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The Administrative and Fiscal Reforms of Liu Ming-ch'uan in Taiwan, 1884–1891: Foundation for Self-strengthening

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

William M. Speidel
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In 1871, aborigines in southern Taiwan killed fifty-four shipwrecked Ryukyuan fisherman. By 1874 this incident had grown into a major international crisis for the Ch'ing Court in Peking, because the Japanese had insisted on punishing the aborigines (through a military occupation of their territory) after the Chinese hesitated to do so. As a result of the negotiations with Japanese diplomats concerning this matter, the Court was made sharply aware of the need to intensify and extend the Chinese administration of Taiwan; to fail to do so would obviously tempt the Japanese and other foreigners to occupy and perhaps annex areas that were not governed or settled by the Chinese.

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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , May 1976 , pp. 441 - 459
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Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1976

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References

1 For details concerning these negotiations and gradual Chinese clarification of this issue, see Yen, Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China's Foreign Relalions (Hamden, Conn., 1965), pp. 212–305Google Scholar, and Gordon, Leonard H. D., “Taiwan and the Powers, 1840–1895,” Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History, ed. Gordon, Leonard H. D. (New York, 1970), pp. 103–10Google Scholar.

2 David Pong, “Modernization and Politics in China as Seen in the Career of Shen Pao-chen (1820–1879)” (University of London dissertation, 1969), pp. 295–317; Shih-ch'iang, Lü, Ting Jib-ch'ang yü tzu-cb'iang yün-tung [Ting Jih-ch'ang and China's Self-strengthening] (Taipei, 1972), pp. 282–320Google Scholar. Liu Ao is discussed further below.

3 Stimulating interpretations of Self-strengthening are Kennedy, Thomas L., “Self-strengthening: An Analysis Based on Some Recent Writings,” Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i. III, 1 (Nov 1974), pp. 3–35Google Scholar; and Liu, Kwang-ching, “Nineteenth Century China: The Disintegration of the Old Order and the Impact of the West,” China in Crisis, ed. Ho, Ping-ti and Tsou, Tang (Chicago, 1968), Volume I, Book 1, pp. 126–38Google Scholar.

4 This was one of the first railroads in China. About fifteen miles of his projected two-hundred-mile route were complete before Liu left Taiwan in 1891 and another forty-five miles were finished by 1893, after which Liu's successor, Shao Yu-lien, cancelled further construction. These sixty miles are significant; China had only 257 miles of track by 1895. Rosenbaum, Arthur L., “Chinese Railway Policy and the Response to Imperialism: The Peking- Mukden Railway, 1895–1911,” Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i, II, 1 (1969), p. 45Google Scholar.

5 See the useful article, Chu, Samuel C., “Liu Ming-ch'uan and Modernization of Taiwan,” Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, 1 (1963), pp. 37–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and William M. Speidel, “Liu Ming-ch'uan in Taiwan, 1884–1891” (Yale University dissertation, 1967).

It should be noted that although Liu—indebted to the ideas of Shen Pao-chen, Ting Jih-ch'ang, and Liu Ao—formulated the program of reform and innovation in Taiwan, he received direction and even prodding from the Court in Peking. For example, in 1884 Liu was ordered to look into the possibilities for reform and to build a telegraph system within Taiwan and to Fukien. Ta-Ch'ing Teb-tsung Ching (Kuang-hsü) huang-ti shih-lu [Veritable records of the Kuang-hsü reign] (Tokyo, 1937Google Scholar; Taipei reprint, 1964) (hereafter SL), ch. 191, 22a-b; ch. 193, 3b-4a.

6 Biographical material about Liu can be found in , Ch'ing-shih-kuan (comp.), Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan [Ch'ing dynasty biographies] (Shanghai, 1928Google Scholar; Taipei reprint, 1962), ch. 59,50a-52b; Hummel, Arthur, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644–1012) (Washington, 1943–1944), pp. 526–28Google Scholar; Yoshinori, Inō, Taiwan jumbu tōshite no Ryū Meiden [Liu Ming-ch'uan as the Governor of Taiwan] (Taihoku, 1905)Google Scholar (hereafter TJ); and Wen-hsien chuan-k'an, IV, pp. 1–2 (1953), a special issue on Liu of the journal now titled T'ai-wan wen-hsien.

7 The most serious friction, which led to defeat in battle for the government forces on one occasion, occurred as a result of rivalry between Liu and Pao Ch'ao (1828–1886) of the Hunan Army. See Teng, S. Y., The Nien Army and their Guerilla Warfare, 1851–1868 (Paris, 1961), p. 186Google Scholar.

