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The Control System of the Chinese Government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Richard L. Walker
Richard L. Walker
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Extract

The new Chinese constitution which was almost unanimously adopted by the National Assembly and presented to Chiang K'ai-shek on Christmas Day 1946 gives conclusive proof that the Chinese plan to maintain their ancient Censoral system, now the Control Yüan of the Chinese government. A clue to the importance which the Chinese attach to this body is found in the fact that although the new constitution has abandoned the complete separation and independence of the five powers (legislative, executive, judicial, examination, and control) as visualized by Sun Yat-sen, the Control Yüan remains as one of the completely independent and elected bodies in the future Chinese government.

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Articles
Information
The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , November 1947 , pp. 3 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1947

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References

1 “The complete text of the constitution of the republic of China” as passed by the National Assembly on December 25, 1946, and proclaimed by the National government on January 1, 1947, is available in the Chinese as printed by the Chinese journal (New York), page 3 of the January 21-January 25 issues inclusive. An unofficial English translation authorized by the Chinese Minister of Information has been issued by the Chinese News Service, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City, January 11, 1947.

2 Chih-shiu, Ch'ien, “The control Yüan,” The Chinese year book 1936–37 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), 337.Google Scholar

3 Pao-chao, Hsieh, The government of China (1644–1911) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), 87Google Scholar. All direct quotations from this work are made with permission of the publisher.

4 The term uniquely is used advisedly. A comparison with the Roman Censorate is found in Hans Wist, Das Chinesische Zensorat (Hamburg: Augustin, 1932), 21–22. One writer (Yu-hsi, King, La theorie constitutionnelle des cinq pouvoirs [Nancy: Imprimerie Grandville, 1932], 124Google Scholar) even suggests a comparison with an organized system of control in two states in the United States: Pennsylvania and Vermont.

5 Linebarger, P. M. A., Government in republican China (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938). 134Google Scholar. Quotations from this work are by permission of the author.

6 A typical example of western criticism of Dr. Sun as a political thinker is “Saggitarius” (pseud.), The strange apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen (London: Heath, Cranton, Ltd., 1939). A fairly cogent criticism by a Western-schooled Chinese is Lain Jung, L'esprit et la pratique de la constitution chinoise (Dijon, 1934). See also Rowe, David Nelson, China among the powers, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1945), 133.Google Scholar

7 There is no readily available work in English which treats the development and importance of the Control system in the Chinese government. Dr. Li Hsiung-fei remarks (Les censeurs sous la dynastie mandchoue (1644–1911) en Chine [Paris: Les Presses Modernes, 1936],7) that “detailed study of it [the system of Censors in China] is entirely lacking in Europe.”

8 The terms Censorate, Control Yüan, Censoral system, Control system, etc. are interchanged because of the conviction derived from this study that they refer to the same institution, which has had a remarkable continuity through the ages.

9 Unofficial English translation; see note 1.

10 An interesting sidelight on the obligation of the Censors to criticize the Emperor is to be found in the works of Han Yü (for Chinese characters see glossary at end of this article) of T'ang times. Han is addressing the Emperor concerning an important ceremony and says, “Even the Censors did not bring up its [the ceremony's] fault, and I am sincerely ashamed” (Han Yü wen, Hsüeh-sheng kuo-hsüeh ts'ung-shu [Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935], 208Google Scholar). There are many examples of an Emperor punishing a Censor for failing in his duty when it has been found out later that the Emperor has committed a blunder. The Emperor's highest duty under the Confucian system was that of setting an example. See Hsieh, , op. cit., pp. 87–88, 95.Google Scholar

11 Hsieh, , op. cit., pp. 90–92Google Scholar; and Qui, Siu, Le pouvoir de controle en Chine (Nancy: Imprimerie Vagner, 1937), 20–25.Google Scholar

12 Quoted from Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, vol. 998, by Hsieh, op. cit., p. 91.

13 Linebarger, P. M. A., The China of Chiang K'ai-shek (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1943), 318Google Scholar. Direct quotations from this work are made with permission of the publisher.

