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“Peasant Nationalism” in the History of Chinese Communism1

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Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. By JohnsonChalmers A.. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. xii, 256. $5.75.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Donald G. Gillin
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , February 1964 , pp. 269 - 289
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Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1964

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References

2 Johnson, Chalmers A., Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford, 1962).Google Scholar

3 See ibid., p. 7.

4 The American reporter Jack Beiden expressed a similar point of view on page 58 and pages 161–163 of his book entitled China Shakes the World (New York, 1949)Google Scholar. However, Beiden is more aware of the complexity of Communist policy with respect to the peasant villages and therefore less inclined to oversimplify the circumstances which brought the Communists to power in North China.

5 Ch'i Chih-chin, “‘T'u-ti ts'un-yu’ hsia chih Chin-pei nung-ts'un,” [“Peasant Villages of Northern Shansi under [Yen's] ‘All Land to the Village’ Scheme”], Kuo-wen chou-pao, 03 23, 1936, p. 26Google Scholar. Ch'i was a native of northern Shansi but apparently was attending school in Nanking at the time he wrote this article. His observations were an outgrowth of talks with peasants living in his own village, as well as in neighboring communities. Besides being unusually well-informed, he seems to have been very objective, since although he held the rich responsible for the suffering of the peasants, he also was sympathetic to Yen Hsi-shan and afraid of the Communists.

6 Hsi-shan, Yen, Yen Po-ch'uan hsien-sheng yen-lun lei-pien (The Collected Addresses of Mister Yen Po-ch'uan) (Shanghai, 1939)Google Scholar, Vol. III Shang, 439 and 386. Hereafter cited as Yen Hsi-shan, Lectures.

7 See ibid., pp. 432–433. Also Yen Hsi-shan, Lectures, Vol. I, 437 and Vol. IX, 10.Google Scholar

8 Hsi-shan, Yen, Lectures, Vol. IIIGoogle Scholar Shang, 414.

9 See ibid., p. 409.

10 See ibid., pp. 432–433.

11 “Ta-shih shu-yao” [“Account of Important Events”], p. 1Google Scholar, in Kuo-wen chou-pao, 04 6, 1936Google Scholar. Another account states that only one-third had rifles and that the Communists were without cannon of any kind. See The North China Herald, 07 8, 1936Google Scholar, 80:3. Hereafter referred to as NCH.

12 Kenichi, Hatano, Chūgoku kyōsantō shi, ichi ku san roku nen (The History of the Chinese Communist Party During 1936) (Tokyo, 1961), p. 47.Google Scholar

13 See ibid., pp. 14, 42, and 46–47. Also NCH, May 6, 1936, 226:3 and Tokuichi, Himeno, Hokushi no seijō (Political Conditions in North China) (Tokyo, 1936), p. 152.Google Scholar

14 Yuzō, Fukada, Shina kyōsangun no gensei (The Current Condition of the Chinese Communist Army) (Tokyo, 1939), p. 364Google Scholar. According to another source, initially Communist soldiers succeeded in disguising themselves as merchants, farmers, and laborers. This would have been impossible without the cooperation of the local population. See NCH, 03 18, 1936, 477:4.Google Scholar