8 As was customary, the title for the Ming troops (Ming-chun) was taken from their leader's name. His units were some of the best-trained and best-armed in the Empire. At one time Liu commanded about 14,000 troops. Liu, Kwang-ching, “Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The Emergence of a Policy, 1870–1875,” Approaches to Modern Chinese History, ed. Feuerwerker, A., Murphey, R., and Wright, M. C. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), p. 76Google Scholar. Erhmin, Wang, Huai-chün-chih [A history of the Huai Army] (Taipei, 1967)Google Scholar contains much information about the Ming troops.

9 For descriptions of this crisis, see Bales, W. L., Tso Tsung-t'ang: Soldier and Statesman of Old China (Shanghai, 1937), pp. 294–390Google Scholar; Hsü, Immanuel C. Y., The Hi Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871–1881 (Oxford, 1965)Google Scholar; and Morse, Hosea B., The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London, 1918), II, pp. 328–39Google Scholar.

10 Liu Ming-chuan, Liu Chuang-su-kung tsou-i [The memorials of Liu Ming-ch'uan], no. 27 of the Bank of Taiwan Economic Research Department Tai-wan wen-hsien ts'ung-k'an series (Taipei, 1958), pp. 121–24Google Scholar (Hereafter this book will be LM; the series will be WHTK). A translation of this memorial is in Wilson, James H., China: Travels and Investigations in the “Middle Kingdom” (New York, 1887), pp. 126–35Google Scholar.

11 It was during this campaign of harassment that the South China fleet was destroyed within minutes at Foochow. Morse, II, pp. 359–60.

12 Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Documents diplomatiques: Affaires de Chine et du Tonkin, 1884–1885 (Paris, 1885), pp. 98Google Scholar, 109–10. See also Eastman, Lloyd D., Thrones and Mandarins: China's Search for a Policy during the Sino-French Controversy, 1880–1885 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967)Google Scholar, especially chapters VI and VII.

13 Although Liu's responsibilities were to be military ones, he was given the high civil rank of Governor, presumably to encourage him and to demonstrate the importance the Court placed on the job to be done. Six months later, in Oct 1884, Liu was appointed to fill the post of Governor of Fukien but ordered to remain in Taiwan and continue directing the defenses there. LM, p. 104.

14 Introductions to the Ch'ing history of Taiwan are Davidson, James W., The Island of Formosa (London and New York, 1903; Taipei reprint, 1964)Google Scholar and T'ing-i, Kuo, T'ai-wan shih-shih kai-shuo [A general history of Taiwan] (Taipei, 1954)Google Scholar. The most detailed works are Yoshinori, Inō, Taiwan bunkashi [Gazetteer of Taiwan] (Tokyo, 1928)Google Scholar (Hereafter Bunkashi) and Heng, Lien, T'ai-wan t'ung-shih [A history of Taiwan], no. 128 of WHTK (Taipei, 1962)Google Scholar (hereafter TWTS). A highly useful Western study of many aspects of late Ch'ing Taiwan is Harry J. Lamley, “The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895—1915: A Study of Their Reactions to the Japanese Occupation and Subsequent Responses to Colonial Rule and Modernization” (University of Washington dissertation, 1964). Competent economic and general reporting on late nineteenth-century Taiwan is included in the annual reports of the Imperial Maritime Customs officials and the British consuls stationed at Tamsui and Tainan. See China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports for the Year 18 (hereafter Customs) and Great Britain, Foreign Office, Annual Series, Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, China, Report for the Year 18 on the Trade of (hereafter Consular). Much additional material is in the unpublished British Foreign Office archives located at the Public Record Office in London. See Great Britain, Foreign Office, Embassy and Consular Archives, China (hereafter PRO).

15 Tamsui (Tan-shui) was located a few miles downstream from the market centers of Banka (Meng-chia) and Twatutia (Ta-tao-ch'eng), the latter place becoming the location of the important tea trade after its establishment in the 1850s. The importance of Banka and Twatutia was enhanced when the new administrative center of Taipei was constructed adjacent to both towns in the 1870s.

In this article “Tainan” designates the traditional administrative center for Taiwan, although for the first part of Liu s administration it was actually named “Taiwan-fu.” However, Liu chose that identical name for his new administrative capital in central Taiwan. In the same way, “Tainan” refers to the treaty port in southern Taiwan. Both Taiwan treaty ports. Tamsui and Tainan, consisted of two locations: Keelung (Chi-lung) was the underused “outport” of Tamsui; Anping (An-p'ing, the port for the city of Tainan) and Takow (Ta-kou, today the port city of Kaohsiung) shared the foreign trade in the south.

