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Policies and Institutions of the Oboi Regency 1661–1669
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
Abstract
During the 1660's four Manchus dominated the Chinese empire from the court at Peking. These four, Soni, Suksaha, Ebilun, and Oboi, had been appointed in the “Imperial Will” of the late Shun-chih Emperor to serve as Regents during the minority of the K'ang-hsi Emperor. For the first five years of the Regency these Manchus governed collectively. After 1666, however, one of the Regents, Oboi, managed to concentrate power in his own hands and to eliminate the influence of the other Regents. In the years of 1667–69, the young K'ang-hsi Emperor, assisted by his grandmother (the Grand Empress Dowager) and several Manchu advisers, sought to assert personal control over the Ch'ing state and to eliminate the ambitious Oboi. Eventually, in June, 1669, the Emperor arrested Oboi and put an end to his faction of relatives and supporters.
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References
1 Biographical information on the Regents and their families is found in the following sources: Ch'ing-shih kao (Draft History of the Ch'ing Dynasty) (Peking, 1928); Ch'ing-shih Ueh-chuan (Ch'ing Dynasty Biographies) (n.p., 1928; reprint: Taipei, 1962); Hummel, Arthur, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (Washington, D.C, 1943–1944); Kuo-ch'ao ch–i-hsien Ut-cheng (Biographies of the Elderly and Distinguished in he Ch'ing Dynasty) (n.p., 1890; reprint: Taipei, 1966); Pa-ch'i t'ting'chih (General History of the Eight Banners) (n.p., 1795); Pa-ch'i Man-chou shih-tsu t'ung-p'u (Genealogy of the Manchu Clans in the Eight Banners (n.p., 1745).Google Scholar
2 Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, ch. 6, 5a.
3 Conclusive proof of the fact that the Shun-chih Will was a forgery is found in Meng Sen, Ch'ing-tai shih (Essays in Ch'ing History), Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, ed. (Taipei, 1960), 128–29.Google Scholar
4Ta-Ch'ing Shih-tsu Chang Huang-ti shih-lu (The Veritable Records of the Shun-chih Reign) (Tokyo, 1937), ch. 144, 2a-b.Google ScholarHereafter: SC Shih-lu.
5 Ibid., ch. 144, 4b–5a.
6 For the development of the Imperial Household, see: Ming-shih (History of the Ming Dynasty) (n.p., n.d.; reprint: Taipei, 1962), ch. 74, 778–80; Ch'in-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li (The Collected Statutes of the Ch'ing Dynasty) (Shanghai, 1899; reprint; Taiwan, 1963), ch. 21, 1a–40, 5325–26; ch. 1170, la–b, 18749; Cheng T'ien-t'ing, Ch'ing-shih t'an-wei (Studies in Ch'ing History) (n.p., 1946), 72–80; Ch'ing-ch'ao wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao (Imperial Encyclopedia of the Ch'ing Dynasty) (n.p., 1787; reprint: Shanghai, 1936), ch. 77, 5572; Spence, Jonathan, Ts'ao Yin and the K'ang-hsi Emperor, Bondservant and Master (New Haven and London, 1966), 27–41;Google ScholarTe-ch'ang, Chang, “The Economic Role of the Imperial Household in the Ch'ing Dynasty,” in The Journal oj Asian Studies, XXXI, no. 2 (February, 1972), 243–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 SC Shih-lu, ch. 144, 3b–43; ch. 136, 13b–15b, 17b–20a; ch. 142, 5b–13b.
8 Ibid., ch. 144, 2b.
9 Ta-Ch'ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu (The Veritable Records of the K'ang-hsi Reign) (Tokyo, 1937), cn. 3, 9a–b. Hereafter: KH shih-lu. Also see: Ch'ing-shih (History of the Ch'ing Dynasty) (Taipei, 1961), IV, 2446–54.
10 SC Shih-lu, ch. I44, 3b.
11 KH Shih-lu, ch. 8–19, passim. I have selected the second year of the K'ang-hsi reign because the “Veritable Records” are fuller for that year than any other during the Oboi period.
12 Ibid., ch. 12, 6a–b.
13 Ibid., ch. 14, 5a–b; Ch'in-ting ta-Ch'ing hut-tien shih-li, ch. 20, 15a–b, 5322; ch. 20, 19a–b, 5324.
14 KH Shih-lu, ch. 4, 7b–8a.
l The following information about the Council of Deliberative Officials is primarily taken from: Fu Tsung-mao, “Ch'ing-ch'u i-cheng ti-chih chih yen-chiu,” (A Study of the i-cheng System of the Early Ch'ing) in Kuo-li cheng-chih la-hsiieh hsüeh-pao, XI (May, 1965), 245–94; Cor-radini, Piero, “Civil Administration at the Beginning of the Manchu Dynasty,” in Orient Extremus, IX, no. a (December, 1962),Google Scholar 133–38; Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, ch. 6, 12b; Wu, Silas, Communication and Imperial Control in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 10–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
16 KH Shih-lu, ch. 4, 7b–8a; ch. 6, 4b–5a.
* Every time that a Council member held one of these posts his name was entered. There are, therefore, a number of cases where a man has several entries in this section.
