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The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543–98
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
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The characteristic feature of Japanese warfare, prior to the introduction of firearms in 1543, was the use of swords and spears in hand-to-hand fighting. Armies were made up of small, independent bands of soldiers who fought more as individuals than as units of a tactical formation, and naval units consisted of fishing vessels that were commandeered for transporting armies within bow-range or sword-reach of the enemy. Thus, all battles, whether on land or at sea, were little more than “monster fencing matches.” But the introduction of the Portuguese arquebus and the subsequent widespread manufacture of firearms soon led to radical developments in military techniques.
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References
1 The Mongols, in their first expedition against Japan in 1274, used weapons which, according to a Japanese military history written in the fourteenth century, were called teppō (a word now meaning “gun” or “firearm”). The reference reads: “When the fighting began, mighty iron balls, known as teppō, were [flung?]. They rolled down the hills like cart wheels, sounded like thunder and looked like bolts of lightning. Two or three thousand were [thrown?] at a time, and many soldiers were burned to death;” see “Taihei ki” published in Kohubun sōsho [Library of national literature] (10th ed., Tokyo: Hakubun Kan, 1918), vol. 4, pp. 478–79. The “Mōko shūrai emaki” [Scroll of the Mongol invasion], which was painted toward the close of the thirteenth century at the request of a warrior who took part in the war against the Mongols, depicts one of these “iron balls” exploding, or burning, slightly in front of, and above, a Japanese warrior. For a picture of that portion of the scroll see L. Carrington Goodrich and Feng Chia-sheng,'” “The early development of firearms in China,” his, 36 (Jan. 1946), 118. It appears that these balls were not discharged by an explosive but were a type of bomb or rocket, although Goodrich and Feng conclude that “there is valid literary evidence for the development, by the thirteenth century, of real firearms in China…” (p. 123). G. Schlegel also found that the Chinese knew and employed firearms in the thirteenth century; “On the invention and use of firearms and gunpowder in China, prior to the arrival of the Europeans,” T'oung pao, 2d ser., 3 (1902), 10. Pelliot later showed, however, that what Schlegel considered to be a thirteenth-century cannon was a type of bomb; P. Pelliot, “Bulletin critique,” T'oung pao, 2d ser., 21 (1922), 432–34. For a picture of what is claimed to be the oldest-dated cast-iron cannon, cast in China in 1377. see Thomas A. Read, “The early castings of iron: a stage in iron age civilization,” Geographical review, 24 (1934), 548.
Boxer found a gun on exhibit in Kamakura which was claimed to have been in the possession of Ashikaga Takauji (1305–58), but he found no evidence on the gun or in contemporary sources that provided any basis for this claim; C. R. Boxer, “Notes on early military influence in Japan (1543–1853), Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 2d ser., 8 (1931), 71 (hereafter cited as TASJ). The “Hōjō godai ki” [Chronicles of the Hōjō family through five generations] contains an account of the presentation of a gun (teppō ) to Hōjō Ujitsuna in 1510 by a Buddhist priest who had just returned from China; Kondō Heījō Ujitsuna in 1510 by a Buddhist priest who had just returned form China: Konō Heijō . ed., Shisehi shūran [Collection of historical materials] (3d ed., Tokyo: Kondo Shuppan Bu, 1907), vol. 5, ch. 26, pp. 58–60. Naganuma Kenkai has found numerous references to the existence of guns in Japan prior to the arrival of the Portuguese; “Teppō no denrai” [Introduction of firearms], Rekishi chiri, 23, no. 6 (1914), 623–35; “Teppō no denrai” (hosetsu) ) [Introduction of firearms (supplementary study)], Rekishi chiri, 24, no. 2 (1914), 131–50 and no. 4 (October 1914), 339–68; and “Teppō no denrai (ōtō)” [Introductio n of firearms (reply)], Rekishi chiri, 25, no. 1 (1915), 32–64. But it is generally agreed that guns were not used extensively for military purposes until the end of the Ternbun era (1532–54); Kuroita Katsumi , kokushi no kenkyū [A study of Japanese history] (6th ed., Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1937), vol. 2, p. 273.
