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The Philippine Sugar Industry and the Politics of Independence, 1929–1935

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Theodore Friend
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Independence was an old question in Philippine-American relations, free trade a middle-aged one, and sugar production a very young one when all three converged in 1929. They remained tangled until an independence bill, a redefinition of Philippine-American trade, and the combined limitation and allocation of Philippine sugar production straightened them out again by 1935. The struggles of the intervening years involved every phase of American colonial policy and every phase of Philippine public life. Here I single out for examination the Philippine place in America's sugar market and the place of sugar in the Philippine political economy.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , February 1963 , pp. 179 - 192
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1963

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References

1 This subject was first treated by Kirk, Grayson V., Philippine Independence: Motives, Problems, and Prospects (New York, 1936)Google Scholar. The present writer is completing a book on political, economic, and military aspects of the independence question, based on American materials which have become available since Kirk's day, on extensive Philippine sources used for the first time, and on captured Japanese documents.

2 In 1899 Philippine exports to America had been only 18% of their total. In the next thirty years, not only this percentage but the export volume went up enormously. Grunder, Garel E. and Livezey, William, The Philippines and the United States (Norman, Okla., 1951), pp. 211–212.Google Scholar

3 The foregoing account is based on a descriptive memorandum from E. D. Hester, to the author, July 17, 1961, and on Mirasol, Jose J., “The Philippine Sugar Industry,” Philippine Sugar Year Book, 1950Google Scholar. Hester for many years was economic adviser to the American governors-general and high commissioners in the Philippines; Mirasol was at one time on the faculty of the Los Baños College of Agriculture and later an official of the planters' confederation.

4 The positions of the several farm lobbies, as well as that of the Independence Mission, are amply stated in Congressional hearings, beginning with Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, 71 Cong., 2 sess., Independence for the Philippine Islands.

5 John E. Dalton analyzes developments in the American sugar system up to the reestablishment of equilibrium through the Sugar Act of 1934 (Jones-Costigan Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act); Sugar, a Case in Government Control (New York, 1937)Google Scholar. Dalton was chief of the Sugar Section of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 1934–35, and later a professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.

6 All these statistics are from Mirasol, citing the Annual Report of the Governor-General, Philippine Islands, 1934.Google Scholar

7 Pratt, Julius W., America's Colonial Experiment (New York, 1950), p. 293Google Scholar. I have estimated the population for 1934 on the basis of preceding and succeeding censuses.

8 Most Philippine sugar was sold raw, and then refined in the country of sale. Little more than 5% of it was consumed domestically. Philippine refineries were, as a result, not politically important, and are omitted from ensuing discussion.

9 “American” ownership is easy enough to distinguish, but the other categories into which the standard tables are broken down, “Filipino,” “Spanish,” and “Cosmopolitan,” are elusive. Data submitted to the Senate Committee on Territories, Hearings, 71:2, p. 689, have it that 49% of central investment was Filipino, 26% American, 24% Spanish, and 1% Cosmopolitan. A check into the makeup of these statistics reveals that the holdings of the Ossorio family are assigned a “Filipino” label, and those of the Elizalde family “Spanish” (American Chamber of Commerce Journal, 09, 1928, p. 20Google Scholar). Inasmuch as the Elizaldes then were, and the Ossorios still are, fairly equally divided among American, Spanish, and Philippine citizenship, they are better described as “Cosmopolitan.” Adjusting the figures appropriately, central investment becomes 39% Filipino, 28% American, 25% Cosmopolitan, and 8% Spanish. Even then, because of other cases of mixed blood and mixed citizenship, these figures are not certainly correct, and, even if correct, of uncertain significance.

10 The preceding two paragraphs are based on Hester's memorandum and Mirasol, “Philippine Sugar Industry.”

11 The foregoing account is derived from letters in the Quezoniana Collection, Bureau of Public Libraries, Manila, (hereafter referred to as Quezon MSS): (a) Earl B. Schwulst, Vice-President of the Philippine National Bank to Governor-General Dwight Davis, Apr. 20, 1931, referring to a memo by Mr. Atherton Lee and letter by E. D. Hester, Economic Advisor to the Governor-General, Apr. 15, 1931; (b) Quezon to George Butte, Acting Governor-General, Jan. 7, 1932; (c) Schwulst to Quezon, Feb. 1, 1932. Mr. Schwulst, now President of the Bowery Savings Bank, New York City, confirmed the above account in an interview with the author, Aug. 3, 1961.

