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A Reconsideration of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

James B. Crowley
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Extract

On July 7, 1937 a handful of Chinese and Japanese soldiers exchanged rifle-fire in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge about thirty miles from Peking. This, minor fracas precipitated a sequence of events that soon propelled Japan into full-scale hostilities on the mainland—a war that was significantly to influence the course of Japanese-American negotiation in the fateful months leading up to the Pacific War. Many historians have portrayed the China incident as the consequence of a conspiracy by the Japanese military and as a repetition of a pattern of aggression identical with that of the Mukden Incident of 1931. With this approach, the Sino-Japanese war presents little apparent difficulty to our ascertaining why the fighting at the Marco-Polo Bridge occasioned a major war. The culprit is the Japanese military.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , May 1963 , pp. 277 - 291
Copyright
Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1963

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References

1 For example, Maxon, Yale, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 1957), pp. 120–124Google Scholar; and Storry, Richard, The Double Patriots (London, 1957, pp. 215–223.Google Scholar

2 The best treatments of these agreements are Ikuhito, Hata, “Umezu Ka Ō-kin kyōtei keii” [Particulars of the Ho-Umezu Agreement], Azija kenkyū, IV (1957), 65–114Google Scholar; and Toshihiko, Shimada, “Umezu Ka Ō-kin kyōtei no seiritsu” [The Conclusion of the Umezu- Ho Ying-chin Agreement], Nihon gaikōshi kfnkyū: Shōwn jidai [Study of Japanese Diplomatic History; the Showa Period] (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 50–70.Google Scholar

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4 Ibid., VI, “Hirota Daijin Shō Taishi Shō Kairoku dai ni kai” [Minutes of the Second Conversation between Foreign Minister Hirota and Chiang's Ambassador Chiang Tsuo-pin] September 7, 1935, Top Secret.

5 Ibid., IV, “Shō Taishi dai niji kaidan ni tsuku suru daijin ōshū shinan” [Summary of the Foreign Minister's Reply to the Second Conversation with Chiang's Ambassador], September 18, 1935, Top Secret.

6 Ibid., VIII, “Shōwa jūichinen ichigatsu yōka Gaimu Daijin heya ni okeru tōgi no kekka ni motozuku taiShi gaikō shi-an” [Summary of Our China Policy Based Upon the Results of the Discussions in the Office of the Foreign Minister, January 8, 1936], Top Secret.

7 International Military Tribunal Far East (IMTFE), Document 1634, p. 3s.Google Scholar

8 Teikoku taiShi … op. cit., VIII, “Nankin seiken no NiShi Nankin kaigi teian ni tai suru ken” [Concerning the Proposed Meeting in Nanking by the Nanking Political Authorities], Sanbō Dainibu [G-2, Army General Stari], February 2, 1936, Top Secret.

9 Ibid.

10 IMTFE, Document 2446. Also, personal conversation with the Honorable Arita Hachiro, the Japanese Foreign Minister in 1936; and with General Hashimoto Gun, the representative of the War Ministry in the organization of the committee.

11 According to Generals Hashimoto, Katakura, Satō, and Colonel Nishiura in conversations with the author.

12 Teikoku no taiShi … op. cit., VIII, Cable 1387 from the Foreign Minister to all representatives in China and Manchukuo, August 11, 1936, Top Secret. Also, IMTFE, Exhibit 216.

13 IMTFE, Exhibit 979.Google Scholar

14 Ibid., p. 3.

15 IMTFE, Exhibit 213.

16 Detailed information on this economic planning is difficult to locate but some clues as to its significance are developed by Katakura Chū, “Ugaki naikaku ryūzan su” [Abortion of the Ugaki Cabinet], Himerareta shōwashi [A Secret History of the Showa Period] (Tokyo, 1956), pp. 161–162Google Scholar; and Ishiwatari Sōtaro denki [Biography of Ishiwatari Sōtaro] (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 193–204Google Scholar. Also, IMTFE, Exhibit 842 and Document 715.

17 Teikoku no taiShi … op. cit., VII, “Horinouchi jikan oyobi Ōa-Tōakyokuchō to Tōjō kantogun sanbōchō kaigi yōryō [Gist of the Conference of Vice-Minister Horinouchi and Heads of European and East Asian Bureaus with the Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, Tōjō], June 16, 1937.