16 In the late nineteenth century, camphor was in great demand in the West as medicine, insect repellent, and an ingredient for the production of celluloid (used in the making of photographic film and smokeless gunpowder).

17 Total trade figures are lacking; accurate statistics are available for the treaty port foreign trade, but not for the domestic Chinese “junk trade.”

18 In addition to disliking each other, the Fukien-ese from Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou often discriminated against and struggled with the minority Hakka settlers, many of whom came from Kwang-tung.

19 This is not to say that Taiwan was Utopian in character. Exploited tenants, beggars, and vagrants did exist. See Myers, Ramon H., “Taiwan under Ch'ing Rule, 1684–1895; The Traditional Society,” Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, V, 2 (1972), pp. 424–27Google Scholar. At the same time, it is significant that thousands of persons went temporarily each spring from China to work in the Taiwan tea industry. Davidson, p. 385; Hongkong Daily Press (hereafter HKDP), 15 May 1888, p. 3. This implies a labor shortage in Taiwan, at least during the busy season n i the north. Also, observers commented on Taiwan's natural wealth: James Wilson reported that he had “never seen a region possessing greater attractions and advantages in surface, soil, and productions.” Wilson, p. 301. Liu Ming-ch'uan wrote that Taiwan's two harvests a year made its agricultural production “first in the southeast [of China] (chia yü tung-nan).” LM, p. 147.

20 The French also carried out a blockade of th e Taiwan coast for six months. This action angered the British merchants anxious to continue the export of tea and sugar and only complicated, not eliminated. Chinese landings of reinforcements and military supplies in Taiwan. See Dodd, John, Journal of a Blockaded Resident in North Formosa, During the Franco-Chinese War, 1884–5 (Hongkong, 1888Google Scholar).

21 LM, pp. 106–12.

22 As Taiwan taotai, Liu Ao made numerous constructive proposals in his reports to superiors about control of the aborigines, development of the mining and sale of coal, military reforms, defense, and administration. See Ao, Liu, Hsun-T'ai t'ui-ssu-lu [Reminiscences of administering Taiwan], no. 21 of WHTK (Taipei, 1958)Google Scholar; and Lamley, pp. 116–19.

23 North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (hereafter NCH), 27 Jan 1886, p. 88. Liu's denunciations of Liu Ao are in LM, pp. 423–31, 434–38.

24 Hsi-chen. a Mongol Bannerman, was President of the Board of Punishments and a member of the Tsungli Yamen (Office of Foreign Affairs); Wei Jung-kuang, like Liu Ao a native of Hunan, was Governor of Kiangsu.

25 Liu Ao was also ordered to return Tls. 26,000 in government funds that he had taken in dishonest ways, such as pay for non-existent soldiers. This resulted in the loss of his family residence in Hunan, worth Tls. 13,000. Translations of the Peking Gazette for 1886 (Shanghai, 1887)Google Scholar, entry for 18 Sept 1886. One tael (Haikwan ) was worth approximately US $1.28 in 1885 and US $1.15 in 1888.

While in exile, Liu Ao reportedly became a subordinate of Mu-t'u-shan (d. 1887), a prominent Manchu military officer. TWTS, p. 925. These two officials had worked together previously when Mu-tu-shan was commander of Banner Forces in Foochow from 1879 to 1885 and Liu Ao was Taiwan taotai.

26 Chen Ming-chih was a native of Hunan and reportedly the brother-in-law of Tso Tsung-t'ang, Liu's old antagonist. PRO, FO228/8O7 Taiwan, Spence to Parkes, 4 Mar 1885; Spence to O'Conor, 3Ojun 1885. He was one of Liu's most effective and cooperative subordinates during his two years as acting taotai, then for the remainder of Liu's administration as director of various military and financial projects.

Much has been written about friction and competition at this time between Hunan and Anhwei officials. In some ways, the relations between Tso and Liu seem to fit this interpretation. On the other hand, Liu's use of Hunanese civil and military sub-ordinates, some of whom were strong supporters of his efforts, and his ability to work with high-ranking Hunanese such as Yang Yüeh-pin (d. 1890) and Yang Ch'ang-chün (d. 1897) suggest the need for further study of late Ch'ing provincial rivalries.

27 T'eng-yüeh, Li, “Chien-sheng shih-mo” [Establishment of the province], Wen-hsien chuan-k'an, IV, 1–2 (1953), pp. 17–29Google Scholar.

