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Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895–1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Chang Han-Yu  and
Ramon H. Myers
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Japan's acquisition and development of Taiwan did not stem from the efforts of a capitalist class seeking cheaper resources and new market outlets, or engaging in dumping practices to maintain a high rate of domestic profit. Taiwan's economic transformation was brought about by enterprising bureaucrats who formulated a policy of state action in areas unattractive to private capital in order to create conditions that would encourage and sustain private investment. Taiwan's traditional economy was not destroyed completely, but restructured in such a way that land and labor became more productive and resources previously idle were now employed. Japanese colonial policy was successful for the following reasons.

(1) The administration of Kodama and Gotō consisted of able leaders assisted by expert young subordinates who were dedicated to their jobs. Kodama was a first class administrator and apparently had a genius for organizing and extracting the best from his officials. Throughout his governorship he gave Gotō full support, especially in the early years when many military officers and foreign advisers complained to Kodama about Gotō's administrative methods. Aldiough Kodama's career ended in 1906, he stands out as one of the most able and imaginative young officials of the late Meiji period. In Gotō, Kodama had an enterprising, intelligent, and dedicated assistant capable of surrounding himself with able, loyal officials and providing the coordination and leadership necessary to organize their work efficiently. Gotō also had the initiative and ability to make the right strategy move or policy decision when the occasion demanded. He possessed a unique talent for discerning which elements in the traditional society could be used to strengthen modern institutions. His policy of integrating the pao-chia with a modern police system was the political key to the Japanese success in enforcing their control in the colony and obtaining local acceptance of it at the same time.

(2) The Kodama-Gotō administration simultaneously introduced a number of important reforms and investment to establish an extensive infra-structure. This encouraged expansion of the market and enabled the administration to formulate policies of promotion, regulation, and financial support to build an industry of great comparative advantage to the island, sugar.

(3) Kodama and Gotō relied on fiscal reform and deficit financing to finance their programs of reform and economic development. Taiwan's fiscal resources were limited, but the administration managed to secure the home government's underwriting of a large debt issue. The land tax reform, the introduction of new excise taxes, and the creation of the monopoly bureaus resulted in large tax revenues which enabled the administration to repay its debt within the stipulated repayment period and accumulate large budget surpluses at the same time. Taiwan's early economic growth was financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.

On first appearance, the events in Taiwan seemed to duplicate the Meiji modernization achievement. But one important distinction must be kept in mind. The Meiji bureaucracy, unlike the small group of active bureaucrats in Taiwan's administration, applied their policies of reform and state support to sectors other than agriculture. Kodama insisted that Taiwan's agriculture, particularly the export of food and raw materials to Japan, be developed to augment Japan's power for economic warfare. Had Kodama and Gotō remained in Taiwan, they might have introduced different economic and social programs in response to changing demands from Japan's industrialization and Taiwan's population increase. Subsequent colonial administrators only imitated Kodama's economic program, and while it is easy to explain this behavior by reference to the usual pattern of modern colonial rule, this seems overly facile in the light of Japan's early and heavy investment in her colony. An explanation of this puzzle is possible only after further study of Taiwan's economic growth and her economic and political relationships with Japan.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , August 1963 , pp. 433 - 449
Copyright
Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1963

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References

1 Two of the better Japanese studies that discuss Japan's colony of Taiwan are Tadao, Yanaihara, Teikoku shugika no Taiwan (Taiwan under Japanese Imperialism) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1929)Google Scholar and Shigeto, Kawano, Taiwan beikpku keizai ron (A Study of Taiwan's Rice Economy) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Ltd., 1941)Google Scholar. Three Western studies of Taiwan also deserve mention: Grajdanzev, A. J., Formosa Today: An Analysis of the Economic Development and Strategic importance of Japan's Tropical Colony (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942)Google Scholar; Barclay, George W., Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954)Google Scholar; Ginsburg, Norton S., The Economic Resources and Development of Formosa (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953).Google Scholar

2 The same argument has been cogently advanced by Kublin, Hyman, “The Evolution of Japanese Colonialism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, II (1959), 67–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 For a description of the traditional economy, see Chang Han-yu, “Jih-chu shih-tai Taiwan ching-chi chih yen-pien,” (Evolution of Taiwan's Economy during the Period of Japanese Rule), Taiwan ching-chishih erh-chi (Series Two of Taiwan's Economic History), (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1956), pp. 74–84Google Scholar; Northern Taiwan was cut off from the southern area for bulk goods shipment, and when the north had a rice surplus it had first to be exported to Amoy and then imported to southern Taiwan. See also Davidson, James W., The Island of Formosa (Taipei: World Book Publishing Co., 1961)Google Scholar, Chapters 23–27.

4 After 1895, camphor and tea continued to be exported, but sugar eventually dominated the island's trade, earning 50–60 per cent of export earnings from 1910 to 1930.