15 NCH, 04 1, 1936, 8:3–4.Google Scholar

16 NCH, 05 6, 1936, 226:3.Google Scholar

17 Tokuichi, Himeno, op. cit., p. 153.Google Scholar

18 Shu-li, Chao, Li-chia-chuang te pien-ch'ien (Li Village Turns Over) (Shanghai, 1947), p. 51.Google Scholar

19 NCH, 07 8, 1936, 80:4.Google Scholar

20 The China Weekly Review, 11 21, 1936, p. 430Google Scholar. Hereafter referred to as CWR.

21 For example, see NCH, 05 6, 1936, 266:3 and 07 8, 1936, 80:3.Google Scholar

22 Kenichi, Hatano, op. cit., p. 47.Google Scholar

23 The anti-Japanese riots of December, 1931, destroyed the authority of the Central Government in Shansi and made it possible for Yen Hsi-shan to regain control of his province after a brief period of exile following the defeat of his armies at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek in 1931. Yen proclaimed his solidarity with the demonstrators by publicly appealing to the central Government to throw an immense force of crack troops into the battle for Chin-chou, a city located on die border between Manchuria and Hopei. He went on to warn that the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was simply a prelude to the invasion of North China so that by not resisting in Manchuria the Government was committing suicide. See Hua-pei jih-pao, 12 25, 1931Google Scholar, as quoted in Hatano Kenichi, Gendai Shlna no kiroku (Modern China Archives), 12, 1931, pp. 337–339Google Scholar. There were reports that the arsenal in Taiyuan was turning out ammunition for use by Chinese volunteers fighting the Japanese in Manchuria. See Woodhead, H. G. W., ed. The China Year Book,, 1934 (Shanghai, 1934), p. 298.Google Scholar

24 Perhaps the most important of these was the Shan-hsi min-chung chien-cheng yun-tung hui or “Shansi Association for the Promotion of Popular Supervision of the Government,” which Yen created in 1932 for the purpose of supervising the implementation of his ten-year plan of economic development. This organization published a magazine entided Chien-cheng chou-k'an or “Supervisorial Weekly.” The January 1, 1935, issue of this periodical contains several articles attacking Japan. For example, see articles by Li Ch'ang-sheng, Ying Ch'iu, and Jen Ying-lun in Chien-cheng chou-k'an, 01 1, 1935Google Scholar. According to Jen Ying-lun, in 1932 Yen also founded two other anti-Japanese organizations: the T'ieh hsieh chiu-kuo t'uan or “Blood and Iron National Salvation Corps” and the Fu-ch'ou fuan or “Revenge Corps.” See Jen Ying-lun and Kuo Chien-fu, “Chin shih-nien-Iai chih shan-hsi min-chung yün-tung” [“The Shansi Mass Movement during the past Ten Years”], p. 4, in Chien-cheng chou-k'an, 01 1, 1935Google Scholar. Consequently, Professor Johnson is wrong when he asserts that “Anti-Japanese nationalistic agitation in Shansi began … in November, 1935.” See Johnson, Chalmers A., op. cit., p. 99.Google Scholar

25 Hsi-shan, Yen, Lectures, Vol. IV, 45Google Scholar and Wang Meng-chou and Chang Lant'ing, “I-nien-lai Shan-hsi chih chin-tu” (“The Fight Against the Drug Traffic in Shansi during the Past Year”), p. 5, in Chien-cheng chou-k'an, 01 1, 1935.Google Scholar

26 Tso-hua, Chang, “Nui-meng wen-t'i yü kuo-fang” [“The Inner Mongolian Problem and National Defense”], Kuo-wen chou-pao, 09 7, 1936, pp. 2–5.Google Scholar

27 NCH, 01 29, 1936, 175:2 and 03 18, 1936, 477:4Google Scholar. Also Kenichi, Hatano, Chūgokuy kyōsantō shi, ichi ku san roku nen, p. 16Google Scholar. Hatano expresses amazement at the Provincial Government's willingness to sponsor anti-Japanese demonstrations at a time when Communist armies were threatening Shansi. Throughout the 1930's, Japanese policy with respect to North China seems to have been based on the mistaken premise that conservative Chinese leaders, like Yen Hsi-shan, were fundamentally pro-Japanese, although occasionally obliged to indulge in anti-Japanese oratory in order to appease Chinese nationalism. For example, see Ikuhiku, Hata, Nitchū sensō shi (A History of the Sino-Japanese War) (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 60–61Google Scholar and Shizuo, Maruyama, Ushinawaretaru kiroku (The Story of Defeat) (Tokyo, 1950), pp. 172–173Google Scholar. This may explain why Professor Johnson, who consulted Japanese sources for most of his information about Yen Hsi-shan, leaves the impression that Yen resisted Japan for fear that otherwise his followers would go over to the outspokenly anti-Japanese Communist Party. See Chalmers A. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 99–100 and 105. As indicated above, Yen had powerful reasons for disliking Japan's policy toward China and opposed it vigorously several years before the Communists challenged his authority in Shansi. An exhaustive investigation of Yen's relations with the Japanese throughout his long career reveals diat at no time was Yen pro-Japanese, nor did he leave off resisting Japan until after 1940 when further opposition to the repeatedly victorious Japanese Army seemed to be utterly futile. Professor Johnson's misapprehension concerning Yen's attitude toward the Japanese illustrates one of the pitfalls that lie in the path of anyone who attempts to write the history of modern China almost exclusively on the basis of information obtained from Japanese sources. Even less reliable is the data about Yen Hsi-shan which Professor Johnson took from Professor George Taylor's book, entitled “The Struggle for North China.” Professor Taylor's own source was an English adventurer named George Hogg, who merely repeated what he was told by the Communists and their sympathizers. See Hogg, George, I See a New China (Boston, 1945), pp. 24–25.Google Scholar