The first Japanese historian to make a study of firearms was Arai Hakuseki (1656–1725) who wrote the “Honchō gunki kō” (12 vols.) sometime prior to 1709, the date of the earliest-known colophon. He studied the development and advantages of each type of weapon and devoted the sixth volume -to firearms: “Kakirui” [Types of firearms], Arai Hakuseki zenshū [Complete works of Arai Haku-seki] (Tokyo, 1907), vol. 6, pp. 335–41. Since his time other historians have discussed the subject; see Naganuma Kenkai, Nihon bunka shi no kenkyū [A study of the cultural history of Japan] (Tokyo: Kyoiku Kenkyū Kai, 1923), 512–22 for a summary of their studies. But they were not concerned with the total effect these new weapons had upon Japanese warfare. The more recent studies too have been limited, for the most part, to problems associated with the introduction itself: Tsuboi Kumazō , “Teppō denrai kō” [Consideration of the introduction of firearms], Shigaku zasshi, 3, no. 30 (Feb. 1892), 37–53; various studies of Naganuma Kenkai (cited above); Gotō Shukudō , “Teppō ron bōkei no isshu yō mondai” — [An important problem associated with the discussion of guns], Rekishi chiri, 24, no. 5 (Nov. 1914), 492–501; Oshigami Morizō , “Naganuma kun no teppō denrai ron hosetsu” [Supplementary discussion to Naganuma's study of the introduction of firearms], Rekishi chiri, 24, no. 2 (Aug. 1914), 172–79; “Teppō denrai ron no Yōsetsu” [Additional discussion of the dispute about the introduction of firearms], Rekishi chiri, 24, no. 4 (Oct. 1914), 371–81; “Teppō no hibiki” [The sound of guns], Rekishi chiri, 24, no. 5 (Nov. 1914), 501–04. Of late some scholars have louched upon various phases of the problem, and one has attacked the problem directly: Dō Tomiō Teppō denrai ki [The introduction of firearms] (Tokyo, 1939). But even this excellent work misses the significance of defensive fighting behind breast-works— a direct result of the adoption of firearms (pp. 145–58).
2 Bows and arrows were also used, but apparently the armor provided such effective protection against arrows that the outcome of most battles was determined only after the opposing forces met in close combat. For discussion and pictures of weapons and other military gear used during the Middle Ages see Gotō Moriichi ., Nihon rekishi kōkogaku [Japanese historical archaeology] (4th ed., Tokyo, 1940), 88–276, and Brinkley, Frank, Japan, its history, arts and literature (Boston, 1901), vol. 2, pp. 128–72.Google Scholar
3 Brinkley, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 161.
4 Marder, Arthur J., “From Jimmu Tenno to Perry, sea power in early Japanese history,” American historical review, 51 (Oct. 1945), 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 Brinkley, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 133.
6 “The “Nanpō bunshū” an account written in about 1600 by a Buddhist priest of the province of Osumi, provides the most detailed and authentic information relative to the introduction of firearms into Japan; quoted in Koji ruien , vo1. 31, pp. 878–80 and translated in James Murdoch, A history of Japan (London: Kegan Paul, 1925), vol. 2, p. 42. The interest of the barons in the Portuguese guns is also described by Fernao Mendes Pinto, one of the first Portuguese to visit Japan; Henry Cogan, tr., The voyages and adventures of Ferdinand Mendez Pinto, the Portuguese (London, 1892), 256 If.
7 Cogan's Pinto, p. 265. Pinto's whole narrative is questionable, however, and the figures could have been based on no reliable statistics.