** Entries were made next to the latest date that a Council member held high positions under the later K'ang-hsi period. High officials include only board presidents, Grand Secretaries, and lieutenant-generals.
Sources; Pa-ch'i t'ung-chih (1795); Ch'ing-shih fyo; Ch'ing-shih tieh-chuan; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, Ch'ing shih; Kuo-ch'ao ch'i-hsien lei-cheng (Biographies of the Elderly and Distinguished in the Ch'ing Dynasty) (n.p., 1890; reprint: Taiwan, 1966).
17 Fu Tsung-mao, “Ch'ing-ch'u i-cheng,” 26a–64.
18 Turtei quoted in Ibid., 283. During the late K'ang-hsi reign modifications were made in the membership of the Council of Deliberative Officials. The President of the Censorate was added to the list. In 1683 it was decided that since the conquest of Taiwan marked the end of the major Ch'ing consolidation campaigns, the lieutenant-generals of the banners would no longer be ex officio members. Thereafter the Council assumed a much more civil administrative character and was dominated by the most prominent Manchu statesmen of the period. The influence of the Council began to dwindle after the formation of the Grand Council (chün-chi-ch'u) in 1729. The Grand Council soon took over many of the responsibilities formerly carried out by the i-cheng ta-ch'en. Finally on January 18, 1792, in the fifty-sixth year of the Ch'ien-lung reign the Council of Deliberative Officials was abolished. Ibid., 283.
19 KH Shih-lu, ch. 14. 6b–7a, 8a; Ch'in-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-ticn shih-li, ch. 78, 5a–6a, 6907; ch. 80, 4b–6b, 6124–25.
20 Sec below under: “Provincial Bureaucracy: The Search for Loyal Officials.”
21 KH Shih-lu, ch. 13, 20b–21b; ch. 17, 6b–8b; Ch'in-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 173, 1a–4b. 7363–64; ch. 173. 21a–22a, 7373.
22 KH Shih-lu, ch. 9. 24a–b.
23 Substantial reforms in the chü-jen and sheng yüan examinations were also made in the late 1650's and early 1660's. In 1660, the quotas for the provincial examinations were cut approximately in half so that the total number of successful candidates was 799. This total may be compared wich the quotas of 1645, for example, which allowed for 1,865 chü-jen degrees. Ch'in-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 348, 1a-b, 9689; ch. 348, 5a, 9691; Shang Yen-liu, Ch'ing-tai k'o-ch'u k'ao-shih shu-lu (The Recommendation and Examination Systems of the Ch'ing Period) (Peking, 1958), 76. These quotas were raised once again in 1668, but remained far below the levels of the late Shun-chih period. Ch'in-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 348, 5b, 9691.
During the early years of the Shun-chih period sheng-yiian quotas had been quite high, but in 1658 it was ordered that a large prefecture would have a quota of 20, a large county a quota of 15, and a small county a quota of four or five. Also in 1658 it was decided to limit the sheng-yüan examinations to one in every three years instead of the previous policy of two examinations in every three years. Ch'in-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 370, 1a–b, 9963; Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry (Seattle, 1955). 74–75. 76–78. Ho Ping-ti claims that the date for the restrictive sheng-yüan quotas was 1661 rather than 1658. Ping-ti, Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China (New York, 1962), 228.Google Scholar
24 On the appointment of Chinese bannermen to provincial posts during the early Ch'ing period, see: Spence, Ts'ao Yin. 4–5, 70–77; Kessler, Lawrence D., “Ethnic Composition of Provincial Leadership During the Ch'ing Dynasty,” in The Journal of Asian Studies, XXVIII, no. 3 (May, 1969), 496–500.Google Scholar
25 The Regents were fearful of losing touch with the actual proceedings in the provinces. They were annoyed when memorials from provincial officials failed to describe events accurately and in detail. On one occasion the Regents complained that memorials citing the death of bandits were often fabricated: Recently in reviewing the reports from all provinces on the question of bandits, the majority announce “death in prison,” “death by drowning,” “death from sickness,” “death caused by resisting capture,” and so forth. It is feared that there are numerous instances where officials keep their offices [by gaining merit] for having apprehended bandits, but have actually accused innocent persons of being bandits. KH Shih-lu, ch. 24, 7a–b.
