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Corporate Social Responsibility in the Niger Delta: Past, Present and Future Challenges

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2022

Paul Samuel Tamuno
Paul Samuel Tamuno*
Affiliation:
University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

Multinational oil companies adopted corporate social responsibility as a means of addressing the challenges of their relationship with the Niger Delta communities, which had been turbulent for several decades as a result of the ecological devastation of the Niger Delta region. This article analyses the challenges of implementing corporate social responsibility in the Niger Delta, from the inception of the Nigerian oil industry to the present day. Using the experiences of multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta as a case study, the article explores the extent to which multinational oil companies operating in developing countries are increasingly assuming roles that are not traditional corporate roles, to compensate for the bad governance and poor regulatory standards in these countries. The article also provides recommendations for what the Nigerian government can do to develop corporate social responsibility and make it more effective.

Keywords

Corporate social responsibilityNiger Deltaenvironmental devastationhuman rightscommunity participation
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of African Law , Volume 66 , Issue 3 , October 2022 , pp. 391 - 417
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London

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Footnotes

*

LLB (Hons) (Port Harcourt), BL, LLM (Aberdeen), PhD (Aberdeen). Associate professor and head, Private and Property Law Department, Faculty of Law, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

References

1 Ebeku, KS “Oil and the Niger Delta people in international law: Resource rights, environmental and equity issues” (2006) 1 Oil and Gas Energy Law Intelligence 1Google Scholar at 25.

2 Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (2008, Government of Nigeria) at 102.

3 “As Nigeria oil reserves rise to 37 billion barrels …” (1 January 2017) This Day (Nigeria), available at: <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/01/01/as-nigerias-oil-reserves-rise-to-37-billion-barrels/> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

4 “Nigeria” (25 June 2020, US Energy Information Administration), available at: <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=NGA> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

5 From 1975 to 2010, oil accounted for between 70% and 80% of Nigeria's total government revenue: CI Obi “Oil extraction, dispossession, resistance, and conflict in Nigeria's oil rich Niger Delta” (2010) 30 Canadian Journal of Developmental Studies 219 at 223. In 2014, crude oil accounted for 95% of Nigeria's total exports and 58% of total government revenue: “Nigeria”, ibid.

6 “Niger Delta natural resources damage assessment and restoration project: Phase I scoping report” (May 2006, Federal Ministry of Environment, Nigerian Conservation Foundation, WWF UK and International Union for Conservation of Nature) at 1, available at: <http://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/niger_delta_natural_resource_damage_assessment_and_restoration_project_recommendation.doc> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

7 Niger Delta Human Development Report (2006, UN Development Programme) at 76.

8 The DPR has been criticized as comprising personnel who lack technical skills and resources. DPR personnel often had to rely on MNOCs for logistic support in planning visits to pollution sites: Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta (2009, Amnesty International) at 12.

9 It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse the various CSR definitions. For such an analysis, see A Okoye “Theorising corporate social responsibility as an essentially contested concept: Is a definition necessary?” (2009) 89/4 Journal of Business Ethics 613. For the purposes of this article, Hamidu et al's features of a good definition of CSR will suffice. They argue that a good definition of CSR must highlight the fact that it is voluntary, aligns economic profit-making responsibilities with social responsibilities towards society and is one the company's important values: AA Hamidu, HM Haron and A Amran “Corporate social responsibility: A review on definitions, core characteristics and theoretical perspectives” (2015) 6/4 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 83 at 85.

10 The EC's definition of CSR encapsulates the features identified by Hamidu et al discussed in “Corporate social responsibility”, ibid.

11 “Communication from the Commission concerning corporate social responsibility: A business contribution to sustainable development” (2002, EC) COM at 3.

12 Ibid.

13 Id at 8.

14 See generally, TK Cheruiyot and P Osando “Corporate social responsibility in Africa: Context, paradoxes, stakeholder orientations, contestation and reflections” in A Stachowicz-Stanusch (ed) Corporate Social Performance in the Age of Irresponsibility: Cross National Perspective (2016, Information Age Publishers) 89; R Rampersad and C Skinner “Examining the practice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in sub-Saharan Africa” (2014) 12/1 Corporate Ownership & Control 723.