28 Min, Wan, “The New Situation and the New Tactics in Soviet China,” International Press Correspondence, 12 8, 1935, p. 1659.Google Scholar

29 Min, Wan, “Replies to Chief Arguments Against the Anti-Imperialist Front in China,” International Press Correspondence, 01 11, 1936, p. 40.Google Scholar

30 Hua, Chie, “A Further Step Towards the Annexation of North China,” International Prest Correspondence, 06 13, 1936, p. 917.Google Scholar

31 International Press Correspondence, 03 14, 1936, p. 377Google Scholar. Mr. Uno Shigeaki of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who has examined much of the Japanese material pertaining to the Communist invasion of Shansi, feels that Communist leaders sent their armies into Shansi, not with the intention of overthrowing Yen Hsi-shan, but rather in the hope that a show of strength would induce Yen to accept their offer of an anti-Japanese alliance. Interview with Mr. Uno Shigeaki at Stanford, California, November 27, 1962.

32 Earl Leaf as quoted in Tan Shin She, “The Policy of the C. P. of China and the Chinese Red Army,” International Press Correspondence, 05 16, 1936, p. 630.Google Scholar

33 NCH, 07 8, 1936, 80:4.Google Scholar

34 Chih-chin, Ch'i, op. cit., p. 26.Google Scholar

35 NCH, 04 1, 1936, 8:3–4.Google Scholar

36 Shu-li, Chao, op. cit., pp. 51–55Google Scholar. Chao Shu-li spent most of his life in Shansi, where he grew up in a small village, much like the fictional one which is the locale of the events described in “Li Village Turns Over.” For an informative autobiographical sketch of Chao Shu-li see Beiden, Jack, op. cit., pp. 89–96.Google Scholar

37 Chih-chin, Ch'i, op. cit., p. 26.Google Scholar

38 Fei, Li, “So-wei ‘t'u-ti ts'un yu’” [“The So-called ‘All Land to the Village’ Scheme”], Hsin wen-hua (New Culture), 02 1, 1936, pp. 13–15.Google Scholar

30 Min, Wang, “For a Change in All Spheres of Our Work,” international Press Correspondence, 02 8, 1936, p. 223.Google Scholar

40 Wu, H. P. Tasmania, “Chinese Red Army in Shansi,” China Today, 01, 1937, p. 39.Google Scholar

41 “Ta-shih shu-yao,” pp. 1–2Google Scholar, in Kuo-wen chou-fao, 04 6, 1936.Google Scholar

42 This was the opinion of the newspaper Ta Kung Pao, as quoted in “Ping-lun” [“Editorials”], p. 2Google Scholar, Kuo-wen chou-pao, 02 24, 1936Google Scholar. It is shared by Kenichi, Hatano, op. cit., pp. 4–6Google Scholar, and Wan Yah-kang, a reporter who spent several years in the Communist capital of Yenan after the outbreak of die Sino-Japanese War in 1937. See Yah-kang, Wan, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chien-shih (A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Hong Kong, 1951), p. 48.Google Scholar