Oboi and his fellow Regents were accustomed to the terse and factual language of battle reports and they were dismayed by the stylized and often vague memorials which they received. At one point they exclaimed:
Recently we have observed that the memorials of the senior officials [yen-kuan], in addition to discussing facts and administration, also make comparisons which are largely just wasted talk. There are many which merely discuss matters already completed and others which are simply plagiarism.… Moreover, memorials were originally limited to no more than three hundred characters, but now there are many which exceed that limit with frivolous chatter. Ibid., ch. 24, 27a.
In short, provincial-capital communications during the 1660's were irregular and inadequate at best. The Regents, like so many Chinese emperors before and after them, were often forced to make momentous decisions on the basis of distorted and scanty information.
20 A second type of criticism leveled against the provincial bureaucracy during the Oboi Regency concerned the failure to make proper recommendations and impeachments of officials. The revamped evaluation system rested heavily on the assessments sent on by upper provincial officials, and once again the Manchus in Peking were disappointed in their subordinates. In an edict of April, 1665, the Regents voiced their anger: Recendy in looking at impeachment memorials from all of the governors and governors-general, there have been [impeachments] of only one or two decrepit or obscure officials who have evaded their responsibilities. How can we avoid situations whereby the subordinates [of the governors and governors-general] are greedy and bring harm to the people? All this arises from excessive toleration of corruption. Ibid., ch. 14, 19a–b.
21 The third area in which the Regents found fault was corruption on the part of the highest officials in the provinces. In 1667, for example, the Shansi financial commissioner, Wang Hsien-tso, was dismissed from his post and forever stripped of his honors for heavy embezzlement from the public granaries. The governor of the province, a Chinese bannerman named Yang Hsi, was also implicated in the case and received a stern reprimand from the Regents. In the same year it was revealed that the top officialdom of Fukien, Kwangtung, Kiangsi, and Hukuang, were engaging in commercial ventures for their own profit. Because of their prestige and power they were able to sell goods at a higher price to the detriment of both consumers and other merchants. Ibid., ch. 22, 5a–b, 7a–b; ch. 23, 2a–b.
28 Ch'ing-shih, IV, 2856–57, 3014–15.
29 KH Shih-lu, ch. 23, 5b–6a; Ch'in-ting ta- Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 24, 20a–2ia, 5366–67.
Another post abolished by the Regents was that of the regional inspector (hsün-an chien-ch'a yii-shih). Under the Ming and early Ch'ing regional inspectors were appointed throughout the empire, one to a province, to provide supervisory and censorial functions. Although the regional inspectors might have limited the powers of the governors and governors-general, the Regents apparently concluded that these inspectors, like the regular censors, were a thorn in the side of the Manchu regime. See Kessler, “Ethnic Composition of Provincial Leadership During the Ch'ing Dynasty,” 491.
An incident involving an outspoken regional inspector, Lu Kuang-hsu, had occurred in the last year of the Shun-chih reign. Lu had openly criticized Manchu policies and Manchu military operations; his case may have convinced the Regents that the regional inspectorship should be abolished. SC Shih-lu, ch. 139, 9a–12b; ch. 141,
8b–1ob.
30 KH Shih-lu, ch. 22, 17b, 18b, 20a; ch. 24, 27a–28a.
31 Ibid., ch. 25, 12a, 13a.
32 Ho Ping-ti, 228.
33 In a recent article, Lawrence Kessler has made the convincing suggestion that several Chinese officials from the north (Chihli, Shantung, Honan, Shansi) may have been active supporters of the Regents' actions against the scholars and officials of Kiangnan and Chekiang. Kessler, Lawrence D., “Chinese Scholars and the Early Manchu State,” in the Harvard Journal of Astatic Studies,XXXI (1971) 181–82.Google Scholar
34 Tax delinquency in Kiangnan had been a central concern of the early Ch'ing state since the mid-1650's. Several regulations were established in the late Shun-chih period to provide penalties for officials and local elites who were involved in tax evasion. Ibid., 184.
35 KH Shih-lu, ch. I, 17a–b.
36 K'u-miao chi-lüeh (A Record of the k'u-miao Affair) in Lo-tien-chü-shih, T'ung-shih (A History of Suffering) (Shanghai, 1911), II, ia.
