There has been a significant rise in litigation between oil companies and those affected by oil operations in Nigerian courts. In the period 1981–86, 24 compensation claims against Shell went to court in Nigeria. In early 1998, Shell was reportedly involved in over 500 pending court cases in Nigeria, out of which 70 per cent, or roughly 350 cases, dealt with oil spills, the other 30 per cent, or 150 cases, dealt mostly with other types of damage from oil operations, contracts, employment and taxation. In the whole of the 1980s, Chevron reportedly had only up to c. 50 court cases in Nigeria. In early 1998, Chevron was involved in over 200 cases, of which 80–90 per cent, or roughly 160–180 cases, dealt with oil spills, other types of damage from oil operations or land acquisition for oil operations. This substantial increase cannot be solely ascribed to expanding oil operations. There are various indications that an increase in the quantity of oil-related litigation was accompanied by legal change. In the 1990s, a number of high profile cases have been won by the local people in the oil-producing areas, notably Shell v. Farah, in which c. 4.6 million Naira (c. US$210,000 according to the official exchange rate) was awarded as damages to the plaintiffs.

In Botswana, which has one of the fastest growing economies in the world, motor vehicle accidents have become a serious economic and social problem. The waste of human and material resources caused by the resulting deaths, bodily injuries and damage to property has for long been a matter of concern t o the government. This is particularly so because not only are financial resources diverted away from more productive purposes, but members of the public live in fear of being killed, maimed or suffering property damage with no certainty of compensation. Even motor vehicle owners are also adversely affected by the damage to their vehicles and the financially crippling risk of having to pay enormous amounts as damages.

When the Industrial Relations Act was enacted in Swaziland in 1980 its express object was to provide for the collective negotiation of terms and conditions of employment and for the establishment of an Industrial Court for the settlement of disputes arising out of employment. In turn, the avowed purpose for the establishment of the Industrial Court as the nerve centre and most important institution established by the legislative scheme was, and still is, “for the furtherance, securing and maintenance of good industrial relations and employment conditions in Swaziland”. As in the case of other industrial courts and labour adjudicatory institutions with special and limited jurisdiction elsewhere, issues surrounding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court of Swaziland have given rise to a measure of controversy.

In terms of article 6(1) of the Protocol Establishing the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, the Court may entitle both relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission), and individuals to institute directly before it, urgent cases or cases of serious, systematic or massive violations of human rights. In deciding the admissibility of cases brought under article 6(1), the Court may request the opinion of the Commission which must give its opinion as soon as possible. Additionally, article 25(2) of the Protocol provides that the Court may receive written and oral evidence and other representations including expert testimony and it shall make a decision based on such evidence and representations.

In the Internet ruling the Authority did not come to the assistance of the monopoly. It is submitted that the vested interests of the ISPs outweighed any protection that Telkom could claim and it suited the Authority then to have reference to constitutional rights and universal sendee policies to justify its ruling. The Authority's perception of the market-place may have influenced the decision. In the call back ruling, however, the Authority came to the assistance of the monopoly. This ruling was based in part on a desire to protect Telkom's revenue. But it seems because the call back operators were not afforded an opportunity to present a case to protect their interests, the Authority assumed Telkom's interests to be more important. This notwithstanding, in both rulings the Authority opted for a value-laden rather than a technologically informed decision. While this may be commendable in terms of achieving the overall goals of the sector, it does lead to inconsistency. As I have alluded to above, this can perhaps be overcome if the Authority develops a coherent policy framework for decision making, i.e. the White Paper and the Telecommunications Act afford the Authority a number of policy beacons by which they may be guided and it is inappropriate to follow one (the Telkom monopoly) at the expense of others.

In a criminal trial an accused person may either choose not to give evidence or give evidence on oath (or affirmation) or make an unsworn statement from the dock. It is with this latter option that this article is concerned. This right to make a statement without being sworn is recognized in section 218 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (C. P. & E.) which confers competency on an accused person, their wife or husband to testify for the defence at every stage of the proceedings. Section 218(3) provides that: