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The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Arif Dirlik
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On February 19, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek inaugurated the New Life Movement in Nanchang, Kiangsi, with the express goal of “revolutionizing” Chinese life. The Kuomintang leadership, holding the material and spiritual “degeneration” of the people responsible for China's continued crisis, decided at this time to launch a movement for hygienic and behavioral reform to revitalize the country. The movement was to signal the start of a new phase of Chinese history, one that was to be both conserving and revolutionary in spirit. It would achieve the most fundamental goals of the Chinese revolution without sacrificing native traditions. Nevertheless, the stress on the revival of native morality was the most striking aspect of the movement with its historical context, and endowed it with an aura of conservatism that overshadowed its revolutionary claims and has dominated its image since then. This image is somewhat misleading in its implication that the New Life Movement was the expression of a traditionalist upsurge in the Kuomintang during the Nanking Decade (1928–1937). The present study attempts a close analysis of New Life ideology—used here in the sense of a world view that underlay conceptions of politics and society—to demonstrate that the conservatism and the revolutionary claims of the New Life Movement must be taken equally seriously. The movement was conservative, but conservative in a very specific sense: far from being a reaffirmation of traditional Chinese political conceptions, it was fashioned by and in response to the twentieth-century Chinese revolution. Its underlying spirit had greater affinity with modern counterrevolutionary movements than with political attitudes inherited from China's past. It was, in short, not a traditional but a modern response to a modern problem.

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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , August 1975 , pp. 945 - 980
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Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1975

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References

The author expresses his appreciation to his colleague Bernard S. Silberman for the many discussions which clarified the issues involved in this study. Charles Bergquist and Peter Burian, also of Duke University, were generous with their stylistic and other comments. Finally, I thank two fine librarians, John T. Ma and Lawrence Chen, their help with sources. I bear sole responsibility for the views expressed in this essay.

1 Walter Hanming Chen, “The New Life Movement,” Information Bulletin, Council of International Relations, 11.11:189–230 (Nanking, 31 December 1936), 189.

2 Chiang Kai-shek, “Hsin sheng-huo yun-tung liang chou-nien chi-nien chih kan-hsiang,” in Minkuo erh-shih-szu nien ch'itan kuo Hsin sheng-huo yun-tung (hereafter Mkessnckhshyt) (Hsin sheng-huo yun-tung ts'u-chin tsung-hui, 1936), 815.

3 Chen, “The New Life Movement,” loc. cit.

4 Chu, Samuel C., “The New Life Movement, 1934–1937” in Lane, J. E. (ed.), Researches in the Social Sciences on China (New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute Series No. 3, 1957). 1Google Scholar.

5 Wright, Mary C., The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (New York: Atheneum, 1966), 304Google Scholar.

6 For an account of Kuomintang relations with the intelligentsia in this period, see Israel, John, Student Nationalism in China, 1927–1937 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1966)Google Scholar. Students and youth were among the foremost concerns of the New Life Movement. For a number of views expressing concern over the attitudes of youth at this time, see Pei Ching-hua (ed.), Hsin sheng-huo lun-ts'ung (hereafter HSHLT) (Shanghai, 1936), Part II, 28–117.

7 Organski, A. F. K., “Fascism and Modernization” in Woolf, S. J. (ed.), The Nature of Fascism (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 31Google Scholar.

8 For Mme. Chiang's increasing control, see Chu, “The New Life Movement,” 9. Shepherd's activities in the New Life Movement are treated extensively in Thomson, James C. Jr., While China Faced West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969)Google Scholar. Contemporary observers noted the changes in the movement in 1936. An American diplomatic dispatch of 1937 noted the existence of a division at the upper levels of the leadership: “Thus the battle is drawn [within the NLM] between the Anglo-American Christian democrats and the German-Italian totalitarians.” (Johnson to State, 21 May 1937. State Department 893.00/14127, enc. 2, pp. 12–13) [I am grateful to Prof. L. Eastman for calling my attention to this reference]. Chiang himself extended an invitation to Christian organizations (including the YMCA) to form New Life service groups and to promote the movement in their congregations in September 1936. Other evidence is provided by the Chinese Recorder, which initially paid little attention to the movement and was even critical of its militarism but adopted a much more positive attitude toward it after Shepherd's appointment. The May 1937 issue of the journal was practically devoted to the NLM, giving it enthusiastic endorsement. In it, Mme. Chiang noted a change in her husband's personal attitude toward the movement: “Since his return from Sian, the generalissimo has been giving more and more time to the development of character through the New Life Movement.” Vol. 68, No. 5, p. 280.