28 Liu oversaw the change from two prefectures consisting of eight districts and four comparable units to a province composed of three prefectures and one independent department with eleven dis- tricts and six comparable units. Bunkashi, I, pp.303–04, 313–14.

29 The improvements in Taipei required almost Tls. 125,000 for the construction of offices (yamen), housing, five temples, and new streets. Liu Ming-ch'uan fu-T'ai ch'ien-hou tang-an [Documents pertaining to the general period of Liu Ming-ch'uan's governorship of Taiwan], no. 276 of WHTK (Taipei, 1969) (hereafter LT), pp. 178–81. The city wall for the new capital (today the city of Taichung ) in central Taiwan reportedly cost Tls. 215,000. TWTS, p. 466. The walls were the only thing built, however, because Liu changed his mind in 1888 and received permission from the Court to postpone development of the new city until he could construct the railroad and use its profits to finance the building of the city. LM, pp. 275, 292. The seat of government never was moved because Liu's successor, Shao Yu-lien, cancelled plans for the new capital city when he decided in 1893 that the railroad should stop at the city of Hsinchu, about midway between Keelun g and the site of the proposed capital. SL, ch. 329, 3b; LT, pp. 238–41; Pannell, Clifton W.. T'ai-chung, Vai-wan: Structure and Function (Chicago, 1973) pp. 26Google Scholar, 32–40.

30 Bunkashi, I, pp. 233–46; T'ai-wan-sheng wenhsien wei-yuan-hui, T'ai-wan-sheng t'ung-chih-kao [Taiwan provincial draft gazetteer], ch. 3 (Cheng-shih-chih) [Government], “Hsing-cheng-p'ien” [Section on administration] (Taipei, 1957), pp. 209–14; TWTS, pp. 309, 476–79.

Such bureaus were outside of the formal Ch'ing bureaucratic structure, and this provided provincial officials with some flexibility in administration and choice of personnel. Thus, Liu made use of some existing bureaus and added new ones, using subordinates of his own choosing for important responsibilities such as land reclamation, the survey of arable land, and attraction of investment capital from Chinese in Southeast Asia.

The Court was well aware of the practice of establishing bureaus in the provinces and tried to keep them under control. In Dec 1889, for example, provincial officials received orders to reduce the number of military bureaus and employees, and to report related finances regularly to the Board of Revenue in Peking. SL, ch. 276, 138–143. Liu, following the suggestion of his provincial treasurer and the taotai, replied to Peking that he was directing a new provincial administration under tight fiscal conditions and—since the agreed policy was to have Taiwan self-supporting (i T'ai-wan pen-ti chih ts'ai kung pen-ti chih yung)—he would not dare be wasteful in that way. LM, pp. 298–300.

31 In addition to having to fill new positions, Liu was troubled by the death from illness of numerous subordinate officials, and the reluctance of replacements to go from Fukien to serve in Taiwan. LM, pp. 401, 407.

32 LM, pp. 401–02, 407–08, 413–14.

33 For discussion about qualifications for appointment of magistrates in a slightly earlier period, see Watt, John R., The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China (New York, 1972), pp. 23–58Google Scholar.

34 The major Chinese uprising was in the vicinity of Chang-hua on the west coast in 1888. Liu's pacification operations against aborigines took place throughout much of the aborigine area: the northeast, the central mountains, the east coast, and the southern tip of the island.

35 LM, pp. 137–38.

36 The Green Standard Forces in Taiwan were on a special rotational system called pan-ping which had been started in the seventeenth century. Under this system, the troops served in Taiwan for three years and then returned to their regular camps in Fukien and Kwangtung. Liu tried to stop this system but was not permitted to do so by the Court. Juho, Li, “Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan pan-ping chih-tu yü t'un-t'ien mu-ping chih i” (The Taiwan pan-ping system during the Ch'ing period and proposals for t'un-t'ien and troop recruitment], T'ai-wan wen-hsien, XXI, 2 (1970), pp. 1–21Google Scholar.

37 LM, pp. 287–88, 400. In the 1820s more than 14,000 Green Standard Forces were stationed in Taiwan. This was reduced to 7600 in 1869 and to 4500 in 1882. Li Ju-ho, p. 1.

38 TWTS, p. 310.

39 LM, p. 400.

40 Yen-hui, Tai, “Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan hsiang-chuang chih chien-li chi ch'i tsu-chih” [Establishment and organization of villages in Taiwan during the Ch'ing period], T'ai-wan yin-hang chi-k'an, XIII, 3 (1962), pp. 284–87Google Scholar. Lin Wei-yuan, one of the wealthiest men in Taiwan, was actively involved in Liu's work by taking on such responsibilities as directing the railroad project and supervising land reclamation.

