Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 July 2009
This contribution focusses on the close intertwinement of Americanization, neoliberalism, and corporate globalization at the turn of the twenty-first century, on the eve of the global economic recession of 2008 and after. Many students of current globalization tend to reject the whole notion of Americanization. It is argued that these theorists have thrown the proverbial baby out with the bath water, namely an interest in America's strong influence in many domains globally. Yet it is also recognized that one has to move beyond a state-centrist approach in order to adequately grasp the significantly increased influence of transnational corporations over the past few decades. Therefore this article explores the major ways in which transnational corporations – in relation to US-dominated international governance – spread capitalist modernity worldwide. An attempt is made to explain how US business leaders and affiliated political power-holders managed to set the agenda of much of the global economy and why many of their foreign counterparts adopted similar neoliberal policies. The article concludes with a brief overview of major challenges and countermovements to the predominant form of capitalist globalization.
1 This essay results from a broader research project on the complexities of Americanization at home and abroad, past and present; see Mel van Elteren, Americanism and Americanization: A Critical History of Domestic and Global Influence (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland, 2006).
2 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.
3 Ibid., 19.
4 Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York: Routledge, 2004), 15–17.
5 Harvey, 82–4; cf. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays (New York: Knopf, 1965).
6 Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for Global Dominance (London: Verso, 1999); Panitch, Leo, “The New Imperial State,” New Left Review, 11, 1 (2000), 5–20Google Scholar; Gopal Balakrishnan, ed., Debating Empire (London: Verso, 2003); James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century (London: Zed Books, 2001), 62–3.
7 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift towards Services (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2004), 11; Drucker, Peter F., “Trading Places,” National Interest, 79 (Spring 2005), 101–07.Google Scholar
8 William Greider, “Debtor Nation,” The Nation, 10 May 2004, 11.
9 William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Capitalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 201–2.
10 Douglas Henwood, “The Dollar's Doldrum's,” The Nation, 16 May 2005, 8; NRC Handelsblad, 18–19 June 2005, 27; 11–12 Feb. 2006, 23; Maarten Schinkel, “De ramkoers van de Amerikaanse economie,” NRC Handelsblad, 18–19 Nov. 2005, 27–28.
11 Duménil, Gerard and Lévy, Dominique, “Neoliberal Income Trends: Wealth, Class and Ownership in the U.S.A,” New Left Review, 30 (2004), 105–33Google Scholar; Lawrence R. Jacobs and Theda Skocpol, eds., Inequality and American Democracy: What We Know and What We Need to Learn (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).
12 Antonio, Robert J. and Bonanno, Alessandro, “A New Global Capitalism? From ‘Americanism and Fordism’ to ‘Americanization–Globalization’,” American Studies 41, 2–3 (Summer–Fall 2000), 46–47Google Scholar; David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 68–74, 189; idem, Brief History of Neoliberalism, 142, 188; Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books – Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 256. For a more positive interpretation of America's role as “empire of consumption” in the global political economy, which emphasizes the developmental component of this role with regard to economic–technological transitions abroad as a counterpart of the vast credits provided by foreign investors, see Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 255–77.
13 Will Hutton, The World We're In (London: Abacus, 2003), 242–51.
14 Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso, 2003), 62–65.
15 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 425.
16 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 299–300; idem, Globalization: Capitalism and Its Alternatives (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 287–91.
17 Meghnad Desai and Yahia Said, “The New Anti-capitalist Movement: Money and Global Civil Society,” in Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor, eds., Global Civil Society 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 60–61.
18 Hutton, 251.
19 Alex Callinicos, Against the Third Way: An Anti-capitalist Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 78–9.
20 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 191.
21 Lundestad, Geir, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal of Peace Research, 23 (1986), 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22 The management of the New York City fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s by a consortium of investment bankers led the way to neoliberal practices pursued both domestically under Reagan and internationally through the IMF in the 1980s. According to Tabb, the politics of the Reagan administration of the 1980s became “merely the New York scenario” of the 1970s “writ large.” William K. Tabb, The Long Default: New York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982), 15.
23 Harvey, Brief History of Neoliberalism, 39–63.
24 Susan Strange, “The Future of Global Capitalism; Or, Will Divergence Persist Forever?”, in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity (London: Sage, 1997), 190.
