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Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Itō-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894–95

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Edward I-te Chen
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Extract

At the conclusion of the war in 1895, Japan acquired two territories from China: Liaotung Peninsula and Taiwan, including the islands of Penghu. (Hereafter Taiwan will denote the main island of Taiwan and the Penghus.) It is easy to understand why Japan annexed Liaotung: because of its proximity to Korea. But why was she interested in annexing Taiwan, located more than a thousand miles away from the principal battlefield and more than half of it controlled by headhunting aboriginal tribes? According to the conventional interpretation, Japan's decision on the annexation was based on consideration of two factors: (1) the island's potential as a new market, and as a supplier of food and raw materials for the rapidly expanding Japanese capitalism and labor forces and (2) its military value as a stepping-stone for future expansion in south China and southeast Asia. Implicit in such views is the assumption that Japan had planned the annexation long before the war—perhaps as early as 1874, when a Japanese expeditionary force briefly occupied a part of the island.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , November 1977 , pp. 61 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1977

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References

1 E.g., Michio, Fujimura, Nisshin Sensō (Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974, p. 202Google Scholar; and Seizaburo, Shinobu, Nisshin Sensō [orig. pub. 1934 as Mutsu Gaiko (Diplomacy of Mutsu Munemitsu)], Tokyo: Sūbunkaku, (enl. & rev. ed.) 1970, p. 31Google Scholar. Most Communist Chinese historians followed the stereotyped interpretation of economic determinism: i.e., the Meiji Government of Japan provoked the war against China under the pressure generated by fundamental conflicts inherent in her capitalist society, and the annexation of colonies was designed to solve the problems of markets and raw materials; e.g., Ch'ang-kan, Cheng, Chung-jih chia-wu chan-cheng (Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95), Peking: Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chu-pan she, 1957, p. 15Google Scholar.

2 E.g., Akira, Nakazuka, Nisshin Sensō no Kenkyu (A Study of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95), Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1968, p. 273Google Scholar.

3 Yosaburo, Takekoshi (Braithwaite, G., trans.), Japanese Rule in Formosa, New York: Longmans, 1907, p. 18Google Scholar.

4 On this date, the Japanese navy attacked the Chinese convoy transporting troops to Korea; the war was not declared, however, until 1 Aug 1894.

5 Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Nihon Gaiko Bunsho (Diplomatic records of Japan) [hereafter NGB], XXVII, pt. 2, p. 475.

6 Munemitsu, Mutsu, Kenkenroku (Diplomatic memoirs of Mutsu Munemitsu) [hereafter K], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1939 (reprint 1963), pp. 169–70Google Scholar.

7 Itō Hirobumi-den (Biography of Itō Hirobumi), Tokyo: Shunzekō Tsuishōkai (Committee to Commemorate the Passing of Itō Hirobumi), 1943, III [hereafter IHD], pp. 143–44Google Scholar.

8 IHD, p. 146.

9 Okuma made his statement in Kaishintō Tōhō; quoted in Fujimura (n. 1 above), p. 149.

10 Jiji Shimpo, 21 Aug and 31 Dec 1894; 12 Mar 1895.

11 See Kokuryukai, , Nisshi Kosho Gaishi (Confidential history of Japanese-Chinese diplomatic relations), Tokyo, 1938, pp. 298–99Google Scholar.

12 K, p. 145. There was at least one person who was on record as opposing the annexation of any Chinese territory: Viscount Tani Takeki, who argued that the annexation would cause irreparable damage to future Sino-Japanese relations. His opposition, however, was made privately in a letter written to Premier Itō (K, p. 185).

13 K, pp. 147–48. In the light of the opinions expressed by Mutsu, he may be accused of using the public clamor for territory for the purpose of expansion. It is a matter of record, however, that Premier Itō disagreed with Mutsu regarding how Japan should deal with a possible Western intervention in the face of mounting public demand for Chinese territorial concession. In the end, it was Itō whose views prevailed; therefore, Mutsu's intention is quite immaterial to the conclusion of this study.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that, unlike at the time of the Russo-Japanese War ten years later, the Japanese Government commanded the solid support of public opinion and the Diet during the Sino-Japanese War. The critics and newspapers that had opposed the government before the war supported the war policy of the government. Political parties in the Diet quickly closed ranks and passed a huge war budget and a resolution in support of the government—a situation that the Meiji oligarchs had not experienced since the implementation of the constitution. Both Itō and Mutsu were determined to preserve national unity behind the government. However, Itō was convinced, while Mutsu apparently was not, that means could be found to preserve unity (by satisfying the public demand) and to avoid foreign intervention at the same time.

14 Actually, the army shed very little blood in capturing the peninsula. For example, well-fortified Port Arthur was captured in one day. The Chinese defenders fled in panic and no resistance was offered.

15 See Yoshinori, Inō, Taiwan Bunkashi (Cultural history of Taiwan), Tokyo: Tōkō Shoin, 1928 (reprint 1965), III, p. 912Google Scholar; also Kiyoshi, Tabohashi, Nisshinsen'eki Gaikoshi no Kenkyu (A diplomatic history of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95), Tokyo: Tōkō Shoin, 1951, p. 443Google Scholar.