9 Sheridan, James E., Chinese Warlord: the Career of Feng Yu-hsiang (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966)Google Scholar notes that in September 1927, Feng launched his own New Life Movement, which bore striking resemblances to the movement under the Kuomintang. One enthusiastic supporter of the movement in 1934 went so far as to suggest that the present movement should be led by Feng. See Paul K. Whang, “Let Marshal Feng Yu-shiang [sic] Lead the New Life Movement,” The China Weekly Review, 68.5:172–173 (31 March 1934).

10 “Chiang Kai-shek Uses Better Anti-Red Tactics,” The China Weekly Review, 68.8:28–281 (21 April 1934). Chiang himself often noted, in his New Life Movement speeches, the insufficiency of reliance on military force alone and the need to educate the people. See, “Hsin sheng-huo yun-tung chih yao-i,” (hereafter “yao-i”), in Pei Ching-hua, HSHLT, 8. In Kiangsi, the government employed the “Special Movement Corps” (Pieh Tung Tui), recruited from among young officers, to conduct welfare activities among the peasants. See Mme Chiang Kai-shek, “China's ‘New Life’ Movement,” in General Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communist Crisis (Shanghai, 1936?).

11 Chiang, “yao-i,” Pei, I, 1.

12 Chen, “The New Life Movement,” 191–192.

13 Min-kuo erh-shih-san nien Hsin sheng-huo yiin-tung tsung pao-kao, (Hereafter pao-kao) (Nan-chang: Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung tśu-chin tsung-hui, 1935), 114.

14 Chen, “The New Life Movement,” 199.

15 Ibid., 200. MKESSNCKHSHYT gives information on personnel in eighteen provinces, four municipal centers, twelve railway centers, and ten overseas communities. See 553–576.

16 pao-kao, 114.

17 The leadership considered these goals achieved by the end of 1934 and expanded the goals of the movement to include “militarization, productivization, and aestheticization” for the second year. See pao-kao, 483–84.

18 See Chu, “The New Life Movement,” 13, for some of these activities.

19 Chen, “The New Life Movement,” 195. This piece, written for a foreign audience, exaggerates the achievements of the movement. The leadership itself expressed great disappointment in the movement in its addresses to native audiences. See below.

20 Ibid., 219. Chen describes the movement here as follows: “The New Life Movement is a movement of the people, for the people and by the people.” Mme. Chiang was one of the major proponents of this view. See her “'New Life' Broadcast to U. S. A.,” in General Chiang Kai-shek., op. cit., 84–86.

21 Chen, “The New Life Movement,” 204–205.

22 pao-kao, 290–362.

23 Ibid., 118–119.

24 Ibid., 121.

25 Ibid., 139.

20 Article 3 of the “Outline of New Life Movement Organization in Provinces and Municipalities” (Ko sheng shift Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung ts'u-chin hui tsu-chih ta-kang), ibid., 140.

27 Ibid., chart between pp. 244 and 245.

28 Chu, “The New Life Movement,” 7.

29 Chen, “The New Life Movement,” 209.

30 Mkessnckhshyt, op. cit., 773. This was also evident in the establishment of the “People's Economic Reconstruction Movement” in April 1935 (Chu, 14) and the recruitment of the veteran social reformer missionary, George W. Shepherd, as an advisor for the movement later in the year. For Shepherd's activities, see Thomson, op. at., chap. 8.

31 Chu, “The New Life Movement,” 8.

32 pao-kao, 234.

33 Chiang Chung-cheng, “Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung liang chou-nien chi-nien chih kan-hsiang,” in Mkessnckhshyt, 815, tr. in Chu, 9.

34 Peck, Graham, Two Kinds of Time (Boston, 1967), 96Google Scholar.

35 Chu, “The New Life Movement,” I.

36 Chu, “The New Life Movement,” 13–14.

37 Chiang, “yao-i,” Pei, I, 5.

38 Chiang, “Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung chih i-i ho, mu-ti,” Pei, I, 22–23.

39 Ibid., 23–24.

40 Lei Yü-t'ien, “Wang kuo sheng-huo ti ch'ing-suan,” Pei, I, 80–86.

41 Wang Ching-wei, “Hsin sheng-huo ti chen i,” Pei, I, 48–49.

42 Chiang, “yao-i,” Pei, I, 5.

43 Chiang, “Outline,” in Chen, 224.

44 Ibid., 227.

45 pao-kao, 121.