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19 IMTFE, Exhibit 219Google Scholar. Also, the Tribunal conclusion that in the spring of 1937 the military planning of the Imperial Army “was not directed wholly or principally toward the conquest of China.” Judgment, p. 168.Google Scholar

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21 Conversations with Generals Katakura Chu and Satō Kenryo.

22 The information in ths paragraph was supplied by General Satō; General Inada Seijun, an original member of the War Leadership Section; and Colonel Nishiura Susumu. Mr. Hata Ikuhito kindly shared his notes based upon interviews with General Kawabe Torashiro.

23 IMTFE, Document 1750 (Deposition of General Ching Teh-chin); Document 1790 (Deposition of General Wang Leu-ch'ai; Defense Document 973 (Deposition of General Hashimoto Gun).

24 IMTFE, Exhibit 2479 (Deposition of General Kawabe Shōzō).

25 See also Jones, Francis C., Japan's New Order in East Asia (London, 1954), pp. 31–33.Google Scholar

28 IMTFE, Defense Document 973.Google Scholar

27 IMTFE, Defense Document 970Google Scholar (Deposition of General Kawabe Shōzō), p. 4.

28 IMTFE, Document 1750; and conversation with Imai Takeo.

29 R. Storry suggests that Wachi's trip to Tokyo was part of a conspiracy similar to the Mukden Incident of 1931. Op. cit., pp. 221–222. However, all of the individuals interviewed by the author, including Wachi, agreed that his trip to Tokyo was deliberately arranged by his superiors in order to neutralize his aggressive behavior and attitude towards the Chinese army stationed in the Peking region.

30 Conversations with Imai Takeo, Hashimoto Gun, and Wachi Takagi.

31 IMTFE, Defense Document 1169 is the text of this settlement.

32 IMTFE, Defense Document 971 (Deposition of General Kawabe Torashiro).

33 Itarō, Ishii, Gaikōkan no isshō [Life of a Diplomat] (Tokyo, 1950), p. 271.Google Scholar

34 IMTFE, Defense Document 2148 (Deposition of Hidaka Shinrokuro); and in a personal talk with Mr. Hidaka.

35 General Ching stipulated that “repeated telegrams from our Supreme Commander (Chiang Kai-shek) ordered General Sung … to proceed to Paoting and to direct operations from there.” IMTFE, Document 1750.

36 General Inada, General Satō, and Colonel Nishiura in conversations with the author stated, without mentioning Nagatsu's name, that the “China Section” had emphasized the dangers created by the Nationalist Army.

37 Conversations with Generals Satō, Inada, Wachi, and Colonel Nishiura.

38 IMTFE, Defense Document 977, p. 10.Google Scholar

39 Akira, Kazami, Konoe naikaku [The Konoe Cabinet] (Tokyo, 1951), pp. 30–31.Google Scholar

40 Ibid., Kazami, however, declares that this suggestion was originally his idea.

41 Asahi (Tokyo), 07 11, 1937, p. 1Google Scholar. This was a special Sunday edition. I am indebted to Mr. Kurihara for calling it to my attention.

42 Itarō, Ishii, op. cit., p. 272.Google Scholar

43 For a blunt comment on this press conference, see Sumihisa, Ikeda, Rikugun sōgt i-in-chō [Head of the Funeral Commission of the Imperial Army] (Tokyo, 1953), pp. 27–28Google Scholar. Ambassador Grew noted on July 13, “There seems to be complete unanimity of opinion between the cabinet, the military, the Foreign Office, the press and the businessmen to resist any weakening of Japan's position in North China.” Ten Years in Japon (New York, 1944), p. 211.Google Scholar

44 IMTFE, Defense Document 977, pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

45 Ibid. Also conversations with Generals Hashimoto, Inada, Imai, and Wachi.

48 Mr. Maxon asserts this conference was “almost an exact repetition of the situation which had occurred at the time of the Mukden Incident six years earlier: one of the conspirators, here Shibayama, being sent with orders to stop an action, the continuance of which he favored.” Op. cit., p. 122.