16 Hirobumi, Itō (ed.), Hisho Ruisan (Classified collection of the private documents of Itō Hirobumi relating to the Meiji development), Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1936, Miscellanea IV, pp. 622–23Google Scholar.

17 Both Saigo and Kabayama took part in the 1874 expedition. In 1894 Saigo was the Minister of Navy; Kabayama, the Director of Naval Strategy. They were the staunchest advocates of the annexation of Taiwan.

18 Fujimura (n. 1 above), p. 150.

19 When Yamagata was appointed the Commander of the First Army, he retained his original post as the President of the Privy Council. This unusual combination of civil and military positions made his ranking in the government even higher than that of the Prime Minister. Anticipating trouble, Itō, in a speech made at a luncheon given by the Emperor for Yamagata on the occasion of the latter's departure for Korea, emphasized the importance of coordinating military strategy with diplomacy. See Fujimura (n. 1 above), p. 104.

20 Ibid., pp. 130–31. Officially, Yamagata's recall was for reason of illness.

21 Itō's “southern strategy,” officially called “Strategy to Attack Weihaiwei and to Invade Taiwan,” is listed in its entirety in IHD, pp. 134–38.

22 Even before negotiations started, he predicted that they would fail “eight or nine out of ten chances”; IHD, p. 157. He was also disappointed by the lowly status of the Chinese representatives.

23 According to Itō, the Chinese documents were mere letters of introduction from the Chinese Emperor presenting his delegates to the Japanese Emperor, not to be considered as full credentials accepted by international law. He was, however, following the predetermined policy of semantics. See the Chinese documents in their entirety in NGB, XXVIII, pt. 2, pp. 236–37.

24 See Itō's statement in its entirety in Hirobumi, Ito (ed.), Kimitsu Nisshin Senso (Classified records of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95), Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1933 (reprint 1967), pp. 1–3Google Scholar.

25 IHD, p. 146.

26 NGB, XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 526–28.

27 Ibid., pp. 510–11, 512–13.

28 Ibid., p. 491. Mutsu noted in his memoirs that the U.S. offer of good offices prompted Japan's inclination toward peace negotiations; although Japan did not accept the U.S. offer at this time, Mutsu did recognize the need for a third party mediation. He further noted that no other country could serve as a better and more impartial mediator than the U.S. See K, pp. 177–78.

29 IHD, pp. 135–36.

30 K, pp. 185–86.

31 IHD, pp. 158–59.

32 Note 16 above, p. 335.

33 K, pp. 219–20. Also Tabohashi (n. 15 above), p. 474.

34 In a telegram to Peking, Li called the suddenchange of Japanese mood a phony act of sympathy designed to cover up the barbaric act of attempted assassination; K, p. 219.

35 After being recalled from the front line, Yama-gata was appointed the Army Minister. He would go along with a 7-day or 14-day truce, but considered a 21-day cease-fire to be too long. Tokutomilichiro, (ed.), Kōshaku Yamagata Aritomo-den (Biography of Prince Yamagata Aritomo), Tokyo: Yamagata Aritomokō Kinen Jigyōkai, 1933, III, pp. 213–14Google Scholar.

36 These words were contained in Telegram No. 1165 sent to Ambassador Nishi Tokujiro in St. Petersburg from Foreign Minister Mutsu on 23 Dec 1894. A copy of the telegram is contained in Nisshin Kowa zengo ni okeru Kakkoku no Taido-Zakken (The attitude of Western Powers before and after the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations—Miscellanea), 1; the document is stored at Gaiko Shiryokan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.

37 NGB, XXVIII, pt. 1, pp. 698–99.

38 Article 1 of the Convention of Armistice stipulated that the truce be enforced only in the provinces of Fengtien, Chihli, and Shantung; see NGB, XXVIII, pt. 2, p. 326.

39 IHD, p. 137.

40 The French reportedly warned the commander of the Chinese garrison of the impending Japanese attack, and proposed the transfer of the sovereignty of the islands to France until China could repulse the Japanese. For details, see Inō (n. 15 above), III, p. 990; also IHD, pp. 196–97.

41 As conditions for peace, along with the cession of Liaotung and Taiwan and an indemnity, Japan demanded Chinese agreement to conclude a commercial treaty on the same basis as those treaties China had granted to various Western nations. This demand was made at the time when Japan was trying to secure Western consent for the revision of her own “unequal” treaties. To comprehend such a contradiction, one must understand the Japanese psychology that by gaining the privileged status in China hitherto enjoyed only by the Western Powers, Japan could claim equality with the West.

42 K, pp. 146–47.

43 Tabohashi (n. 15 above), p. 415.

44 According to Tabohashi (ibid., p. 435), the desire to follow the example of Germany was not just Itō's alone; it was shared by other leaders including the military.

45 Fujimura (n. 1 above), p. 202. Also vide text of footnote 1 above.