8 Shigesuke, Kasai, “Nankai jiran ki” [Chronicles of government and war in the Nankai], Koji ruien, vol. 31, p. 884.Google Scholar
9 When a certain artisan had gained a reputation for superior workmanship or technique, a group of apprentices would gather to study his methods. The more capable apprentices were adopted into the family of the master and gained the privilege of practicing the art under the master's name, which became known as a ryu or “School.” The matchlocks of the “schools” varied considerably. Therefore, we find no uniformity in the caliber of these early guns; the weight of the loads ranged from 10 to 110 grams. Tokutomi Iichirō Kinsei Nihon hohumin shi [Modern history of the Japanese people] (Popular ed., Tokyo: Minyu Sha, 1935), vol. 10, p. 377 (hereafter cited as KNKS). For a picture of a sixteenth-century matchlock made in Japan see Boxer, op. cit., p. 72.
10 Kuroita, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 274. The early development of the manufacture of firearms is discussed at length in Dō Tomiō, op. cit., pp. 14–110.
11 “Kunitomo teppō ki” [History of the firearms of Kunitomo], quoted in Kuroita, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 274.
12 Takeda Shingen order, 8th moon, Genki 2 (1571), KNKS vol. 10, p. 384. Tokutomi expresses some doubt as to whether this order was really issued by Shingen, but it is probable that Shingen did place great value upon the use of guns at this time, for as early as 1555 he had supplied one of his castles with 300 muskets; “Myōhō-ji ki” [Chronicles of the Myōhō Temple], KNKS, vol. 1, p. 103.
13 Rose Hōan “Nobunaga ki” [Chronicles of Nobunaga], Koji ruien, vol. 31, p. 935. Nobunaga's extensive use of firearms has been studied in Dō, op. cit., pp. 126–96.
14 “Rose Hōan, “Taikō ki” [Chronicles of Toyotomi Hideyoshi], Shiseki shūran, vol. 6, ch. 29, p. 203.
15 Kusaka Hiroshi , ed., Hō Kō ibun [Documents of Toyotomi Hide-yoshi] (Tokyo: Hakubun Kan, 1914), pp. 77–137.
16 “Taikō ki,” Shiseki shūran, vol. 6, ch. 29, pp. 207–08. Hideyoshi wrote that “guns and ammunition” had been captured from the enemy; Hideyoshi to Sagara et al, 10th moon, 22d day, Tensho 15 (1587), Hō Kō ibun, p. 170.
17 “Katsube Hyoemon kikigaki” [Record of matters heard from Katsube Hyoemon], KNKS, vol. 5, p. 287.
18 “Hōjō godai ki,” Shiseki shūran, vol. 5, ch. 26, p. 60.
19 Ibid., p. 59. There was very little fighting at Odawara because Hideyoshi forced Hojō to surrender by surrounding the castle with a superior army and waiting until Hojō's provisions were exhausted (Murdoch, A history of Japan, vol. 2, pp. 256–58).
20 In preparing for the Korean invasion Hideyoshi ordered Shimazu of the province of Satsuma to arm 1,500 men with muskets, 1,500 with bows, and 300 with spears. Hideyoshi to Shimazu, Tenshō 19 (1591); translated in Asakawa Kanichi, ed., The Documents of the Iriki: illustration of the development of the feudal institutions of Japan (New Haven, 1929), 332–35.
21 John L. Boots found evidence that the musket was first introduced into Korea in 1590 when Japanese envoys presented several such weapons to the Korean king. He concludes, however, that the Koreans did not learn the method of manufacturing small arms at that time, since a Korean source (which he does not cite) shows that in the first battles with the Japanese the Korean soldiers met the enemy with flails, tridents, and arrows; “Korean weapons and armor,” Transactions of the Korean branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 23, no. 2 (Dec. 1934), 25.
22 “Taikō ki,” Shiseki shūran, vol. 6, ch. 29, p. 309.