41 Shih-ch'ing, Wang, “T'ai-wan ai-chih k'ao” [An investigation into the ai system in Taiwan], T'ai-wan wen-hsien, VII, 3–4 (1956), pp. 7–25Google Scholar; Heng-li, Lin, “Fu-k'en” [Pacification and reclamation], Wen-hsien clpuan-k'an, IV, 1–2 (Aug 1953), p. 66Google Scholar; “T'ai-wan-sheng wen-hsien wei-yuan-hui,” T'ai-wan-sheng t'ung-chih-kao [Taiwan provincial draft gazetteer], ch. 3 (Cheng-shih chih) [Government], “Fang-shu-p'ien” [Section on defenses] (Taipei, 1959), pp. 174–92.

42 Tai Yen-hui, “Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan ti t'un-chih yang-chan-ti chi t'un-t'ien” [The t'un and yang-chan systems in Taiwan during the Ch'ing period], She-hui k'o-hsueh lun-ts'ung, no. 4 (Sept 1953), 42 pp.; Hai-ming, Kuo, “Ch'ing-fu” [Reorganization of the land tax], Wen-hsien chuan-k'an, IV, 1–2 (1953). pp. 39–40Google Scholar.

Discussion of ai and t'un in the Chinese literature is usually related to problems of land tenure, since an important feature of both was that participants were given land to provide support and income. T'un is particularly confusing since the t'un-t'ien system, a time-honored method of providing land for Chinese soldiers to support themselves on the frontiers, was also in effect in Taiwan. See Li Ju-ho, pp. 11–15. In addition, the term t'un-t'ien also referred to land held by the aborigine t'un-ting (later called fan-yung). See LM, p. 305, for example.

43 Liu once remarked that t'un units were more effective than the Green Standard Forces. LM, p. 307.

44 Ai-ting became ai-yung and t'un-ting became fan-yung (aborigine braves). Liu Ao, in 1884, had already changed the name of militia to t'uan-yung and lien-yung. Liu Ao, p. 247.

Yen-hui, Tai, “Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan chih ai-chih chi ai-tsu” [The ai system in Taiwan during the Ch'ing period], T'ai-wan yin-hang chi-k'an, IX, 4 (Mar 1958), p. 55Google Scholar; Wang Shih-ch'ing, p. 18; Chin-teh, Chuang, “T'ai-wan t'un-cheng chih hsing-fei” [A history of the t'un system in Taiwan], T'ai-wan wen-hsien, XI, 4 (1960), p. 98Google Scholar.

45 LM, pp. 339, 403. Lin Ch'ao-tung, a member of the powerful Lin family of Wu-feng in central Taiwan, was one of Liu's primary Taiwanese supporters. See Meskill, Johanna Menzel, “The Lins of Wufeng: The Rise of a Taiwanese Gentry Family,” Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History, ed. Gordon, Leonard H. D. (New York, 1970), pp. 15–18Google Scholar.

46 In late 1885, there were ten Anhwei battalions and sixteen Hunan battalions in Taiwan. LM, p. 339. About five hundred fighting men made up a battalion at full strength. Spector, Stanley, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in nineteenth Century Chinese Regionalism (Seattle, 1964), p. 42Google Scholar.

Liu usually referred to the Hunan troops as Ch'u-yung (Ch'u braves). Established by Chiang Chung-yuan (1812–1854) in 1851, the Ch'u regional army provided the nucleus of the famous Hsiang Army that was founded by Tseng Kuo-fan (1811–1872) in 1853. Hummel, pp. 136, 751–52; Kuhn, Philip A., Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 113–14Google Scholar; 146.

47 It is not surprising that Liu was more critical of troops from Hunan than of those from Anhwei. See, for example, LAI, pp. 431–32. However, he was able to use the Hunan troops effectively and, as with Hunanese civil officials such as Chen Ming-chih, he received strong support from Wan Kuo-pen, the Brigade General (tsung-ping) in Taiwan, and other Hunanese military officers. LM, p. 400.

48 Of eighteen Green Standard battalions, only four (one each in Hsin-chu, Banka, Tamsui, and I-Ian) were stationed north of P'u-li or Chang-hua. TWTS, pp. 324–37. In late 1885, of the sixteen Hunan battalions, four were north of Chang-hua (three in Tamsui and one in Man). None of the ten Anhwei battalions in Taiwan was located south of Taipei except in the Pescadores Islands. LM, p. 339.

