviser Graaff, H. J. van de (P. van der Kemp, “Het reglement op de particuliere landerijen bewesten de Tjimanoek,” Tijdschrift voor Nijverheid en landbouw in Nederlandsch-Indie, 41 [1890], 144 ft.).Google Scholar

54 Staatsblad, 1823, no. 17.

55 Staatsblad, July 15, 1823, no. 15.

56 Hageman, 45.

57 “Everybody was overjoyed. It was as if we were sprinkled with water; we were refreshed,” thus Mangkoeboemi lyrically describes the effects of van der Capellen's decrees upon his immediate environment (Walraven Van Nes, 147).

58 Arrangements for the indemnity payments differed between Soerakarta and Djokjakarta; in the last state all refunds were to be made directly from the sultan's treasury, in Soerakarta, from the money obtained by the native lessors from the coffee cultivation on the estates now returned to them. Over-all supervision was to be exercised by a board consisting of J. I. van Sevenhoven and Mac Gillavry from Soerakarta and Smissaert from Djokjakarta (P. van der Kemp, “Java-Oorlog,” 32-33, and J. I. van Sevenhoven, Kort overzicht van den legenwoordigen toestand der Vorstenlanden…passim).

59 Walraven van Nes, 147-49. and Majoor W. de Stuers, 50-52.

60 Walraven van Nes, 152.

61 Rapport van den Gouverneur-Generaal Du Bus De Chisignies aan den koning, Batavia, July 6, 1827 (MSS archives, Department of Overseas Territories, The Hague. Java Oorlog, folio II, 1827-37, 310 ff.).

62 Kemp, P. van der, “Java-Oorlog,” 38.Google Scholar

63 Kemp, P. van der, “Het reglement op de particuliere landerijen bewesten de Tjimanoek,” Tijdschrift voor nijverheid en lanbouw in Nederlandsch-Indie, 41 (1890), 163.Google Scholar See also Kemp, P. van der, ed., Brieven van en aan Mr. H. J. van de Graaff (Batavia, 1901), 15–67Google Scholar, for the advice given by van de Graaff to other members of the Council of the Indies and the Governor-General concerning the land-lease system.

64 Sevenhoven, J. I. van, Kort overzicht van den tegenwoordigen toestand der vorstenlandenGoogle Scholar …, quoted in P. van der Kemp, “Java-Oorlog,” 40.

65 Ibid.; see also Staatsblad, February 22, 1825, no. 7.

66 Kemp, P. van der, “Het reglement op de particuliere landerijen,” 159 ff., and by the same author, Java's landelijk Stelsel, 1817-1819 (The Hague, 1916)Google Scholar, ch. 1, passim.

67 Nahuys, 1:69 ft.

68 A. M. de Salis, Pro memorie, May 8, 1828 (MSS Archives, Department of Overseas Territories, The Hague, Regeeringsadviezien, folio 102, passim). See also the letter of Lieutenant-Governor-General de Kock to the Governor-General, May 20, 1826, which does not regard the Dutch default as being a serious matter. The reason for Dutch failure to pay was due to the almost depleted condition of the Dutch treasury in the Indies (Waal, E. de, Aantekeningen over koloniale onderwerpen (The Hague, 1866), 7, 126–37.Google Scholar

69 de Salis, quoted in P. van der Kemp, “Java-Oorlog,” 41.

70 Louw, De Java-Oorlog, vol. 1, pp. 28 ff. tratie van Java (Batavia, 1829), 220-229; and M. van Deventer, 317-34.

71 Ong Eng Die, Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Jndie, sociografie van een Indonesische bevol-kingsgroep (Leiden, 1943), 60-64. Since the days of the Dutch East India Company, foreign Asiatic nationals in the Indies, insofar as they lived in urban communities under direct Dutch control, had been placed under a measure of social and political control of one of their leaders; thus the Chinese had their captain, the Arabs, their lieutenant, etc. This official acted chiefly as intermediary between the members of his own nationality and the Dutch, although the captain of the Chinese seems to have had actual judicial power in early days (Gie, Phoa Liong, “De rechtstoestand der Chinezen in Indonesia,” Chung-hwa hui-tsa chih, 5 [1926], 56–60).Google Scholar For the historic position of the Chinese in the Indies as regards the land-lease system see Heemstra, J., “Particuliere landerijen in en om Soerabaja,” Koloniaal tijdschrift (Jan. 1940), 48–63;Google ScholarCator, W. J., The economic position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies (Oxford, 1936), 11–20;Google Scholar and Sandick, L. H. van, Chinezen buiten China (The Hague, 1909), 176–77.Google Scholar