5 This term denotes administrators who spent most of their life working in colonies and developing various theories of colonial administration and development. We use the term much in the spirit in which it is used by Julien, Andre (ed.), Les Technicians de la Colonisation (XIXe–XXe siècles) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947).Google Scholar

6 For discussion of the activities of these officials, see Seikan, Sugiyama, Taiwan rekidai Sōtoku chiseki (Administrative Achievements of Taiwan's Governors-general, 1895–1912) (Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō; Kosei Gakkai, 1921), pp. 1–82Google Scholar, henceforth referred to as TRSJ; and Yoshio, Matsushita, Nogi Maresuke (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1955), pp. 114–115.Google Scholar

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11 Moriji, Moriyama, Kodama Taishō den (Biography of General Kodama) (Tokyo: Taiheiyō Tsūshin Sha, 1908)Google Scholar, henceforth referred to as Moriyama.

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18 Moriyama, , pp. 259–260, 281Google Scholar. Kodama was appointed head of a number of medical inspection teams on April 1, 1895. Shortly afterwards, he met Gotō, a civilian official attached to one such team investigating conditions of plague and was immediately impressed with his administrative abilities. They soon became warm friends.

14 A good example of Gotō's handling of a difficult social problem was the opium question. As a result of his policy to license opium users and restrict traffic to the opium monopoly bureau, opium smoking had been erased from Taiwan by the end of World War I, a notable achievement considering the large number of addicts when the island became Japan's colony. See TRSJ, pp. 42–51.Google Scholar

15 One of the many things Kodama did was to acquaint himself with the Chinese urban communities and attempt to establish better working relationships with them. He ordered annual banquets for the reputable and honored elders, men and women of eighty years and older. By such means, Kodama's administration was gradually able to gain some support for administration policies from the urban centers. TRSJ, pp. 104–108.Google Scholar

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20 Tsurumi, , II, 816Google Scholar. This is a very liberal translation of what Gotö believed Japan's strategy ought to be in Kwantung. The phrase Gotö used to denote this policy, “bunsö teki bubi,” is probably best understood in its context as “the use of culture as a major weapon.” Gotö envisaged that Japanese penetration and eventual control of Manchuria could be accomplished only by resort to cultural means. By establishing schools, public health agencies, etc., he believed the Chinese would be convinced that Japan had a moral claim to develop Manchuria and it would be to their benefit to agree to this process. Gotö seemed to wish to avoid war at all costs.

21 Tsurumi, , II, 86Google Scholar, Moriyama, , p. 290Google Scholar; Takekoshi, Yosaburo, Japanese Rule in Formosa (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), p. 18Google Scholar. Tsurumi, Moriyama, and Takekoshi agree that this reshuffling of military authority was most important for the success of Kodama's administration.

22 See the report by Gotö, Baron, “The Administration of Formosa (Taiwan),” in Count Shigenobu Okuma, Fifty Years of New Japan (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1909), p. 531.Google Scholar

23 Tsurumi, who has assembled the letters and statements of officials serving under Gotö, probably gives the best account of Gotö's methods of recruitment. See Tsurumi, , II, 56–61.Google Scholar

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26 Ibid., pp. 81–84.

27 Ibid., p. 25.

28 Asami, Noboru, Japanese Colonial Government (Unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia University 1924), pp. 62–63.Google Scholar

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30 Han-yu, Chang (see note 3), pp. 78–79Google Scholar; also Moriyama, , pp. 286–287.Google Scholar

31 TRSJ, pp. 99–102Google Scholar; also Moriyama, , pp. 295–300.Google Scholar

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33 According to Barclay's demographic study of Taiwan (see note 1), the death rate dropped from 33.4/1,000 in 1906 to 18.5/1,000 in 1943.

34 See Noboru, Niida, Chūgoku hosei shi (History of China's Legal System) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1957), pp. 280–290Google Scholar, and Chūgoku hosei shi kenkyū (Studies in the History of China's Legal System) (Tokyo: Tokyo University, 1960), pp. 164–216Google Scholar, which deals with land customs during the Ming and Ch'ing periods.

35 The best compilation of materials on this system can be found in Rinji Taiwan kyūkan chōsa kai dai ichi chōsa hōkukusho (First Report of the First Division of the Provisional Committee for the Investigation of Social Manners and Customs in Formosa) (Kyoto: Keizai Jipōsha, 03 15, 1903), I, 144–170Google Scholar. This section describes Ch'ing policy to encourage land cultivation and its influence on the land tenure system; see also Ōkurashō, , Meiji Tatsho zaisei shi (History of Public Finance During the Meiji and Taisho Periods) (Tokyo: Keizai Ōraisha, 1958), XIX, 188–288Google Scholar (henceforth referred to as Ōkurashō); the threetier land tenure system had evolved in Fukien during the late Ming, and was transplanted later into Taiwan. See Taiji, Shimizu, “Mindai Fukken no nōka no keizai toku ni ichi den sanshu no kankō nitsuite” (The Peasant Economy of Fukien during the Ming Period with Special Reference to the Custom of Triple Land Ownership), Shigaku Zasshi, LXIII (1945), 1–21.Google Scholar

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37 Ibid., pp. 234–235.