43 The testimony of Yen Hsi-shan and his supporters can be found in Yen Hsi-shan, Lectures, Vol. III Shang, 448 and Vol. IX, 11, Yuzō, Fukada;, op. cit., pp. 362–363Google Scholar, and “Ta-shih, shu-yao,” p. 5Google Scholar, Kuo-wen chou-pao, 05 18, 1936Google Scholar. Reports written by English and American missionaries stationed in Shansi appeared in the NCH, 05 6, 1936, 226:3 and 07 8, 1936, 80:4Google Scholar. For a revealing Japanese narrative, which maintains that the Communists confiscated even the wealdi of rich peasants, see Tokuichi, Himeno, op. cit., p. 152Google Scholar. Another Japanese account merely says that notwidistanding its demands for an anti-Japanese united front, in Shansi the Community Party pursued orthodox Communist fiscal and economic policies. See Reizo, Otsuka, “The Red Influence in China,” in Data Papers, Sixth Congress, Institute of Pacific Relations (Tokyo, 1936), Vol. VII: 49Google Scholar. This is corroborated by at least one Communist writer. See Wu, H. P. Tasmania, op. cit. p. 39.Google Scholar

44 Yen, Himeno, and the missionaries all speak of officials and wealthy persons being killed. Only Hatano Kenichi, op. cit., p. 43, mentions the execution of captured officers; however, he seems to be exceptionally knowledgeable with respect to the actual fighting and conditions within the various armies.

45 NCH, 05 6, 1936, 22:3 and 07 8, 1936, 80:4.Google Scholar

46 Edgar Snow, as quoted in Kenicho, Hatano, Chūgokō kyōsantō shi, ichi ku son shichi nen (A History of the Chinese Communist Party during 1937) (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 680–682.Google Scholar

47 Ch'ang-ch'iang, Fan et al. , Hsi-pei hsien (Northwestern Front) (Shanghai, 1938), pp. 146–147Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as HPH.

48 See Tokuichi, Himeno, op. cit., p. 153Google Scholar, NCH, 04 i, 1936, 8:3Google Scholar, and Hanson, Haldore E., “Chinese War Lord Dreams of Russia,” CWR, 02 8, 1936, p. 356.Google Scholar

48 Hsi-shan, Yen, LecturesGoogle Scholar, Vol. Ill Hsia, 239 and Yuzō, Fukada, op. cit., pp. 357–358 and 365–366.Google Scholar

50 Ch'iang, Ch'ang, “Shan-hsi chi-hsing” [“Notes Made on a Trip to Shansi”], Kuo-wen chou-pao, 03 29, 1937, p. 23Google Scholar. In October, another reporter who visited the headquarters of the “Justice Force” in Taiyuan was told much the same thing. See Fang-t'ung, Ch'en, “T'ai-yuan lueh-hing” [“Fleeting Impressions of Taiyuan”], Kuo-wen chou-pao, 12 7, 1936, p. 31.Google Scholar

51 Ch'iang, Chang, op. cit., p. 23Google Scholar. Professor Johnson, on die other hand, leaves his readers with the impression that the “Justice Force” was set up to appease anti-Japanese elements and does not mention its attempts to destroy the popularity of Communism by combatting social injustice. See Johnson, Chalmers A., op. cit., pp. 99–100 and 219–220Google Scholar. This is inexplicable because, although he failed to consult the Chinese works referred to here as sources of information about the “Justice Force,” he cites a study by a Japanese who describes in detail the activities and objectives of this organization. See Yuzō, Fukada, op. cit., pp. 336–361Google Scholar. Nothing Fukada says suggests that the “Justice Force” was established for the purpose of arousing or absorbing anti-Japanese sentiment. This may explain why Professor Johnson, who argues otherwise, accuses Fukada of writing “from a vociferously … Japanese nationalist point of view,” notwithstanding the fact that Fukada obviously is quoting from materials issued by the “Justice Force” itself. See Johnson, , op. cit., p. 220Google Scholar. Virtually everything Fukada says concerning the “Justice Force” can be found in the writings of Yen Hsi-shan, which indicate that this organization did not take on a pronounced anti-Japanese coloration until 1937. See Hsi-shan, Yen, LecturesGoogle Scholar, Vol. III Hsia, 230 and 239, and Vol. II, 189. Professor Johnson also is mistaken when he states that the “Justice Force” was created in the summer of 1936. See Johnson, , op. cit., p. 99Google Scholar. An examination of Yen's speeches reveals that the “Justice Force” was conceived of as early as October, 1935, and actually organized in the winter of 1936, during the Communist invasion of Shansi. See Hsi-shan, Yen, Lectures, Vol. IX, 14Google Scholar. Since Fukada says much the same thing (see pages 336–337 and page 361), Professor Johnson either did not read Fukada's account carefully or else ignored Fukada's assertions because they contradict his own assumptions with regard to the history of Chinese Communism.