46 Ibid., 137–138.

47 Tz'u Shih-ch'eng, Hsin sheng-huo yü chiu she-hui (hereafter, chiu she-hui) (Nanking, 1935), 75.

48 Chiang, “yao-i,” Pei, I, 13.

49 Chiang, “Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung chih chen i,” in Chiang, Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung (hereafter, HSHYT) (Nanking, 1935), 59 and 66.

50 Tz'u, chin she-hut, 75.

51 Chiang, “Outline,” in Pei, I, 112. This was omitted in Mme. Chiang's translation in Chen.

52 Chiang, “yao-i,” Pei, I, 6.

53 For an example see Liu Yung-yao, “Hsinsheng-huo yün-tung ti shih-tai shih-ming,” in Pei, I, 52–60.

54 Chiang, “Outline,” in Chen, 225.

55 Ibid., 229.

56 Tz'u, chin she-hui, 50. For an extensive treatmerit of the importance of physical reform, see Liu Jui-heng, Hsin sheng-huo yü chien-k'ang (Nan-king, 1934).

57 Editor's preface to the series Hsin sheng-huo ts'ung-shu.

58 Chiang, “Li-hsing Hsin sheng-huo,” in Pei, I, 18.

59 Wang Ching-wei, “Hsin sheng-huo yü min-tsu fu-hsing,” in collection of same title, op. cit. Also, Tz'u, chiu she-hui, op. cit., 59.

60 Wang Ching-wei, “Hsin sheng-huo ti chen i,” in Pei, I, 47.

61 pao-kao, 242.

62 See remarks to this effect by Hu Shih cited in Liu Shen-tung, Hsin sheng-huo yü kuo-min chingchi (Nanking, 1935), 57–60.

63 Chang Yüan-jo, Hsin sheng-huo yü cheng-chih hai-ko (Nanking, 1934), 45.

64 Li Hao-yü, “Hsien-tai Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien ti sheng-huo t'ai-tu,” in Pei, II, 35. Also see Shen Chao-ying, “Hsien-tai ch'ing-nien sheng-huo ti kai-tsao wen-t'i,” in ibid., 69.

65 Chiang, “Outline,” in Chen, 223–224.

66 Wang, “Hsin sheng-huo ti cheni,” Pei, I, 52.

70 Ch'en Li-fu, Hsin sheng-huo yü wei-sheng shih-kjuan (Nanking, 1934), 1–2. Also see, Ho Chung-han, “Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung chih i-i,”. Pei, I, 35.

68 Editor's preface to Hsin sheng-huo ts'ung-shu.

69 Shen Chieh-jen, Ko kuo ch'ing-nien hsün-lien yü. Hsin sheng-huo yü-tung (Nanking, 1935), 90–96.

70 Chiang, “yao-i,” Pei, I, 5–6.

71 Chiang, “Hsin sheng-huo ti i-i ho mu-ti,” Pei, I, 25.

72 Peck, loc. cit.

73 Cited in Tz'u, chiu she-hui, op. cit., 78. Also see Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (New York, 1966), 310–311, on this question.

74 Ibid., 305.

75 P'an Kung-chan, Hsüeh-sheng ti Hsin shenghuo (Nanking, 1935) 14; and Liu, Hsin shenghuo yü kuo-min ching-chi, op. cit., 46.

76 See note 43 above for an example of this common charge.

77 Ch'en Chien-yu, Hsin sheng-huo yü hsin-li chien-she (Nanking, 1935), 1–2.

78 Chang, Hsin sheng-huo yü cheng-chih kai-ko, op. cit., 39.

79 Tz'u, chin she-hui, op. cit., 9; and Chang, Hsin sheng-huo yü cheng-chih kai-ko, op. cit., 14. Many insisted on right and wrong, rather dian old and new, as the proper distinction. This, I think, was als o the basis of Chiang's frequent references to “civilization” and “barbarism.”