38 TRSJ, p. 62Google Scholar. Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseibu (Dept. of Civil Administration of Taiwan Government General), Taiwan dōryōko chōsa sho (Report of Survey of Measures and Standards in Taiwan); also Kaku, Ino, Taiwan bunku shi (History of Taiwan's Civilization) (Tokyo: Toko Shoin, 1928), II, 74–78.Google Scholar

39 Our discussion of Taiwan's monetary conditions and reforms for this period is derived from Kitayama Fukujirō, “Taiwan ni okeru hyōryō kahei seido to waga heisei seisaku” (Weighted Money systems and Japan's Monetary Policy in Taiwan), Taihoku Imperial University, Seigakka kenkyū nempō (Annual Report of Studies by Dept. of Politics), Vol. II, 1935.Google Scholar

40 TRSJ, pp. 158–161.Google Scholar

41 Takekoshi, , p. 259.Google Scholar

42 Ibid., p. 260.

43 Ibid., p. 285.

44 A good summary of Japanese sanitation policy and achievements in Taiwan is contained in Taiwan Sötokufu keimukyoku eiseika, Taiwan no eisei (Sanitation in Taiwan) (Taihoku: Sanitation Department of General Bureau of Police, 1935).Google Scholar

45 See Hideyuke, Yoshiya, Taiwan kyōiku shi (A History of Taiwan Education) (Taihoku: Taiwan Nichi-Nichi Shimpōsha, 1927), p. 192.Google Scholar

46 Davidson (see note 3), Chapter 25; also Provisional Committee for Survey of Taiwan Customs, Taiwan tōgyō kyukan ippan (A General Survey of Taiwan's Traditional Sugar Industry) (Taihoku: Taiwan Government General Office, 1909).Google Scholar

47 Tadao, Yanaihara, Shokumin seisaku kōgi oyobi rombon shū (Collected Essays and Lectures on Colonial Policy) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1943), pp. 206–207Google Scholar. This work contains three essays by Professor Yanaihara on the sugar industry and how the administration encouraged its growth. See also Rolph, George M., Something About Sugar (Its History, Growth, Manufacture and Distribution) (San Francisco: John J. Hewbegin, 1917), p. 277.Google Scholar

48 Davidson, , p. 453.Google Scholar

49 Yahaihara, , p. 228.Google Scholar

50 These regulations are discussed in greater detail in Shigeo, Ito (ed.), Taiwan seitō kabushiki kaisha shi (History of Taiwan Seitō Joint Stock Co.) (Taihoku: Taiwan Seitō Kaisha, 1935), pp. 63–137.Google Scholar

51 Han-yu, Chang (see note 3), pp. 87–93Google Scholar; TRSJ, pp. 135–142Google Scholar; Taiwan Sōtokufu Shōkusan Kyoku (Industrial Bureau of Taiwan Government General), Taiwan tōgyō gaiyō (A Survey of Taiwan's Sugar Industry) (Taihoku: Office of the Governor-General, 1927), p. 1.Google Scholar

52 Sōtokufu, Taiwan, Taiwan no Tōgyō (Sugar Industry of Taiwan) (Taiwan: Office of the Governor-General, 1939), p. 57.Google Scholar

53 Bank of Taiwan, Jih-chu shih-tai Taiwan ching-chi shih (Economic History of Taiwan during the Period of Japanese Rule) (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1958), I, 81.Google Scholar

54 Rolph, , p. 281.Google Scholar

55 Ōkurashō, , pp. 928–954Google Scholar. Calculated from the annual budget expenditures for these years.

56 Tsurumi, , II, 198Google Scholar. Gotō envisaged a great role for the monopoly bureaus: “As for the monopoly bureaus, their future profits must be used along with tax revenue for financing the completion of the land survey, adjusting ta-tsu claims, refunding original debt issue and interest used to promote public works, and for reforming and improving the tea and sugar industries.” See also, Okuma, , Fifty Years, PP. 543–546Google Scholar. Gotō pointed out that the success of the Japanese monopoly bureau lay in the fact that the administration could control price. He opposed a laissez-faire policy, arguing that price stabilization was necessary to guarantee stable output; see also Moriyama, , p. 302Google Scholar, for reference to Kabayama's actions and Gotō's efforts to establish government monopoly bureaus.

57 In Yen, pp. 91–92 (see note to Table 2).

58 Tsurumi, , II, 168.Google Scholar

59 Ibid., p. 177.

60 Ibid., p. 186.

61 Ibid., p. 207.

62 See Tsurumi, , II, 83–85Google Scholar for an account of an incident involving Gotō with Colonel Muramatsu.

63 See ibid., pp. 68–70 for the conflict between the foreign adviser Meyer and Gotō.