23 Shimazu Yoshihiro to Hishijima Kii no Kami, 9th moon, 28th day, Bunroku 1 (1592), KNKS, vol. 10, pp. 379–80.
24 Murdoch states that both the Jesuit and Korean sources show that the Chinese army had a large artillery train of small field-pieces but no matchlocks (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 343). The lack of small arms is surprising in view of the fact that there is a Chinese handgun dated 1421 in the Berlin Museum fiir Völkerkunde; Gohlke, W., “Das älteste datierte gewehr,” Zeitschrift fūr historische waffenkunde, 7 (1916), 205–06.Google Scholar
25 W. G. Aston, “Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea,” TASJ, 9, no. 3 (reprinted in 1881), 87–90; Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese expansion on the Asiatic continent: a study in the history of Japan with special reference to her international relations with China, Korea and Russia (Berkeley, 1937), vol. 1, p. 156; KNKS, vol. 8, pp. 16–35.
26 For pictures of sixteenth-century Korean matchlocks see Boots, op. cit., plates 25–27.
27 Asano Yoshinaga to Inatomi Ichimu, 1st moon, 10th day, Keichō 3 (1598), KNKS, vol. 10, pp. 378–79.
28 Asano Yoshinaga to Asano Nagamasa, 1st moon, 11th day, Keicho 3 (1598), KNKS, vol. 10, p. 379.
29 “Zōho Otomo kōhai ki” [Supplement to the history of the rise and fall of the Otomo], quoted in Takekoshi Yosaburō , Nissen gohyakunen shi [History of two thousand five hundred years] (Tokyo, 1909), 514–15.
30 “Nankai jiran ki,” quoted in Takekoshi Yosaburō, Nihon keizai shi [Economic history of Japan] (3d ed.; Tokyo: Heibon Sha, 1936), vol. 3, p. 17 and tr. in Yosoburo, Takekoshi (sic), The economic aspects of the history of the civilization of Japan (London, 1930), vol. 1, p. 288.Google Scholar
31 “Kunitomo teppō ki,” quoted in Kuroita, Kohushi no kenkyū, vol. 2, p. 274Google Scholar. A letter from the lord of Bungo to a Jesuit priest in China in 1568 shows that this lord was still interested in obtaining cannon from the Portuguese. Otomo indicated that he had been given a cannon, but that it was lost at sea en route from Malacca. Otomo pointed out that he was protecting the Christians and the Jesuit priests in his province and went on to request another cannon, since he needed one badly in defending his frontiers and coasts against enemies. He closed with the observation that, if he were successful in defending his territory, the Christian churches, the Jesuit missionaries, the Christians, and the Portuguese all would be better off. Otomō Sorin letter, dated Sept. 13, 1568 (8th moon, 22d day, Eiroku 11), tr. into Japanese in Naojirō, Murakami, Yasokai shi Nihon tsūshin [Japanese correspondence of Jesuit missionaries] (2 vols.; Tokyo, 1907), vol. 2, pp. 86–87.Google Scholar
32 “Bessho Nagahara ki” [Chronicles of Bessho Nagaharu], Gunsho ruijū, vol. 13, p. 1198.
33 Maeda Toshiie, who was fighting a campaign in the province of Etchū, ordered his brother, who was then stationed in the province of Nōto, to send twenty cannon balls; Maeda Toshiie to Maeda Gorōbei, 4th moon, 18th day (1582) (unpublished manuscript in Sonkeikaku Bunko . Tokyo). One raontn Iater Toshiie acknowledged the receipt of one cannon and asked that another one be made immediately; Ibid., Maeda Toshiie to Maeda Gorōbei, 5th moon, 22d day (1582). But five days later Toshiie sent the cannon back to Gorōbei, complaining that the barrel was too small and ordering that it be recast; Ibid., Maeda Toshiie to Maeda Gorōbei, 5th moon, 27th day (1582).
34 “Nobunaga ki,” KNKS, vol. 2, p. 490.
35 KNKS, vol. 6. p. 94.
36 “Hōjō godai ki,” Shiseki sliuran, vol. 5, ch. 26, p. 60.