80 Chang, Hsin sheng-huo yü cheng-chih kai-ko, op. cit., 39.

81 This still leaves, of course, the question of what “minimum” implies. Robert Kann, in his The Problem of Restoration (Berkeley, 1968), defines restoration as “the reestablishment of a state of political and social affairs that was upset by previous revolutionary change” (3). In order for restoration to be successful, however, the restored system must incorporate some of the changes brought in by revolution. He nevertheless refuses to commit himself to the question of how much change the restored system can tolerate and still remain as a restoration, suggesting that the answer must be “pragmatic.” If any one aspect is essential, it is “legal continuity” with the pre-revolutionary system (97). He rules out dictatorships that make instrumental use of the past as genuine restorations.

In the case of the Kuomintang, it is clear that it did not seek continuity with imperial institutions or values. If anything was being restored, it was the values of the ancient past. In many ways, imperial institutions and values were regarded as perversions of those values. The Chinese term fu-ku, literally “reverting to the old,” does include going back to the past, bypassing an intervening period no matter how long. This is different than Kann's more specific use of the term “restoration.” But even then, the Kuomintang usage, unlike that of conservative Confucians in imperial China, did not imply the revival of the institutions of ancient China, and not even of the values, as they themselves were quick to point out.

82 Chiang, “Outline,” in Chen, 223.

83 Hsiao Yu-mei, i n his Yin-yüeh-che ti Hsin sheng-huo (Nanking, 1935), rejected the past altogether, noting that the price of preserving the past was becoming the laughing stock of all (91–92).

84 T'ang Hsüeh-yung, Hsin sheng-huo yü li-yüeh (Nanking, 1934), 68.

85 Chiang repeated this constantly. In one speech, he noted poignantly, “Foreigners are men, so are we; we can surely do what the foreigners are capable of doing….” See “Hsin sheng-huo yün tung chih chen i,” in Chiang, Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung, op. cit., 69.

86 Wang Ching-wei, “'Mo-teng' ying tso ‘hsientai’ chieh,” in Hsin sheng-huo yü min-tsu fu-hsing, op. cit., 53–57.

87 One author, noting the necessity of modernization, went on to say: “The party and national leaders wh o advocate the New Life Movement have also perceived this; therefore, they do not advocate the revival (hui-fu) of all the old teachings (li chiao) or the old system but only stress the li, i, lien, ch'ih, which are the basis of human life. They do not advocate that we imitate in toto the lives of Europeans and Americans but only instruct us to find out about their basic morality (chi-pen tao-te) such as preservation of order, love of cleanliness, emphasis on group and feeling of responsibility.” Ch'en Heng-che, Hsin sheng-huo yü fu-nü chieh-fang (Nanking, 1934), 8.

88 Chiang, “Outline,” in Chen, 223.

89 Tsou Shu-wen, Hsin sheng-huo yü hsiang-ts'un chien-she (Nanking, 1934), 66.

90 Ch'en, Hsin sheng-huo yü hsin-li chien-she, op. cit., 50.

91 Chang, Hsin sheng-huo yü cheng-chih kai-ko, op. cit., 14.

92 To my knowledge, this issue was not even brought up by New Life writers. Only one author, trying to identify the basis of Chinese social organization, goes through a number of early works and thinkers to discover a common principle, which, it goes without saying, he succeeds in doing. See Tz'u, chin she-hui, 17–22.

93 The importance of the “four virtues” (ssu-wei) o t political order is stated in the first paragraph of the first chapter of the Kuan Tzu, appropriately entitled “On Shepherding the People.” The statement here was a subject of conflict among the critics and defenders of the New Life Movement. Kuan Tzu says that only if the state takes care of the people's welfare and carries out its duties can the people practise the four virtues. On the other hand, if the four virtues are not practiced, the state will perish. Critics noted that Kuomintang ideologues completely overlooked the first part, the condition of the practice of the virtues. The defenders, on the other hand, claimed that such critics “misunderstood” the passage. See Chang, Hsin sheng-huo yü cheng-chih kai-ko, op. cit., 95. For the Kuan Tzu, sec Maverick, Lewis, Economic Dialogues in Ancient China: Selections from the Kuan Tzu (New Haven, 1954)Google Scholar.

94 Ibid., Introduction. For the ambiguities of the Kuan Tzu and also for its Legalist components, also see preface and introduction in Rickett, W. Allyn, (tr.) Kuan Tzu (Hong Kong, 1965)Google Scholar.