14 Hsiung-fei, Li, op. cit., p. 9.Google Scholar

15 Dates for the origin of the Censoral system range from 3500 B.C. in the time of the legendary Huang-ti (Wu, Frederick C., La nouvelle Chine et le gouvernement national [Paris: Rivière, 1929]Google Scholar) to as late as Ch'in times (Chih-fang, WuChinese government and politics [Shanghai: Commercial Tress, 1934], 211Google Scholar; MacNair, H. F., China in revolution [University of Chicago Press, 1931], 145Google Scholar). Most writers prefer to date the roots to the time of the Chou li and the Li chi, the only two of the thirteen classics which mention the Censorate.

16 The Chou li (Shanghai: K'ai-ming edition), 27 says: “The Yü-shih took charge of the directives for the nation, cities, and the people in order to assist the prime minister. All those who governed received their instructions from him. He took charge of editing the records and lie kept count of all those who took part in the government.”

17 Li chi (Shanghai: K'ai-ming edition), 40.

18 Hsieh, , op. cit. p. 87.Google Scholar

19 Siu, , op. cit., p. 10Google Scholar. Another function introduced during the Ch'in was that of Master of Ceremonies at any court function (Hsieh, , op. cit., p. 88Google Scholar). This task was carried down through the course of the dynasties so that any new ceremonies naturally came under the control of the Censors.

20 Wist, , op. cit., p. 12Google Scholar. The Three First Ministers, San-kung, were: The Prime Minister (Ch'eng-hsiang), The Grand Pacificator (T'ai-wei), and The Censor-General (Yü-shih-ta-fu), see Hsiung-fei, Li, op. cit., p. 10.Google Scholar

21 Functions at this time included making remonstrances to the Emperor, examining lawbreakers, supervising the work of functionaries, and supervising munitions and supplies (Ibid., p. 12).

22 Ibid., p. 11.

23 “For example, if crimes committed by functionaries were uncovered, the Chung-ch'eng was condemned because it had not exercised proper surveillance” (Siu, , op. cit., p. 12).Google Scholar

24 Hsieh, , op. cit., p. 88.Google Scholar

25 Ibid., p. 13. An attempt is made here to use the Chinese terms which were in general use through the dynasties. Many times from Han on the titles of the offices and the ministers were changed for brief periods, but certain appellations such as Yü-shih always managed to reappear. A good example is the term Su-cheng-t'ai which was substituted for Yü-shih-t'ai for a short while under the Empress Wu. The original term was soon revived.

26 Hsin T'ang shu (Shanghai: K'ai-ming edition), 3744A–3747C.

27 The Censors of the ten tao had assistants whose functions may be summarized as follows: (1) investigate whether the officials are virtuous or corrupt; (2) check on population movement and see that financial accounts are not withheld but are properly distributed; (3) supervise to assure the diligence of those who are engaged in agriculture and sericulture so that the warehouses will be full and goods not wasted; (4) ferret out fakers and thieves who do no productive work, and who are harmful to others; (5) check on the moral character of the people so that no one takes advantage of those who are poor and unable to help themselves, and (6) search out the officials who rob the people by means of their power. For the complete text sec Ibid., p. 3744C.

28 It was in T'ang times that the expression Feng-wen fang-chih came into use. It was this expression, “We heard the rumor and through investigation have come to know…,” which became the standard introduction for all petitions submitted to the Emperor by the Censors (Wist, , op. cit., p. 23).Google Scholar

29 Siu, , op. cit., p. 14.Google Scholar

30 Hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), 3285A.

31 Siu, , op. cit., p. 13.Google Scholar

32 Hsiung-fei, Li, op. cit., p. 13.Google Scholar

33 From the biography of Chang Hsiung-fei in the Yüan shih, quoted by Wist, , op. cit., p. 29.Google Scholar

34 Li-tai chih-kuan-piao (Shanghai: Commercial Press Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng edition, 1936), 517.