15 AFM Maniruzzaman “Global business and human rights” (2006) 67 Amicus Curiae Journal 11.

16 Ochieze, C “Corporate complicity in the extractive industry: Where does legal liability stand?” (2007) 5/2 Oil and Gas Energy Law Intelligence 1Google Scholar at 8.

17 “Guiding principles on business and human rights” (2011, UN) at 18–19.

18 Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability: Volume 1 Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal Path (report of the International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes), available at: <https://www.icj.org/report-of-the-icj-expert-legal-panel-on-corporate-complicity-in-international-crimes/> (last accessed 15 February 2022). It is beyond the scope of this work to analyse the various forms of complicity.

19 UN Economic and Social Council E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2, para 10(c). These norms have been superseded by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 2011. However, they are useful in tracing the history of the international response to business complicity in human rights violations.

20 See generally, R Goodland “Free, prior, informed consent and the World Bank Group” (2004) 4/2 Sustainable Development Law and Policy 66.

21 Scholars have described social licences as informal contracts between companies and the communities in which they operate, aimed at shaping the communities’ perception of the acceptability of the companies and their local operations: RG Boutilier and I Thomson “Modelling and measuring the social license to operate: Fruits of a dialogue between theory and practice”, available at: <http://socialicense.com/publications/Modelling and Measuring the SLO.pdf> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

22 The term CSR is believed to have been coined by HR Bowen in 1953: “What's wrong with corporate social responsibility” (2006, Corporate Watch) at 6, available at: <https://corporatewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CSRreport.pdf> (last accessed 1 March 2022).

23 AB Carroll “The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders” (1991) Business Horizons 34 at 37.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 NA Nalband and SA Kelabi “Redesigning Carroll's CSR pyramid model” (2014) 2/3 Journal of Advanced Management Sciences 236.

27 W Visser “Revisiting Carroll's CSR pyramid: An African perspective” in ER Pedersen and M Huniche (eds) Corporate Citizenship in a Development Perspective (2005, Copenhagen Business School Press) 29 at 30.

28 Ibid.

29 See generally, Y Omorogbe “The legal framework for public participation in decision-making on mining and energy development in Nigeria: Giving voices to the voiceless” in DN Zillman, AR Lucas and G(R) Pring (eds) Human Rights in Natural Resources Development: Public Participation in the Sustainable Development of Mining and Energy Resources (2002, Oxford University Press) 549.

30 “Beyond the financial crisis: What next for economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries” (Panos media brief, 2010) at 3, available at: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b27e5274a27b20009c3/economic_growth_layout_final_web_loojZV2h.pdf> (last accessed 20 February 2022).

31 Carroll “The pyramid”, above at note 23 at 38.

32 Visser “Revisiting Carroll's”, above at note 27 at 34.

33 Ibid.

34 Examples of this abound in Nigeria. Omoregbe, for instance, asserts that the Land Use Act 1978 was enacted by the Nigerian government on the insistence of MNOCs to enable them to have unlimited access to community lands for their oil operations: Omorogbe “The legal framework”, above at note 29 at 549–50. For an analysis of how Nigeria compromises environmental regulation to encourage investments by MNOCs, see NE Ojukwu-Ogba “Legal and regulatory instrument on environmental pollution in Nigeria: Much talk, less teeth” (2006) 8/9 International Energy Law and Taxation Review 208 at 215–17. For an analysis of how gas-flaring prohibition laws have been repeatedly compromised, mostly due to the government's lack of political will but also in accession to the demands of MNOCs, see PS Tamuno “A sequential analysis of Nigeria's attempts to end gas-flaring” (2018) International Energy Law Review 21.

35 Carroll “The pyramid”, above at note 23 at 38.

36 Id at 39.

37 Visser “Revisiting Carroll's”, above at note 27 at 34.

38 Ibid.

39 Carroll “The pyramid”, above at note 23 at 38.

40 Id at 39.

41 Visser “Revisiting Carroll's”, above at note 27 at 33.

42 T Olaniyi, J Azeez and ST Abdusalam “Impact of corporate social responsibility on firms’ profitability: Evidence from Nigeria and Sierra Leone” (2015) 16/2 Amity Business Review 1.