95 Wright, op. cit., 307. This is not to suggest that the “Chineseness” of the four principles played no part in New Life thought. But to see them merely as the result of a “romantic” commitment to the past is to completely overlook their political connotation.

96 Chiang, “Outline,” in Chen, 226–227.

97 Ch'en Li-fu, op. cit., 58–59.

98 Ibid., 59–61.

99 Chiang, “Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung chih chung-hsin chün-ts'e,” in Chiang HSHYT, 72.

100 Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. by D. Bodde (New York, 1966), 42.

101 This was stressed by Hsün Tzu in particular. For the importance of the li in Hsün Tzu, see Chai, C. and Chai, W., The Humanist Way in Ancient China: Essential Works of Confucianism (New York, 1965), 241–254Google Scholar.

102 Schwartz, Benjamin, “Some Polarities in Confucian Thought,” in Nivison, D. S. & Wright, A. F. (eds), Confucianism in Action (Stanford, 1959), 54–58Google Scholar.

103 Chiang, “Hsin sheng-huo yün tung chih chung-hsin chün-ts'e,” in HSHYT, 73–74.

104 This résumé of Confucian political attitudes would not apply equally to all Confucians. The aspects stressed here are those characteristic of the Mencian interpretation of Confucius' political philos- ophy.

105 Creel, H. G., Chinese Thought: From Conjucitis to Mao Tse-tung (New York, 1960), 125–131Google Scholar. It is difficult to agree with Prof. Creel's description of the Legalists as “totalitarian,” except in a very broad sense of that term. Modern totalitarianism, I think, has a conception of the relationship between society and politics that the Legalists did not, and could not, have. For this distinction, see below.

106 See, for example, Teng Hsüeh-ping, “Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung chih fa-tung chi ch'i chin-hsing,” in Pei, I, 63.

107 Chiang, “Hsin sheng-huo yüün-tung chih chung-hsin chün-ts'c,” in HSHYT, 80.

108 Tai Chi-t'ao, Sun Wen chu-i chih che-hsueh ti chi-ch'u (Canton, 1925), 47–49. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, whose many concerns foreshadowed much of the political debate in twentieth century China, also blamed Taoism for China' s weakness, although in his case the emphasis was on the passivity Taoism had engendered in Chinese society. See Hao, Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890–1907 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), esp. 87–89Google Scholar.

100 Tz'u, chiu she-hui, op. cit., 30–37.

110 Wang Ching-wei, “Hsin sheng-huo ti chen i,” in Pei, I, 51.

111 Ta Hsüeh, in Chai and Chai, op. cit., “The Eight Ethical-Political Items, “295.

112 Chiang, “Li-hsing Hsin sheng-huo,” in Pei, I, 20–21.

113 T'ang, Hsin sheng-huo yü li yüeh, op. cit., 3.

114 Chiang, “yao-i,” in Pei, I, 2. The original of this statement was in the Analects, No. 12:19: “The virtue of the gentleman may be compared to the wind and that of the commoner to the weeds. The weeds under the force of the wind cannot but bend.” Wm. Theodore de Bary (ed.), Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York, 1964), 33.

115 Liu, Hsin sheng-huo yü kuo-min ching-chi, op. cit., 56–57; and Fan Yüan-sheng, Nung-min ti Hsin sheng-huo (Nanking, 1934), 55–57.

116 Ch'en Li-fu, op. at., 22–23. Also, pao-kao, 118–119.

117 “If our everyday lives are thoroughly trained and methodically organized, there will be no motion not corresponding to rules, just like the operation of a machine,” quoted in Ch'en, Hsin sheng-huo yü hsin-li chien-she, op. cit., 24.

118 T'ang, Hsin sheng-huo yü li yüeh, op. cit., 16–17.

119 The metaphor of the machine and the idea of efficiency were also important among the advocates of organization as the solution to political problems in Europe. The aim of efficiency was “to create a special environment which will induce the individual to make the best decision—and ‘best’ in this context, means a decision most helpful to the needs and ends of the organization.” S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston, 1960), 410.

