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German Mediation in the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–38

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

James T. C. Liu
James T. C. Liu
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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When the marco polo bridge incident occurred near peiping on july 7, 1937, japan was not prepared to launch a long-term war with china. on the contrary, she was hopeful that a little military pressure would result in a local settlement providing for North China autonomy and economic co-operation with Japan, which she had been demanding for several years. When the incident developed into a fullscale war toward the end of July, she declared that her army was only punishing the anti-Japanese 29th Army and particularly its 37th Division. Even after the war spread to Shanghai in August, Japan still insisted that the military operations were undertaken with the limited purpose of urging the Chinese National government to reconsider and to correct its attitude toward Japan. Although these were absurd explanations, they did reflect to a certain extent the true intention of the Japanese government. On the one hand, a war with China would not be favorably received by the Japanese people. Financial, circles stressed that only a general settlement with China would bring economic prosperity to Japan. Even the General Staff, which had Russia in mind, advised against it. On the other hand, however, the young officers in the army, with War Minister Sugiyama as their leader, advocated war, at least a limited one. They felt that the rising nationalism and the growing unification of China must be checked before China would accept Japanese leadership.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , February 1949 , pp. 157 - 171
Copyright
Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1949

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References

1 Fumimaro, Prince KonoyeWahei e no doryoku (Efforts toward peace) (Tokyo, 1946), 5–15. [The character wa should precede hei in the title; see Kenkyusha (1942), 2122.]Google Scholar

2 International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, Record of proceedings (hereafter referred to as Record), exhibit 486-A: 5,980. This group of documents was captured by the U.S. forces at Marburg. At about the same time and later Britain offered mediation. The United States also offered her good offices short of mediation on condition that both China and Japan ask for them. Both offers were declined because the Japanese army objected to any Anglo-Saxon mediation which it considered intervention (ibid., exh. 3620: 29,691-700).

3 The Chinese-Russian Non-Aggression Pact was not signed until August 21, 1937, after the fighting broke out in Shanghai.

4 The five provinces were Hopeh, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar, and Suiyuan, which Japan had wanted to be “autonomous” since 1935.

5 Record, exh. 486-A: 5,975-77.

6 Ibid., 5,977-78.

7 Ibid., exh. 270: 3,618-19. “Gist of talk by Sato Kenryo, Chief of Press Section, War Ministry, at the Extraordinary Conference of Police Chiefs, in August 1938.”

8 Ibid., exh. 486-B: 5,983. Report from Trautmann, German Ambassador to China, Jan. 13, 1938.

9 Ibid., 3,618, note 7.

10 Ibid., 5,983-84, note 8.

11 Ibid., exh. 486-B: 5,983; also Wang Ching-wei . Chüi-ko li , (For an example) (Shanghai, 1939), 3-4, which, in the absence of any conflicting government document, may be accepted as true, despite the fact that Wang was a traitor.

12 This refers to the demilitarized zone established by the Tangku Truce, May 1933, in eastern Hopeh, inside the great wall, where the puppet regime of the Eastern Hopeh Anti-Communist Autonomous Council was established in November 1935.

13 Established by the Shanghai Truce, May 15, 1932.

11 Wang, , 5–8.Google Scholar

15 Record, exh. 486-B: 5,984, note 8.

16 Ibid., 3,625, note 7.

17 Ibid., 3,619-20, note 7. Mitchell, Kate and Holland, W. L. (eds.), Problems of the Pacific 1939 (New York, 1940), 30Google Scholar, give a summary of Japanese peace terms in six points, which seem to be a combination of the first and second Japanese demands. Quigley, Harold S., Far Eastern war, 1937–1941 (Boston, 1942), 81Google Scholar, gives the same four points revealed here, based on Hirota's, address published in Contemporary Japan, 6 (1938), 785.Google Scholar

18 Record, exh. 486-B: 3,619-20, note 7.

19 Ibid., 3,626, note 7.

20 lbid., exh. 486-D, diplogerma from Berlin to Hankow, no. 5 signed by Mackensen, Jan. 5, 1938, but not read into the record.

21 Ibid., exh. 486-D: 5,994-95. Telegram from Dirksen to the German Foreign Office, Jan. 5, 1938.

22 Ibid., but not read into the record.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., exh. 486-F: 5,993-94. Telegram from Dirksen to German Foreign Office, Jan. 10, 1938.

25 lbid., exh. 486-D: 5,991-92. Office memorandum of Foreign Minister von Neurath, Jan. 10, 1938.

26 Ibid., 5,993-94, note 24.

27 Ibid., 3,619-21, note 7.

28 Ibid., 5,989.

29 Ibid., exh. 486-E: 5,989-90. Berlin to Trautmann, signed by Mackensen, Jan. 12, 1938.

30 Ibid., exh. 486-D: 5,995-96. Dirksen to Berlin, Jan. 11,1938.

31 Ibid., exh. 486-B: 5,983-85, note 8.

32 Ibid., exh. 2260: 16,223-24. MSS diary of Marquis Kido.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., exh. 486-C: 5,987-88. Dirksen to German Foreign Office.

35 Ibid., exh. 2260: 16,223-24. Kido's diary.

36 Ibid., exh. 486-B: 5,997-98.

37 Ibid., exh. 486-G: 5,999-6,000.

38 Ibid.