37 As early as 1377, according to the history of the Koryö Dynasty, a department of cannon was established; Boots, op. cit., p. 21. The Orye-üi [The five ceremonies], written in 1474, lists several types of cannon for stones and weapons; Boots, op. cit., p. 21. The oldest extant Korean cannon are heavy cast-iron pieces found in the Kudan Museum in Tokyo. It is claimed that they were cast in Korea between 1522 and 1566 and that they were brought to Japan during the Korean invasion. They are “2 feet 2 inches long, slightly tapering, 31/4 inches across the muzzle, with 13/4 inches bore…”, for illustration see Ibid., plate no. 23. Cf. A. L. Sadler, “The naval campaign in the Korean war of Hideyoshi (1592–98),” TASJ, 2d ser., 14 (1937), 180.
38 Boxer, C. R., “Notes on early European military influence in Japan (1543–1853),” TASJ, 8(1931). 72–73.Google Scholar
39 “Taikō ki,” Shiseki shūran, vol. 6, ch. 29, p. 347. Cf. KNKS, vol. 9, pp. 456–68.
40 Murdoch, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 355–56.
41 Shimazu Yoshihiro to Hishijima Kii no Kami, 9th moon, 28th day, Bunroku 1 (1592), KNKS, vol. 10, p. 380.
42 “Ishida Mitsunari to Shimazu, 9th moon, 25th day, Bunroku 2 (1593), KNKS, vol. 10, p. 381.
43 Brinkley, y Japan, its history, arts and literature, vol. 2, p. 136.
44 Obata Kanbei , “Kōyō gunkan” [Military history of the province of Kai], Koji ruien, vol. 29, pp. 181–82.
45 “Daté nikki” [Daté diary], Cunsho ruijü, vol. 13, p. 1064.
46 Koji ruien, vol. 29, pp. 44–72.
47 Early in the Korean campaign Hideyoshi instructed his generals in the field to keep gunners in the vanguard. Hideyoshi to Kobayaski et al, 12th moon, 6th day, Bunroku 1 (1592), Hō Kō ibun, p. 404.
48 “Dō Tomiō, op. cit., p. 145.
49 The most detailed contemporary account of the battle of Nagashino is found in the “Nobunaga ki,” Koji ruien, vol. 31, pp. 935–36. The best recent study of the use of firearms in the battle is Lieutenant General Morizō Oshigami's “Nagashino eki higa no senjutsu to buki to ni tsuite” [Concerning the weapons and tactics of the armies in the Nagashino battle], quoted at length in KNKS, vol. 2, pp. 115–18. Oshigami concludes that Nobunaga's victory was due primarily to a wiser and more extensive use of firearms. For a general survey of the battle see Seiyū, Watanabe“Nagashino no sen” in Dai Nihon sen shi (Tokyo, 1924), vol. 2Google Scholar; also cf. Yoshinari, Tanaka, Oda jidai shi [History of the Oda era] (Tokyo: Meiji Shoin, 1924), 138–49.Google Scholar
50 The historical materials relating to the battle of Shizugatake were collected, during the seventeenth century, under the title of “Shizugatake gasen ki” [Records of the battle of Shizugatake], Shiseki shuran, vol. 13, pp. 350–55. See also Dening, Walter, The Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (3d ed., London: Keyan Paul, 1930), 203–08.Google Scholar
51 While the two armies were facing each other at Komaki, Hideyoshi wrote: “Our encampments extend for a distance of ten or fifteen chō along the front of Komaki Castle. Although we have tried to force the enemy to fight it out in the open, Ieyasu absolutely will not come out of his castle at Komaki. So there is no use in being here. Forts have been built at three places before Komaki and strong forces have been placed therein…” Hideyoshi to Mori Terumoto,'(5th?) moon, 9th day, Tenshō 12 (1584), quoted in Miura Kaneyuki , “Komakiyama jin to seikai sen” [The encampment at Mount Komaki and the world war], Rekishi to chiri, vol. 3, no. 4 (April 1919), 427. See “Taikō ki,” Shiseki shūran, vol. 6, ch. 29, pp. 182–86. Hideyoshi's defenses have been described as follows by Sadler, A. L. in The maker of modern Japan: the life of Tokugawa Ieyasu (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937), 125Google Scholar: “Hideyoshi on his part built a rampart 15 feet high and 3 feet thick between Nijubori and Iwasaki-yama, a distance of nearly a mile and a half, with several gates in it, so that he could hold the position safely against attack while he considered his next move… and thus the two armies dug themselves well in and lay opposite each other, both fearing to repeat the mistake of Nagashino by making a frontal attack.”