35 In 1435 A.D., Ibid..

36 Siu, , op. cit., p. 16.Google Scholar

37 The summary of the development of the Chi-shih-chung is based on the Li-tai chih-kuan-piao, pp. 473–518; Hsiung-fei, Li, op. cit., pp. 14–16Google Scholar; Siu, , op. cit., pp. 17–20Google Scholar; and Chih-fang, Wu, op. cit., pp. 211–12.Google Scholar

38 Hsiung-fei, Li, op. cit., p. 15.Google Scholar

39 Hsieh, , op. cit., p. 92.Google Scholar

40 Hsieh Pao-chao believes that the degree of independence of the Censors might easily be a key to the extent of absolutism in the government in dynastic times (Ibid., p. 88).

41 Ibid., p. 98.

42 Brunnert, and Hagelstrom, , Present day political organization of China (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1912), 75 ff.Google Scholar

43 In 1637, T'ai-tsung decreed, “Even if the accusation be not substantiated, no punishment shall befall the Censors.” Quoted in Hsieh, op. cit., p. 93.

44 Ibid., p. 96.

45 Wist, , op. cit., p. 44.Google Scholar

46 Hsieh, , op. cit., p. 98.Google Scholar

47 Throughout most of the Ch'ing dynasty the Censors held the fifth rank, first degree (Cheng-wu-p'in), which was relatively low. Their prestige depended upon their function rather than on their rank (Hsiung-fei, Li, op. cit., pp. 24–32).Google Scholar

48 Ibid., pp. 123–134.

49 Wu Chih-fang (op. cit., p. 212) criticizes the Censorate on the grounds that it derived its power from the Emperor and not the people, that it represented the Emperor's interests, and that it could not force him to follow its advice. These are all rather legalistic points and seem to ignore the spirit and practice of the Censoral system as outlined above.

50 For example, Morse, H. B. (The trade and administration of the Chinese empire [London: Longmans Green & Co., 1908], 58)Google Scholardevotes only one short paragraph to the Censorate.

51 Chen, and Payne, , Sun Yat-sen, a Portrait (New York: John Day, 1946), 69.Google Scholar

52 Linebarger, P. M. A., The political doctrines of Sun Yat-sen (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 222Google Scholar. Direct quotations from this work are made with permission of the publisher.

53 Yen-chen, Cheng, Les principaux mouvements constitutionnels en Chine de 1897 à 1935 (Lyon: Ferreol, 1936), 66.Google Scholar

54 One Western-trained Chinese scholar of politics ignores his national background and criticizes the five-power concept on the grounds that it is contrary “to juridical logic and to the principles of law, not in conformity with actual legislative tendencies, the augmentation of powers is unnecessary, and that independence of Control is an imperfect solution” (Lain, , op. cit., p. 17Google Scholar).

55 Article 19 of the Fundamentals of national reconstruction reads: “At the beginning of constitutional government the Central Government should complete the establishment of five yüan for the exercise of the five powers, the order being as follows: (1) Executive Yüan. (2) Legislative Yüan, (3) Judicial Yüan, (4) Examination Yüan and (5) Control Yüan” (Wei-tang, Pan, The Chinese constitution (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1945), 212Google Scholar). This work contains an excellent collection of Chinese constitutional documents.

56 Ch'ien, , op. cit., p. 339.Google Scholar

57 Ibid., p. 338.

58 T'ang, “Five years of the Control Yüan,” Information bulletin (Council of International Affairs, Nanking), 2 (Nov. 11, 1936), no. 7.

59 Information on the organic law of the Control Yüan and its various amendments and revisions may be found in Siu, op. cit., p. 71 ff.

60 Linebarger, , The China of Chiang K'ai-shek, p. 219.Google Scholar

61 “Control Yüan,” China handbook 1937–1943 (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 98.

62 Ting-fu, Tsiang, “Reorganization of the National government,” The Chinese year hook 1938–39 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939).Google Scholar

63 On the impeachment of high officials including Wang Ch'ing-wei, see Siu, , op. cit., pp. 87–89Google Scholar, and Chih-fang, Wu, op. cit., p. 216.Google Scholar

64 Linebarger, , The China of Chiang K'ai-shek, p. 320.Google Scholar

65 China handbook, 1937–1943, p. 98.

66 See Siu, , op. cit., pp. 82–84Google Scholar, and T'ang, op. cit.

67 New constitution, chapter 9 articles 90–106 deal with the Control organ of the government.

68 Hsieh, , op. cit., p. 87.Google Scholar