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Do Incentives for Quality Matter?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2015

Corinne Alexander ,
Rachael E. Goodhue  and
Gordon C. Rausser
Corinne Alexander
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN
Rachael E. Goodhue
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, CA
Gordon C. Rausser
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley, CA
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Abstract

We use an unusual dataset involving 14 tomato growers over 4 years to analyze the effect of incentive contracts on behavior in a fixed effects econometric model. We find that growers respond to incentive contracts by improving tomato quality, as predicted by economic theory. The comparison is not confounded by the usual contract endogeneity and simultaneity problems because of characteristics of the processing tomato industry and our dataset. We discuss the implications of our findings for the design of agricultural contracts.

Keywords

contractspanel dataprocessing tomato industryD86C23Q13
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , April 2007 , pp. 1 - 15
Copyright
Copyright © Southern Agricultural Economics Association 2007

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