52 Yah-kang, Wan, op. cit., p. 48.Google Scholar

53 Perhaps the most valuable sources of information about Communist activities in Shansi during the Japanese conquest are accounts written by Chinese newsmen who accompanied units of the Eighth Route Army. Many of these were edited by one Kao K'e-fu and published under the title, Ti-pa lu chün tsai Shan-hsi (The Eighth Route Army in Shansi) (Shanghai, 1938)Google Scholar. The style in which these articles are written suggests that they were set down in great haste and not appreciably altered by the editor. Most of the reporters who composed these narratives were sympathetic to the Communists, but wrote regularly for the non-Communist newspaper, Ta Kung Pao. Their writings also appear in a number of other books published early in 1938 under the auspices of Ta Kung Pao, along with articles by correspondents like the famous Fan Ch'ang-ch'iang, who were attached to Kuomintang and provincial armies fighting the Japanese in Northwestern China. None of diese works is mentioned in Professor Johnson's bibliography.

54 Fan Ch'ang-ch'iang, et al., Hsi-hsien hsieh-chan chi (An Account of the Bloody Fighting on the Western Front) (No date or place of publication), pp. 25–28. Hereafter cited as HHHCC.

55 Ch'ang-ch'iang, Fan et al. , Hsi-hsien feng-yün (The Situation on the Western Front) (Shanghai, 1937). p. 183Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as HHFY.

56 HHHCC, p. 51.Google Scholar

57 Kao-K'e-fu, ed., Ti-pa lu-chün tsai Shan-hsi, pp. 190–205Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as TPL.

58 The New York Times, 10 12, 1937, 3:3.Google Scholar

59 HHHCC, pp. 70–71Google Scholar. Even the Communists lavished praise on Yen's troops for their heroic defense of Yüan-p'ing. For example, see Pi-shih, Jen, “Shan-hsi k'ang-chan te hui-i” [“Recollections of the Fighting in Shansi”], Chieh Fang (Liberation), 01 28, 1938, p. 16.Google Scholar

60 Hanson, Haldore E., Humane Endeavour (New York, 1939), p. 108Google Scholar. This interpretation of the battle of Hsin-k'ou is based on the account given in Fan Ch'ang-ch'iang, et al., Hsi-pei chan-yün (War Clouds over the Northwest) (Shanghai, 1938), pp. 109–115Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as HPCY. A Communist account describes the fighting at Hsin-k'ou as “the most fierce in North China.” See Pi-shih, Jen, op. cit., p. 16Google Scholar. An authoritative Japanese study calls the battle a “stalemate” and speaks of enormous Japanese casualties. See Ikuhiku, Hata, op. cit., p. 277.Google Scholar

61 HPH, pp. 51–53.Google Scholar

62 See ibid., p. 53.

63 CWR, 12 18, 1937, 74:2Google Scholar. A vivid description of the battle for Taiyuan can be found in Smedley, Agnes, China Fights Back (New York, 1938), pp. 201–208.Google Scholar

64 These were the figures given to Agnes Smedley by General Wei Li-huang, who commanded the armies despatched to Shansi by the Central Government. See Smedley, Agnes, op. cit., p. 211Google Scholar. A Japanese study states that the battles of P'ing-hsing kuan, Hsin-k'ou, and Taiyuan were responsible for more than half of the losses sustained by the Japanese Army in North China. According to this account, by the time it occupied Taiyuan, the Itagaki Division had lost virtually all of its officers. See Ikuhiku, Hata, op. cit., p. 279.Google Scholar

65 The New York Times, 02 19, 1938, 3:7.Google Scholar

66 U. S. Army, Forces in the Far East, North China Area Operations Record, 07 1937–05 1941Google Scholar. Tokyo: Military History Section; Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, 1955. Japanese Monograph 178, pp. 126–128.