72 J. I. van Sevenhoven, Nadere toelichting, Dec. 4, 1826, in MSS. Archives, Department of Overseas Territories, The Hague, Regeeringsadviezen 1816-26, 4, 35 ff.

73 Louw, , De Java-Oorlog, vol. 1, pp. 28 ff.Google Scholar

74 Opinions are sharply divided as to the importance of these economic factors in causing the insurrection. No authority has been more critical than D. C. Steyn Parvé, who has pointed out that van cter Capellen's decrees came into being in 1823, two years before any sign of insurrection occurred (Steyn Parvé, 53). However, this source tends to underestimate the consequences of the van der Capellen decrees, consequences which needed time to make themselves felt. To blame the war entirely on Diponegoro's intransigent behavior and on the tactlessness with which he was treated as J. I. van Sevenhoven (op. cit., 130) has done is to fail to take into consideration the overwhelming support Diponegoro received from all classes of society and which led him, while standing on the brink of rebellion, to repulse all mediation with the words: “I can't act differently, the masses at large have taken possession of me” (Diponegoro's autobiography in P. van der Kemp, “Dipanegara,” 394).

75 Tjakranegara, 160-61.

76 Hageman, 63. Not confirmed elsewhere.

77 Walraven van Nes, 158; also Smissaert's letter to Commissaris-General Du Bus, August 10, 1826, in Eene portefeuille met stukken, cited in note 36.

78 Smissaert, ibid.

79 Capellen, G. van der, “Aantekeningen van den Gouverneur-General,” 363, as cited in note 30.Google Scholar

80 Ibid., 316.

81 Nahuys, 1:21; see also the impressions of W. Pietermaat, the Dutch representative (resident) at Menado, where Diponegoro was exiled in Kielstra, 412-13.

82 Diponegoro's autobiography quoted in P. van der Kemp, “Dipanegara,” 399-400; see also the article “Diponegoro” in Paulus, J., ed.. Encyclopedia van Nederlandsch-Indie (The Hague, 1917), 1:367.Google Scholar

83 Schoemaker, 412.

84 See Smissaert's letter to the Governor-General, July 30, 1825, in Eene portefeuille met stukken. A tradition, though unconfirmed, exists that Diponegoro escaped because of the treasonable behavior of Wiranegara, commandant of the native troops (P. F. Chevallier, Con-fidentieele Nota, Djokjakarta, August 25, reprinted in Louw, , De Java-Oorlog, 1:599Google Scholar and 285, footnote 1.

85 Report of Chevallier to Smissaert, July 29, 1825, quoted in P. van der Kemp, “Dipane-gara,” 405.

86 See van der Capellen's complaints to the minister of the colonies in P. van der Kemp, “Brieven van den Gouverneur-General van der Capellen over Dipanegara's opstand,” 539 ff., and G. van der Capellen, “Aantekeningen van den Gouverneur-Generaal,” 277, as cited in note 30. For the effect of the war on the Netherlands, see Waal, E. de, Nederlandsch-Indie in de Staten-Generaal sedert de grondwet van 1814 (The Hague, 1860), 1:202 ff.Google Scholar, and Coolhaas, W. P., Het regeeringsreglement van 1827 (Utrecht, 1936), 36 ff.Google Scholar During the course of the lengthy and costly war, many statesmen wondered, like the former minister of the colonies, Roell, if it would not be wiser to give in to Diponegoro and allow him the title of “Emperor of Java” in return for peace and the resumption of trade and agricultural exploitation (Knibbe, W. A., De vestiging der monarchie, het conflict Elout-van den Bosch, 10).Google Scholar

87 During the peace negotiations at the end of the war, Kyay Modjo deliberated with the Dutch without Diponegoro's consent, saying to the prince, “According to the Koran, this is none of your business. I am supreme commander, and you must do my bidding” (Kielslra, 421). According to Louw, (De Java-Oorlog, 1:4–10)Google Scholar, Diponegoro left even all military decisions to Modjo. In the end, bitter enmity broke out between Modjo and the prince.

