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The Oyüwan Soviet Area, 1927–1932
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
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One of the striking differences between the Russian and Chinese Communist revolutions was the Chinese use of rural bases (Soviet Areas) to capture national political control—surrounding the cities with the countryside. Remarkably, these bases, their evolution, characteristics, and role in the various intra-Party struggles remain one of the least studied or understood elements in our knowledge of Chinese Communist history.
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References
1 See Eto, Shinkichi, “Hai-lu-feng—The First Chinese Soviet Government,” Peking: The China Quarterly (October–December, 1961) No. 8, p. 162Google Scholar, for a discussion in English of this Institute and its staff.
2 Nung-hsüeh, Shan, Chung-kuo nung-min ch'an-ch'eng shih ti yen-chiu, (Studies on the Struggles of the Chinese Farmers) (Shanghai, 1935).Google Scholar
3 T'ang Leang Li in his, Suppressing Communist Banditry in China (Shanghai: China United Press, 1934) p. 35Google Scholar says
“The doubtful elements … had been left at the rear during the march from Canton to the Yangtze, and their leaders were concentrated in Kiangsi between Kiukiang and Nanchang.”
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4 I have discussed the location factors of such bases in “A Political Geography of Revolution,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XI, No. 2, June, 1967.Google Scholar
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9 Eto, , op. cit., p. 182Google Scholar gives the number of students in the Institute from each province. Also see, Strong, , op. cit., p. 160Google Scholar, and Chung-kuo chin tai nung yeh shift tzu liao (Source Materials on Modern Chinese Agriculture History), II, 1912–1927 (Peking: San Lien, 1957), 694.Google Scholar
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from Chiangling to Chienli, Hsienti, Tungyang, everywhere opening the prisons to release the haoshên, who then acted as guides to hunt down the commissioners of the present associations and the executive committee members and to slaughter them. They killed right and left almost all the way to Wuchang. In the hsien adjacent to Honan, the gentry united with the Red Spears to massacre the peasants. In western and northern Hupeh they joined with Chang Lien-shen and Yü Hsüeh-chung…. In Yanghsin they poured kerosene over the peasants and burned them alive. In Hwangkang they used red hot irons to sear the flesh and to kill. In Lotien they bound their victims to trees and cut them to death with one thousand cuts into which they rubbed sand and salt. They cut open the breasts of women comrades, pierced their bodies perpendicularly with wires, and paraded them naked through the streets. In Tsung-chang, every comrade was pierced twenty times.
Yi-tsen, Tsai, “Difficulties and Recent Tactics of the Hupeh Peasant Movement,” Min Kuo Jih Pao, June 12–13, 1927Google Scholar, cited in Isaacs, op. cit. p. 227.
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20 Taube, O., op. cit., p. 23Google Scholar and ibid., p. 448.
21 The best documentary collection on the Li Li-san period and its policies in English is found in Tso-liang, Hsiao, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), pp. 14–49Google Scholar and passim.
22 Ch'en, Jerome, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 156–57Google Scholar and Chiao jet chan-shih, VI, pp. 447–57Google Scholar, contain detailed accounts of this reorganization.
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26 Chiao fei chan-shih, ibid., pp. 450–51 gives details on this process and the men involved.
27 Ibid., p. 453.
28 “O-yü-wan ch'u ti su-wei-ai yun tung” [The Oyüwan Area's Soviet Movement], Hung Ch'i Chou Pao, No. 25, November 27, 1931Google Scholar, and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien's autobiography to Nym Wales, Red Dust, op. cit., pp. 148–62.Google Scholar
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31 According to the editorial in the Communist International, November 11, 1931Google Scholar, Oyüwan was commended for its “forward and positive line” while the Central Soviet (Kiangsi) was criticized for its “procrastination” and errors of “opportunism” in failing to attack key cities following the November, 1931, Party Conference (The First All-China Congress of Soviets). Later (1936) Mao criticized the leaders of Oyüwan for their “Left” opportunism, Tse-tung, Mao, “Problems of China's Revolutionary War,” Selected Worlds, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), 201–02.Google Scholar
32 “Pi pi pai pai su-wei-ai yun-tung,” op. cit., p. 54.Google Scholar
33 Ibid. p. 55.
34 Accounts of this purge can be found in, Tso-liang, Hsiao, op. cit., pp. 193–94Google Scholar, Wales, Nym, Red Dust, op. cit., p. 154Google Scholar, and “Pi pi pai pai te su-wei-ai yun-tung,” op. cit., pp. 56–57.Google Scholar
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36 Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien gives the details of this situation to Wales, Nym, Red Dust, op. cit., p. 154Google Scholar. Also Tso-liang, Hsiao, op. cit., pp. 193–94Google Scholar. See also “Oyüwan ch'u ti su-wei-ai yun-tung,” op. cit.
37 Mach'eng, it will be recalled, was one of the original hsien of the Oyüwan base. See above p. 7.
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39 O'Ballance, Edgar, The Red Army of China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), pp. 76–77.Google Scholar
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42 See, Chung-kuo hsien-tai ko-ming shih ts'an-k'ao kua t'u (Collected Wall Maps of the Chinese Revolution) (Peking: Chinese People's University, 1958) and the report of Col. David D. Barrett, “Communist Account of Clashes with the Chinese National Government in Kiangsi and Anhui, 1939–41” with maps (on file in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford).
43 In an interview with the author in the summer of 1965, Mr. Rung Chu (author of Wo yü Hung-chun [The Red Army and I], Hong Kong: South Wind Publishing Co., 1954Google Scholar), stressed that Chang Kuo-t'ao was not present at the Tsunyi Conference, but had wired word from his base in Szechwan reprimanding Mao for his attacks on the Returned Students. Chang's concern was for what Moscow would think. At Maoerkai, Chang had more, fresher, and better equipped troops than Mao and was clearly the more powerful. As Mao's name was better known, however, Mao was selected Chairman and Chang Vice-Chairman. Other sources include Ho Kan-chih, op. cit., Wales, Nym, Red Dust, op cit.Google Scholar, and North, Robert, Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953).Google Scholar
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