43 Id at 7.

44 Ibid.

45 Ownership of petroleum resources is vested in the federal government of Nigeria (Constitution of Nigeria 1999, sec 44(3) and Petroleum Act 1969, sec 1). Oil exploration adversely affects the NDP's use and enjoyment of their lands. The system of compensation prescribed under Nigerian law is inadequate. Sec 43 of the constitution guarantees the right to own immoveable property in Nigeria, while sec 44 guarantees that land shall only be compulsorily acquired under the provisions of a statute that guarantees prompt payment of compensation. Sec 44(2)(M) provides that compensation shall be paid for damage to economic trees, crops, buildings etc. The Land Use Act 1978 and the Petroleum Act 1969, first sched, para 37 provide that this compensation shall only be paid for surface interests.

46 In fairness to the MNOCs, the oil industry in Nigeria has had a turbulent history. In the first decade since the commercial discovery of crude oil, a series of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria degenerated into a civil war that resulted in the destruction of the oil infrastructure existing at the time. Accounts of the destruction of oil facilities during the war can be found in: Nigeria: Petroleum, above at note 8 at 16; and KS Wiwa On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War (1989, Saros International) at 137.

47 JG Frynas “The oil industry in Nigeria: Conflict between oil companies and local people” in JG Frynas and S Pegg (eds) Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (2003, Palgrave Macmillan) 99 at 104.

48 The Ogoni are an agrarian ethnic group in the Niger Delta.

49 “Shell” is used in this article to describe the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. This is a subsidiary of Shell International.

50 KS Wiwa Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy (1988, Saros International) at 85; LS Pyagbara “The Ogoni of Nigeria: Oil and the peoples’ struggle” in A Whitmore (ed) Pitfalls and Pipelines: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industries (2012, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs / Tebtebba Foundation) 124.

51 For an analysis of judicial actions on the Niger Delta, see Tamuno, PS “Negligence versus strict liability: The fight against environmental degradation in the Niger Delta” (2011) 6 Oil and Gas Energy Law Intelligence 1Google Scholar.

52 “The Ogoni crisis: A case study of military repression in southeastern Nigeria” (1995) 7/5 Human Rights Watch at 8–11, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Nigeria.htm> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

53 For an analysis of the Ogoni crisis, see A Rowell, J Marriot and L Stockman The Next Gulf: London Washington and the Oil Conflict in Nigeria (2005, Constables and Robinsons) at 1.

54 AFM Maniruzzaman “Global business”, above at note 15 at 11–12.

55 Ibid.

56 For the NDP, the inability to find remedy in the domestic courts was as a result of the challenges encountered in the Torts Law Grievance Redress Mechanism. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an analysis of these challenges; for such an analysis, see PS Tamuno “The tort of negligence and environmental justice in the Niger Delta” (2017) 1 Oil and Gas Energy Law Intelligence 1.

57 A Cassese International Law (2001, Oxford University Press) at 3; C Warbrick “States and recognition in international law” in MD Evans International Law (2006, Oxford University Press) 217.

58 See “The Ogoni crisis”, above at note 52.

59 M Friedman “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profit” (13 September 1970) New York Times Magazine.

60 The Nigerian oil industry commenced in 1956 when commercial discovery of oil was made in Oloibiri in the Niger Delta: EE Osaghae “Managing multiple minority problems in a divided society: The Nigerian experience” (1988) 36/1 Journal of Modern African Studies 1 at 23; Nigeria was mostly under a military regime from independence in 1960 until the democratic elections in 1999.

61 The phrase “corporate philanthropy” was derived from U Idemudia “Corporate partnership and community development in the Nigerian oil industry: Strength and limitations” (2007, UN Research Institute for Social Development) at 8–9.

62 KSA Ebeku “Oil and the Niger Delta people: The injustice of the Land Use Act” (2004) 9 Centre for Energy Petroleum Mineral Law and Policy 7.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Petroleum Act 1969, sec 1 vested the entire ownership and control of petroleum in the federal government. Land Use Act 1978, secs 1 and 2 vested ownership of all Nigerian lands in the government and gave private and community land owners a right of possession for 99 years.

