The heads of state and government of the East African sub-region established a forum known as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for expanded cooperation in 1996. The conclusion of the treaty by which IGAD was created was the beginning, not the end, of commitment to IGAD through the principle of pacta sunt servanda [agreements are binding and must be implemented in good faith]. In spite of the great hopes, optimism and aspirations placed on the creation of IGAD, the challenge then become IGAD members' commitment to the treaty establishing IGAD. If member states are unable to grant powers to IGAD and cooperate to enable IGAD to execute its objectives, IGAD cannot work as was intended, hence it remains open to questions. This article discusses IGAD's fundamental features and the institutional progress it has achieved, as well as the challenges it faces as an international legal body.

Affiliation with a political community or entity has throughout history been important for the purposes of protection and belonging. This article discusses the concept of citizenship in Sudan in light of the Sudanese and Southern Sudanese interim constitutions and relevant laws, taking into consideration the international norms in this regard. It also sheds light on the application of the law and possible scenarios when the South becomes an independent nation. It argues that a set of legal rules that organize nationality issues in Sudan and Southern Sudan are inconsistent with general nationality principles and that, if their provisions remain valid until the fragmentation of Sudan becomes a reality, many post-secession violations will be difficult to avoid. It suggests a series of measures that the main parties to the National Unity Government should take to avert such violations and secure peaceful and neighbourly relations in the years to come.

A practice of frequent constitutional amendments started shortly after Kenya attained her independence in 1963. Consequently, the country has witnessed a confusion of systems of governance, ranging from single-party autocracy to virtual multi-party democracy, which have served to endorse the chronic condition of human rights violations in the country. In the process of such experimentation, Kenyans have unabatedly been denied the enjoyment of many of their fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to participate in their government. This article analyses Kenya's constitutional order with the intention of highlighting the extent to which the country's citizens have been denied the right to participate in their government. Drawing inspiration from the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the article recommends ways in which this right could be entrenched in the country's constitutional order.

One of the constitutional challenges of regional integration is how to manage the limitation of national judicial sovereignty of member states to ensure that community law is recognized as superior to national law and is accordingly applied and interpreted by national courts at the instance of community citizens. This challenge arises from the national ordering of legal systems and the fact that states are the primary parties to agreements in which they limit their sovereignty in favour of the success of the community. This article examines the enforceability of the law of the Economic Community of West African States in the national courts of the West African states which comprise ECOWAS, with the aim of determining how this affects the integration goals of ECOWAS.

The right to non-discrimination for all children is established in international human rights law. International children's rights law further provides for the common responsibility of parents for the maintenance of their children. African customary law and common law have always made a distinction between children born in and out of wedlock so far as the duty to maintain them is concerned. The resilience of this customary and common law approach is evident in statutory provisions of the countries discussed in this article. This is despite international obligations under children's rights treaties ratified by these countries. On the face of it, the distinction of responsibility based on marital status seems harmless. However, in view of gender inequities and resource distribution between men and women in society, such a distinction has serious implications for the rights of affected children.

This article explores the use of law in development at two levels in Nigeria. Development as a state duty has been provided for under the constitution, thereby creating socio-economic rights for citizens, albeit rights which are unenforceable. Seven development policies drawn up at different times have all also invoked law in one way or another to facilitate the achievement of their respective objectives. Both cases reflect the international trend in their respective discourses. The first approach mirrors the international human rights regime, while the second mimics international development discourse. While the instrumental use of law is desirable, this article argues that it is inadequate. More needs to be done to supplement it. First, courts need to adopt a radical interpretation of the constitutional provisions to make socio-economic rights enforceable. Secondly, people need to be active citizens through participation in the development process.

The influence of the United States of America in the world is reflected not just in the export of its values and policies, but also in the spread of US jurisprudence and legal norms around the world. Many nations try to emulate US trial practice and procedure, while others measure the utility of their procedural rules by US standards. The rule generally prohibiting the admissibility of hearsay evidence is firmly rooted in the common law which is the basis of the legal systems in both the USA and Nigeria. This article explores and compares the jurisprudential and other rationales underpinning the hearsay rule in both jurisdictions. It finds that, although there are slight differences in the trial procedures of the two systems, the general stricture against hearsay evidence is informed by similar rationales in both jurisdictions.