12 Terms of the bill are summed up by Kirk, p. 113. The proposed quota was about 7.5% above Philippine exports to the United States in 1931, whereas the annual increase in Philippine production was then exceeding 20%, with America almost the sole outlet. My figures are derived from data in Farr's Manual of Sugar Companies—1934. Amounts of sugar throughout this discussion are referred to in short tons.

13 Felipe Buencamino Jr., confidential memo to Quezon, Sept., 1932 (Quezon MSS).

14 Nationwide radio broadcast by Rafael Alunan, Manila, early Sept., 1932 (Quezon MSS).

15 The actual crop for 1931–32 was 70,000 tons less than the estimate. Alunan's proposed quota was therefore 46% above the record (calculations based upon data in Philippine Sugar Year Book., 1950, p. 106).Google Scholar

16 Juan L. Ledesma, a Negros planter, was one exponent of this view; letter to Secretary Alunan, Sept. 10, 1932 (Quezon MSS).

17 Resolution of Nov. 5, 1932, forwarded by Quezon to the Osmeña-Roxas mission, Dec. 8, 1932 (Quezon MSS).

18 Quaqual to Osrox, cablegram, Nov. 2, 1932; Osrox to Quaqual, night letter, Nov. 5, 1932 (Quezon MSS). The cablegram abbreviation “Osrox” stood for Osmeña and Roxas; “Quaqual” stood for Quezon, (Benigno) Aquino, and (Antonio) de las Alas. The latter two were pro tempore holders of Osmeña's and Roxas' offices.

19 Reported by Osrox to Quaqual, night letter, Nov. 7, 1932 (Quezon MSS). Hoover is quoted on this point in the Congressional Record, 72:2, 1912.Google Scholar

20 Quezon to Osrox, cable, Dec. 10, 1932 (Quezon MSS).

21 So Aquiño, who had been sent as a special envoy to try to swing Osmeña and Roxas into line, cabled Quezon, Dec. 22, 1932 (Quezon MSS).

22 Quaqual to Osrox, cable, Dec. 30, 1932, contains the resolution (Quezon MSS). The New York Herald Tribune reported the whole political situation in Manila, 12 30, 1932.Google Scholar

23 Quezon to Amando Avanceña, telegram in Spanish, Dec. 30, 1932 (Quezon MSS).

24 Congressional Record, 72:2, 1768–9, 1924–1925.Google Scholar

25 Evidence of the anti-H-H-C fund is found in a carbon copy of a letter to Alunan from Benito Razon, on behalf of the entrepreneur-financier, Andres Soriano, Apr. 22, 1933, in Spanish. The situation among the planters is described in a letter in Spanish to Quezon by Amando Avanceña, Feb. 6, 1933 (Quezon MSS). Quezon's informant on sugar labor was Jose Nava, president of the Workers' Federation of the Philippines (Kattlingban Sa Mamumugon Sa Pilipinas). Nava claimed one hundred thousand union members—probably a great exaggeration—in forty locals scattered through eight provinces of Mindanao and the Visayas.

26 Quezon from Iloilo to Alunan in Manila, Feb. 6, 1933, in Spanish (Quezon MSS).

27 Nava letter to Quezon, in Spanish, Mar. 17, 1933 (Quezon MSS).

28 “The Mixed Mission: Statement of Amando Avanceña,” Mar. 23, 1933, in English (Quezon MSS).

29 Quezon from New York to Alunan in Manila, Apr. 29, 1933, in English (Quezon MSS). Quezon's tiff with the American senators is described in the Philippines Free Press, 06 17, 1933.Google Scholar

30 Philippines Free Press, Philippines Herald, Manila Tribune, 06–07, 1933Google Scholar, passim.

31 As of 1937, capital invested in Luzon mills was P49,499,988, and in the Visayas P120,501,391. Philippine Sugar Year Book, 1950, pp. 100, 102.Google Scholar

32 Of several sources concerning the dispositions of centralistas during the anti-pro fight, my chief informant was Don Felipe Buecamino Jr., in an interview at Bontolok, Dingalan Bay, June 28, 1958.

33 Buencamino, ibid.

34 Diario de Sessiones, 07 20–31, 1933Google Scholar, passim; Philippines Free Press, 07 29, 08 5, 1933Google Scholar; War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, historical memoranda 364–961 and 3427-a-w-46.

35 Vicente Bunuan, in an interview with the author, Manila, Jan. 19, 1958. At the time of the crisis, Bunuan was Director of the Philippine Press Bureau in Washington. He later became assistant to Rafael Alunan, Chief of the Philippine Sugar Administration, formed in 1935. After the war, he succeeded Alunan.