52 Gubbins, J. H., “Hideyoshi and the Satsuma clan in the sixteenth century,” TASJ, 8 (1880), 110.Google Scholar
53 Ibid., p. 111.
54 Early in the war the Koreans made a stand in a large plain surrounded by mountains, near Chūshū . The Japanese sent detachments to block the passes in the mountains and then descended upon the Koreans from all sides. Guns, bows, spears, and swords were all used in the attack; KNKS, vol. 7, pp. 375–78.
55 Murdoch, History of Japan, vol. 2, pp. 328–32.
56 A discourse on castle construction, written about 1565, provides the best description of castles built before firearms had seriously affected military architecture. Kubota Saburobei no Jo, “Chikujō ki” [Discourse on castle construction], Gunsho ruijū, vol. 14, ch. 49, pp. 942–47.
57 “Manshōin dono anabo ki” , Kojitsu sōsho, vol. 33, pp. 149–50. For details of military and political events associated with the construction of this castle see KNKS, vol. 1, p. 100.
58 This tower, called tenshuhahu , has been the subject of considerable discussion, for it is claimed that it was influenced by occidental ideas of fortification. Tanaka Yoshinari in “Tenshukaku kō” [Concerning the tenshukaku], Shigaku zasshi, 1, no. 2 (Jan. 1890), 17–22Google Scholar, found that none of the features of the tower were new to Japan and that the word tenshukaku had a Buddhist, rather than a Christian, origin. Furthermore, Boxer, in his study of the Portuguese sources, found no evidence that the Jesuits had had any part in the construction of the Azuchi Castle; Boxer, “Notes on early European military influence in Japan (1543–1853),” TAS], 2d ser., 8 (1931), 71.
59 An authentic contemporary description of the Azuchi Castle is included in “Azuchi Yama ki” [History of Mt. Azuchi], quoted in KNKS, vol. 2, pp. 169–70.
60 Also see “Nobunaga ki,” quoted in Takekoshi, Nihon keizai shi, vol. 3, p. 20; N. Orui and M. Toba, Castles in Japan (Tokyo, 1935), 18–21; and Tanaka, Oda jidai shi, 163–66.
61 Professor Kuroita attributes this development directly to the use of firearms, because the densely vegetated mountains provided an attacker with natural defenses; Kuroita, Kokushi no kenkyū, vol. 2, p. 284.
62 Kuwata Tadachika , in his study of source materials in relation to the castle, concludes that it was “rebuilt” by the Tokugawa government some time prior to 1650, “Toyotomi jidai no Osaka jō [The Osaka Castle of the Toyotomi era], Rekishi chiri, 74, no. 3 (Sept. 1939), 208. It is not clear just how basic the alterations were, but sixteenth-century sources reveal that the castle constructed by Hideyoshi was made of amazingly large stones and that the gate of the inner citadel was made of (or covered with?) iron; Ibid., p. 209. Rev. J. Summers found that the Osaka Castle was modeled after a famous Chinese fortress, “Notes on Osaka,” TASJ, 7, no. 1 (1879), 391. Also see Mathew Garbutt, “Military works in old Japan,” TASJ, 2d ser., 8 (1907–10), 61, and Orui, op. cit., pp. 21–25.