67 Ibid. Also see Elmquist, Paul O., The Nature of the Chinese Foothold in Shansi, 1937–1938. (Unpublished manuscript in the possession of the writer), p. 30.Google Scholar

68 NCH, 04 5, 1939, 10:1 and 04 19, 1939, 98:1.Google Scholar

69 NCH, 11 15, 1939, 272:4 and 11 22, 1939, 317:5Google Scholar. Also see U. S. Army, Forces in the Far East, op. cit., pp. 221–223 and 308–312.

70 Although Professor Johnson devotes considerable attention to the Communist victory over the Japanese at P'ing-hsing-kuan, he does not mention the more important battle of Hsin-k'ou or the fighting at Nan-k'ou, Niang-tzu-kuan, Taiyuan, and Ling-shih-kuan. He is not the first American to be taken in by Communist efforts to create the impression that the Eighth Route Army was responsible for the setbacks experienced by the Japanese in Shansi. For example, the journalists, Theodore White and Anna Lee Jacoby, confuse what happened at Hsin-k'ou with the struggle for P'ing-hsing-kuan and give the Communists credit for victories at both places. Sec White, Theodore and Jacoby, Anna Lee, Thunder Out of China (New York, 1946), p. 50.Google Scholar

71 HHFY, pp. 219–220.Google Scholar

72 HHHCC, p. 44.Google Scholar

73 Ibid.

74 HHFY, pp. 213–217Google Scholar. Also see TPL, pp. 79–80, 96, and 100–103.Google Scholar

75 HHFY, pp. 170 and 222.Google Scholar

76 HPH, p. 146.Google Scholar

77 TPL, p. 223.Google Scholar

78 See ibid., p. 41.

79 See ibid., p. 277.

80 See ibid., p. 41.

81 HPCY, p. 40.Google Scholar

82 TPL, p. 37.Google Scholar

83 HPH, p. 147.Google Scholar

84 TPL, pp. 203, 221, and 226–229.Google Scholar

85 HHFY, pp. 219–220.Google Scholar

86 See ibid., p. 220.

87 Johnson, Chalmers A., op. cit., p. 19.Google Scholar

88 See ibid., p. 218.

89 TPL, pp. 186–187.Google Scholar

90 See ibid., p. 159. A Communist account written early in 1938 calls on the Communists to exploit the resentment aroused among the peasants by the behavior of the Japanese Army but says that lightening their economic burdens is “the most important way of inducing the masses to organize for resistance.” Sec Pi-shih, Jen, op. cit., p. 17.Google Scholar

91 Tse-tung, Mao, The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan (Peking, 1956), pp. 9 and 18.Google Scholar

92 Shu-li, Chao, op. cit., pp. 56 and 58.Google Scholar

93 HHHCC, p. 53.Google Scholar

94 Shu-li, Chao, op. cit., pp. 67–68.Google Scholar

95 See ibid., p. 94.

96 TPL, p. 279.Google Scholar

97 See ibid., pp. 44–45 and 250–262.

98 Ch'ien, Wang, Erh-shih-ch'i nien Shan-hsi cheng-chih kai-k'uang (Twenty Seven Years of Government in Shansi) (Unpublished manuscript in the possession of the writer), p. 21bGoogle Scholar. Professor Johnson erroneously describes these committees as an invention of the Communists. See Johnson, Chalmers A., op. cit., p. 97Google Scholar. He seems to be intent on conveying the impression that in Shansi only the Communists attempted to arouse the masses against the Japanese.