66 JG Frynas “Corporate and state responses to anti-oil protest in the Niger Delta” (2001) 100 African Affairs 27 at 31.

67 Ibid.

68 Nigerian Constitution, sec 44(3) and Petroleum Act, sec 1 vested ownership of petroleum in the federal government: Frynas, id at 32.

69 Suit no CA/L/25/85.

70 This decree empowered the military government to detain anyone who was a threat to security for a renewable period of three months without trial.

71 This decree exempted the court from requiring jurisdiction to examine the validity of any action taken by the military government.

72 Suit no CA/L/25/85, para 14.

73 Tamuno “Negligence versus strict liability”, above at note 51.

74 Suit no W/89/71 (unreported), High Court, Warri, 26 November 1973.

75 Wiwa described the ecological devastation of the Niger Delta as “genocide” on the NDP, perpetrated by the Nigerian military government in partnership with the MNOCs: Wiwa Genocide in Nigeria, above at note 50 at 103. See also Rowell, Marriot and Stockman The Next Gulf, above at note 53 at 38.

76 The Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission was established in 1993 to provide infrastructure in oil producing communities. This agency has been widely criticized as failing to engender communities’ participation. See Omotola, S “From OMPADEC to NDDC: An assessment of state responses” (2007) 54/1 Africa Today 73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tamuno, PS “The rights to participation and consultation and the conflict in the Niger Delta” (2015) 13/6 Oil and Gas Energy Law Intelligence 1Google Scholar.

77 Comm no 155/96.

78 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art 4.

79 Id, art 24.

80 Id, art 21.

81 Comm no 155/96, above at note 77, para 55.

82 Ibid.

83 Frynas, JG “The false developmental promise of corporate social responsibility: Evidence from multinational oil companies” (2005) 81/3 International Affairs 581CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 584–85.

84 Idemudia “Corporate partnership”, above at note 61 at 9.

85 Ibid.

86 Id at 8–9.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 U Idemudia and U Ite “Corporate-community relations in Nigeria's oil industry: Challenges and imperatives” (2006) 13 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 194 at 199.

90 Shell Petroleum Development Company 2004 People and the Environment (2003 annual report, Shell Petroleum Development Company), cited in Idemudia “Corporate partnership”, above at note 61 at 9.

91 SO Aghalinno “Oil exploitation and the accentuation of intergroup conflicts in the Niger Delta, Nigeria” (2009) 28/3 Journal of Human Ecology 153 at 156.

92 R Ako “Resource exploitation and environmental justice: The Nigerian experience” in FN Botchway (ed) Natural Resource Investment and Africa's Development (2011, Edward Elgar) 72.

93 Tamuno “The rights to participation”, above at note 76 at 1–2.

94 K Mate Communities, Civil Society Organizations and the Management of Mineral Wealth (2002, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development) at 8.

95 Id at 9.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 Id at 10.

100 For instance, in 1998 Shell, Mobil and the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Company signed an MOU with the traditional heads of Bonny Kingdom: JG Frynas Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation Between Oil Companies and Village Communities (2000, Lit Verlag) at 52.

101 Idemudia “Corporate partnership”, above at note 61 at 9.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 Sagebie, J “The corporate social responsibilities of Canadian mining companies in Latin America: A systems perspective.” (2008) 14/3 Canadian Foreign Policy 103Google Scholar at 112; B Horrigan Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices across Governments Law and Business (2010, Edward Elgar) at 153.

107 H Ward Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibility: Taking Stock (2004, World Bank and International Finance Corporation) at 7, available at: <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16014IIED.pdf> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

108 Ibid.

109 T Fox, H Ward and B Howard Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibility: A Baseline Study (2002, World Bank) at 3, available at: <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16017IIED.pdf> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

110 Ibid. Ward Public Sector Roles, above at note 107 at 5.

111 For instance, the Companies Act of India 2013, sec 135 provides that any company with a net value of at least INR 500 Crore or at least INR 1,000 Crore in turnover in any financial year is bound to apply 2% of its turnover to CSR. Secs 260(7) and 450 provide that failure to comply with any of the provisions of the act (including provisions on CSR) shall attract a fine at the first instance and, subsequently, imprisonment of the directors.