36 The final vote in the Senate, taken early in the morning of Oct. 7, 1933, in a continuation of the session of Oct. 6, was 15 for rejection, 4 for acceptance, 5 absent or abstaining. The key phrase of the resolution, later affirmed by the House, had that body “declining to accept” the act. Diario de Sessiones, Oct. 6, 1933, 698–699.

37 The course of these negotiations may be traced in the “sugar” files of the Bureau of Insular Affairs for 1933; in the correspondence and cables among Hawes, Alunan, and the Philippine Sugar Association, July–Sept., 1933, Quezon MSS; in the Franklin D. Roosevelt papers at Hyde Park, N. Y., material accessible through index names “sugar,” “Philippines,” and “Hawes.”

38 Quezon's preparations for the trip and his dealings with President Roosevelt and Senator Tydings are documented in the Quezon MSS, Nov. 1933–Mar. 1934; Roosevelt MSS, Jan.–Feb., 1933; Senate files 73A–F25, 125–6, Legislative Section, National Archives, containing papers pertinent to the Philippines deposited by Tydings.

39 Tables of quotas proposed at various stages of the national sugar crisis are available in Dalton, , pp. 102, 103.Google Scholar

40 Murphy to Secretary of War, radiogram, Mar. 13, 1934; forwarded to the President, Mar. 14, 1934. Roosevelt MSS.

41 The gist of a confidential memorandum from Ambassador Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt, Aug. 20, 1933, is that unless the American government bolstered Cuban finance and facilitated more sugar imports, “chaos” would result, and stable government would become impossible. The administration acted accordingly. Roosevelt MSS.

The Philippines, by contrast, suffered only one bad year, in 1935, when the full effects of sugar restriction were first felt, and the composite index of business conditions fell to 78. The next year, however, it rose to 96, taking the years 1924–28 as a norm of 100. (The Philippine Statistical Review, III, 1936, 261Google Scholar) With this and the post-war privileges afforded Philippine sugar exports both in mind, Kirk's conclusions (Philippine Independence, pp. 208–210Google Scholar) appear exaggerated and alarmist. Kirk's conclusions might also have been modified had he understood the quota race and compared the Philippine sugar industry more carefully with other insular producers.

42 Amando Avanceña reiterated this point in a letter to Quezon, Oct. 20, 1933, in Spanish (Quezon MSS).

43 From the crop year 1931–32 through the record year 1933–34, Luzon mills increased their production 112.8%, and Negros mills only 61.5%. Calculation based on data in Philippine Sugar year Book, 1950, pp. 104, 106.Google Scholar

44 This anecdote was told me by Alfonso Ponce Enrile in an interview, Manila, Aug. 27, 1958.

45 Act 4166 was drafted by E. D. Hester, Edward Kemp, and Jose Yulo. Yulo, a former law partner of Buencamino, was then becoming a political protégé of Quezon; he later ran for president as the Liberal candidate in 1957, unsuccessfully. Kemp was legal advisor to the governor-general, and Hester was economic advisor. The latter was long a key figure in sugar questions. Frank Murphy, Democrat and liberal Catholic, put Hester on his staff despite the latter's warning that, “I was a very black Republican, a Philippine retentionist, a Protestant, a mason, socially a boor, sociologically a Bourbon, with just a slight touch of liberalism acquired from you [Theodore Roosevelt Jr., Murphy's predecessor].” Hester to Roosevelt, Sept. 8, 1936, T. Roosevelt Jr. papers, Library of Congress.

46 The figures upon which the foregoing remarks are based come from Dalton, p. 239.

47 One illiterate family in Pampanga, members of the colorum society, would not accept a benefit payment because “God made the ground to grow cane.” They would obey restriction “because the Government seemed more powerful than God,” but to accept money for such obedience would be “blasphemy.” Hester to T. Roosevelt Jr., Sept. 8, 1936.

48 Concerning the sugar bloc during and after the election campaign of 1961: Wurfel, David, “The Philippine Elections: Support for Democracy,” Asian Survey, 05, 1962, pp. 25–37Google Scholar; Starner, Frances, “Philippine Economic Development and the Two-Party System,”Google Scholaribid., July, 1962, pp. 17–23.

49 Sayre, Francis B., Glad Adventure (New York, 1957), p. 195Google Scholar. Sayre was High Commissioner to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, 1939–1942.