Corporate criminal liability is a problematic concept, especially where it is based on an exceptionable principle such as vicarious liability. This is the case with the South African model. This article seeks to demonstrate that this model requires substantial modification because it compels the court to adopt the incoherent exercise of holding a corporation (which is a distinct person) liable for the intentional act (crime) of any of its agents, whether or not there is criminal intention on the corporation's part and whether or not it was aware of, or could have prevented the commission of the offence. It is submitted that it is more appropriate to hold a corporation liable only where it has been established that the course of conduct that resulted in the offence was encouraged or tolerated by persons who embody the corporation (usually sufficiently empowered managers or members of the board of directors).

The 1994 Malawian Constitution is unique in that it, among other things, recognizes administrative justice as a fundamental right and articulates the notion of constitutional supremacy. This right and the idea of constitutional supremacy have important implications for Malawi's administrative law, which was hitherto based on the common law inherited from Britain. This article highlights the difficulties that Malawian courts have faced in reconciling the right to administrative justice as protected under the new constitution with the common law. In doing so, it offers some insights into what the constitutionalization of administrative justice means for Malawian administrative law. It is argued that the constitution has altered the basis and grounds for judicial review so fundamentally that the Malawian legal system's marriage to the English common law can be regarded as having irretrievably broken down as far as administrative law is concerned.

The Ugandan Supreme Court's decision in Attorney General v Susan Kigula & 417 Others ended a ten year constitutional challenge against capital punishment. The attorney general was appealing the Constitutional Court's declarations that a mandatory death penalty and a delay on death row of more than three years violate Uganda's Constitution. The respondents cross-appealed the Constitutional Court's declarations that the death penalty is constitutional and that hanging is an appropriate and therefore constitutional method of execution. The Supreme Court dismissed both the appeals and cross-appeals. This article summarises the Supreme Court's findings and analyses the court's reasoning. It demonstrates that, while the court's reasoning is generally in line with the interpretations offered by international courts and human rights bodies, the court arguably missed an opportunity to take a bolder approach regarding the relationship between the death penalty and the prohibition on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, particularly in light of recent international trends.

Nigeria's recent efforts to pass local content legislation with stringent targets and stiff penalties have drawn widespread attention, spurred ongoing debate and prompted numerous international workshops and seminars. Lack of local content has been blamed for high unemployment and lack of capacity, and even been linked to militancy in the Niger Delta region. After much debate and delay, the bill has become law. This article reviews the bill's history and tracks the hype surrounding Nigeria's moves towards a legislative mandate. It discusses the provisions of the bill, observing that it is poorly drafted, vague and therefore difficult to comply with. The bill could also violate international agreements, such as bilateral investment treaties and GATT, and is unnecessary in the face of contractual alternatives that could be successfully utilized to enhance local content. Contract models contain ample provisions for enabling local content and have been successfully employed by other resource-rich nations.

In furtherance of its role to entrench good corporate governance practice in Nigeria, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria published a draft revised Code of Corporate Governance. It is intended that this revised code will replace the country's current corporate governance code which came into force in 2003. This article sets out a thorough examination of the draft code with a view to appraising whether the final version of the code will be well-suited to meet its desired goals. Consequently, some of its provisions have been critically reviewed while others have been acclaimed. Furthermore, the article draws attention to the increased responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission in establishing good corporate governance practice and makes extensive suggestions in this regard.

This is the first judgment from the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to address the rights of indigenous peoples and their claims to land and natural resources. It is also the first ruling by an international tribunal which finds a violation of the right to development. The Commission examined the Kenyan government's eviction of the indigenous Endorois community from their ancestral land around Lake Bogoria to establish a game reserve. Finding violations of the rights of the Endorois to religion, culture, property, natural resources and development, the Commission called for the recognition of Endorois ownership of their ancestral land and its restitution to the community. This case note describes the Commission's legal analysis of the Endorois case and explains how the decision establishes an important precedent for ensuring equity and participation in natural resource management and development on indigenous lands.

Section 66 of the 1963 Kenyan Constitution established the Kadhi's courts with the jurisdiction to determine “questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce or inheritance in proceedings in which all the parties profess the Muslim religion”. 26 Christians petitioned the High Court and argued that section 66 was unconstitutional because it, inter alia, violated the principle of separation of Church and state. The court found in their favour and held that Kenya is a secular state, that section 66 violated the doctrine of separation of state and Church, and that it was discriminatory and contrary to section 82 of the constitution which prohibits discrimination. This note gives the facts of the case, the issues before the court and the court's decision. It also analyses the court's decision.