112 Knuutinen, R “Corporate social responsibility, taxation and aggressive tax planning” (2014) 1 Nordic Tax Journal 36Google Scholar at 39.

113 A Karnani “Mandatory CSR in India: A bad proposal” (May 2013) Stanford Social Innovation Review, available at: <https://ssir.org/articles/entry/mandatory_csr_in_india_a_bad_proposal> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

114 Perhaps in recognition of this challenge, the Indian Companies Act 2013, sec 135 provides further that, if the 2% CSR allocation is not made by a company in a given year, the company must provide an explanation to avoid being penalized. This provision has rendered the mandatory regulation of CSR in India ineffective, as many companies use this loophole to avoid engaging in CSR: “The Companies Act 2013: Road to CSR non-compliance” (20 May 2016) The Financial Express, available at: <https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/column-the-companies-act-2013-road-to-csr-non-compliance/260467/> (last accessed 1 March 2022).

115 Karnani “Mandatory CSR in India”, above at note 113.

116 Ibid.

117 The commission was established in 2000 to address the absence of infrastructure in the region: Omotola “From OMPADEC to NDDC”, above at note 76 at 73.

118 See generally, I Usa Doing Business and Investing in Nigeria Guide (2009, International Business). However, in the case of Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited v Federal Board of Inland Revenue (1996) 8 NWLR (pt 466) 256, the Nigerian Supreme Court noted that MNOCs’ expenses on scholarships, exchange rate losses (due to the payment of profit tax) and the Central Bank's commission for payment of profit tax were all allowable deductions from MNOCs’ tax.

119 P Nieto “Why regulating corporate social responsibility is a conceptual error and implies a dead weight for competitiveness” (2014) The European Enterprise Journal 25.

120 Ibid.

121 Fox, Ward and Howard Public Sector Roles, above at note 109 at 3–5.

122 Ward Public Sector Roles, above at note 107 at 5.

123 Fox, Ward and Howard Public Sector Roles, above at note 109 at 6.

124 For analysis of how MNOCs use CSR in their favour in developing countries, see: Frynas, JG “The false developmental promises of corporate social responsibility: Evidence from the experiences of multinational oil companies” (2005) 81/3 International Affairs 581CrossRefGoogle Scholar; K Amaeshi et al “Corporate social responsibility in Nigeria: Western mimicry or indigenous influences” (2006) 24 Journal of Corporate Citizenship 83; Frynas, JG “Corporate social responsibility in the oil and gas sector” (2009) 2/3 Journal of World Energy Law & Business 178CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

125 “What's wrong with corporate social responsibility”, above at note 22.

126 “Industry's Rio +10 strategy: Banking on feelgood PR” (December 2001) Corporate Europe Observer, available at: <http://archive.corporateeurope.org/observer10/basd.html> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

127 Ibid.

128 Frynas Oil in Nigeria, above at note 100 at 51–52.

129 U Idemudia “Corporate social responsibility and the rentier Nigerian state: Rethinking the role of government and the possibility of corporate social development in the Niger Delta” (2010) 30/1–2 Canadian Journal of Development Studies 131 at 143.

130 Fox, Ward and Howard Public Sector Roles, above at note 109 at 5; Ward Public Sector Roles, above at note 107 at 5.

131 B Campbell “Corporate social responsibility and development in Africa: Redefining the roles and responsibilities of public and private actors in the mining sector” (2011) Resource Policy Journal 2.

132 “Shell, NDDC and Niger Delta women support” (3 April 2012) The Nigerian Tide at 6–7.

133 This bill was titled the Corporate Social Responsibility Commission (Establishment, etc) Bill 2007.

134 Id, sec 1(1).

135 Id, sec 5(1).

136 Id, sec 5(1)(l).

137 Id, sec 5(1)(i).

138 Id, sec 5(1)(f)(m)(n).

139 Id, sec 5(1)(i).

140 Id, sec 7(2).

141 Id, sec 7(3).

142 Ibid.

143 Id, sec 7(4).

144 For detailed discussions on these approaches, see generally: R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy and Practice (2012, Oxford University Press); and Oyewunmi, T “Examining the role of regulation in restructuring and development of gas supply markets in the United States and Europe” (2017) 40/1 Houston Journal of International Law 191Google Scholar.