25 Jonathan Zeitlin, “Introduction: Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking U.S. Technology and Management in Post-war Europe and Japan,” in Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herrigel, eds., Americanization and its Limits: Reworking U.S. Technology and Management in Post-war Europe and Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 46–8.
26 Bawden, Tom, “Anger as judge rules NatWest Three can be extradited,” Times Online, 22 Feb. 2006, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk.Google Scholar
27 Stiffler, Alan, “Management, Consulting Services Continue Rapid Overseas Growth,” Business America, 14 Oct. 1985, 13–14Google Scholar; P. W. Daniels, “Overseas Investment by US Service Enterprises,” in David Slater and Peter J. Taylor, eds., The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 67–83.
28 Jorge I. Dominguez, Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).
29 Harvey, Brief History of Neoliberalism, 44, 54.
30 Admittedly, these American books on management did not constitute a homogeneous category. Both the most prominent proponents of various versions of what may be called the mainstream management approach and its most outspoken critics were represented among them. But the overall picture is that the mainstream American-style management approach predominated. Of course, the actual influence of the contents of these books was dependent on the way they had been appropriated locally.
31 Keith Thurley and Hans Wirdenius, Towards European Management (London: Pittman, 1989).
32 Ruggie, John G., “At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalisation and Domestic Stability in the New World Order,” Millennium 24, 3 (1994), 507–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
33 Donald Kalff, Onafhankelijkheid voor Europa: Het Einde van het Amerikaanse Ondernemingsmodel (Amsterdam and Antwerp: Business Contact, 2004).
34 Sinclair, Timothy J., “Passing Judgment: Credit Rating Processes as Regulatory Mechanisms of Governance in the Emerging World Order,” Review of International Political Economy, 1, 1 (Spring 1994), 133–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
35 James N. Rosenau, “Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics,” in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–29.
36 Jean-François Carrez, Le Développement des fonctions tertiaires internationales à Paris et dans les métropoles regionales (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1991); Saskia Sassen, “The Spatial Organization of Information Industries: Implications for the Role of the State,” in James H. Mittelman, ed., Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 44.
37 Dezalay, Yves and Garth, Bryant, “Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes,” Law and Society Review, 29, 1 (1995), 27–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 20–21.
38 Saskia Sassen, “The State and the New Geography of Power,” in Don Kalb, Marco van der Land, Richard Staring, Bart van Steenbergen, and Nico Wilterdink, eds., The End of Globalization: Bringing Society back in (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 59.
39 Jeswald Salacuse, Making Global Deals: Negotiations in the Global Marketplace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991); Sinclair, 150.
40 Sassen, Losing Control, 58.
41 Arturo Bris, “Global Growing Pains,” Financial Times, 6 April 2006, available at http://www.ft.com.
42 de Graaf, Heleen, “IFRS: eindelijk eenheid in de boeken. Europa voert nieuwe regels voor financiële verslaglegging in,” NRC Handelsblad, 20–21 Nov. 2004, 21.Google Scholar
43 John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (London: Granta Presss, 1998), 78–79.
44 Hutton, The World We're In, 180–81.
45 Ralph Nader, The Good Fight: Declare Your Independence & Close the Democracy Gap (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 236–37.
46 Sklair, Globalization, 72.
47 Antonio and Bonanno, “A New Global Capitalism?”, 58.
48 Susan Strange, “Towards a Theory of Transnational Empire,” in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to the World Politics of the 1990s (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 161–76.
49 Harvey, Brief History of Neoliberalism, 9.
50 Harvey, New Imperialism, 137–82.
51 World Bank, World Development Report, 2004: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
52 Harvey, Brief History of Neoliberalism, 7–9, 115–18.
53 William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 12.
54 Hutton, The World We're In, 231–32.
55 Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
56 Sklair, Globalization, 282; Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2002); Paul Krugman, The Great Unravelling: Losing Our Way in the Twentieth Century (New York: Norton, 2003); George Soros, George Soros on Globalization (New York: Public Affairs, 2002).
57 Harvey, New Imperialism, 73–74, 162; idem, Brief History of Neoliberalism, 199–201.
58 Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith, Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000), 67–80; Manfred B. Steger, Globalism: The New Market Ideology (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 145–47; Harvey, New Imperialism, 76.
59 Steger, 147.