37 The following information about the public demonstration and tax evasion is taken from:K'u-miao chi-lüeh; Hsu K'o, Ch'ing-pai lui-ch'ao (Categorized Documents on the Ch'ing Dynasty) (Shanghai, 1917), ts'e 8, 67; Ch'en Teng-yüan, Chin Sheng-t'an chuan (Biography of Chin Jen-jui) (Hongkong, 1935); Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle, i960), 127, 599; Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, Local Government in China under the Ch'ing (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 185, 331–32; Su-chou fu-chih (The Gazetteer of Soochow Prefecture) (n.p., 1883), ch. 88, 90–1ob; KH Shih-lu, ch. 2, 3b–4a; ch. 3, 3a; Meng Sen, “Tsou hsiao an,” (Taxation Case Reported to the Board of Revenue) in Ming-Ch'ing shih lun-chu chi-k'an (Collection of Writings and Discussions of Meng Sen on Ming and Ch'ing History) (Taipei, 1961), 141–47; Kessler, , “Chinese Scholars and the Early Manchu State,” 184–91.Google Scholar
38 Kessler, “Chinese Scholars and the Early Manchu State,” 186–87.
39 KH Shih-lu, ch. 3, 3a.
40 K'u-miao chi-lüeh, 5b.
41 Kessler, “Chinese Scholars and the Early Manchu State,” 187
42 Ibid., 188–89.
43 Ibid., 194–96.
44 Spence, Ts'ao Yin, 127–28.
45 The following information concerning the Ming History Case is taken from: Nan-hsün chih (The Gazetteer of Nan-hsün District) (n.p., 1922), ch. 42, 1a–3a; Meng Sen, “Shu Ming-shih ch'ao-lüeh” (On the Ming-shih ch'aolüeh) in Ming-Ch'ing shih lun-chu chi-k'an, 141–47; Hsieh Kuo-chen, “Chuang-shih shih-an ts'an-chiao chu-jen k'ao” (Notes on the Case of Chuang T'ing-lung) in T'u-shu-k.uan-hsüeh ch'i-k'an, IV, 3–4 (Peking, 1930), 423–27; Ku Yen-wu, “Shu Wu P'an er-tzu shih” (On the Matter of Wu Yen and P'an Ch'eng-chang) in Min Er-chang, Pei-chuan chi-pu (Addenda to the Pei-chuan chi) (Peiping, 1931), ch. 35, 23b–28b; Kessler, “Chinese Scholars 3nd the Early Manchu State,” 182–84.
46 Ch'ung-ming hsicn-chih (The Gazetteer of Ch'ung-ming hsien) (n.p., 1760), ch. 4, 34a; ch. 7, 5a–6b, 8b–na; ch. 8, 270-283; ch. 12, 35b–36a; ch. 14, 5b'6a; Chiang lih-sheng, T'ai-wan wai-chi (Collection of Documents Relating to Taiwan and Foreign Affairs) (n.p., 1704), ch. 10, 11a–b, 18b–19a, 19b.
47 KH Shih-lu, ch. i, 18a–b.
49 KH Shih-lu, ch. 2, 15b.
50 Background information on the hsiang-y'eh and hsiang-hsien techniques may be found in Hsiao Kung-chuan, 184–220. Hsiao clearly documents the fact that these techniques were relatively ineffective as propaganda devices for the dynasty. But, as indicated, the Regents' aversion to relying on these techniques was probably determined more by considerations of values than of efficacy.
51 In The Collected Statutes of the Ch'ing Dynasty there were no regulations promulgated on the hsiang-yüeh or the hsiang-hsien during the Oboi period; sec: Ch'in-ung ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 397, 1b–2b, 10332; ch. 402, 1a–b, 10404.
52 This information was compiled by taking the list of the members of the Oboi faction in KH Shih-lu, ch. 29, 6b–18b, and checking them against the list of military officials in the Ch'ing-shih and the Pa-ch'i t'ung-chih (1795).
53 KH Shih-lu, ch. 29, 3b–28b, passim.
55 Ibid., ch. 25, 4a–6a, passim.
56 Ibid., ch. 29, I7a–18b. Some dramatic, though probably apocryphal, tales about Oboi's death have circulated; see: Hsieh Pao-chao, The Government of China (1644–1911) (Baltimore, 1925), 39; Shang Yen-liu, 138; Edmund Backhouse and J.O.P. Bland, Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking (Boston, 1914), 243–45.
During the early part of the eighteenth century, Oboi posthumously regained some stature. In 1713 the K'ang-hsi Emperor recalled Oboi's illustrative career as a soldier, and granted him the posthumous rank of baron. At first this rank was held by Oboi's grandnephew, Su-hei, but was later inherited by Oboi's grandson, Dafu. When Dafu became a deputy lieutenant-general in 1727, he impressed the Yung-cheng Emperor at an audience. The Emperor, therefore, restored Oboi's dukedom and granted it to Dafu. The revived dukedom was given the appelation, “military excellence” (ch'ao-wu). After Dafu was killed in 1731 while fighting against the Ölöd Mongols, the ch'ao-wu dukedom remained in his family for a half-century. In 1780, however, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor, citing the crimes of the Oboi faction, reduced the former Regent's hereditary rank to that of baron. Hummel, 600; Pa-ch'i Man-chou shih-tsu t'ung-p'u, ch. 1, 6b; Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, ch. 6, 12b.