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When Self-interest is Self-Defeating: The Public Goods Experiment as a Teaching Tool

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2015

Robert G. Nelson  and
Richard O. Beil Jr.
Robert G. Nelson
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology
Richard O. Beil Jr.
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Auburn University, Alabama
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Abstract

This simple classroom experiment demonstrates many of the behavioral phenomena associated with the voluntary provision of a public good. The mechanics of the game are explained in detail and complete instructions are provided, as well as suggestions for follow-up lectures. Influences such as anonymous voting, persuasion, returns to free-riding, and duration of association can be explored in connection with concepts of incentives, individual rationality and group welfare. A number of variations and extensions can be used to incorporate prisoners' dilemmas, incentive compatible mechanisms, negative externalities, and Coasian bargaining.

Keywords

teachingexperimental economicspublic goods
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , December 1994 , pp. 580 - 590
Copyright
Copyright © Southern Agricultural Economics Association 1994

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