120 It is quite possible, as Lloyd Eastman suggests, that the Blue Shirt Organization provided the paradigm for the New Life Movement initially, The Blue Shirts, in their active commitment to national and organizational goals, were but a military organization operating with maximum and conscious efficiency. For the relationship between the Blue Shirts and the NLM, spiritual and organizational, see Eastman, “Fascism in Kuomintang China: the Blue Shirts,” The China Quarterly, No. 49 (January-March 1972), pp. 1–31.

121 Chiang, “Outline,” in Chen, 229–230.

122 Chiang, “Hsin sheng-huo ti i-i ho mu-ti,” in Pei, I, 27.

123 Chu P'ei-te, Chün-kuan ti Hsin sheng-huo (Nanking, 1934), 6–11.

124 Chu, “The New Life Movement,” 8.

125 Chiang, “Hsin sheng-huo ti i-i ho mu-ti,” in Pei, I, 31–33.

126 Ibid., 26. The New Life conception of politics was informed by what Michael Walzer has called the “military view of the political world.” See The Revolution of the Saints (New York: Atheneum, 1973), 277. As in the case of the protestant radicals, the primacy given by New Life ideology to the extensive organization of society implicit in the “military view” derived ultimately from the rejection of the naturalness of political order and a simultaneous, and related, commitment to reform, (ibid., 4–11). In this fundamental sense, New Life ideology parted ways with traditional Chinese political conceptions, and justified its claims to being revolutionary, even though in its case it was the nation-state rather than a transcendental God that provided the authority for political action. The analogy, however, must not be carried too far. What was conspicuously absent in New Life ideology was the notion of systemic change: a “Utopian,” in Mannheim's sense, challenge to the existing order. (Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, New York: Harvest Books, 192–204) The nation-state, hypostatized, could have sanctioned the transformation of the socio-political structure. The Kuomintang, while it employed the nation-state as the source of its legitimacy, identified it with the existing order. As a result, its claims to revolution devolved into mere justification for the defense of the status quo and the intensification of its control over society. Even its vision of political reorganization on the military model was used to strengthen the existing order, not to replace it with another, The goal of the movement was to suppress revolution and bolster the status quo of which the Kuo-mintang was an inextricable component. Its vision, though it had revolutionary implications, did not offer the potential for revolutionary action that Walzer ascribes to radical protestant ideology but did serve the cause of counterrevolution.

127 Chiang, “yao-i,” in Pei, I, 4.

128 Shen, Ko k.uo ch'ing-nien hsün-lien yü Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung, op. cit.

129 Yü Wen-wei, “Hsin sheng-huo yün-tung,” in Pei, I, 72–74. This is a frequently encountered claim. Many NLM writers regarded the movement as the latest stage in China's modernization, rather than as one that would counteract earlier changes. The claim was based on this movement being more fundamental than all the others, as it aimed to change people's very lives. Sec Ch'en, Hsin sheng-huo yü ju-nü chieh-jang, op. cit,, 8.

130 Quoted in Donald Munro, “The Malleability of Man in Chinese Marxism,” The China Quarterly, No. 48 (October-December 1971), 609–640, 611. Mao's relevant ideas are most cogently expressed in the essay “On Practice” and in its 1963 supplement, “Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?”

131 Thomson, passim.

132 This has been documented extensively by now. See, for instance, Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972). Johnson, Chalmers A., in his Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford, 1967)Google Scholar, also provides impressive evidence of Communist responsiveness to the needs of the rural population. Although these authors differ considerably in their premises of the conditions of peasant mobilization, they both provide a sharp contrast between the Communist ability and the Kuomintang inability to deal with the problems of rural China.

133 Criticisms of the movement were extremely rare. Few at the time dared to criticize the movement openly. Hu Shih was one of the most outspoken critics. Chu, “The New Life Movement,” 10. For this particular criticism, see Chang, Hsin sheng-huo yu cheng-chih kai-ko, 18, 19.

134 Hu Shih, “Hsin sheng-huo,” in Pei, II, 3–4.

135 Hu Shih, “Fei ko-jen-chu-i ti Hsin sheng-huo, “in ibid., 13–14.

136 Referred to in Fan, Nung-min ti Hsin sheng-huo, op. cit., 20–24.

137 Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang in Wang Ching-wei, Hsin sheng-huo yu min-tsu ju-hsing, op. cit., 17–19.

138 Liu, Hsin sheng-huo yu kuo-min ching-chi, op. cit., 58–60.

139 Chu, “The New Life Movement,” 14.

140 Eastman, op. cit.