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The (Un)Constitutional Appropriation and Expenditure of Public Funds in Nigeria: Analysing the “Security Vote” Paradigm through the Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 May 2018

Joy Ngozi Ezeilo ,
Uchechukwu Nwoke  and
Sylvester Ndubuisi Anya
Joy Ngozi Ezeilo*
Affiliation:
University of Nigeria
Uchechukwu Nwoke*
Affiliation:
University of Nigeria
Sylvester Ndubuisi Anya*
Affiliation:
University of Nigeria
*
[email protected]
[email protected]; [email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

Security challenges have continued to trouble governments internationally. From the Islamic State terrorists in the Gulf region, to the murderous activities of Boko Haram and “herdsmen” in Nigeria in recent times, it has become imperative for those entrusted with maintaining security to redefine the conditions of national security. In this context, it is now conventional for various governments in Nigeria to appropriate enormous amounts of money in their budgets for “national security” (“tagged security vote”). This article explores the emergence, configuration, constitutionality and abuses of security votes in Nigeria. It also explores the appropriation and expenditure of security funds in the USA and attempts to draw lessons from this jurisdiction. It argues that there is a robust connection between security votes and corruption and, thus, attempts to identify legal structures for preventing the misspending and embezzlement of public funds (security votes) in the country's monetary appropriation and expenditure.

Keywords

Security votenational securityappropriation and expenditurecorruptionunconstitutionalityNigeria
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of African Law , Volume 62 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 225 - 253
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Copyright
Copyright © SOAS, University of London 2018 

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Footnotes

*

LLB (Nig), BL, LLM (London) PhD (Nig). Professor of law and associate dean, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Nigeria.

**

LLB (Nig), BL, LLM (Wales), PhD (Kent). Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Nigeria.

***

LLB, BL, LLM, PhD (Nig). Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Nigeria.

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72 Ibid.

73 Id at 27.

74 Ibid.

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111 Ibid.

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113 Ibid.

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115 Ibid.

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118 The Constitution, fifth sched, para 1.

119 Ibid.

120 [2016] 2 NWLR (pt 1495) 1 at 59, paras A–C. See also Attorney-General of the Federation v Abubakar [2007] 8 NWLR (pt 1035) 117.

121 The Constitution, sec 308.

122 Cap E1 LFN, 2004.

123 Cap C31 LFN, 2004.

124 The Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, secs 5–6 and 8–9.

125 Id, secs 12–13.

126 Id, sec 16.

127 Id, sec 19.

128 Apparently, the anti-corruption agencies are unable to act in this context because they are establishments of the executive arm, which are also the major perpetrators of security vote corruption. It is, therefore, virtually impossible for an appointee of a particular government to prosecute those who appointed him. Again, the functions of these agencies are usually politicized. This emasculates their ability to function effectively.

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