88 Louw, , De Juva-Oorlog, 1:262 ff.Google Scholar

89 Capcllen, G. van der, “Aantekeningcn van den Gouverneur-Gcneraal, 367Google Scholar, and Louw, , De Java-Oorlog, 1:277–79;Google Scholar see also the letter to Smissaert written by de Kock, September 18, J820. in Rene Portrfruillc met stukken, as cited in note 36.

90 Kock, H. Mcrkus de, De oorlog op Java van 1825 tot 1830 (Breda, 1853-1855), 1:232–79 and 2:35-86.Google Scholar

91 de Klerck, 2:169. Among the slain princes were the newly appointed guardians of the young sultan of Djokjakarta. Wrote de Kock; “From the day that the Princes were captured and slain, dates the phenomenal revival of Diponegoro's influence and the dwindling confidence of other nobles in our success” (Letter of General de Kock to Commissaris-Generaal Du Bus, August 5, 1826, no. 60, in MSS Archives, Department of Overseas Territories, The Hague. Regeeringsadviezen, folio 30, pp. 27-29). A part of this letter is reprinted in Louw, , De Java-Oorlog, 2:408 ft.Google Scholar

92 As early as August 1825 the Dutch government had requested and obtained the meditation of Sepoeh in the war (see Secreete resolutien van 24 Augustus en 20 December 1825, folio 32, pp. 118-119 in Landsarchief, Batavia). However, these efforts were in vain. Ultimately General de Kock, noting the waxing power of Diponegoro (see footnote 91) and alarmed at the spiritless nobility at the courts, proposed to have Sepoeh reinstalled, despite the fact that he was known as a rabid hater of the Dutch and his accession would mean the downfall of many of the most loyal native princes, such as Pakoe Alam and Wiranegara, who had long since incurred Sepoeh's enmity. It was hoped that Sepoeh's fanatical hatred of Diponegoro would rouse the lethargic country. Opposition to de Kock's proposal was immediate, notably coming from the resident of Djokjakarta, van Sevenhoven (J. I. van Sevenhoven, Nota eerbie-dig aangeboden aan de hoge commissie, die benoemd is om den oud-sultan van Jogjakarta in zijn waardigheid to herstellen [Jogjakarta, 1826], passim). Nonetheless higher authority approved of the plan, and, on September 21, 1826, Sepoeh became sultan. Young Menol was quietly pushed aside, although some dissatisfied courtiers did stage minor insurrections, notably near Poerworedjo in the district of Bagelen and in Rembang. At first, the change was scarcely one for the better, so that Commissaris-Generaal Du Bus was obliged to write the minister of the colonies in the Netherlands: “The rebels have disregarded the admonitions of their father and grandfather [e.i. Sepoeh] to surrender, on the grounds that Diponegoro is only striving to cleanse the Mohammedan religion from the innovations introduced by the Europeans” (my italics) (Rapport aan den koning van den minister van kolonien, dd. 19 Maart 1827 no. 46 k. geheim, reprinted in Louw, De Java-Oorlog, 2:43Google Scholar).

93 Louw, P. and Klerck, E. de, De Java-Oorlog, 4:13 ff.Google Scholar For the construction of a benteng see Louw, P. J., Kaarten en teekeningen behorende bij de Java-Oorlog van 1825 tot 1830.Google Scholar

94 See the moving dialogue between Diponegoro and Mangkoeboemi in Diponegoro's autobiography (babad) quoted in part in Louw and de Klerck, De Java-Oorlog, 5:401–03Google Scholar, after Mangkoeboemi had informed his nephew that he was about to surrender himself to the Dutch.