49 LM, pp. 160–62, 340–41; Hung-chang, Li, Li Wen-chung-kung hsüan-chi [Selections from the writings of Li Hung-chang], no. 131 of WHTK (Taipei, 1961), pp. 548–49Google Scholar, Ch'ang-fu included servants, porters, and cooks. Spector, pp. 44, 122.

50 PRO, FO228/837 (Taiwan), Spence to O'Conor, 23 Feb 1886.

51 The Court did not agree with Liu. LM, pp. 184, 380–82.

52 LM, p. 341; Mail Supplement to the HKDP, 12 Apr 1887, p. 2; HKDP, 16 Jun 1887, p. 3; Chinese Times, 23 Jul 1887, p. 614.

53 Liu was also the beneficiary of Court generosity; in addition to the annual Tls. 440,000 subsidy for five years from Fukien mentioned above, the Court—in an unusual move—permitted Liu to use all Imperial Maritime Customs receipts (including the likin on opium imports) collected in Taiwan from 1887 on, totalling perhaps 1.4 million taels annually. Translations of the Peking Gazette for 1887 (Shanghai 1888)Google Scholar, entry for 15 Dec 1887; LM, pp. 277–78; TWTS, p. 239.

54 Tai Yen-hui, “Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan chih ta-hsiao tsu-yeh” [The ta-tsu—hsiao-tsu system in Taiwan during the Ch'ing period], T'ai-pei wen-hsien, no. 4 (jun 1963), pp. 1–47; Wickberg, Edgar B., “Late Nineteenth Century Land Tenure in North Taiwan,” Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History, ed. Gordon, Leonard H. D. (New York, 1970), pp. 80–82Google Scholar; LM, pp. 147–48.

55 LM, pp. 147, 309.

56 LM, p. 148.

57 A leading scholar on this subject writes that originally Liu hoped to completely separate the ta-tsu-hu from the land system. This proved to be impossible, however, and was not done until early in the twentieth century by the Japanese administrators of Taiwan. Yen-hui, Taj, “T'ai-wan ta-hsiao tsu-yeh chi k'en-t'ien chih kuan-hsi” [The relationship of the ta-tsu — hsiao-tsu land system to the opening of new lands], T'ai-wan wen-hsien, XIV, 2 (1963), pp. 164–65Google Scholar; Tai Yen-hui, “Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan chih ta-hsiao tsu-yeh,” p. 43; Myers, Ramon H. and Ching, Adrienne, “Agricultural Development in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule,” Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, 4 (1964), pp. 561–62Google Scholar.

58 Kuo Hai-ming, pp. 31–48; chosakyoku, Rinji Taiwan tochi, Seifu ippan [An outline of the reorganization of the land tax] (Taihoku, 1900), pp. 228–30Google Scholar; T'ai-wan ssu-fa wu-ch'üan-pien [Documents from Taiwan shihō pertaining to property rights], no. 150 of WHTK (Taipei, 1963), pp. 47–49Google Scholar.

In one district, Chia-i, the pao-chia was not used to carry out the survey; Liu followed the suggestion of the magistrate, who felt that the pao-chia was too weak to be revitalized. Instead, Liu ordered the magistrate simply to survey the land and to levy taxes accordingly. TJ (n. 6 above), pp. 68–69.

59 TJ, pp. 70–76. Liu meant what he said: several officials were dismissed for taking bribes and for careless measuring during the land survey, including Lo Chien-hsiang, the Chia-i magistrate mentioned above in note 58. LM, p. 443.

60 Deed fees ranged from $2.5 0 per chia (approximately 2.5 acres) for the best paddy land to $0.50 per chia for the lowest quality dry fields. T'ai-wan ssu-fa wu-ch'iian-pien, p. 210. Assuming an average payment of $1.50 per chia, deed fees for the 425,241 chia of private land (LM, p. 318) would have brought in $637,861 or Tls. 414,195 (taking the 1888 rate of one Haikwan tael to equal 1.54 Mexican dollars). Liu was anticipating a surplus, since he asked permission from the Court in late 1887 to use the surplus from deed fee receipts for construction, including land purchase, of the railroad. LM, p. 311.

61 LM, pp. 318–21, 323.

62 For example, Hsin-chu District saw an increase of almost fourteen-fold to a total of Tls. 81,478 as a result of the land survey. Rinji Taiwan tochi chōsak-yoku, Seifu ippan, pp. 201–202. It should be kept in mind that the increased revenues did not result from increasing the tax rate but only from collecting the taxes that should have been paid at existing rates.