63 The Koreans had stronger castles during the sixteenth century than the Japanese. Hide-yoshi's invasion, therefore, gave the Japanese an opportunity to observe and study Korean techniques. As a result, the castles built in Japan after 1598 were influenced by continental ideas of fortification; Kuroita, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 284 and 348.
64 “Tamon In nikki” [Tamon In diary], quoted in KNKS, 2, p. 505. This diary, kept by a monk of a Nara temple, is considered one of the most reliable sources of the sixteenth century, but the figure of 5,000 seems too high. Father Frois visited these boats and saw the cannon with which they were equipped. Regarding the ships, he said that they were the biggest and best ships he had seen in Japan and that they were similar to those made in Portugal. Regarding the cannon, he expressed considerable surprise for he had at that time (about 1580) not seen cannon in Japan, except for small ones made in the province of Bungo. Father Frois explained that the ships were made to blockade the entrance to Osaka, and he predicted that, largely as a result of these new ships, Osaka would soon fall; Frois' report, tr. in Murakami, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 434–35.
65 Ota Gyūichi , “Nobunaga Kō ki” [Chronicles of Lord Nobunaga], Shisehi shūran, 19, ch. 5, p. 146. In general, the above version is in agreement with the description contained in the “Yoshida monogatari” [Tales of Yoshida], written by a retainer of Lord Mori of western Japan and quoted in KNKS, vol. 2, pp. 501–02. [The first Chinese character for Ota Gyūichi should be no. 1948 in the Daijiten.— Editor.]
66 “Nobunaga Kō ki,” Shiseki shūran, vol. 19, ch. 5, pp. 150–51.
67 “Yoshida monogatari,” KNKS, vol. 2, p. 503.
68 In 1586 Hideyoshi tried to purchase two Portuguese ships, but his attempt failed; Murdoch, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 334. In the Hojō campaign of 1589 hundreds of boats were used, but there is no indication that they were equipped with artillery. Kuki Umanosuke, the builder of Nobunaga's “iron ships,”, was placed in charge of 1,500 vessels, but this force met no opposition and was engaged primarily in transporting supplies and blockading the coast of eastern Japan; Rikugun Sanbu Honbu, ed., Dai Nihon sen shi [Military history of Japan], quoted in KNKS, vol. 6, pp. 143–44.
69 Included in the Prince Yi Household Collection is a screen painting of a naval engagement fought during the Korean invasion, and it depicts the general characteristics of the Korean warship (at the close of the sixteenth century?). For a reproduction see Horace H. Underwood, “Korean boats and ships,” Transactions of the Korea branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 23 (1934), fig. 40. Underwood calculates that there must have been as many as six men to an oar and that the oars were about three feet apart; Ibid., p. 55.
70 One of the naval commanders of the Japanese force had a ship (or ships?) burned by hōrokubiya which were thrown by the Koreans. “Wakizaka ke denki” [Biographical sketches of the Wakizaka family], quoted in KNKS, vol. 7, 674–75. According t o the Daijiten (vol. 23, p. 153), a hōrokubiya was a metal ball into which explosives were inserted, and which was wrapped with cloth and then painted with lacquer. Fire was set to the cloth and the ball thrown into the midst of the enemy where it exploded. This weapon was mentioned in the “Nobunaga ki,” written about 1600, as having been used effectively, sometime prior to 1582, against enemy ships, Kojitsu sōsho, vol. 31, p. 639, but there is no evidence that the Japanese had used such weapons extensively. The Koreans had long known similar weapons, as can be seen from the names and description s appearing in the Korean work, Orye-üi . written in 1474 and quoted in Boots, “Korean weapons and armor,” Transactions of the Korea branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 23, no. 2 (Dec. 1934), 21. A later Korean source, the Yŏllyŏsil kisul , which wa s written between 1567 and 1608, describes a weapon which fired a ball as'far as 1,000 yards. The ball was filled with powder and had a delayed fuse; it may have been the hōrohubiya mentioned in the Wakizaka records; Ibid., pp. 22–23.