145 Indeed, Nigeria has successfully adopted the incentive-based approach in other sectors of the Nigerian oil industry. For instance, the incentives provided under the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (Fiscal Incentives Guarantees and Assurances) Act 1990 were instrumental to the establishment of associated gas utilization projects in Nigeria, such as the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Project and the Oso Condensate Project. See Tamuno, PS “A sequential analysis of Nigeria's attempts to end gas flaring” (2018) 1 International Energy Law Review 17Google Scholar.

146 C Mordi et al “Corporate social responsibility and the legal regulation in Nigeria” (2012) LXIV/1 Economic Insights - Trends and Challenges 1.

147 L Raimi et al “Survey on the adequacy and effectiveness of regulations on corporate social responsibility and social reporting: Evidence from the Nigerian telecommunication industry” (2014) 2/2 Net Journal of Business Management 18 at 22.

148 Ibid.

149 Mordi et al “Corporate social responsibility”, above at note 146 at 6.

150 Ibid.

151 JS Olatunji “Reps pass bill for companies to adopt corporate social responsibility” (5 July 2018) Nigerian Tribune, available at: <https://tribuneonlineng.com/reps-pass-bill-for-companies-to-adopt-corporate-social-responsibility/> (last accessed 1 March 2022).

152 See Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act (Amendment) Bill 2018, preamble.

153 Approximately USD 139.

154 Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act (Amendment) Bill, sec 1.

155 Olatunji “Reps pass bill”, above at note 151.

156 The OECD is an intergovernmental economic organization founded to stimulate global economic growth: “Who we are”, available at: <https://www.oecd.org/about/> (last accessed 15 February 2022).

157 The guidelines have been updated several times. This article refers to the 2011 update of the guidelines. See “Organization for Economic Corporation and Development guidelines for multinational enterprise 2011”, chap IV.

158 See UNGP, preamble, para B.

159 Abe, O “The feasibility of implementing the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in the extractive industry in Nigeria” (2016) 7/1 Afe Babalola University Journal of Sustainable Development, Law & Policy 137Google Scholar at 149.

160 Ibid.

161 This policy was preceded by the UN Global Compact of 2000 (UNGC 2000), which encouraged businesses to engage in sustainable and social responsibility practices.

162 A Business Reference Guide: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2013, UN Global Compact) at 7.

163 See “The United Nations Global Compact”, available at: <https://www.ioe-emp.org/international-organisations/united-nations-global-compact> (last accessed 4 March 2022).

164 A Business Reference Guide, above at note 162 at 7.

165 A Rasche A Necessary Supplement: What the United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not? (2007, Helmut Schmidt University) at 18.

166 Ekenedirichukwu, EG “Multinationals and adherence to the United Nations Global Compact: A focus on Shell Petroleum Development Company in Nigeria” (2011) 13/3 Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 149Google Scholar at 160.

167 Ibid. This comment was directed at UNGC 2000 and has been carried on to the UNGC 2013.

168 Indeed, several other soft law treaties on CSR exist, such as the ISO 26000 and International Labour Organization frameworks.

169 CM Chinkin “The challenge of soft law: Development and change in international law” (1989) 38/4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850.

170 Cohen and Uphoff recommended a typology of participation that looks into the dimensions of participation: JM Cohen and NT Uphoff “Participation's place in rural development: Seeking clarity through specificity” (1980) 8 World Development 218. Typologies of participation were developed by academics in response to the widespread adoption by NGOs and international institutions of the concept of participation from the 1960s onwards: A Cornwall “Unpacking participation: Models, meanings and practices” (2008) Community Development Journal 269.

171 Cohen and Uphoff, id at 219.

172 Id at 220.

173 Cohen recommends that communities’ resource contribution may take several forms, including provision of labour, information, material goods or even cash: ibid.

174 Id at 219.

175 Ibid.

176 Id at 222.

177 Id at 219.

178 Id at 224.

179 Ibid.

180 Ibid.

181 Id at 224–25.