63 Tea lands were surveyed, but not taxed according to the established schedules as long as tea was grown upon them. Instead, Liu first levied a tax of $2.00 for every ten thousand tea bushes owned; but soon he changed to a system of taxing the amount of tea actually produced. Taiwan sōtokufu minseibu zaimukyoku zeimukanai zeimushokuin kyōikai, Taiwan zeimushi [A history of taxation in Taiwan] (Tokyo, 1910), I, pp. 63–65; TJ, p. 49. Thus, the considerable acreage in tea in northern Taiwan could help to explain the cooperation of the northern landlords, since the tea lands were taxed separately.

64 The seige was broken by a combined effort of regional forces, local troops under Lin Ch'ao-tung, and units transferred from Fukien; but this affair was part of a grave situation for Liu, since military strength was also required simultaneously to check a large rising of aborigines—instigated by Chinese— at the east coast town of Pilam (Pei-nan) near the present city of Tai-tung. LM, pp. 402–06, 408–09; TWTS, pp. 877–82; TJ, pp. 101–03; Wu Teh-kung, Tai-Shih liang-an chi-lüeh [Accounts of the risings of Tai Wan-sheng and Shih Chiu-tuan], no. 47 of WHTK (Taipei, 1959), pp. 95–116Google Scholar.

65 Those southern ta-tsu-hu who previously received at least twenty percent of the harvest as ta-tsu were to receive the land deed and to continue to be responsible for the land tax. Tai Yen-hui, “Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan chih ta-hsiao tsu-yeh,” pp. 43–44; Tai Yen-hui, “T'ai-wan ta-hsiao tsu-yeh chi k'en-t'ien chih kuan-hsi,” pp. 164–65.

66 Ginsburg, Norton S., Economic Resources and Development of Formosa (New York, 1953), p. 26Google Scholar.

67 Liu was proud of this accomplishment and reminded the Court twice within one year how little, in contrast, had been done in mainland provinces, LM, pp. 317, 323.

68 Like other advocates of Self-strengthening, Liu sought ways to compete with the foreign ships sailing Chinese waters. See Samuel C. Chu, pp. 42–47. Here, however, we are examining Liu's attempts to restrict the freedom of action and the profits of the foreign merchants in Taiwan.

69 Likin was a major source of income for officials who were in need of additional funds to finance regional forces and modern projects in the late Ch'ing period. See Beal, Edwin George Jr., The Origin of Likin, 1853–1864 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958)Google Scholar. In Taiwan, before Liu' s new likin policy, only tea and camphor as exports and opium as an import had been subject to likin. China, Inspectorate Gen eral of Customs, “Tamsui, Decennial Report, 1882–91,” Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation Industries, etc. of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce in China and Corea and on the Condition and Development of Treaty Port Provinces, 1882–1891 (Shanghai, 1893), p. 459Google Scholar.

70 Consular, Taiwan, 1886, p. 7.

71 Customs, Takow 1886, p. 283.

72 Liu soon reduced the likin to the same amount that transit passes issued under the Imperial Maritime Customs would have cost the foreign merchants, it being perceived that any [likin] rate above a Transit Due, or half Export Duty, would drive the exporters into taking out Transit passes.” Customs, Takow 1886, p. 282. Some of the foreign officials believed that the likin itself was contrary to treaty rights. PRO, FO228/837 (Taiwan), O'Conor o t Warren, 26 May 1886; Warren to Walsham, 30 Jun 1886. Before 1887, the use of transit passes probably would have meant a loss of revenue for Liu, since he had access to likin income but not funds collected by the Imperial Maritime Customs (which included those generated through the sale of transit passes). This changed, beginning in 1887; see note 53 above.

73 U.S. Dept. of State, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843–1906 (hereafter DD), Denby to Bayard, 26 Jan 1888; Denby to Bayard, 15 Feb 1888; Denby to Bayard, 19 Mar 1888; Denby to Bayard, 27 Apr 1888; Denby to Blain, 22 Jun 1891.

74 LM, pp. 157–60; Li Hung-chang, pp. 535–39, 581–88.

75 NCH, 6 Jan 1888, p. n; 26 Sept 1890, pp. 369–71; 3 Apr 1891. pp. 395–96. Late in his stay, Liu again caused concern among the diplomats in Peking by confiscating, on the road from Tainan to Anping, kerosene belonging to the American firm of Russell and Co. DD, Denby to Blaine. 21 Apr 1891; U.S. National Archives, U.S. Consulate, Amoy, Despatches from the United States Consuls in Amoy, 1844–1906, Bedloe to Adee, 6 Jul 1891; Bedloe to Wharton. 22 Jul 1891.