71 For pictures of the types of cannon probably employed on the Korean warships, see Underwood, op. cit., figs. 42D, 43C, and 43D.
72 Homer B. Hulbert in The history of Korea (Seoul, 1905), 376–77, concludes that the Korean warship had iron plates on its sides, but Underwood could not prove the existence of such a feature, op. cit., p. 76.
73 Underwood, op. cit., pp. 74–76. Hulbert (op. cit., pp. 376–77) states that the Korean ship was equipped with a ram, but Sadler found no evidence of rams and concludes: “…what emerges very significantly from the latest Japanese researches on this fighting is that here also it was the gun and the incendiary missile and not the ram that proved so deadly”; “The naval campaign in the Korean war of Hideyoshi (1592–98),” TASJ, 2d ser., 14 (1937), 180.
74 Sadler, op. cit., p. 180. Underwood finds that “The Japanese thus had plenty of muskets but few cannon. The Koreans on the other hand had no muskets but plenty of cannon,” op. cit., p. 59. According to Bonar, H. A. C., “On maritime enterprise in Japan,” TASJ, 15 (1887), 113Google Scholar, Japanese vessels were equipped with more than 78 oars and carried one cannon.
75 Mao Yūan , Wu-pei chih [On preparations for war], written about 1600, KNKS, vol. 7, p. 623 and tr. in Sadler, op. cit., pp. 182–83.
76 Underwood, op. cit., pp. 79–81.
77 , Marder, “From Jimmu Tenno to Perry, sea power in early Japanese history,” American historical review, 51 (Oct. 1945), 26.Google Scholar
78 See KNKS, vol. 7, pp. 621–84, and Sadler, op. cit., pp. 179–208.
79 Chung tnu hong chun soh, , a compilation of Yi Sun Sin papers (compiled in 1796), quoted in Sadler, op. cit., p. 190, footnotes.
80 Boxer, op. cit., pp. 72–73.
81 “Toyotomi Hideyoshi to Aki Chūnagaon, 8th moon, 10th day, Keichō 2 (1597), KNKS, vol. 9, p. 467.
82 Marder, op. cit., p. 29.
83 “Seikan iryaku” [Outline history of the Korean invasion], KNKS, vol. 9, p. 461.
84 For an excellent survey of the economic history of the Middle Ages, see Shiba Kentarō , “Chūsei no keizai” [Medieval economy], Iwanami koza: Nihon rekishi, ser. 10, 3 (July 1934), but no adequate study of the expansion of industry in the sixteenth century has been made.
85 Asakawa, K., “Some aspects of Japanese feudal institutions,” TASJ, 46, no. 1 (1918), 98.Google Scholar
86 Toyotomi Hideyoshi order, 7th moon, 8th day, Tenshō 16 (1588), Hō Kō ibun, pp. 202–03. The social repercussions arising from the introduction of firearms deserve further study. It appears that at first the position of the professional soldier was undermined by the more extensive use of firearms, for there was a definite tendency for companies of gunners to be organized from among untrained peasants. But with the growing importance of large castles and the concurrent establishment of political centralization, the differentiation between peasant and soldier again became quite clear, and during the prolonged period of peace that came after 1615 the warrior class formed the élite in the rigid social structure that prevailed under the Tokugawa Shogunate.
87 Dō Tomiō draws the conclusion: “We can not deny that the introduction of firearms was an important factor in the establishment of the modern, centralized state,” op. cit., p. 192. This view marks a definite advance beyond the traditional interpretation which ascribes the centralization of Japan to the political and military genius of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, but this problem too should receive study. It is suggested that the discovery of new sources of precious metals, th e introduction of improved methods of mining and better metallurgical techniques, and the general expansion of commerce and industry also faciliated the emergence of a centralized feudal state.
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