99 TPL, p. 45.Google Scholar

100 See ibid. pp. 46, 75, 136–137, and 164.

101 Yen had been unable to make the gentry pay their share of these taxes. This was a source of continual concern to younger and more liberal elements in his régime. For example, see Ch'i Tien-yū, “I-nien-lai Shan-hsi chih ts'ai-cheng” [“Fiscal Administration in Shansi During the Past Year”], pp. 8 and 14, in Chien-cheng chou-kan, 01 1, 1935.Google Scholar

102 TPL, pp. 46, 75, and 279–280.Google Scholar

103 See ibid., pp. 46 and 229.

104 See ibid., pp. 75 and 280.

105 See ibid., p. 271 and HPCY, p. 44.Google Scholar

106 TPL, p. 281.Google Scholar

107 Shu-li, Chao, op. cit., p. 66.Google Scholar

108 For example, see TPL, p. 75.Google Scholar

109 See ibid., 275–276.

110 See ibid., 281.

111 HHFY, p. 222.Google Scholar

112 TPL, p. 274.Google Scholar

113 Shih-yeh pu, Kuo-chi mao-i chü (Industry Section, Board of International Trade), pub, Chung-kuo shih-yeh chih, Shan-hsi sheng (The Chinese Industrial Gazetteer, Shansi Province) (Shanghai, 1937), p. 50–iGoogle Scholar. Another equally authoritative source states that in 1934 fully independent peasants and their families comprised 66 percent of the rural population in Shansi. See Monthly Review of Economic Statistics, 09, 1935, p. 8Google Scholar. A third set of statistics, which indicates that only 40 percent of the peasants were tenants or partial tenants, can be found in T'ang Ch'i-yü, “P'ing Yen Hsi-shan shih chih ‘t'u-ti ts'un yu’” [“A Critique of Mr. Yen Hsi-shan's ‘All Land to the Village’ Scheme”], Tung-fang tsa-chih (Far Eastern Miscellany), 11 1, 1936, p. 7Google Scholar. After visiting Shansi in the winter of 1935, the American writer, Haldore Hanson, said that no less than 70 per cent of the farmers were completely independent and a mere 3 percent, exclusively tenants. See Hanson, Haldore E., “Chinese War Lord Dreams of Russia,” CWR, 02 8, 1936, p. 356.Google Scholar

114 United States Department of State, pub., Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Far East, 1936 (Washington D. C., 1954), p. 70.Google Scholar

115 Chiao-fu, Chang, “Living Conditions of Peasants in Middle Shansi,” Agrarian China (Shanghai, 1938), p. 201.Google Scholar

116 Hsü Fan-t'ing, “Chi Shan-hsi t'u-huang-ri Yen Hsi-hsan te i-feng wu-ch'ien yen shu” [“A Five Thousand Word Letter to the Small-time Emperor Yen Hsi-shan”], p. 11, in Ch'en Po-ta, Yen Hsi-shan p'i-p'an (A Criticism of Yen Hsi-shan) (Kalgan, 1945).Google Scholar

117 Tuan Liang-ch'en, “I-nien-lai chih Shan-hsi ching-chi” [“The Economy of Shansi During the Past Year”], p. 4, in Chien-cheng chou-k'an, 01 1, 1935Google Scholar. Also see Ch'üan-kuo ching-chi wei-yüan-hui (“National Economic Committee”), pub., Shan-hsi k'ao-ch'a pao-kao shu (Report on an Investigation of Shansi) (Shanghai, 1936), pp. 316 and 326Google Scholar. In at least one village, interest rates were as high as 80 per cent by 1936. See Chih-chin, Ch'i, op. cit., p. 25.Google Scholar