76 A similar camphor monopoly had existed from 1855 to 1868; but it, like Liu's, was stopped as a result of foreign pressure. Camphor was exported freely from 1869 until Liu instituted his monopoly in 1886. Davidson, pp. 400–07.

77 LM, pp. 368–71; NCH, 20 Jun 1890, pp. 762–63, 767–69; China Mail, 25 Jun 1890, p. 3. Totalling well over one million pounds annually (except for two isolated years) throughout the 1860s and 1870s, camphor exports dropped drastically from two million pounds in 1881 to 399 pounds in 1885. Under Liu's administration, camphor exports then increased to a million pounds in 1890 and to 2.7 million pounds in 1891 following the end of the monopoly. Davidson, p. 442.

78 A light transit tax on tea had been levied for years, and Liu apparently saw the wisdom of maintaining the status quo. Customs, Tamsui 1886, p. 265. Late in his administration of Taiwan, he even offered exemption from that tax for any goods shipped in the government steamers under his control. While this might have appealed to the tea merchants, it was considered disastrous for foreign steamship companies, especially Douglas Co., serving Taiwan. NCH, 29 May 1891, pp. 661–62; 12 Jun 1891, p. 721.

79 See Miyakawa, Hisayuki, “The Confuciani-zation of South China,” The Confucian Persuasion, ed. Wright, Arthur F. (Stanford, 1960), pp. 21–46Google Scholar.

80 In addition, as stated above, Liu felt compelled to extend Ch'ing control over all of Taiwan so as to avoid repetition of the dangerous and embarrassing occupation of portions of Taiwan by the Japanese in 1874 and the French in 1884.

81 Like others, Liu divided the aborigines into “savage” (sheng) and “civilized” (sbu). Those living on the plains, somewhat synonymous with the latter, were called p'ing-p'u-fan (“pepohoan” in the Western literature of that day).

82 The land remaining in aborigine hands was considerable in size if not totally arable; Liu mentioned on occasion that the area occupied by the aborigines in the hills comprised sixty percent of the island. LM, pp. 150, 155.

83 Ta-k'o-k'an (today the town of Ta-hsi in T'ao-yuan District) was adjacent to lands long held by the powerful Lin family of Pan-ch'iao, of which Lin Wei-yuan was a leading member. Ishikure, Kyoko, “The Lins of Pan-ch'iao,” The Journal of the Blais-dell Institute, IX, 2 (1974), p. 39Google Scholar; Chen, Cheng-siang, T'ai-wan ti-ming tz'u-tien (Gazetteer of Taiwan place names] (Taipei, 1960), p. 50Google Scholar.

84 Lin Heng-li, pp. 52–53.

85 A special degree for aborigines (fan-hsiu-ts'ai) was awarded to those who completed the three-year course in Liu's school. Lin Heng-li, pp. 60–63; LM, p. 150; Arnold, Julean, Education in Formosa (Washington, 1908), pp. 24–27Google Scholar; TJ, p. 57.

86 LM, pp. 150–51, 218–20, 222, 406.

87 LM, pp. 235–36.

88 In addition to the vessels Liu ha d for moving men and supplies in the campaigns, Li Hung-chang sent two ironclads, the Ching-yuan and Chih-yuan, under the command of Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang (d. 1895) to help in the large 1888 rising at Pilam on the east coast. China Mail, 8 Sept 1888, p. 3; Li Hung-chang, pp. 589–91, 593, 606.

89 Li Hung-chang, pp. 590–91; LM, pp. 201–08, 213, 224, 226–27, 230–31, 240; China Mail, 10 Mar 1890, p. 3; 14 May 1890, p. 3.

90 A general assessment of Liu as Governor and advocate of Self-strengthening is to receive treatment in a longer study now in progress.

91 The Court had become angered by Liu's ineffectiveness in solving the aborigine proble m and by his attempts to hand the government coal industry over to merchants despite orders to the contrary. LM, pp. 117–18. In addition, as one scholar points out, the 1888 Shih Chiu-tuan rebellion and problems with the land survey brought Liu critical evaluations from censors in Peking; and the death of Prince Ch'un (1840–1891), father of the Emperor and supporter of Liu in the Court, was an additional factor leading to Liu's departure.

92 Recent scholarship on a slightly later period grapples with similar problems and provides insights for further investigation of the Self-strengthening period. See Gasster, Michael, “Reform and Revolu- tion in China's Political Modernization,” China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900–1913, ed. Wright, Mary Clabaugh (New Haven, 1968), pp. 67–96Google Scholar; and Forges, Roger V. Des, Hsi-liang and the Chinese National Revolution (New Haven, 1973)Google Scholar.