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British Intervention Against the Taiping Rebellion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
Extract
Practically all accounts of British intervention in support of the Manchu rulers of China against the Taiping rebellion present it as a calculated and deliberate change of policy by the British government which followed more or less immediately upon the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin and of the Convention of Peking at the end of 1860. Having forced extensive commercial and diplomatic concessions from the Manchu government by these treaties, so the usual argument runs, the Western powers in China, led by Great Britain, quickly set about helping this just-defeated enemy suppress a domestic rebellion which, in the view of many modern historians, offered a more hopeful and progressive alternative to the Chinese people than did the continuance of Manchu rule, but which was regarded as a threat to their interests by these powers.
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References
1 For examples see Eberhard, W., A History of China (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1950), pp. 311–312Google Scholar; Fitzgerald, C. P., China: A Short Cultural History (rev. ed., London: Cresset Press, 1950), pp. 574–576Google Scholar, 581–582; Leger, F., Les Influences Occidentales dans la Revolution de l'Orient (1830–1030) (Paris: Libraire Plan, 1955), I, 233–234Google Scholar, 239; Sheng, Hu, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), pp. 40–45Google Scholar; Erh-kang, Lo, T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-kao [A Draft History of the Taiping] (Peking: Chunghua Press, 1955), pp. 174–175Google Scholar; Meng-yuan, Jung, Chung-kuo chin pai nien ko-ming shih-lüeh [Outline History of Chinese Revolutions of the Last Century] (Peking; Hsin hua Press, 1954), p. 37Google Scholar.
2 Bruce to Malmesbury, February 5, 1859, in F.O. 17/312; Malmesbury to Bruce, March 1, 1859 (no. 5), in F.O. 17/311.
3 Elgin to Bruce, October 12, 1860, enclosed in Elgin to Russell, same date, in F.O. 17/331.
4 Elgin to Bruce, December 11, 1860, in Elgin Papers at Broomhall, Dumfermline, Scotland. I am indebted for this reference to Mr. J. Gerson of the Memorial University of Newfoundland, who was given access to this material by Lord Bruce in connection with his research on the career of H. N. Lay in China.
5 Bruce to Wade, January 16, 1861, enclosure 5 in Bruce to Russell, March 12, 1861, in F.O. 17/350.
6 Russell to Bruce, April 25, 1861, in F.O. 17/347.
7 The repulse of the first Taiping attempt to capture Shanghai, in August i860, by British and French forces may appear to be evidence against this argument. But this action did not become the starting point for a sustained policy of intervention in favour of the Manchus, as did a similar action in January 1862, and did not mark any decisive change in British policy (see Bruce to Russell, June 10, 1860, in B.P.P. 1861 (2754), Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859–60, esp. pp. 65–66).
8 Elgin to Hope, January 20, 1861, in B.P.P. 1861 (2840). Correspondence Relating to the Opening of the Yangtzekiang to Foreign Trade, pp. 1–3.
10 For the change in the official British attitude to Ward's force cf. Bruce to Russell, July 3, 1861, in B.P.P. 1862 (2976), pp. 60–61, where Bruce reported “with satisfaction,” bu t prematurely, its disbandment; and Russell to Bruce, August 8, 1861, in F.O. 17/349, where Russell stated that if the Emperor were to establish “an Imperial Legion of Foreigners” there was no reason to object to British subjects entering it. For assistance in preparing the defense of Ningpo see B.P.P. 1862 (2976), pp. 16, 46–50, 143.
11 Hope to Admiralty, December 7, 1861, in B.P.P. 1862 (2976), p. 82; also Bruce to Russell January 18, 1862, ibid. p. 143.
12 For Hope's report on his second visit to Nanking see ibid. pp. 97–104.
13 B.P.P. 1862 (2992) Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China, pp. 1–6.
14 Parkes to Hammond, November 23, 1861, in F.O. 17/360, with memos by Hammond and Palmerston attached.
15 B.P.P. 1862 (2976), p. 111.
16 For Hope's recommendation to Bruce of the need for action beyond the walls and his confidence that the home government would approve see B.P.P. 1862 (3058) Further Papers Relating to China, pp. 10, 38, and for Bruce's qualified support ibid. pp. 10–11, 20, 24–25. The consul at Shanghai, W. H. Medhurst, was a strong advocate of more extensive action, and urged it upon Hope and Bruce; see B.P.P. 1862 (2976), pp. 140–141, 151–153.
