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East Timor Ten Years On: Legacies of Violence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2011

Geoffrey Robinson
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Extract

On August 30, 2009, East Timor's Prime Minister, the former resistance leader Xanana Gusmão, quietly authorized the release of a man directly implicated in one of the country's most notorious massacres. Maternus Bere, a commander of the pro-Indonesian Laksaur militia group, had been indicted for his role in the September 1999 killing of as many as 200 unarmed supporters of independence who had taken refuge in the Catholic Church in Suai. Of the 40 victims whose identities could be determined, three were priests, ten were under the age of 18, and more than a dozen were women. The Suai Church massacre was part of a shocking campaign of violence that followed a United Nations-organized referendum in which Timorese had voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 70 , Issue 4 , November 2011 , pp. 1007 - 1021
Copyright
Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 2011

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References

1 Since 2002 East Timor has also been known as Timor-Leste.

2 For reactions to Bere's release, see Tempo Semanal, September 10, September 25, and September 28, 2009. Available at: http://temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com/

3 There is, of course, debate about whether the massive violence of this period constitutes genocide as defined in the UN Genocide Convention. Nevertheless, a growing number of scholars and human rights professionals maintain that at least in the colloquial sense of the word, and arguably even by its strict legal definition, this was genocide. See Robinson, Geoffrey, ‘If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die’ – How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010, chapters 1 and 3Google Scholar.

4 Cited in Robinson, 2010, pp. 59–60.

5 The new CNRT (Congresso Nacional da Reconstrução de Timor – National Congress for the Reconstruction of Timor), established in 2007, is distinct from the original CNRT (Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense – National Council of Timorese Resistance) the broad nationalist alliance that led the final push for independence in the 1990s.

6 Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste. Geneva, October, 2006Google Scholar.

7 East Timor's police resumed overall responsibility on March 27, 2011. ICG, “Timor-Leste: Reconciliation and Return from Indonesia,” Asia Briefing No. 122, April 18, 2011, p. 8.

8 Per Memoriam Ad Spem: Final Report of the Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF), Denpasar, March 31, 2008. The report was made public on July 15, 2011Google Scholar.

9 ICG, Asia Briefing No. 122, p. 6.

10 For an account of these murders, see Robinson, Geoffrey, East Timor 1999: Crimes against Humanity. A Report Commissioned by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jakarta: Elsam and Hak, 2006, pp. 201–2Google Scholar.

11 While acknowledging that the transfer circumvented the law, Gusmão vehemently defended the move in Parliament, saying that it was in the “national interest” to place good relations with Indonesia ahead of due process. Likewise, in televised comments, Ramos-Horta said that “not all legal measures support the national interest.” ICG, Asia Briefing No. 122, p. 8.

12 See Tempo Semanal, August 30, September 3, September 6, September 25, and October 6, 2009.

13 ICG, Asia Briefing No. 122, p. 16.

14 See Tempo Semanal, September 3, 2009.

15 See Tempo Semanal, August 29, 2010.

16 The CAVR was established under UNTAET regulation 10/2001 (July 13, 2001). Its final report Chega! is available at http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm.

17 Cited in Robinson, 2010, p. 224.

18 In a recent article, a former UN official cited eight studies that had made that case since 2008, and drew the same conclusions. Rees, Edward, “Time for the UN to Withdraw From East Timor?” Atlantic, December 21, 2010Google Scholar.

19 These were: United Nations, Situation of Human Rights in East Timor, New York, December 1999Google Scholar; United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General, New York, January, 2000Google Scholar; KPP-HAM, Laporan Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur, Jakarta, January, 2000Google Scholar; United Nations Security Council, “Summary of the Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999,” New York, May 26, 2006; CAVR, Chega!; and Robinson, Geoffrey, East Timor 1999: Crimes Against Humanity, Jakarta, 2006Google Scholar.

20 Kofi Annan also argued at this time that before an international mechanism was set up, Indonesia should first be given an opportunity to hold perpetrators to account through its own judicial system. UN Secretary-General Briefing to the Security Council on Visit to Southeast Asia. New York, February 29, 2000Google Scholar.

21 Cohen, David, Intended to Fail: The Trials before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta, New York, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2003Google Scholar.

22 The Serious Crimes Investigation Unit or SCIT.

23 ICG, Asia Briefing No.122, p. 5.

24 Cited in Robinson, 2010, p. 224.

25 United Nations Security Council, “Summary of the Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts,” May 26, 2006, p. 6.

26 CAVR, Chega!; Geoffrey Robinson, East Timor 1999: Crimes Against Humanity.

27 Jakarta Globe, July 23, 2010