118 Chiao-fu, Chang, op. cit., p. 203.Google Scholar

119 Chih-chin, Ch'i, op. cit., p. 25.Google Scholar

120 Hanson, Haldore E., op. cit., p. 356.Google Scholar

121 Liang-ch'en, Tuan, op. cit., p. 11.Google Scholar

122 TPL, p. 273.Google Scholar

123 Ibid.

124 HPCY, p. 31.Google Scholar

125 TPL, pp. 273, 277, and 280.Google Scholar

126 See ibid., pp, 273–274.

127 See ibid., p. 271.

128 See ibid., p. 274.

129 See ibid., p. 75–76.

130 HPCY, pp. 106 and 146.Google Scholar

131 Smedley, Agnes, Battle Hymn of China (New York, 1943), pp. 189–190Google Scholar. Also TPL, p. 278.Google Scholar

132 See ibid., p. 189. Also Chu Teh's statement in TPL, p. 164Google Scholar, and Lo Fu's in HPCY, p. 146.Google Scholar

133 TPL, pp. 277–278.Google Scholar

134 Shu-li, Chao, op. cit., pp. 61–62, 69–76, and 83.Google Scholar

135 See ibid., p. 77. Also TPL, pp. 46 and 229.Google Scholar

136 Statement by Lo Fu in HPCY, pp. 149–151.Google Scholar

137 TPL, p. 159.Google Scholar

138 Shu-li, Chao, op. cit., p. 112.Google Scholar

139 TPL, pp. 136–137 and 252.Google Scholar

140 See ibid., pp. 136–137 and 163.

141 TPL, p. 281.Google Scholar

142 Yen Hsi-shan's campaign to modernize the economy of Shansi and its impact on his relations with the gentry will be the subject of another article.

143 Gaimushō jōhō bu (Information Section, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), comp., Gendai Chūka minkoku manshō teikoka jimmei kan (Current Survey of Important Men in the Chinese Republic and the Manchu Empire) (Tokyo, 1937), p. 278.Google Scholar

144 Hsi-shan, Yen, Lectures, Vol. IIIGoogle Scholar Shang, 630 and Vol. IX, 40.

145 NCH, 01 29, 1936, 175:1Google Scholar. Also see Mu-ch'iao, Hsieh, ed., Chung-kuo nung-ts'un wen-t'i (The Problem of China's Peasant Villages) (No place of publication, 1936), p. 46.Google Scholar

146 CWR, 05 22, 1937, p. 456Google Scholar. Also see Fang-t'ung, Ch'en, op. cit., p. 29.Google Scholar

147 TPL, p. 235Google Scholar. Also see HHHCC, pp. 42–44Google Scholar and HHFY, p. 219.Google Scholar

148 CWR, 07 31, 1937, p. 312Google Scholar. Also see HHHCC, pp. 47–48Google Scholar and TPL, pp. 41 and 112.Google Scholar

149 For example, see TPL, pp. 88, 183–184, and 278Google Scholar. Also see HHHCC, pp. 40–41Google Scholar, and HPH, pp. 55 and 65.Google Scholar

150 Meng, C. Y. W., “Japan's Plans to Attack China's First Line of Defense,” CWR, 06 19, 1937, pp. 90–91.Google Scholar

151 For example, see Chu Teh's statement to the reporter Hsü Ying, in TPL, p. 163Google Scholar. Another Ta Kung Pao correspondent also calls the gentry a major source of collaborators in Shansi. See TPL, p. 136.Google Scholar

152 Agnes Smedley, as quoted in Hatano Kenichi, Chūgoku kyōsantō shi, ichi ku san shichi nen, p. 307.Google Scholar

153 Shu-li, Chao, op. cit., p. 96.Google Scholar

154 It was an established policy of the Japanese to guarantee property rights and other privileges belonging to indigenous élites in return for their cooperation in administering newly conquered territories. For example, see Barclay, George W., Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan (Princeton, 1954), pp. 49–52.Google Scholar

155 Johnson, Chalmers A., op. cit., p. 19.Google Scholar

156 There is reason to believe that the united front and many of the policies associated with it were forced on the unwilling Chinese Communists by the Soviet Union as late as December, 1936. An interesting discussion of this subject is James C. Thomson, Jr., “Communist Policy and the United Front in China, 1935–1936,” Harvard University, Committee on International and Regional Studies Seminar, Papers on China, Volume 11 (1957)Google Scholar. Thomson's study docs not appear in Professor Johnson's bibliography.

157 TPL, p. 84.Google Scholar

158 Ch'en Po-ta, Yen Hsi-shan p'i-p'an (A Criticism of Yen Hsi-shan), pp. 1–70Google Scholar, in the anthology of the same name (Kalgan, 1945).