17 Foreign Office to War Office and Admiralty, May 6, 1862, in F.O. 17/382, and Russell to Bruce, July to, 1862, in F.O. 228/319. Just how far the F.O. was behind developments in China itself is well illustrated by the situation which developed at Ningpo after its capture by the rebels. On July 7, 1862, Russell was instructing Bruce that “Ningpo ought to be recovered by the Imperialists” (B.P.P. 1862 (3058), p. 26). A week or so later he learned that it had in fact been recaptured by British and French naval forces on May 10, and on July 22 he wrote approving the action taken. (B.P.P. 1863 (3104) Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China, p. 35). For details of the position at Ningpo see B.P.P. 1862 (3058), pp. 29–31, 36–40, 44–52.
18 Bruce to Russell, December 11, 1862, in F.O. 17/375; also B.P.P. 1864 (3295) Papers Relating to the Affairs of China, p. 162.
19 Lo, p. 175; Cahill, Holger, A Yankee Adventurer (N. Y.: Macaulay, 1930), p. 286Google Scholar.
20 The figures for the British military establishment are taken from the Monthly Returns of British Troops in China, listed in the Public Record Office as W.O.17. The volumes covering the years 1860–64 are numbered 1723–1727. The Proof Sheet in each return gives the total strength, while the details for the Shanghai district are taken from the Distribution Sheets. The naval figures are from Fox, Grace, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates (London, 1940), p. 195Google Scholar.
21 Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo (Hereafter IWSM): Hsien-feng (HF) 72. 10 a. For earlier memorials and edicts on the proposals see IWSM-HF. 69. 28b-32b; 70. 18b-20a; 71. 1a-4a, 9b-18b, 34b-37a; and esp. 72. 3a-8b in which Wade's warning that “if others lend aid what profit will there be in it for them if they do not occupy territory” is quoted (4a) as an argument against accepting direct foreign aid. For translations of several of these memorials see Swisher, Earl, China's Management of the American Barbarian (New Haven: Far Eastern Association Publications, 1953), pp. 683-98Google Scholar.
22 IWSM: Tung-ch'ih (TC), 4. 26b-27a.
23 IWSM-TC, 8. 42a-43b. Part of this memorial from Tseng Kuo-fan, who quotes the views of Tso Tsung-t'ang, is translated in Hail, W. J., Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taping Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927)Google Scholar.
24 IWSM-TC, 5. 55a.
25 For doubts on the reliability of foreign led troops note IWSM-TC, 10. 13a-15a, and for Li Hung-chsng's complaints against the Ever Victorious Army in particular IWSM-TC, 12. 53a-54b. On the fears of the Manchu government about forign intervention against the rebellion note also Wright, M. C., The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) pp. 214–219Google Scholar.
26 “With a view to the permanent improvement of our position in China, and the permanent security of our vast interests here, the object to be arrived at is the re-organization of the Executive of the Chinese, simultaneously with its recognition of our rights, so that it may be able to tranquillize the country, by making itself respected, and be able to give us that protection which by Treaty it is bound to give us in the exercise of our Tre3ty rights…. Our future position in China is involved in the success of the experiment.” (Bruce to Rear-Admiral Kuper, November 22, 1862, in B.P.P. 1863 (3104), pp. 146–147).
27 B.P.P. 1862 (3058), p. 9.
28 For Bruce's initial favourable reaction to the coup (“the most favourable incident that has hitherto taken place in the course of our relations with China”) see Bruce to Russell, November 12, 1861, in F.O. 17/356. In the House of Commons in March 1862, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Layard, claimed that “within a very short time a very great change had taken place” in the government at Peking, and used this to help justify the change in policy then developing (see British Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 165 (1862) col. 1812).
29 Bruce to Brig. Gen. Staveley, April 23, 1862, in B.P.P. 1862. (3058), p. 18.
30 “I cannot be a party, in any way, to the employment of these officers beyond the radius, either at Ningpo or Shanghae.” (Bruce to Maj. Gen. Brown, enclosed in Bruce to Russell, June 25, 1862, in F.O. 17/392). Bruce later supported Burgevine in the dispute which developed over the leadership of the Ever Victorious Army after Ward's death, and was greatly annoyed at the connivance of the British military authorities at Shanghai with Li Hung-chang in replacing Burgevine with regular British army officers. Russell, however, saw no reason to object (see B.P.P. 1864 (3295), pp. 69, 96, 156).
31 Bruce to Russell, October 29, 1863, in F.O. 17/394.
32 Bruce to Russell, February 23, 1862, in F.O. 17/370.
33 Russell to Bruce, July 7, 1862, in B.P.P. 1862 (3058), p. 26.
34 On the revocation of the Orders in Council note Palmerston's statement of March 4, 1864, in the House of Commons (B.P.D. vol. 173 (1864) col. 1473). Bruce was not informed of the government's intention, and complained of the manner in which it had been carried out. (Bruce to Russell, June 8, 1864, in F.O. 17/408).