47 Conversation with Generals Imai and Hashimoto. Also according to Mr. Hata's talks with Ikeda Sumihisa.

48 IMTFE, Defense Document 971, p. 12.Google Scholar

49 IMTFE, Defense Document 971, p. 13.Google Scholar

50 Ambassadors Hidaka and Kamimura in talks with the author.

51 IMTFE, Document 2146, p. 3.Google Scholar

52 IMTFE, Defense Document 2148.

53 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1937 (London, 1938), pp. 186–187.Google Scholar

54 Conversation with Hidaka Shinrokuro.

55 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey … op. cit., p. 187.Google Scholar

56 According to General Hashimoto, Sung attended the funeral alone and “… cried bitterly before the spirit of the dead over losing such a close friend.” IMTFE, Proceedings, p. 20619.Google Scholar

57 Sumihisa, Ikeda, op. cit., p. 23Google Scholar. General Hashimoto, in a talk with the author, emphasized that he never presented Sung with an ultimatum.

58 IMTFE, Proceedings, p. 20619.Google Scholar

59 General Imai Takeo in a conversation with the author.

60 According to General Inada Seijun in a conversation with the author. General Kawabe Torashirō and General Tanaka Shinichi also informed Mr. Hata of this fact.

61 Ibid.

62 Itarō, Ishii. op. cit., p. 275.Google Scholar

63 Ibid., p. 276. Mr. Kamimura, the Head of the China Section, also signed this memo.

64 Ibid., p. 276. Kamimura and Ishii handed in a joint resignation in protest of Foreign Minister Hirota's failure to follow their recommendation. Also, Mr. Kamimura, in a talk with the author in 1958.

65 Itarō, Ishii, op. cit., p. 277.Google Scholar

66 Ibid., and personal conversation with Hashimoto Gun.

67 Talks with General Inada and Colonel Nishiura. Also, IMTFE, Defense Document 977, p. 14.Google Scholar

68 Itarō, Ishii, op. cit., p. 277.Google Scholar

69 Ibid. Conversation with Generals Hashimoto Gun and Imai Takeo.

70 According to General Imai Takeo in his talk with the author. Also, Jones, Francis C., op. cit., p. 38.Google Scholar

71 IMTFE, Proceedings, p. 20632.Google Scholar

72 General Wang Len-Ch'ai testified that on the 29th, “Being so cornered and pressed, our authorities (were) ordered to attack.” IMTFE, Exhibit 248, p. 8.Google Scholar

73 Conversation with Generals Hashimoto, Imai and Wachi. Also, United States State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, (Washington 1952), III, p. 298.Google Scholar

74 IMTFE, Exhibit 617, p. 18.Google Scholar

75 Ibid., p. 17. This exhibit is the report of the League of Nations Sub Committee which investigated the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

76 IMTFE, Document 2146.

77 IMTFE, Defense Document 2605.

78 IMTFE, Defense Document 2605.

79 IMTFE, Defense Document 2030.

80 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations … op. cit., 1937, III, pp. 363–366.Google Scholar

81 Ibid., p. 385.

82 Ibid., p. 386.

83 Ibid., p. 418.

84 According to Generals Inada, Katakura, Satō, Wachi and Colonel Nishiura in conversations with the author. See also Mamoru, Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, (New York, 1958), p. 141.Google Scholar

85 Conversation with Admiral Hasegawa.

86 Gunreibu [Naval General Staff], Taiheiyō sensō kaigen senshi [The Naval History of the Pacific War], I, p. 16. This volume is undated but was written approximately in 1942. As far as I know only the first volume was published. One copy is available at the Zaidan Shiryō Chōsakai. [Documentary Research Organization], Tokyo. The author is indebted to Vice Admiral Tomioka Sadatoshi for permission to use the records collected at this institute.

87 Kazami Akira states that War Minister Sugiyama, after this Cabinet meeting, labeled the civilian Cabinet members who favored operations in Central China as foolish men. Op. cit., p. 46.

88 Liu, F. F., A Military History of Modern China 1924–1949 (Princeton, 1956), p. 114.Google Scholar