95 See the letter of Commissaris-Generaal Du Bus de Ghisignies to General de Kock, February 19, 1829, in MSS Archives, Department of Overseas Territory, The Hague. Regeerings-adviezen, 1819-29, folio 14, passim.

96 See the amusing sidelight on Diponegoro's tactics near the Bogowonto river and their effect on the perplexed Dutch military command in Multatuli, Ideen (Amsterdam: Verzamelde Werken, 1883), 4, no. 1022, 275-78. Here Multatuli, the pseudonym of Eduard Douwes Dekker, famed Dutch champion of native rights, records his conversation with Colonial Cleerens, who vainly pursued Diponegoro near the Bogowonto. Whenever Cleerens had surrounded Diponegoro, apparently leaving no other possibility of escape than crossing the river as the Dutch hoped, Diponegoro foiled their plans by breaking through the Dutch lines rather than crossing the river. According to Multatuli, Diponegoro would not cross the Bogowonto because of an oath which his illustrious forebear, Sultan Agoeng, had taken when he for the first time approached the river, the name of which when translated is the most vulgar term for human excretion. Proud Agoeng refused to cross such an ill-named stream, taking an oath whereby he enjoined his descendants to do the same, an oath which Diponegoro apparently piously kept.

97 Capellen, G. van der, “Aantekeningen van den Gouverneur-Generaal Baron van der Capellen”, 376.Google Scholar

98 A. W. Weitzel, 1:266. Modjo's letters are reprinted in Louw and de Merck, 4:899-901.

99 M Kielstra, 429.

100 Ibid., 410-13, records the reports of some Dutch officials at Menado on whom Diponegoro made a most unfavorable impression.

101 “The reason why I am writing you these lines is in order to ask you not to be concerned over my fate. I feel that I have done you great wrong and I prn) that you will grant me your foregivencss,” thus Diponegoro wrote to his children (Hollander, J. J. de, “I wee brieven van Diepa Ncgara,” BAY, 2 [1887], 195–96).Google Scholar

102 Diponegoro's conversation with dc Stuers in van Scvenhovcn, 110.

103 Kemp, P. van der, “Dipanegara,” ch. 17, passim.Google Scholar

104 See Alkerna, B., De Sarekat Islam (Utrecht, 1919). 13 ff.Google Scholar, and Blumbergcr, J. Th. P'ctrus, De nationalistisclie beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (The Hague, 1931), chs. 1–11Google Scholar, for the early development of the Sarekat Islam. This party was originally founded as a reaction against Chinese economic competition in the batik weaving industry, and its typical anti-Chinese as well as anti-Western character is clearly indicated in the government report. Medeelingen der regeering omtrcnt enkele onderwerpen van algcmeen belong. 1019:2-10; 1920:1: and 1921: 6-18.

105 Vlekke, 335.

106 Sutan Sjahrir, “Our nationalism and its substance: freedom, social justice and human dignity,” The voice of free Indonesia, April 27, 1946, May 4, 1946, and May 18, 1946.

107 Wolf, Charles Jr., The Indonesian story, (New York: John Day, 1948), 41 ff.Google Scholar

108 An example of this can be seen in Bali after the war. One of the first things the Dutch had to promise the Balinese was that they would not revive the so-called “Balinization” of the educational system. Enlightened Dutch educational policy before the war had made an attempt to establish a close connection between the indigenous cultural traditions of the Balinese and Western school curricula. This apparently had by no means been appreciated by the Balinese, a people certainly not indifferent to their own religious and social heritage.” Education had to be Western education and nothing more,” as one observer put it (J. van Baal, “De Westerse beschaving als constante factor in het hedendaagse acculturatie proces,” Indonesië, 2 [1948], 131).

109 Djajeng Pratomo, “Diponegoro, een nationale vrijheidsheld,” Indonesia, Feb. 9, 1946.