35 Morse, H. B., The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London, 1910–1918), II, 65Google Scholar.
36 Eberhard, p. 311; also Levenson, J. R., Confucian China and its Modern Fate (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 147–149Google Scholar.
37 Lo, p. 160.
38 Wen-lan, Fan, Chung-huo chin-tai shih [Chinese Modern History] (Peking: Jenmin Press, 1951) p. 124Google Scholar; also Hsing-yao, Hsieh, T'ai-p'ing fien-kuo shih-shih lün-ts'ung [A Collection of Essays on Taiping History] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), p. 243Google Scholar.
39 Eberhard, p. 311; Hail, pp. 228–9.
40 From Medhurst's first report in F.O. 17/214, enclosed in Bowring to Clarendon, July 7, 1854.
41 T. F. Wade, Account of the Expedition to Han K'au (1859) (copy enclosed in Bruce to Russell, April 29, 1862, in F.O. 17/371); see also B.P.P. 1859 (Session 2) (2571), Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Mission to China and Japan 1859–60, pp. 447–51.
42 B.P.P. 1862 (2976), pp. 25–26.
43 ibid., p. 45, Parkes to Hammond, June 12, 1862.
44 B.P.P. 1862 (2992), p. 13.
45 The validity of Harvey's reports on the situation at Ningpo was several times challenged in parliament (B.P.D. Vol. 167, col. 1617; Vol. 70, col. 1786; Vol. 172, col. 318), and they were very critically analysed by Lindley, A. F., Ti-ping Tien-kwoh (London, 1866), II, 521–525Google Scholar.
46 Bruce to Russell, April 10, 1862, in B.P.P. 1862 (3058), p. 19.
47 B. P. P. 1862 (2976), pp. 52–53, 143.
48 Russell to Bruce, May 6, 1862, in F.O. 228/318.
49 Note Russell to Bruce, November 26, 1862, in B.P.P. 1863 (3104), p. 93: “Horrible as the proceedings of the Taepings are, murdering as they do men, women and children wherever they go, it is for the Imperial authorities and not for H.M.G. to protect the subjects of the Emperor from Taeping atrocities. You will be careful, therefore, to distinguish those cases in regard to which we have a right and obligation from those in which we have neither.”
50 This kind of explanation reaches its most extravagant form in Lo's argument (pp. 174–5) that the rising in India in 1857 was “without doubt an echo of the Taiping revolution,” and that the British government was alarmed for the security of its colonial possessions in Asia if the Taiping example spread. The only evidence I have seen of any alarm that events in China might set things moving elsewhere in Asia were some editorials in The Times (September 16, 17, October 22, 1859) fearful lest news of the British repulse at Taku “fly through China … [and] agitate all the bazaars in India, and penetrate even the ravines of Nepaul.” But the Taipings seem never to have been credited with such an influence. In any case, it is surely oversimple to assume that nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century was regarded as a threat to British imperial interests to the same degree as may be true for the mid-twentieth century. About 1860, Utilitarian-Benthamite views on empire and trade still predominated in British political and economic thought and, although the turn of the tide towards imperial protectionism was not far off, an optimistic belief in the existence of a natural world market was still almost axiomatic. The main threat to the free working of this market was not nationalism but mercantilism, which survived in the policies of autocratic, out-dated governments such as that of the Manchus in China. Popular movements of revolt against governments of this kind were to be encouraged rather than otherwise.
51 Cited in R. Temple, Men and Events of My Time in India (London, 1882) p. 220. Laing was the author of a pamphlet entitled England's Mission in the Far East (1863), in the last chapter of which he argued in favour of intervention against the Taipings only on the ground that they destroyed the conditions for trade in general, not that they threatened opium revenues in particular.
52 Jardine, Matheson Archive (University Library, Cambridge), Europe Letter Book Vol. 41 (1861–2), pp. 293–5. There is also some evidence to suggest that Dent and Co., another major opium trading firm, was hostile to the policy of intervention (see B.P.D. Vol. 172 (1863) col. 296 and the letter of Lord Naas to The Times, July 13, 1863).
53 Cited in R. Wardlaw Thompson, Griffith John (London, 1907), p. 137. For similar reports note B.P.P. 1862 (2976), pp. 26, 154, and Wolseley, G. J., Narrative of the War in China in 1860 (London, 1862), pp. 347–348Google Scholar.